This is a reproduction of a library book that was digitized by Google as part of an ongoing effort to preserve the information in books and make it universally accessible.

Google™ books

https://books.google.com



Digitized by Google



Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google

French F.M.
Dec. 2. 1920.

Field-Marshal Rt. Hon. Viscount FRENCH, K.P., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G.

Colonel 19th Hussars and Irish Guards. Colonel-in-Chief Royal Irish Regiment.

Photo by Vandyk

Digitized by Google

THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

WITH THE SANCTION OF THE ARMY COUNCIL.

UNDER THE DIRECTION OF
FIELD-MARSHAL EARL HAIG, K.T., G.C.B., ETC.
(COLONEL ROYAL HORSE GUARDS AND 17TH LANCERS),
ASSISTED BY
LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR R. S. S. BADEN-POWELL, BT., K.C.B., K.C.V.O.
(COLONEL 13TH HUSSARS),
LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR P. W. CHETWODE, BT., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.,
COL.-COMMANDANT A. E. W. HARMAN, C.B., D.S.O.,
LIEUT.-COLONEL SIR A. LEETHAM, KNT., C.M.G.

Vol. XI

JANUARY to OCTOBER, 1921.

Published at
ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION, WHITEHALL, S.W.1
LONDON
1921

Digitized by Google

UE 1
C 3
v.11

HONORARY EDITORS AND SUB-EDITORS.

Managing Editor:

Major-General Sir N. M. SMYTH, V.C., K.C.B. (Colonel 3rd Dragoon Guards).

Editor:

The Commandant of the Cavalry School, Netheravon.

Sporting Editor:

Lieut.-Colonel T. B. PHILLIPS, O.B.E. (late 13th Hussars)

Sub-Editors:

Royal Horse and Royal Field Artillery: Colonel J. E. C. LIVINGSTONE-LEARMONTH, C.M.G., D.S.O., R.A.

Yeomanry: Lieut.-Colonel F. H. D. C. WHITMORE, C.M.G., D.S.O., T.D., Essex Yeomanry.

Royal Air Force: Squadron Leader A. W. H. JAMES, M.C., R.A.F. (late 3rd Hussars).

Tank Corps: Captain F. E. HOTBLACK, D.S.O., M.C. (2nd Tank Battalion).

Australia: Lieut.-Colonel W. J. FOSTER, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Department of Defence, Melbourne, Victoria.

Canada: Brigadier-General R. W. PATERSON, C.M.G., D.S.O. (Fort Garry Horse).

Egypt: Major GOUGH COBDEN, O.B.E., 9th Lancers, attd. Egyptian Army.

India: The Commandant Cavalry School, Saugor.

New Zealand: Lieut.-Colonel G. C. POWLES, C.M.G., D.S.O., N.Z. Staff Corps, Wellington.

South Africa: Major N. H. M. BURNE, C.M.G., D.S.O., S.A. Mounted Rifles, Department of Defence, Pretoria.

Published at
THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION, WHITEHALL, S.W.1.

Director of Publicity:
C. GILBERT-WOOD, F.R.G.S., F.R.S.A., M.J.I., ETC.,
11, Red Lion Square, W.C.1.

Printers:
J. J. KELIHER & Co., LTD., Craven House, Kingsway, W.C.2,
and Marshalsea Works, S.E.1.

Digitized by Google

INDEX

Aerial Survey, 165, 169.
Anatolia, Cavalry Work in (*Map*). By *Maj. J. K. McConnel, D.S.O., M.C.*, 53.
Armoured Car Experience, An. By *Lambade*, 162.
Armoured Cars with Cavalry, The Co-operation of (*Illustrated*). By *Maj. A. J. Clifton, O.B.E.*, 247, 378.

Balkans, The. By *M. L.*, 121.
Bayonet, Training in the use of the (*Illustrated*). By *Lt.-Col. T. G. Dalby, D.S.O.*, 263.
Blenheim, 329.
Borwick, Lt.-Col. Malcolm, D.S.O. : Equitation, 48.
Browne, Lt.-Col. J. G., C.M.G., D.S.O., 14th King's Hussars : Operations of the Mounted Troops of the E.E.F. (*Maps*), 223.

Cambrai, 69.
"*Capevi*" : An Indian Cavalry Action in Mesopotamia (*Map*), 405.
Cavalry Cocked Hat, The (*Illustrated*). By *Edward Fraser*, 389.
Cavalry Subaltern on £200 a Year, A. By *R. R. G.*, 87.
Cavalry War Memorial, The, 91, 201, 435.
Charrington, Maj. H. V. S., M.C., 12th P.O.W. Royal Lancers : Hotchkiss Guns, 58.
Clifton, Maj. A. J., O.B.E. : The Co-operation of Armoured Cars with Cavalry (*Illustrated*), 247, 378.
Compass Knowledge, 17.

Dalby, Lt.-Col. T. G., D.S.O. : The Small Arms School, Hythe (*Illustrated*), 191.
— Training in the use of the Bayonet (*Illustrated*), 263.
Disbandments, The Proposed, *to face p.* 111, 312.
Door Ajar, The (*Maps*). By *Col. Ewing Paterson, D.S.O.*, 395.

Edwards, Maj.-Gen. Sir A. H. M., K.B.E., C.B., M.V.O. : Inoculation for African Horse Sickness, 421.
Equitation. By *Lt.-Col. Malcolm Borwick, D.S.O.*, 48.

F.A.N.Y., The (*Illustrated*). By *A. H. Gamwell* and *P. Beauchamp Waddell*, 272.
Falconry, 64.
Field Trials for Gundogs (*Illustrated*). By *The Sporting Editor*, 74, 187.
Fifth Cavalry Brigade at Cerizy, The (*Maps*). By *Lt.-Col. R. G. H. Howard-Vyse, C.M.G., D.S.O.*, Royal Horse Guards, 111.

M66378

Digitized by Google

Fraser, Edward: The Cavalry Cocked Hat (*Illustrated*), 389.
French, Field-Marshal Viscount (*Portrait*), 1.
Foster, Lt.-Col. W. J., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.: Operations of the Mounted Troops of the E.E.F. (*Illustrated*), 3, 127.

Gallant French Female Hussar, A. (*Illustrated*). By *Lt.-Col. Sir Arthur Leetham, C.M.G.*, 256.
Gamwell, A. H., and *P. Beauchamp Waddell:* The F.A.N.Y. (*Illustrated*), 272.
Gaza, 225.

Haig, Speech by Field-Marshal Earl, 95.
Helmets *Illustrated* by *R. Caton Woodville*, 386.
Historical Records of British Cavalry (*Illustrated*). By *J. Paine*, 79.
Homing Instinct in Horses, 93.
Hotchkiss Guns with Cavalry. By *Maj. H. V. S. Charrington, M.C.*, 58.
" " " By *Bt.-Lt.-Col. C. B. D. Strettell*, 300.
Howard-Vyse, Lt.-Col. R. G. H., C.M.G., D.S.O., Royal Horse Guards: The 5th Cavalry Brigade at Cerizy (*Maps*), 111.
Hunter's Observations on the African Elephant, A (*Illustrated*). By *A. C. Leggo*, 278.
Hunting Trip with Arabs, A. By *Maj. F. H. Sutton, M.C.*, 324.

Indian Cavalry Action in Mesopotamia, An (*Maps*). By "*Capevi*," 405.
Inoculation for African Horse Sickness. By *Maj.-Gen. Sir A. H. M Edwards, K.B.E., C.B., M.V.O.*, 421.

Kadir Cup, 318.
Kicking in the Stable (*Illustrated*), 92.
Kinlark, H.R.H. the Prince of Wales's (*Portrait*), 118.

"*Lambade*": An Armoured Car Experience, 162.
Leetham, Lt.-Col. Sir Arthur, C.M.G.: A Gallant French Female Hussar (*Illustrated*), 256.
— Speech by, 95.
Leggo, A. C.: A Hunter's Observations (*Illustrated*), 278.
Londonderry, General Charles, Third Marquess of (*Portrait*). By *R. H.*, 84.

M. L.: The Balkans, 121.
McConnell, Maj. J. K., D.S.O., M.C., 20th Hussars: Cavalry Work in Anatolia (*Map*), 53.

Digitized by Google

Machine Gun Corps (Cavalry) in France (*Maps*). By *Capt. T. Preston, M.C.*, Yorkshire Hussars, 66, 180, 288, 409.
MacLeod, Maj. M. N., D.S.O., M.C., R.E.: Survey Work in Modern War (*Illustrated*), 165.
Microphones, 173.
Miller, Lt.-Col. E. D., D.S.O.: Polo, 304.

Noel, Capt. J.: Training in the Revolver (*Illustrated*), 39.

Operations of the Mounted Troops of the E.E.F. (*Illustrated*).
By *Lt.-Col. W. J. Foster, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.*, 3, 127.
,, *Lt.-Col. J. G. Browne, C.M.G., D.S.O.*, 223.
,, *Lt.-Col. Rex Osborne, D.S.O., M.C.*, 331.
Osborne, Lt.-Col. Rex, D.S.O., M.C., 20th Hussars: Operations of the Mounted Troops of the E.E.F. (*Illustrated*), 331.

Page of Unrecorded Regimental History, A (*Illustrated*), 196.
Paine, J.: Historical Records of British Cavalry (*Illustrated*), 79.
Paterson, Col. Ewing, D.S.O.: Swordsmanship (*Illustrated*), 260.
— The Door Ajar (*Maps*), 395.
Preston, Capt. T., M.C., Yorkshire Hussars: The Machine Gun Corps (Cavalry) in France (*Maps*), 66, 180, 288, 409.
Polo. By *Lt.-Col. E. D. Miller, D.S.O.*, 304.

R. H.: Third Marquess of Londonderry (*Portrait*), 84.
R. R. G.: A Cavalry Subaltern on £200 a Year, 87.
Revolver, Training in the (*Illustrated*). By *Capt. J. Noel*, 39.
Richardson's Bluff, Capture of, 164.
Rifle Associations, 93.
Romani, 127.

Saunders-Knox-Gore, Bt.-Lt.-Col. W. A. C., D.S.O.: Outline of Gen. Smuts' Campaign in East Africa (*Portrait*), 245.
Sinai, 4.
Small Arms School, Hythe, The. By *Lt.-Col. T. G. Dalby, D.S.O.*, 191.
Smuts' Campaign in East Africa, Outline of Gen. (*Portrait*). By *Bt.-Lt.-Col. W. A. C. Saunders-Knox-Gore, D.S.O.*, 245.
Snipers, 94.
Sporting Notes. By *The Sporting Editor*, 100, 202, 315, 435.
Strettell, Bt.-Lt.-Col. C. B. D.: Hotchkiss Guns, 300.
Survey Work in Modern War (*Illustrated*). By *Maj. M. N. MacLeod, D.S.O., M.C.*, R.E., 165.
Sutton, Maj. F. H., M.C., 11th Hussars: A Hunting Trip with Arabs, 324.
Swordsmanship (*Illustrated*). By *Col. Ewing Paterson, D.S.O.*, 260.

Digitized by Google

Tail Docking (*Illustrated*), 427.
Tips to Gamekeepers, 102.

Valiant Young Adversary in the Peninsular War, A (*Illustrated*). By *Percy White*, 33.

White, Percy: A Valiant Young Adversary (*Illustrated*), 33.
Woodville, R. Caton: Illustrations of Helmets, 386.

Digitized by Google

PLATES

Field-Marshal Rt. Hon. Viscount French, K.P.	*Frontispiece*	
The Right and the Wrong Way	*To face page*	74
Pointer and Setter Field Trials	„	75
R.H.A., Life Guard, Officer of Dragoons 1803	„	78
Light Dragoons, Dragoon Guards, Officer Light Dragoons	„	79
Lieut.-General Charles Third Marquess of Londonderry	„	84
The Great Ascot Record, 1919	„	100
The Capture of Richardson's Bluff at Sharqat	„	111
H.R.H. the Prince of Wales's Kinlark	„	118
Survey Work in Modern War, A D.H.9	„	164
„ „ „ „ A B.E.2.E. in Flight	„	165
Pointer and Setter at Work	„	188
It's all right, the Major's up	„	189
Fifty Years Ago, School of Musketry	„	190
French Caricatures of the British Army	„	191
Charge of the 5th Dragoon Guards at Harbonnières, 1918	„	223
General the Rt. Hon. Jan Christian Smuts	„	245
A Scrimmage	„	260
F.A.N.Y. on the Western Front	„	272
The African Elephant	„	278, 279
Blenheim, August 13th, 1704	„	329
The Charge at El Mughar	„	373
Palestine (*Folding Map*)	„	376
Armoured Cars on the Indian Frontier	„	384
Design for Shrapnel Helmet	„	385
Riding for First Spear	„	439

Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google

THE

CAVALRY JOURNAL

JANUARY, 1921.

FIELD-MARSHAL THE RIGHT HONOURABLE JOHN DENTON PINKSTONE VISCOUNT FRENCH OF YPRES AND OF HIGH LAKE, K.P., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G., Colonel 19th (Queen Alexandra's Own Royal) Hussars and Irish Guards; Colonel-in-Chief Royal Irish Regiment; was born at Ripple Vale, Kent, 28th September, 1852, the only son of Captain French, R.N., and Margaret, daughter of William Eccles; entered H.M.S. "Britannia" 1866, served as naval cadet and midshipman in the Royal Navy for four years. Joined the 8th (King's Royal Irish) Hussars in 1874, and transferred to the 19th Hussars, in which regiment he served in the Sudan Campaign, 1884-5, and took part in the actions of Abu Klea, Gubat and Metemneh. The 19th covered the withdrawal of the expedition to Wadi Halfa. French distinguished himself, and the dash and discipline of the regiment have always been remembered by those who campaigned with them.

He commanded the 19th from 1889-93, was employed as A.A.G. of Cavalry till 1894, and at Army Headquarters till 1897, when he took over command of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade. In 1899, as temporary Major-General, commanded 1st Cavalry Brigade at Aldershot.

In the South African War, appointed Major-General of the Cavalry Division in Natal; he commanded the troops at the victory of Elands Laagte, in which the cavalry charged the enemy. He led the cavalry of Sir George White's forces in the battles of Reitfontein and Lombard's Kop. When the garrison was invested in Ladysmith, General French left at the last possible moment and became Lieut.-General Commanding the Cavalry Division based on Cape Colony. Commanded the troops in the operations round Colesberg from 10th November, 1899, to 31st January, 1900, including several important engagements; led the cavalry force in the operations culminating in the great charge and relief of Kimberley in February, 1900; commanded the Cavalry Division in Lord Roberts' forces throughout the operations ending in the capture

Digitized by Google

of Bloemfontein and Pretoria; led the left wing of the army in the battles east of Pretoria, 10th and 12th June, 1900. Captured Barberton. In 1901 conducted operations in the Eastern Transvaal, also against rebels in Cape Colony till the end of the war.

General French was a living example of the maxim *audaces fortuna juvat*; throughout the campaign in South Africa he conducted a series of daring offensive movements which disconcerted and defeated the enemy.

He became Field-Marshal in 1913; Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 1911-14; British Commander-in-Chief in France, 1914-15; in the United Kingdom, 1915-18; and is now Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.

In addition to other decorations he was one of the great leaders to receive the Médaille Militaire of France.

The Field-Marshal was chairman of the CAVALRY JOURNAL Committee from 1908 to 1919.

On completion of the first year of republication we thank our readers and contributors for their co-operation.

There will be four numbers this year. It is necessarily impossible to publish the mass of informative material which has been contributed as early as we could wish. A special feature will be recent cavalry history and its lessons.

As regards the get-up of the JOURNAL we are aiming at legibility and portability; lighter paper will be used for economy in postage; in fewer pages our readers will be given the same amount of letterpress and illustrations as in the early numbers.

Back numbers of the CAVALRY JOURNAL are on sale at 3s. post free.

These form an encyclopædia of knowledge invaluable to the horseman and the military student. Annual volumes bound in white cloth, and covers ready for binding are available on application to the CAVALRY JOURNAL, Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W.1.

NOTICE TO SUBSCRIBERS.

Owing to the large number of new subscribers, the July issue, No. 37, of the CAVALRY JOURNAL is completely sold out. Should any of our readers who do not bind up their JOURNALS wish to dispose of that issue, the Publisher will be pleased to give them half-price for the same, namely, 2s. 6d. The JOURNAL should be sent here (The Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W.) and the sum will then be remitted.

Digitized by Google

OPERATIONS OF THE MOUNTED TROOPS OF THE EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

By LIEUT.-COLONEL W. J. FOSTER, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.,*
Australian Military Forces.

FOREWORD.

IN the October number of the CAVALRY JOURNAL a few examples of the long distance patrols in the Sinai Desert were given, and it is now proposed to give, in brief outline, the doings of the mounted arm from their jumping-off place, at Kantara, on the Suez Canal, to the final overthrow of the Turkish forces in Syria. It is a story of an indispensable arm, of brilliant leadership, and of men but for whose moral and fine horsemastership the campaign could not have been. They were amazing times and embrace the conquering of a hundred miles of desert; the building of the iron road and all that it implied; the conquest of Palestine and the desperate fighting in the hills north of Jerusalem; the grim relentless determination with which the cavalry held the Jordan Valley throughout a summer of intense heat and blinding dust, despite the fact that the native never thought of staying there during that period; the brilliant leading of troops at night across mountain country, where often only goat tracks existed; the daring raids in the Moab country, despite intense cold and rain; the realization of the cavalryman's dream, when on that bright September morning in 1918 the Cavalry Corps burst through the gap made by the XXIst Corps between Tabsor and the sea and, riding hard and straight, overwhelmed the Turkish armies and, finally, the brilliant staff work in that classic pursuit by two columns on widely divergent roads, which caused the two columns to arrive at the objective, over hundreds of miles of country, after several hard fought actions, within almost a minute of each other.

* In collaboration with Lieut.-Colonel J. G. Browne, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, 14th (King's) Hussars, who served as G.S.O.1 of the Anzac Mounted Division, throughout the operations described. After the Armistice a historical section under Lieut.-Colonel W. J. Foster was formed in connection with the A.I.F., E.E.F. Much accurate information was thus obtained from officers who took part in the various actions, and many valuable sketches and panoramas were received, some of which are included, by permission, in this account.

Digitized by Google

There are to-day a few critics whose minds seem all obsessed by the standpoint of warfare on the Western Front. It should hardly be necessary to remind them that the British officer's horizon is not limited by the doings in one particular theatre of war, however great that struggle may have been, and, although the development of the world war has added to the numbers of weapons employed, it has not replaced those of former days.

When the world theatre of war is examined, not only does it demonstrate the tremendous possibilities of the cavalry, under dashing and intelligent leadership, and gives to the true cavalryman a vast encouragement, but it shows beyond doubt that to-day the Empire needs the best cavalry that can be produced. The campaign in the East is rich with examples of cavalry work in the desert, on the plains and in the hills; in thickly and sparsely populated lands and in co-operation with infantry and the air force.

He who serves the Empire to-day must be prepared to do so in all climes and under widely varying conditions.

It is for those who may be called upon to soldier outside Europe that these notes have been written, in the hope that they may be of use to them.

Chapter I. The Sinai Campaign.

(Reference.—Sketch Map A, Sinai Peninsula.)

An enemy force moving from Palestine against the Suez Canal and Egypt had to cross a comparatively waterless desert for a distance of over a hundred miles. There were two main routes by which invading armies might approach from Palestine. The first, or northern route, the Darb el Sultani, the oldest road in the world, ran roughly parallel with the Mediterranean, through Rafa, El Arish, Bir el Abd and Qatia to Kantara. The second, or centre route, ran from El Auja, through Jifjaffa and the Wadi Muksheib to Serapeum. There was also a third route, through Nekhl. The first was the best watered route, there being a considerable oasis area stretching from Qatia to Bir el Abd, in which any number of troops could concentrate within striking distance of the Canal. On the second route the only large water supply was at Moiya Harab, 45 miles east of Serapeum, where it was stored in very large ancient rock cisterns, supplemented after a good rainfall by a small lake on the Wadi Muksheib. On the third route water was considered insufficient to maintain any large force. Such an enemy force would, however, be operating far from its base, with long lines of communication. The northern route was, to a certain extent, vulnerable from the sea. The second route is safeguarded from interruption by the desert it traverses and the long distance it is from the coast.

Digitized by Google

PANORAMA A.


MEDITERRANEAN SEA
PORT SAID
EGYPT
PLAIN OF TINA
SABKHET EL BARDAWIL
ISMAILIA
GREAT BITTER LAKE
LITTLE BITTER LAKE
SUEZ
GULF OF SUEZ
G. EL BARGA
GEBEL MAGHARA
GEBEL LIBNI
GEBEL HELAL
G. GEDEIRA
GEBEL UN MAKHASSA
G. MUSHEIB
G. HURR
GEBEL RAHA
EGYPTIAN FRONTIER FORCES
PALESTINE FRONTIER
GAZA
RAFA
Sharia
Shellal
Abu Aweigila
Bir Hasana
El Nasaima
Bir Rod Salim
Bir Jifjaffa
Bir Thamada
Bir Gifgafa
Bir Hamra
Bir Magdhaba
Abu Aweigila
Bir Asluj
Bir el Jafar
Bir el Mahadat
Bir Abu Aruq
Bir el Hagalbra
Bir el Qussaib
Bir Zumlet
Bir Beyud
Bir el Maqalbra
Rigm el Lagsaifa
Bir el Hamma
Bir el Hagalbra
Bir el Qutlaia
Bir el Hasana
Bir Hifir
Bir Nasana
Bir el Thamada
Bir el Bruk
Bir el Arida
Nekhl
Kuntilla
El Qusaima
Ain Muweilah
Ain Kadeis
Ain Qudeirat
Ain el Qudeirat
Ain Hudhera
Ain el

PANORAMA B.



Digitized by Google

On the outbreak of war the garrison of Egypt was reinforced by troops sent out from England, India and Australia. The Suez Canal, through which vast numbers of troops were passing, was of vital importance as a main line of communication to the Allies.

On 5th November, 1914, Turkey threw in her lot with the Central Powers, probably induced by the possibility of the restoration of her supremacy in Egypt. With Turkey's open threat to invade Egypt, the protection of the Canal and of Egypt became a matter of urgency.

The policy of defence adopted was that of making the line of the Canal the line of resistance. A large portion of the lower-lying desert to the north-east of the Canal was flooded, so as to render approach by that direction impossible. Warships took up stations in the Canal itself, while naval launches took over the duty of guarding the Bitter Lakes. The troops detailed for the defence of the Canal itself were entrenched on the western side, with reserves concentrated at points of tactical importance. It was thought that the difficulties of crossing the desert would make approach by the Turks wellnigh impossible. Whether the Germans ever intended to pay the price for Turkish alliance, by sending a strong enough force to make the invasion practicable, is doubtful. The Turkish rank and file were led to believe that a serious invasion was intended. The primary object was to detain as large a British force as possible in Egypt and possibly, a secondary object, to render the Canal temporarily impassable. There were rumours in Syria that, when their army crossed the Canal, the disaffected population in Egypt would rise. Whatever may have been the object, Turkey made an attempt in February, 1915. As a preliminary move, the railway in Syria was put in hand, and by January, 1915, the Turks had formed advanced posts at El Auja, on the frontier, and also at El Kossaima and El Arish.

The promised attack materialized in February, 1915. The Turk came by the central route, being no doubt influenced in this direction by the possibilities of raids on the northern route. It was of course conceivable that a raid via the Wadi el Arish might temporarily dislocate communications ; but only mounted troops could have done this. Such difficulties as transport by sea and a landing at El Arish, or a long march along the coast and water difficulties as well, made such an attempt by us most improbable. But as regards the second route, the very points which safeguard it form its greatest difficulties as a route by which to attack the Canal.

The Turk, although he managed to reach the Canal and actually placed pontoons in the Canal, was driven back with some loss. He finally withdrew and marched back to Palestine which, we are told, he reached in a most pitiable condition. This was the only time that a formed body of the enemy succeeded in reaching the Canal. The result, however, had shown that it was possible to achieve the almost impossible.

Digitized by Google

After the evacuation of Gallipoli, most of the forces there were withdrawn directly or indirectly to Egypt, and subsequently again met the Turk in the advance into Palestine. The situation in the Sinai Peninsula early in 1916 was obscure. Although the Turkish means of communication in Southern Syria and Sinai, commenced with a view to another attack on the Canal, were in a backward state, it was known he had a force of 250,000 men or more available for such an attack.

In the light of over a year's experience of actual war, views on the military situation had altered. In the first place we had been disillusioned as to the impossibility of crossing the desert. The Turk had announced that what they had effected was only a reconnaissance. In any case they had shown us that, backed by the resources of the Central Powers, there would be no insuperable obstacles to their bringing a large and fully equipped army across the desert. In the second place, the problems of defending the Canal and Egypt were not identical. While the Canal formed an excellent obstacle, difficult to negotiate when stoutly defended, and so a capital defensive line for the protection of Egypt, yet this line was inadequate for the protection of the Canal itself or for securing the immunity of the passing ships. It was also realized that some other line must be found for the protection of the Canal itself. In 1915, whilst the defences were on the western bank, small parties of the Turks approached the eastern bank. On more than one occasion in the summer of 1915 they placed mines in the fairway of the Canal. It would have been possible, therefore, to have interfered seriously with the working of the Canal and the passage of shipping. A defensive line across the actual desert may be all very well in war time, but to keep a garrison on such a line always would be wellnigh impossible. It appeared that sooner or later the best line for the defence of the Canal lay in the fertile country beyond the eastern desert—Palestine.

Finally, it had been brought home that the worst form of defence is passive defence.

Chapter II. First Moves Eastward.

(*Reference.—Sketch Map A, Sinai Peninsula.*)

In accordance with the policy of defending the Suez Canal upon a line farther east, decided upon about October, 1915, a scheme of defence had been prepared, certain works constructed, railways, pipe lines and roads commenced in the various sections of the Canal defences, which had been divided into three sections.

Troops were being concentrated in the three sections of the Canal defences. The work on the defences was backward and a part of the front defence line was first occupied by the 2nd Australian Division about 4th February, 1916. The situation did not give any great cause for anxiety as there were no signs of any immediate advance by the enemy

Digitized by Google

from his advanced posts, now at El Kossaima and Bir Hassana. The defences were, however, hastened on with all speed, in order that the paramount importance of organizing the offensive defence could be achieved. Hence all troops returning from the Peninsula were employed as far as possible on the Canal.

Practically nothing had been done towards the organization of mobile forces. Any advance by the enemy, owing to the season, had to be commenced by the middle of March. The collection of a large number of riding and transport camels was at once undertaken and the Australian Light Horse Brigades and the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade were rapidly re-equipped and horsed. One brigade (1st Australian Light Horse Brigade) was sent off at once to prevent raids on the Nile Valley by the Senoussi from the desert area west of Egypt, to prevent the stirring up of the native tribes that were favourably inclined towards the enemy, and also to prevent unrest in this area among disaffected or nervous elements of the population. These duties were successfully accomplished and passed off without incident.

In the meantime the situation on the Eastern Front became easier. The decisive defeat of the Turkish army at Erzerum by the Russians, on 16th February, crushed the Turkish hopes of a conquest of Egypt, and necessitated a withdrawal of a considerable number of troops from the Egyptian Front. The garrisons of Syria were gradually reduced until it was estimated that not more than 60,000 were available for an attack on Egypt, consequently the withdrawal of troops in March and April for embarkation to France had no immediate effect on the campaign. The work of completing the front line defences (some eighty miles) was pushed forward rapidly, in spite of the difficulties of the khamseen storms which blew during the whole of March. Trenches were continuously filled with sand. Wire entanglements would be found at the end of a dust storm to have disappeared entirely, being some two to three feet under the sand. The work was successfully accomplished. At times the heat was overpowering. Sometimes, when the wind was carrying with it so much of the desert that the sun was hidden by dust clouds, the temperature went up to 115 and 120 degrees. Lips cracked and the daily scanty allowance of water did not relieve parched throats for an hour. The allowance of water for all purposes was never more than a gallon a day, and very often less. Pipe lines and roads were pushed on, but for some time all water had to be brought in fantasses on camels for a distance of over nine miles. Fantasses are small iron receptacles and hold from ten to fifteen gallons each. Two usually make a load for a camel. The troops, notwithstanding the greatest discomforts of continuous dust and flies, worked day and night and completed the trenches in a remarkably short period.

During this period a small reconnaissance, which was sent out from No. 2 Section of the Defences to ascertain the attitude of the local Bedouins

Digitized by Google

and to obtain information regarding the water supply at Moiya Harab in the Wadi Muksheib and at El Kassif, covered a distance of seventy-two miles, over a waterless and barren area, in thirty-seven hours (including halts), demonstrating very early in the campaign the *use of cavalry for long distance patrols.*

Formation of the Anzac Mounted Division.

On 16th March, 1916, the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division was formed, under Major-General H. G. Chauvel, C.B., C.M.G.,* and consisted of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigades and the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade. No Dominion Horse Artillery was available, so the Ayrshire, Inverness, Somerset and Leicester Territorial Horse Artillery Batteries were attached to the division, and remained with it throughout. During the second week of April the division moved to Salhia and came into No. 3 Section Canal Defences. It is interesting to note that Salhia was Napoleon's jumping-off place when he started on his invasion of Syria. The Imperial Camel Corps was also formed about this time, from volunteers from the Yeomanry, Australian and New Zealand Infantry and also from the Light Horse and New Zealand Mounted Rifles.

The system of entrenched posts, covering practically the whole length of the Canal and on an average seven miles east of it, was naturally very expensive in troops and, as all the infantry that could be spared were urgently required in France, some more economical system had to be adopted. It was therefore decided to occupy the Qatia—Abd oasis area, empty the water at Moiya Harab (thus rendering the second route useless) and keep sufficient troops in the vicinity of Suez to ward off any raid in that direction, while holding the rest of the defences, except those at Kantara, lightly.

Chapter III. Difficulties of the Country.

(Reference.—Sketch Map A, Sinai Peninsula.)

In order to understand thoroughly the campaign in the Sinai Peninsula, it is necessary to grasp the difficulties under which troops, particularly the mounted troops, worked for nine months. The three big factors were water, sand, and the palm hods or plantations.

The problem of water supply had always presented a difficulty to armies crossing this waterless desert. There are a certain number of

*Afterwards Lieut.-General Sir H. G. Chauvel, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., commanding the Desert Mounted Corps.

Digitized by Google

reservoirs or cisterns* which held up water during the rains. Water for animals is plentiful in certain areas, particularly in the Qatia area, the Zugba Peninsula and in the hods along the beach near El Arish. In most places within easy reach of the coast water could be got at a few feet, and large sumps were made. In very few instances only was water so obtained fit for human consumption. Testing parties were always with the advanced troops. Water containing less than fifty parts of salt in 100,000 could, after chlorination, be issued. Wells containing less than fifty parts of salt were, however, few and far between. Water for the troops had to be brought by the pipe line and supplies by the railway, hence it was a matter of great difficulty to maintain a mobile column for any length of time at any distance from the railhead. The nature of the soft sand prevented the use of wheeled transport to any extent, and even then it could only be used in a very limited way on the main tracks. First line transport consisted of camels, while camel convoys took the place of the divisional train. The progress of the campaign, therefore, became regulated by the speed with which the railway could be opened up. Material for the railway and the pipe line was the most serious obstacle, and at times considerable delay ensued owing to its non-arrival.

At first the horses would not drink the water, particularly coming off fresh water. The water was brackish and contained a large percentage of alkaline matter. Horses, unless very thirsty, would not touch water that contained more than 150 parts of salt. Drinking water in the Sinai, unless chlorinated, was dangerous. Most of the wells are in the palm hods and are used by the Bedouins. They are usually filthy and always required cleaning. A few wells like these occasionally relieved the pressure on the pipe line, but, in the main, water brought by the pipe line alone could be depended on. From the pipe line it was brought in fantasses to the troops.

The problem of drinking water was always an anxiety and limited the activity of the mounted troops at any great distance from the railhead. The water for animals was, as a rule, easily obtainable once a camp was formed, but, in the long distance patrols carried out by the mounted troops off the beaten palm tree areas (coastal area), horses had to do without water until the return to camp.

The wells in the hods were unsuitable. The best wells, as a rule, were found under the high sand dunes. The construction of them was often a difficulty, owing to the pressure of sand and, until a suitable well lining was brought up, trouble was always occurring in keeping them open. Where water was found at depths of under six feet big sumps were dug.

In the early days it was found necessary to construct wells in the

* Cisterns are bottle shaped and dug into the ground to depths varying from 20 to 30 feet, with diameters up to 15 feet.

Digitized by Google

reconnoitred areas, and special protective detachments for this purpose were sent out from time to time. A supply of water for the horses was then usually ensured for small bodies. A good deal of the difficulty was later overcome by the employment of the "spear point." The spear point was in effect a small boring plant, and consisted of a triangle, pulleys, large pipe in sections and weight, etc. The pipe was driven in until water was reached and the smaller pipe for the pump then inserted, when the larger pipe was withdrawn. The whole gear could be easily packed on a half limber, together with pumps. It could also be carried on the pack animal. It was quick and easy to put down, and solved a lot of the water difficulties, provided that the water was not more than twenty feet from the surface. Later when El Arish was occupied, all the water was confined to the beach and very little inland. The only exceptions inland were at certain places down the Wadi el Arish, particularly at Magdhaba, where a plentiful supply was available. Even at El Arish, some ninety miles from the Canal, the troops were still dependent on the pipe line for their water supply.

The carriage of water in tanks on the backs of camels, a method used by us locally for supplying troops between water dumps and the head-quarters of units, proved successful here thousands of years ago. Further progress was made when supplies were transported in tank trucks along the railway. But a bolder adaptation of modern science was reached when it was decided to lay a piped supply of water from the Nile. Purity had to be considered as well as adequacy of supply. A peculiar danger had to be guarded against, the *bilhaziosos*. This disease is conveyed by a parasitic worm found in the waters of the Nile, and affects not only those who drink the water but also those who bathe in it or merely wash, consequently no troops were allowed to touch it unless it had been previously treated.

The supply east of the Canal was restricted and only one gallon per man per day for all purposes allowed. Large waterworks were put up at Kantara, water drawn in from the sweet water canal and mixed with alum and pumped through settling tanks with filters. When it had passed through these it was pumped underneath the Suez Canal into reservoirs on the eastern bank. Here it was chlorinated and hence the water, now fit for all purposes, was pushed forward to its destination. There being no gradient to assist the natural flow of the water, it had to be pumped forward by successive stages. The first stage was Romani. When working at its greatest length there were seventeen in all. At times during the advance the railway had to be called into aid with water tanks. Ultimately, when the infantry settled down to protracted trench warfare, before Gaza, this pipe line was delivering a constant flow of water into the trenches, distant some couple of hundreds of miles from the banks of the Nile.

Digitized by Google

Beyond a little rough grazing in isolated parts for camels, no vegetation existed in Sinai, and so, throughout the period, the horses never had an opportunity of grazing.

The general run of the sand dunes is from south-east to north-west, and steep on the north side. The march from north to south is, therefore, considerably lengthened. The soft sand is tiring to the horses, which often in parts sank down to the hocks. Leading horses, as is usual on a night march, is frequently impossible when the soft areas have to be traversed. Very often the only route possible was to slide down the side of dunes at angles as steep as one in one. It was hopeless to attempt climbing them, and deviations of over a mile had constantly to be made.

On dark, moonless nights the sense of direction of the most acute was sorely tried. Patrols off the beaten tracks had the greatest difficulty in finding their way. The hot season, May-August, was most trying; at times the continual glare, the abnormal distances, unusual means of transport (often none), sand storms, the mirage, and the awful heat tried troops to the utmost limit, and only troops whose physique and morale were of the highest order could have stood the strain.

The horses stood the strain well. Beyond battle casualties there were few evacuations. Even though the standard of horsemastership was high, only horses which had been carefully selected as the right type could have lasted. A poor type horse seldom lasted nore than one patrol, hence the greatest care had to be exercised in sending forward remounts. The Australian remount always stood his test and rarely failed.

The heavy sand cut down the marching powers of our infantry to one-third of the normal; but the sand did not prove so much an obstacle to the enemy. He was usually barefooted and got over it easily and silently, and at night was difficult to locate.

The horseman, on the other hand, always makes a noise, especially when horses are worried by sand flies. The sand always gives a well defined track, and in this respect was equally disadvantageous to the enemy as to us.

The palm hods were of tactical value for concealment, especially at Qatia, but the sand surrounding them would show up the tracks leading into them. They were hot in summer and damp and cold in winter.

Vehicles were given up early in the campaign and, beyond a few limbers, sand carts for the ambulances and cable wagons, camel transport was wholly depended on. Considerable difficulty was at first experienced with the artillery in the heavy sand. Sand tyres (an iron tyre some six to eight inches wide) partly overcame the trouble, except in the soft sand country. It was not until the pedrails had been adopted that the eighteen pounder could keep up with a column, using eight horses per gun, two wheel, three centre, and three lead. The pedrail consisted of stout blocks of wood about a foot square and two-and-a-half inches thick

Digitized by Google

held on the tyres by chains. Sand sledges for carrying the wounded were also found preferable to the camel cacolets, which is a sort of canvas arrangement on both sides of a camel for carrying either sitting or lying-down cases. The evacuation of the wounded was always a serious anxiety.

The railway was broad gauge and commenced at Kantara. It eventually became the trunk line between Egypt and Palestine, and later with Syria and beyond. In the days of trench warfare before Gaza, in 1917, it transported freight heavily laden with ammunition and stores, troop trains conveying officers and men in open trucks, hospital trains, and a sleeping car express running nightly in each direction. In its conception it was just a military railway, laid with but little preparation across the sands of the desert. To this railway, however, was largely due the success of the campaign.

Chapter IV. Commencement of the Desert Campaign

(Reference.—Sketch Map A, Sinai Peninsula.)

The 5th Mounted Brigade were operating in the Qatia oasis and patrolling as far as Bir el Nuss and Hod um Ugba. In this district, the last within striking distance of the Suez Canal where there is sufficient water to allow the concentration of a large body of troops, preliminaries to the accomplishment of the ultimate aim, the permanent occupation of the well-watered zone radiating fifteen miles east and south-east, were begun. Bir el Abd, forty-five miles from the Canal, was reconnoitred by a squadron of the Gloucestershire Hussars on the 2nd April and found occupied. A further reconnaissance on the 9th April, by the Worcestershire Yeomanry, found the enemy in considerable strength in possession of a ridge north-east of Bir el Abd. The enemy were driven eastwards, but owing to the heavy soft sand no shock action was possible, and the squadron was compelled to return to Qatia.

Aeroplane reconnaissance had reported small enemy forces at Hassana and Nekhl, with a fairly strong force at El Arish.

In the meantime, the railway had been pushed forward to Pelusium. A force of approximately 2,500 enemy, with some guns, was now at Bir el Abd. On the 22nd April the Flying Corps reported small bodies of the enemy troops at Bir el Bayud, fifteen miles east-south-east of Qatia and Bir el Mageibra, ten miles south-east of Qatia.

The disposition of troops in No. 3 Section on the 21st April was as follows :

Worcestershire Yeomanry	Qatia.
Warwickshire Yeomanry (less one squadron)	Hamisah.

Digitized by Google

5th Mounted Brigade Headquarters and Gloucestershire Yeomanry ..	Romani.
156th Brigade, 52nd Division ..	Pelusium (railhead).
Detachment 5th Bn. Royal Scots Fusiliers	Dueidar.
52nd Division (less one brigade) ..	Kantara.
Anzac Mounted Division (less two brigades)	Salhia (some twenty miles west of Kantara, or approximately sixty-five miles from Bir el Abd.

On the 21st April one squadron of the Worcestershire Yeomanry moved into bivouac at Oghratina, seven miles east-north-east of Qatia, to cover an R.E. party (fifty dismounted men) detailed to prepare wells. On the 22nd April another squadron of the regiment proceeded to Oghratina. This place was within ten miles of Bir el Abd, and it was intended that these two squadrons, if attacked in force, should retire on Qatia, thence, if necessary, on Romani. It is questionable, in view of the overwhelming enemy force within striking distance, whether the officer commanding these two squadrons would have been able to hold off the enemy long enough to enable him to get his dismounted party away; the chances were less if attacked at night. As it turned out, the enemy, favoured by a dense fog, attacked Oghratina at dawn on 23rd April. The first encounter took place at 05.30. By 07.00, the enemy had surrounded Oghratina on all sides and escape for the dismounted party was beyond hope. The garrison of the post practically died to a man. A squadron of the 6th Light Horse Regiment reached Oghratina two days later, and the scene on the battlefield, yeomen and Turkish dead lying together, proved beyond doubt that not only had the yeomen put up a great and gallant fight, but, rather than surrender, had died almost to a man. Only three badly wounded men were left to tell the story. Two of these subsequently died. As the squadron had no means of transporting the wounded, *the men carried them in relays on their backs to Romani, some ten miles over the soft sand.*

At 09.30 this column then attacked Qatia, which was finally taken about 14.00. In the meantime, another enemy column, of about 1,000, moving up from the south, attacked Dueidar at 06.30, but the garrison, reinforced by two companies from Hill 70, counter-attacked at 12.30 and forced the enemy to withdraw. The Turkish columns after this raid fell back on Bir el Abd and Bir el Bayud. After Qatia had fallen a portion of the 5th Mounted Brigade, which had made desperate efforts to rescue the force at Qatia, withdrew partly to Romani, and the remainder of the brigade to Dueidar, and subsequently the whole brigade to Kantara.

Digitized by Google

In view of the possibility of attack on these isolated posts in the Qatia area, the 5th Australian Light Horse Regiment had left Salhia at 06.00 on April 22nd and bivouacked at Kantara on the night of 22nd-23rd April. The regiment was not sent forward from Kantara until 13.00, a delay of half a day, although fourteen miles from the nearest enemy, who were then retiring south-east. The regiment, however, managed to get in touch with the Turkish column before dusk and inflicted material damage on it.

The remainder of the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade left Salhia at 13.00 on 23rd April. The first intimation that the Anzac Division received was at 17.30, when orders were given for the remainder to move to Kantara as rapidly as possible. The whole division (less guns) left at 19.00, and marching all night reached Kantara at 04.00 on the 24th April.

Thus commenced one of the most interesting campaigns in history, for, although the occupation of the oasis was at first undertaken as a purely defensive measure, there is no doubt that the defeat of the Turks at Romani in August, 1916, led to the further advance on El Arish and the clearing out of the Turks from Egyptian territory, and the subsequent victories at Magdhaba and Rafa opened the way for the invasion of Palestine. These Australian and New Zealand horsemen and Territorial horse gunners were to form the nucleus of one of the largest bodies of horse that had ever operated under one commander since the days of Darius and, with their comrades from Great Britain and India, not only maintained the traditions of cavalry but added to them.

At 09.00 on the 24th April the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade (less 5th A.L.H. Regiment) left Hill 70 for Pelusium railhead. The column had hardly started when information was received that a large force of the enemy was reported by the Flying Corps moving on the railhead. The brigade at once increased the pace, and notwithstanding the heavy " going " (soft sand) maintained a speed of six miles until within two miles of the railhead, when the advanced patrols reported "all quiet." The enemy column reported turned out to be some 400 Egyptian Labour Corps, who had been working on the railway track between Pelusium and Romani, and no rations having been delivered to them during the excitement of the 23rd, they had decided to come in and see about it.

The brigade bivouacked there that night and, moving at 05.00 on the 25th April, occupied Romani at 09.00. Strong patrols were pushed out to locate the enemy, who now had retired to Bir el Abd. The remainder of the Mounted Division remained at Hill 40. One regiment of the New Zealand Brigade moved up to Pelusium on the 26th April. The 5th Mounted Brigade was withdrawn to Kantara.

Owing to the difficulties of supply it was apparently not possible to move the division earlier to Kantara ; hence it could hardly be considered

Digitized by Google

within supporting distance of the force occupying the Qatia oasis when the enemy made his raid. The division thus had to move thirty-two miles over very soft sandy country before it could reach even the nearest advanced defensive post at Dueidar, and this meant the loss of at least twenty-four hours, which was of paramount importance.

The 2nd Light Horse Brigade (6th and 7th Regiments at Romani and the 5th Regiment at Dueidar) remained in the oasis, patrolling the Qatia district and the country to the south, which was quickly cleared of the enemy's outposts. When the enemy was known to be in close proximity the troops patrolled about fourteen miles out, where they remained until dark and then returned to camp. Throughout the campaign units in the front area had everything in readiness to move straight out so as to take the enemy on in the open should he advance.

In No. 2 Section of the Defence Zone a very successful reconnaissance to Jifjaffa was carried out between the 11th and 13th April, by a detachment from the 3rd Light Horse Brigade. The force, commanded by Major W. H. Scott, D.S.O., 9th Light Horse Regiment, consisted of one squadron 9th L.H. Regiment with detachments from the 8th L.H. Regiment, Bikanir Camel Corps, Engineers and Camel Transport Corps. A pack wireless detachment also accompanied the force. The objective was fifty-two miles from the starting point, and a jumping-off place for the attack, eight miles south-west of objective, was reached at 02.30 on the 12th April. From here the attack was made by three troops upon the enemy's position at 09.00. The enemy, cut off in their attempted retreat, by the right flanking party of the attack, stood on one of the hills above the wells and lost sixteen men killed and fifteen men wounded before surrendering. One Austrian lieutenant of engineers and thirty-three other prisoners were captured, our casualties being one man and one horse killed. The destruction of the enemy's camp was thoroughly carried out, a quantity of correspondence was taken, and the elaborate well-boring plant, which had been at work for five months, was completely demolished.

The raid is of particular interest as being the first carried out by the cavalry against the enemy in Sinai. The distance, though long, and the time allowed to reach the objective short, proved that the cavalry could be efficiently used in desert warfare. The actual distance covered by the raiding party was over 120 miles in less than three-and-a-half days.

Chapter V. Patrolling the Desert.

(Reference.—Sketch Map A, Sinai Peninsula.)

From the end of April continuous patrolling within a radius of twenty miles from Romani and Dueidar was maintained, but the nearest enemy outpost was Bir el Abd, and he very rarely ventured beyond it. Efforts were made early in May to flood the Bardawil Lake, by means of a canal

Digitized by Google

cut in from the sea, as a partial barrier against an enemy advance, but the depression being only eight inches deep no appreciable amount of water was let in.

Value of Cavalry for Long Distance Patrolling.

Raids at frequent intervals were made on the enemy's advanced outposts. Although the Turk had materially increased his numbers in Sinai, doubtless with a view of detaining troops in Egypt, there were indications that he was drawing in his advanced posts. The Turk early found that his posts within thirty, and, later in September, forty-five miles, notwithstanding the heavy sand and heat, were within striking distance of the Anzac Mounted Troops at Romani.

During May several successful reconnaissances were made. At first only one brigade was kept in the forward area, but from the middle of May onwards two brigades were always kept there (Romani and Et Maler) and divided the patrol work, which had become increasingly heavy. The various oases were always visited by strong patrols, who rounded up any small enemy parties within reach. Later the leakage of information by Bedouins became apparent and, while they were allowed to remain unmolested, the possibility of surprising any of the Turkish outposts was out of the question.

The native population comprises some seventeen minor tribes of nomadic Arabs or Bedouins, numbering in the whole peninsula perhaps 10,000 adult males, with possibly 25,000 women and children. Over these tribes the nominal sheikhs have but little control and the tribesmen are in most matters a law unto themselves. The Bedouin moves over the desert silently and in the soft sand country can easily out-distance a column. It was also known that a majority, though not actively hostile, were favourable to the Turk, and often gave him warning of our approach in sufficient time to allow him to escape. In that heavy country it was not possible to capture the Turk if he had been warned in time to allow his getting even a start of only a thousand yards. After several unsuccessful attempts to round up Turkish patrols known to have been warned the Bedouins were taken in hand also, and, thus robbed of his most accurate means of information, the chances of minor enterprises became brighter, and the enemy outposts patrols often fell an easy prey.

In the early periods the long distance reconnaissance was always made in strength, a whole brigade often being employed, and seldom less than a regiment. The methods we worked on were (*a*) an objective was selected and either that alone was visited or we struck at two or three objectives at the same time; (*b*) no party sent out was less than a squadron for each place; (*c*) at least a regiment was ready to back up the party carrying out the reconnaissance; (*d*) the operation was always timed to hit the objective at dawn. The march was therefore always at night

Digitized by Google

and so avoided heat and being seen by the enemy. It was the policy adopted to employ these larger bodies, and it certainly had the advantage of getting everyone to know the country by day and night, and accustomed the horses to move in the sand and to drink the water. Had our intelligence of the enemy's movements been more accurate in those days it would perhaps have been more advantageous to have adopted more frequent reconnaissances with smaller bodies. In the long distance raids the column always moved at night and struck at dawn. By day any element of surprise was impossible and the night work was always cooler and less fatiguing. Maps issued were on a scale of 1/125,000, accurate enough as regards location of places but of little use otherwise. The sandy desert features of the country were monotonous in their regularity, and often the only way of locating one's position was by the old telegraph line from Kantara to El Arish. Many a weary column returning, after working to the south, heaved a sigh of relief when the line appeared in sight.

Necessity for Thorough Compass Knowledge.

Compass work at times was alone possible. There are no outstanding features to guide one—just sand dune after sand dune—and the difficulties of getting to an obscure post some thirty miles away, and marked only by a few palm trees, were great. Often the palm trees were in a depression and could not be seen until within a hundred yards. The lie of the sand dunes made a direct march impossible. The direction had to be carefully plotted, especially for night work, distances on each bearing carefully noted and, as the march went on, careful calculations had to be made for the various deviations, and the column brought back again on the direction as soon as the dune country allowed. Seldom, however, was a unit late in getting to its destination. One particular instance is noteworthy of a unit moving all night in a dense fog over unknown dune country, surrounding its objective, some twenty-nine miles away, and capturing the garrison by dawn.

By day the hazy mirage effects also proved an added obstacle. Often no pace faster than a walk was possible for hours, and the heat in some of the return journeys so great that the men could not even touch their water bottles, and the rifle barrels became so hot that men's hands were often blistered. Some of the distances covered by these patrols are of interest. The starting point was either Romani or Et Maler.

Salmana	..	..	..	48	miles in	30 hours.
Bayud	..	..	..	60	,,	32 ,,
Ge'eila	..	..	..	44	,,	24 ,,
Mageibra	..	..	..	34	,,	24 ,,
Bir el Abd		..	..	40	,,	24 ,,

Digitized by Google

A good deal of the work was carried out in conjunction with aeroplanes and according to intelligence from agents. The enemy used his aeroplanes to a limited extent and relied a great deal on Bedouins as spies.

The reconnaissance to Bayud, sixty miles in thirty-two hours, was probably the most strenuous during the desert period. On arrival it was found that the bird had flown, and after burning a few stores the regiment (6th Australian Light Horse) turned for home. In moving back they had a particularly bad time. It was a day of intense heat: the temperature in the tents at Romani was over 120 degrees Fahr. A very hot wind began at 09.00 and continued until 16.00. The glare on the sand was almost blinding. The steel on the equipment became so hot as to be almost unbearable. The track back to Qatia, the nearest adequate supply of water for the horses, ran over what was probably the worst soft sand dune country in the peninsula. Altogether there were 160 cases of heat exhaustion, of whom seventy had to be evacuated to hospital.

In spite of the awful heat the men, in order to save their horses, led them for the first ten miles into the palm hods at Hod el Metiana. On reaching there many of the men literally collapsed. It is perhaps one of the finest examples of good horsemastership that can be given.

Chapter VI. Period May—July, 1916.

(*Reference.—Sketch Map A, Sinai Peninsula.*)

Operations in the Wadi um Muksheib.

On the 10th June a detachment from the 3rd Light Horse Brigade, consisting of

Two squadrons 9th Light Horse Regiment,
10th Light Horse Regiment,
Four Machine Guns, 8th and 10th Light Horse Regiments,
Detachment 14th Army Troops Company,
Detachment Royal Engineers, and a
Wireless Section,

left Serapeum railhead, No. 2 Section, for the Wadi um Muksheib, forty miles south-east of Ismailia. The camel convoy for the above, some 650 camels, left under escort on the night 9th-10th, and were overtaken on the night of the 10th by the column. The object was to drain the rock cisterns and pools with a view to preventing the enemy using them as an area of concentration for a raid on the Suez Canal. The rock cisterns were not destroyed as they were of great value to the Bedouins. The water was syphoned out of the cisterns. The work was completed on the 12th, and the column returned to Serapeum on the 14th. Some five million gallons of water were disposed of, the party working continuously until completion. In the case of the pools, a hole was

Digitized by Google

cut in the water-holding layer of clay and the water ran through into the ground below. A further reconnaissance was made on the 18th to complete the draining of the pools and thus closed to the Turk any possible advance by the central route.

No. 3 Section.

Towards the end of May the infantry (52nd Division) began its concentration in the Romani—Mahemdia area. Throughout June and July, whilst the cavalry kept the forward area clear, the infantry constructed a series of strong redoubts from Katib Gannit to Mahemdia, and the railway was completed to Romani (*see* sketch Battle of Romani). On the 1st June the 1st Light Horse Brigade camp at Romani was bombed by an enemy aeroplane, probably in retaliation for a very successful raid carried out by the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade on 30th-31st May, when they cut up a Turkish post at Salmana. The casualties in the bombing were one officer and seven other ranks killed and three officers and nineteen other ranks wounded.

Operations in No. 3 Section, July, 1916.

More than half the month of July had passed without any important occurrence. The usual reconnaissances were continued. On the 17th July, however, enemy aircraft was active in the Romani—Dueidar area. On the 18th a patrol came into contact with a camel patrol of fifteen Turks near Oghratina. A few shots were exchanged with the patrol, which then retired rapidly eastwards. Up till this date there had been no considerably body of Turkish troops farther west than Bir el Mazar, some forty miles east of Oghratina, where for some time there had been a camp of between 1,500 and 2,000.

The dispositions of the mounted troops on the 18th July were as follow:

Headquarters Anzac Mounted Division ..	Hill 40.
Divisional Troops (less Field Squadron and R.H.A. Batteries)	Hill 40.
Leicester Battery	Hill 40.
Divisional Wheeled Transport..	Kantara.
Field Squadron	Kantara.
Somerset Battery	Kantara.
New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade (less Wellington M.R. Regiment)	Hill 70.
5th Mounted Brigade (attached to N.Z.M.R. Brigade and in process of reorganization)	Kantara
3rd Light Horse Brigade ..	No. 2 Section, Canal Defences.
Inverness Battery	No. 2 Section, Canal Defences.

Digitized by Google

1st Light Horse Brigade	Romani
2nd Light Horse Brigade (less 5th L.H. Regiment but with Wellington M.R. Regiment attached)	Et Maler.
5th Light Horse Regiment	Dueidar.

DISPOSITIONS OF OTHER TROOPS.

52nd Division	Occupying the Romani—Mahemdia position.
42nd Division	Kantara, with detachments at Gilban, Dueidar and Hill 70.
53rd Division	No. 2 Section. Based principally on Ismailia and Serapeum.
3rd Light Horse Brigade	
11th and 12th Light Horse Regiments	
City of London Yeomanry	
Three Double Dismounted Squadrons	
Bikanir Camel Corps	
Part of Imperial Camel Brigade ..	

CHAPTER VII. OPERATIONS PRIOR TO THE BATTLE OF ROMANI.

(*Reference.—Sketches A and B, Sinai Peninsula and Romani.*)

The situation suddenly changed on 19th July, when an evening reconnaissance by the Flying Corps revealed the fact that a large force of the enemy had moved westwards from El Arish and established itself on the line Bir el Abd—Bir Jamiel—Bir Bayud. Their numbers were estimated to be between 8,000 and 9,000, of which from 3,000 to 4,000 were at Bir el Abd and the remainder divided between the other two places. A peculiar incident had been noticed at Oghratina by the patrol on the 18th July, when it had been driven back by the enemy camel men. On the old battlefield of 23rd April a number of tins had been noticed, arranged on some systematic pattern, and there was reason to believe *that the enemy worked out his trench sites in advance, so that work could be begun on them without delay on arrival of his troops.*

The 2nd Light Horse Brigade, when moving out from Et Maler on the 19th July, had intended sweeping all the country north of the Oghratina—Bir el Abd telegraph line, with a view to clearing the area of all Bedouins, an influx of whom had been reported. There were also rumours of an intended enemy advance, and it was partly owing to this and partly to ascertain that the country to the east was clear during the sweeping operations of the 2nd Light Horse Brigade, that a special reconnaissance, with Brig.-General E. W. C. Chaytor, C.B., C.M.G.,

Digitized by Google

commanding the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade, had been asked for by the General Officer the Anzac Mounted Division.

The 2nd Light Horse Brigade had just reached Qatia when the aeroplane report was received by the Divisional Headquarters at Romani at 17.30 to the following effect:

"July 19th, 16.00.—3,000 men and 2,000 camels with from 200 to 300 large shelters at Bayud. Also three rows of trenches facing west. At Bir el Abd from 3,000 to 3,500 men, 2,000 camels, 200 to 300 large shelters, 20 to 30 bell tents, 1 large black hut and 3 circular trenches."

This estimate of numbers later turned out to be very accurate. Immediately on receipt of it, General Officer Commanding Anzac Mounted Division ordered the following action:

"The 2nd Light Horse Brigade to remain at Qatia, putting out a strong outpost line. At 03.00 on 20th to send patrols, of two troops each, to Bir el Hamisah, Hill 245, Hod es Sagia and Oghratina. 5th Light Horse to send patrols, one troop each, to Hod el Aras, Bir Gharif, El Dukhan and Bir ed Dhaba, leaving Dueidar at 03.00 on 20th. 1st Light Horse Brigade to send patrols, one troop each, to Hill 110 and Bir ed Dhaba, leaving camp at 03.00 on 20th."

The patrols were to remain out until orders were sent to them, but, in the event of an enemy advance, to withdraw gradually on the brigade, keeping touch with the enemy. The brigades at Romani and Hill 70 were to stand to at 03.00 on 20th July. In addition, patrolling of the pipe line from Romani to Hill 70 was at once undertaken. Both the railway and the pipe line were open to enterprises by the enemy agents, as were also the telephone and telegraph line between Romani and the Section Headquarters at Kantara. If these went communications could still be kept up by cable via Port Said, but the water might easily have become a very serious matter. During the night 19th-20th the Ayrshire Battery arrived at Romani.

Nothing occurred during the night 19th-20th, but at 04.45 patrols from the 2nd Light Horse Brigade met the enemy in the neighbourhood of Oghratina and made progress until Hod Abu Rodha was reached, where their advance was held up. Patrols to other points, except Sagia, found all clear, but the patrol to Hod es Sagia reported some 150 camel men about two miles south of Oghratina.

Policy Adopted.

At 06.45 on the 20th orders were received from the section as to the future action of the mounted troops. Touch was to be kept with the enemy, but, in view of the operations which were to follow, the men and the horses were to be kept as fresh as possible. No action likely to bring on an engagement at present was to be undertaken. This, of course,

Digitized by Google

was only following out all the previous policy, which was, if the enemy appeared, he was to be drawn on and made to fight as near Romani as possible—if possible among the sand hills to the south and south-west of the Romani position (*see* panoramic sketches C, D, E and F outpost line). On no account was any action to be brought on so far away that infantry would have to march over the heavy sand to join in. Should the enemy, however, make a heavy attack against the southern flank of Romani—Mahemdia position, the rôle of the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division was to act vigorously against the enemy and delay his advance until the 52nd Division had extended its right flank to cover the railway. The mounted division was responsible for maintaining close touch with the 52nd Division throughout and was to act vigorously against the southern flank so as to crush the hostile attack between the two divisions. On no account was the enemy to penetrate through a gap between the two divisions. In considering this policy it must be borne in mind that, although the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division consisted of four mounted brigades, only two, the 1st and 2nd, were under its immediate command. The 3rd Light Horse Brigade was still in No. 2 Section, based on Serapeum, whilst the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade was at Hill 70 and became for the time being, to all intents and purposes, Section troops. The action of the mounted troops in delaying and retarding the enemy advance and endeavouring to bring him to battle south-west of Romani, within striking distance of our infantry, was governed by certain local conditions which had a decisive influence on the policy. The heavy sand cut down the marching powers of the infantry out of all proportion, produced weariness and hence troops were unfit to attack at the end of it. Only a limited supply of water was available for drinking, and probably the infantry, if called on to march, would have to be content in that broiling heat with one water bottle per diem. Thirst would be the natural consequence and men would be driven to drink from the native wells, probably with disastrous results. Heat acting in conjunction with the other two factors would, and later did (in the march of the 42nd Division from Pelusium to Qatia on 7th August), have an overpowering adverse effect on the marching powers of the infantry. These points were given their proper weight, and action taken accordingly. They had, however, a very grave effect on the two front mounted brigades. A third brigade, which would have relieved matters, was asked for but was refused, and it was not until 09.00 on the 5th August, after the Turk had made his decisive but unsuccessful attack, and had fallen back to a prepared position at Qatia, that all the mounted brigades, widely separated, were put under the command of the General Officer Commanding Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division and ordered to take up a vigorous pursuit. *The immediate result of the order was that the two brigades had very little*

Digitized by Google

time to rest, especially as it was of vital importance that the Turk should be continually harassed, particularly at night. The procedure adopted meant that a brigade left its camp at Romani at 02.00, moved six miles to Qatia and thence, getting touch before daylight, operated against the enemy during the day and moved back to Romani after nightfall. Officers' patrols were left out during the night. Each of the brigades did this on alternate days. The principle of the general withdrawal of the cavalry after dusk, necessitated wholly by the water supply, when the enemy became aware of it, allowed him to carry out his moves in practical security. It is doubtful whether the enemy was aware for the first ten days of the cavalry withdrawal west of Qatia at night.

Thus the 1st and 2nd Light Horse Brigades bore the burden and heat of the day from 19th July onwards. They took the brunt of the Battle of Romani, and when the time came to take up a bold and vigorous pursuit only these two brigades, whose endurance had already been tested to the uttermost, were in the hands of the Cavalry Commander. The lesson taught, however, was *that cavalry can picket the enemy and keep a close observation on all his movements whilst avoiding being drawn into an engagement.*

By 07.42 it was certain that the enemy was in strength at Oghratina and digging in. The patrol at Hill 245 reported at 09.00 a body of troops six miles to the south-east. The enemy at Oghratina still showed signs of coming on. He was digging hard but his patrols were active. Later it was ascertained that he was entrenching a position from Hod Negiliat to the south-east. Apparently a gun emplacement was being made, and that a strong line was in course of construction was evident. About this time the aeroplane reconnaissance, which had been over Bir Bayud and Bir Jamiel, reported that the enemy had either concealed his force or moved in some other direction. *Here the value of the palm hod country from a tactical point of view came in.* It was evident from after events that the enemy had moved into the palm groves in the Hod el Hassania area and the Um Aisha district and thence appeared again. All that was known temporarily was that the enemy about Bayud and Jamiel had vanished. At first his forces at Oghratina seemed weakened, but patrols early found his strength. By midday it was obvious that a movement was in progress towards Mageibra, and an enemy post was reported established two-and-a-half miles south-east of Hill 245. At 12.55 the patrol at Hill 245 captured some prisoners, from whom it was discovered that the force in front of us was the 3rd Turkish Division, consisting of 31st, 32nd and 39th Regiments, with mountain guns, heavy artillery and special machine-gun companies. The artillery was manned by the Turks, Germans and Austrians, and there were Germans with all the machine-gun companies. The prisoners also stated that a general attack on Romani was intended. It was quite plain, from their badly

Digitized by Google

blistered feet, that the enemy's columns had come a long way. Prisoners also stated that there were other echelons following behind these advanced troops at a distance of one day's march. The information was confirmed in all essentials by the completer knowledge subsequently obtained of the attacking force, except that the prisoners all exaggerated the number of troops that were following behind. The whole force consisted of the 3rd Turkish Division, with eight machine-gun companies, officered and partly manned by the Germans, mountain artillery and some batteries



of 4-inch and 6-inch howitzers and anti-aircraft guns, manned chiefly by Austrians, with a body of Arab camelry. It was commanded by Colonel Kress Von Kressentein, a German in Turkish employ, and the German personnel of the machine-gun units, heavy artillery, wireless sections, field hospitals and supply section had been organized in Germany as a special formation for operations with the Turkish forces. The force was in fine physical condition and admirably equipped.

At 17.30 our patrols reported that the enemy was moving on Qatia. Their guns came into action west of Oghratina at 18.19. The battery with the 2nd Light Horse Brigade came into action at 18.45, and shelled their camps at Oghratina with effect. The 6th Light Horse Regiment attacked the enemy's northern flank from the direction of Hod el Negiliat and drove it in on that place. About this time the enemy's advanced troops withdrew. An aeroplane message reported that the enemy was in strength about Mageibra. His numbers were estimated at from 2,000 to 3,000 and about 1,000 camels. They were also reported to be digging

Digitized by Google

in rapidly. The 2nd Light Horse withdrew after dark to Romani. It had been arranged that the horses should be watered at Qatia, but the water here soon ran out, necessitating the watering of the majority at Romani. As an enemy advance on Qatia might deny the use of the water there at any time the construction of wells sufficient for one mounted brigade was at once put in hand in the valley just north of Mount Meredith. From here the outpost brigade could operate east of Qatia, watering both morning and evening. The position of the wells was concealed from the

A.L.H. BDE.



enemy's position.

front. Large working parties were sent out daily from No. 2 Section, cleaning out the old wells at different points to the east and south-east, in order to provide an adequate supply of water for a force operating from there.

From the night 21st-22nd July onwards the following scheme for watching the enemy by night, the only possible one without completely exhausting the men and horses of the two brigades, was adopted. The brigade on outpost, on withdrawing, left out three officers' patrols, who were to keep as close to the enemy as possible and watch his movements during the night. The brigade taking up the outpost work next day left camp at 01.30 and marched to the wells in the sand dune half mile south of Katib Gannit. Here the brigade waited until 03.00 and then moved on Qatia, taking up the observation of the enemy from the officers' patrols, which then returned to the camp in Romani or Et Maler. The brigade resting in camp had to provide an outpost line covering Et Maler and send patrols to Hod ed Dhaba, linking up with the 5th Light Horse Regiment from Dueidar, and later to Hill 110.

Digitized by Google

The tour of duty for the two brigades was as follows:

" A " Brigade.

(1) Left camp at 01.30 on " X " day and marched to a point two miles south of camp;

(2) Waited there till 03.00 on " X " day.

PANORAMA D.


WELLINGTON RIDGE
Looking South
MOUNT MEREDITH
WELLINGTON RIDGE
WELLINGTON RIDGE
Led horses
Int. Post
N° 22A
3rd A.L.H. Regt. held a line facing East and eventually retired in a semicircle in a Northerly direction to this Ridge, where, being finally outnumbered, the Regiment moved N.W. to HOD DIUR. The shaded dip held the horses of 2 Regiments during the fight

(3) Then moved on Qatia and took on the work of observation and reconnaissance for " X " day.

(4) Withdrew after dark on " X " day, leaving out officers' patrols.

(5) Returned to camp about 21.00 on " X " day.

(6) The officers' patrols remained on duty for night " X "-" Y " day and were relieved by " B " brigade before dawn on " Y " day.

" B " Brigade.

Left camp at 01.30 on " Y " day.

Each brigade therefore was on duty from 01.30 on " X " day to 21.00 on " X " day, or eighteen-and-a-half hours; off duty 21.00 on " X "

Digitized by Google

day to 01.30 on "Z" day, or twenty-eight and a-half hours, but providing certain outpost duties and patrols.

The necessity of constructing defensive works on Wellington Ridge and turned north on Et Maler had been urged. To the south and west of the mounted camps no works existed. It had been the accepted theory that a Turkish attack on the Romani position would be from the south and south-west. Works in this direction would have made an effective barrier, and the construction and occupation of them by the infantry would have relieved the resting brigade from outpost duty at Romani and left them comparatively fresh to carry out their legitimate rôle of picketing and harassing the enemy.

Beyond some patrol encounters the day passed quietly. Some prisoners were taken near Hod es Sagia. They stated that they had left Bir el Abd on 21st July and there were still four battalions and ten guns there.

Formation of the Section Mounted Troops.

A temporary command, known as the "Section Mounted Troops," was formed under Brig.-General E. W. C. Chaytor, and came under the direct orders of No. 3 Section. The troops forming this command were the Canterbury and Auckland Mounted Rifle Regiments, 5th Australian Light Horse Regiment, two squadrons Warwick Yeomanry, one squadron Gloucester Yeomanry, one squadron Worcester Yeomanry, with the Somerset and Leicester Batteries R.H.A.

On the 27th July a mobile column was formed in No. 2 Section, to operate against the enemy's left flank and left rear, in the neighbourhood of Mageibra and Bayud. It consisted of the 11th Australian Light Horse Regiment, City of London Yeomanry, and four companies of the Imperial Camel Corps. It was concentrated at Ferdan Railhead, where it remained until 4th August, when it moved to Bada.

Position of the Turkish Force.

It was now evident that the enemy had no immediate intention of a raid upon the Qatia district, but was preparing to establish himself firmly in the Um Aisha district, so as to block our advance towards El Arish, and possibly to protect his own communications between Syria and the Hedjaz, and to prevent us from denying to him the whole of the Qatia area, the only district within which he could collect and maintain any considerable force within striking distance of the Suez Canal. It is possible that he might have intended to strike at the Canal defences farther west, but with a cavalry and an infantry division on his flank it did not seem probable. Later it became evident that he intended to seize Romani, consolidate himself there and at Qatia and, with the arrival of reinforcements, attack the Suez Canal.

Digitized by Google

To attack the Turk on his Oghratina—Mageibra line forthwith with infantry was impracticable, since fifteen miles of desert separated our main positions from those of the enemy, and it was necessary that any force to advance across this tract to the attack on a strong enemy position should be equipped with camel transport on a complete scale. The force

PANORAMA E.

MOUNT ROYSTON NORTHWARDS TO THE RAILWAY LINE.
Position of 3rd A.L.H. Regt at 16.00 on Aug 4th 1916—taken from Mt Meredith



The Turkish Advance came to a standstill between MOUNT ROYSTON and HOD DIUK 1600 prisoners taken here during afternoon of Aug. 4th.
Railway and pipe line run just to the right of the sketch.

in No. 3 Section, therefore, was for a time compelled to remain on the tactical defensive.

It was the intention of the higher command that all formations should be ready to take the field by 1st August, and attack the enemy in force about 13th August. By strenuous endeavours the organization of the essential camel transport and the completion of the infantry units on a mobile scale was accomplished by 3rd August.

Frequent patrol encounters and continued harassing of the enemy's line marked this period. The enemy still continued to entrench himself on the Oghratina—Mageibra line, occasionally pushing forward patrols towards us, particularly in the southern sector. These patrols were invariably driven in and resulted usually in a few prisoners being taken. On the 25th some old tents were pitched in Qatia. Some shelters were

Digitized by Google

put up and a few trenches dug, with the idea of leading the enemy to believe that we were occupying Qatia permanently in some strength. The 5th Light Horse Regiment, operating from Dueidar, also placed a few tents in scattered hods to the south-east and patrols visiting them early at night and just before dawn placed lighted candles in them to give the impression that these hods were occupied. From some enemy diaries captured later it was found that the means adopted had the desired effect.

From the night 27th-28th until 3rd August the enemy gradually pushed his line forward. Enterprises at night against any enemy patrols were carried out, but in all cases it was found that the enemy had only strong posts out a short distance from his firing line. They established the fact, however, that the enemy kept his force very much together at night, and avoided any risk of our cutting out isolated or small posts. During the whole of these operations the enemy rarely exposed a small body to the chance of capture. One noteworthy exception occurred at 16.00 on 28th July. Some fifty Turks had pushed forward in front of their entrenched line and entered Hod um Ugba. The Wellington Mounted Rifle Regiment (then attached to the 2nd Light Horse Brigade) saw their opportunity, worked up to the hod, and suddenly charging mounted into the hod, drove the enemy out, killing sixteen and taking eight prisoners and some camels. The regiment lost two men killed and one wounded.

The enemy was now within striking distance of Romani, and it had further been reported by agents and prisoners that the attack was to take place during the feast of Bairam. This ended on the 4th August. It was also evident now that we could concentrate against him as his line of attack was fairly well defined. It appeared certain that he would attack the Romani position and that, whilst holding us in that position, he would throw his main attack against the Qatia—Gannit—Et Maler line in a north-westerly line, with the object of forcing back our entrenched line before troops could be brought against him from the west and north-west.

If the enemy was to attack he must do so soon or we would have our concentration complete, and in that case be far too strong for him. It certainly was more to the enemy's advantage to get us to move out and attack him in the Qatia area, but probably, being now so far ahead of his base, feeding was getting difficult. From subsequent information it was known that he thought, or at any rate published in his orders, that we were weaker than we actually were. He certainly made a grave miscalculation in the position of the cavalry covering Et Maler from the south. It seemed certain that the attack would come, probably at once; as for its probable direction, from the position at Qatia, the enemy could strike at Romani from the east or the south, or at Dueidar.

Digitized by Google

Though he might have trusted to destroying the infantry posts with gun fire and attacking from the east, it would have taken a long time. The south of the position from the infantry post 21 westwards was quite open, and a force occupying Wellington Ridge would be able to shoot into the camp at 800 yards range. Moreover, this ridge completely dominated the whole place, but it was considered too far out for the infantry to hold.

Plan of the Romani Position.

A move on Dueidar was possible, and from there it would be quite easy to cut the railway line in the neighbourhood of Gilban and to move north against Romani, with the idea of capturing the troops at that place. There were two factors against this: first, he was not strong enough to keep his flanks guarded whilst doing so; and, secondly, it meant a long march through heavy sand to Dueidar and certainly a move of part of his force south of Katib abu Asab.

Action of the Mounted Troops in case of an Attack from the South-west.

The possibility of the attack from the south-west had been often considered and it had been decided that, if the enemy did attack that way, the mounted division should engage him and, without becoming seriously involved, withdraw slowly before him, with the left flank on the infantry post No. 21, and drawing the enemy into the heavy sand dune country, south of the Et Maler camps. If the enemy attacked that way, as now seemed probable, it was plain that he would try and assemble his forces as near as possible to the Et Maler position before dawn, as any move by daylight would be well under observation. To stop this the General Officer Commanding Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division decided to hold an outpost line from the night 3rd-4th August onwards, from Hod el Enna (inclusive) on the right, to the infantry posts south of Katib Gannit (exclusive) on the left. This line was reconnoitred by 10.00, and the 1st Light Horse Brigade detailed to take up the position that night (*see* panorama C).

In the meantime the 2nd Light Horse Brigade, at 08.00 on 3rd August, found the enemy holding the ridge north of Bir el Hamisah strongly. About the same time the Section Mounted Troops reported that the enemy, 2,000 strong, was at Bir Waset and moving on Bir Nagid. The troops, Auckland Mounted Rifle Regiment, at Bir Nagid remained in observation. A prisoner was taken there but could not be questioned as there was no interpreter. By means of signs, however, he explained that the attack was to come that night when troops would be asleep, and he also indicated that the route by which they would come was from

Digitized by Google

PANORAMA F.

VIEW SHOWING CENTRE OF OUTPOST LINE HELD BY 3rd A.L.H. REGT

3/4 Aug. 1916



Reproduced by the Survey of Egypt June 1919 (0626)

Digitized by Google

the south on Romani. It was arranged that this squadron should have a post at Bir abu Raml, and that the cavalry outpost line that night would keep connection with it by patrols at frequent intervals during the night. At 12.10 large bodies of the enemy were reported moving towards Er Rabah. The aeroplanes also reported teams of horses hauling guns towards Hod el Reshafat, and a considerable movement was noticed towards Bid abu Theila. They were also reported placing a gun on the ridge north-east of Er Rabah. In the evening the enemy's line had been located as follows:

"From a point two miles east of Hill 110 to a point bearing 168 degrees from Hill 110 through Bir Qatia, thence to a point just south of Bir Nagid."

The detailed arrangements for the night 3rd-4th August were:

"The 2nd Light Horse Brigade to leave out the usual officers' patrols and withdraw to the Et Maler camp. The 1st Light Horse Brigade to put out an outpost line after dark, running from Katib Gannit (exclusive) to Hod el Enna (inclusive) towards Qatia (as already described on 21st July). Two regiments to hold this line of three miles, with one regiment in reserve at Romani, being about half mile from headquarters of the brigade and about two miles from the southernmost flank of the line."

Complete telephonic arrangements were made to link up all units. The arrangements for next day, if all was quiet, were for the reserve regiment to join its brigade at 03.00, the brigade then to move forward and gain touch with the enemy at 04.00. One battery R.H.A. was to move with the brigade. The 5th Light Horse Regiment was under orders to leave Dueidar at 00.30 and reconnoitre Nagid at dawn, the object being to locate the enemy's left flank and to find out, if possible, his strength; any serious engagement was to be avoided. The outpost line got into position and reported all quiet at 21.30 (*see* panorama sketch A). The 2nd Light Horse Regiment held the right sector Hod el Enna (inclusive) to Mount Meredith (exclusive). The 3rd Light Horse Regiment held the left sector Mount Meredith (inclusive) to infantry post No. 21 (exclusive). The right flank reported at 22.00 that the advanced post was in touch with a small party of the enemy. At 22.02 a light was reported at Qatia. It was exposed four times, for ten seconds each time, then ceased. By 23.30 there seemed to be a general feeling as to a movement of the enemy along the whole of the outpost line, and the Battle of Romani began, the first shots being fired at 23.50.

(*To be continued.*)

Digitized by Google

A VALIANT YOUNG ADVERSARY IN THE PENINSULAR WAR: GENERAL AUGUSTE COLBERT (1777—1809).

By PERCY WHITE.

JUST thirteen days before the death of Sir John Moore, France mourned the loss of one of her finest cavalry leaders—Auguste Colbert—who was shot by Rifleman Plunket, of our 95th Regiment, during the rear-guard fighting on the road to Corunna.

This young officer, who had fought at St. Jean d'Acre, Marengo, Elchingen, Jena, and, finally, in Spain, had always won the respect and admiration of the British troops, and when he died, at the early age of 32, a feeling of pity and sorrow spread alike through the English and French armies.

GENERAL AUGUSTE COLBERT.

Auguste François Marie de Colbert was born on November 18th, 1777, and descended from a branch of the family of the great Colbert, Minister to Louis XIV. When not quite sixteen years old he enlisted with his two brothers in the 8th Battalion of "Volontaires de la Seine." They did not remain long in the regiment, for Edward (the eldest) passed into the 11th Hussars, and shortly afterwards Auguste and his other brother, Alphonse, joined the 7th Chasseurs-à-Cheval. In 1793, this regiment (formerly known as the Chasseurs de Picardy) wore the following picturesque uniform: leather helmet, ornamented by a band of tiger skin, very similar to our own light cavalry helmets of the period; dark green coat (caraco), with rose collar and cuffs, white waistcoat, dark green breeches, light cavalry boots. Coat and breeches ornamented with white braid. They were armed and mounted like the Hussars.

During the Civil War in La Vendée, 1794, Colbert's regiment formed part of the army of the West, commanded by General Canclaux. Having heard that Grouchy, his former friend, was Chief of the Staff, Colbert

Digitized by Google

formed a means of obtaining an interview with the future Marshal of France, who promised to assist him, and at once placed him in the cavalry escort attached to the staff. It was not a great step on the road to fortune, but certainly a beginning.

In the following year, having obtained his rank as lieutenant, he became Grouchy's aide-de-camp, and after a brief period of service in Holland, accompanied his general on the ill-fated expedition to Ireland (1796). On returning to France, he obtained permission to leave Grouchy and was invited by Berthier to join the Headquarters Staff of the Army of Italy. On his arrival here, he met Murat, who, taking a great liking to him, obtained permission to retain him as his aide-de-camp. The time had not yet come, however, for Colbert to distinguish himself as a soldier, for his first mission was of a diplomatic and political nature.

The Valteline, or Upper Valley of the Adda, having been under the domination of the Grisons since the sixteenth century, now wished to throw off the Swiss yoke and join the Cisalpine Republic, which had just been formed. Rebelling against their present Government, they expelled the representatives of the Grisons. Both sides appealed to Bonaparte, who, acting as mediator, sent Murat with troops into the Valteline, under the pretence of restoring order. Auguste Colbert, aged nineteen, was given the duty of discussing these important matters between the two parties, but they did not come to any definite result. Bonaparte, losing patience, finished the discussion by allowing the Valtelines to join the Cisalpine Republic. Colbert having carried out his duties with great tact and intelligence was promoted to the rank of captain.

He was one of the many officers who accompanied Bonaparte on his State entry into Rastadt, in order to attend the Congress, on November 24th, 1797, but did not return to Paris with the conqueror of Italy, having received orders to rejoin Murat, whose cavalry brigade formed part of the Army of Italy.

Shortly after the French troops had entered Rome, a mutiny occurred among the soldiers, who were badly fed and in arrears of pay, but although in revolt, they did not forget their duty, and when the insurrection broke out among the inhabitants in the outskirts of Rome, they fought so well that the enemy were either taken prisoners or driven into the Tiber.

In his dispatches to the Government, Masséna gives an exaggerated importance to these minor achievements, in order to counterbalance any reports that might reach Paris respecting the disorganized condition of his troops. Captain Colbert had the honour of taking the captured flags to Paris, and also the following letter from Masséna to the Directory: "Owing to the bravery and intelligence of General Murat, I am able to send you by Citizen Colbert, his aide-de-camp, the four flags captured from the rebels at Albano, who were completely routed."

Digitized by Google

Colbert, as aide-de-camp to Murat, accompanied Bonaparte to Egypt. During the combat of Salahieh, he charged, by Murat's side, at the head of the 3rd Dragoons, mounted, without stirrups, on an Arab horse, which he had captured during the fight. For his great bravery on this occasion he was promoted "Chef d'Escadron" on the battlefield.

1793.

After the defeat of the Turks at Mount Tabor, Murat and Colbert returned to St. Jean d'Acre, and served together in the trenches before the besieged city. During a sortie by the garrison Colbert saved his general's life, but was severely wounded by a pistol shot, the bullet penetrating both thighs. Fortunately it was not fatal, and after the enemy had been repulsed he was brought in from the trenches and placed under the care of Baron Larrey. His wound kept him in hospital for several months, and he did not return to Cairo until June 14th, 1799.

A month later, Bonaparte wrote to him from headquarters: "I send you, Citizen, two pistols to replace those which you have lost; they could not be placed into better hands!" It is not known how Colbert lost his weapons, but possibly whilst serving in the trenches before St. Jean d'Acre. Owing to the bad state of his health he was not permitted to take part in the Battle of Aboukir, and Kléber kept him in Cairo as his aide-de-camp until he was well enough to sail with Desaix, for France, in February, 1800.

After an absence of ten months, being eager to join Murat again, he travelled post-haste into Lombardy and reached Stradella, where he received a cordial reception from his general, who had now become the Cavalry Commander of the Army of Italy.

For his great bravery at Marengo, 1800, Murat claimed for him the grade of Adjutant-General, and at the close of the campaign Colbert returned to Paris and the First Consul gave him the command of the 10th Chasseurs-à-Cheval, which was considered one of the finest light cavalry regiments in the French Army.

At Hohenlinden, he distinguished himself as a magnificent leader, and

Digitized by Google

quickly gained the affection and respect of both officers and men of the regiment.

In March, 1803, before war was again declared against England, the First Consul entrusted him with a special mission to the Czar of Russia. After receiving precise instructions as to his conversations with the Emperor Alexander, Colonel Colbert set out on his journey, and two days after his arrival at St. Petersburg he was received by the Czar, to whom he presented a personal letter from the First Consul. The Emperor Alexander showed him every mark of esteem and consideration during his short stay in the capital, and on his departure presented him with a diamond ring.

Upon returning to France he again took up the command of the 10th Chasseurs, which formed part of the VIth Corps under Ney. After the splendours of Court life at St. Petersburg he found regimental duties at Montreuil very dull and monotonous, and during this period of inactivity he became engaged to the daughter of General Canclaux, who was at this time Inspector-General of Cavalry. Canclaux had previously known Colbert when he served under Grouchy in La Vendée, and conceiving a great liking for the young Colonel, consented to the marriage, which took place in Paris in December, 1803, General Murat assisting at the ceremony.

From March, 1804, until the autumn of the following year, he remained with his regiment at Montreuil, but at last camp life came to an end, for Austria declared war against France, and the "Grande Armée" received orders to march to the Rhine. At the Battle of Elchingen (October, 1805) Colbert commanded the 10th Chasseurs and the 3rd Hussars. At the head of only 300 men he charged the Austrian squares, and during their retreat captured 1,800 infantry, a general and his staff, several guns and two flags. Two days before the Treaty of Pressburg (December, 1805) Colbert was made Brigadier-General.

When war broke out with Prussia, in 1806, Ney's Corps was concentrated at Nuremburg. The Marshal, recognizing his fine qualities, gave him the command of the advance guard; and in a letter to Napoleon, added: "Colbert keeps up his reputation for courage and valour, and I am sure he will make an excellent Brigadier-General."

He took an important part in the Battle of Jena (October, 1806) and was wounded in the knee whilst bravely leading his Chasseurs in several charges against the Prussian batteries. In a letter home he sums up the battle thus:

"I commanded the advance guard, under Marshal Ney, composed of four battalions of infantry, two regiments of cavalry and some light artillery. One of my aides-de-camp has been wounded and the other has had his hat riddled with bullets. The Duke of Brunswick is killed, and nearly all the Prussian generals and staff officers are wounded or prisoners."

Digitized by Google

Colbert showed exceptional bravery at Eylau (1807). In his report to the Emperor, Murat gives him the greatest praise for his achievements during this terrible battle.

His brigade did not operate with the VIth Corps at Friedland, but was attached to Grouchy's cavalry and the left wing of the army. Colbert and Beaumont, with 2,500 cavalry, were employed during this day in repulsing the Cossack hordes, who attacked the rear of the French line. In this battle, the 3rd Hussars employed new tactics against the Russian cavalry, by remaining stationary until the enemy came within thirty paces, then, pouring in a heavy fire from their carbines, they charged with drawn sabres. The Russians, unused to this method, were quickly demoralized.

Colbert was under Soult's orders at the Battle of Tudela (November 23rd, 1808). He overthrew the centre of the Spanish army, and, deploying behind the enemy's right wing, vigorously attacked them in the rear, thus greatly helping to complete the victory.

On December 15th, the VIth Corps, preceded by Colbert's brigade, entered Madrid, and a few days later, Napoleon received them on the heights of Chamartin. The meeting between Napoleon and the young General must have recalled memories of their earlier campaigns, for the Emperor promised to grant him further rewards for his gallant services. "You had better do so quickly, sire!" remarked Colbert, "for although I am not yet thirty, I begin to feel very old!"

Whilst Soult and Ney were advancing against General Moore, in order to intercept his communications with Portugal, Colbert's brigade formed the advance guard, under Marshal Bessières. Coming in touch with the British and Spanish forces at Astorga, Colbert pursued them through the town and captured many prisoners and a quantity of baggage.

Just before arriving here, Napoleon received important dispatches respecting another great war with Austria in the spring, which changed all his plans of campaign. Leaving Soult to deal with the retreating forces under Moore, he stationed the VIth Corps at Astorga and recalled Bessières to headquarters, in order that he might return with him immediately to France.

Colbert, now in advance of the main forces, was on the point of being sent back to the VIth Corps under Ney, but, owing to his men being in a much better condition than those of Fournier's brigade, Napoleon agreed with Soult to allow him to continue the pursuit. This unfortunate order, although giving Colbert further chances for distinction, was the cause of his early death.

To hinder the advance of the French on the road to Corunna, and at the same time to give his weary troops a rest, Moore posted his rear-guard on rising ground planted with vineyards on the western side of the Cua, a stream crossed by a bridge in the village of Cacabellos.

Digitized by Google

Colbert, following closely in pursuit, arrived at this place on January 3rd, 1809, and during the fighting in the main street, captured about fifty prisoners, but whilst trying to cross the bridge his cavalry were driven back by a heavy fire from the battery of the British Horse Artillery.

On the arrival of Merle's infantry, the French advanced again, after another slight engagement. Colbert, riding close up to the British positions, was an easy mark for the troops posted in the vineyards, and whilst conversing with an officer of Hussars he was picked out by Rifleman Thomas Plunket and shot through the head. At nightfall Merle's Division assailed the British position and Moore's reserve fell back to Villafranca (January 3rd, 1809).

Napier, in his history of the Peninsular War, referring to Colbert's death, remarks: " His fine martial figure, his voice, his gestures, and, above all, his daring valour, had excited the admiration of the British, and a general feeling of sorrow was predominant when the gallant soldier fell ! "

In 1810 Napoleon gave instructions for a marble statue to be erected in memory of him, but events intervened which, unfortunately, prevented the work being carried out. Colbert's glorious name is, however, inscribed on the Arc de Triomphe de l'Etoile, Paris.

Digitized by Google

TRAINING IN THE REVOLVER.

By CAPTAIN J. NOEL, *The Small Arms School.*

ALTHOUGH a high degree of efficiency in musketry training has always been maintained in our army, a part of weapon training that has been rather neglected has been that of the revolver. Revolver shooting has been considered too much a matter of individual skill, for officers to study or not as they pleased. They were not obliged to do so. They had no systematic training in the work. They had no standard test or examination to pass. If they were good shots or bad shots it did not affect them professionally. Now it is incumbent on every officer to understand his revolver, not only for his self-defence on active service, but also for the tactical uses to which he can put his weapon.

It was unfortunate that the pre-war annual revolver course for officers was based on incorrect principles, for the range practices were all in opposition to the correct use of the weapon according to its characteristics. The result of this was that on service an officer found that he had to use the weapon for a totally different kind of shooting than that which he had practised in peace time. His methods of slow, deliberate aim failed altogether against the quick moving and surprise targets he met. This led in its turn to mistrust of the weapon, blame being put on the weapon and not on the faulty training. Now the revolver has this peculiarity, that in the hands of an untrained man it is not only difficult to shoot with, but is also dangerous to himself. But conversely, in the hands of a trained man the weapon changes altogether in character and becomes one of enormous possibilities on account of its rapidity and deadliness of effect. With a rifle an untrained man will certainly be able to do some damage, but with a revolver he will be useless.

It was customary to apply the same method of aiming and firing with the revolver as with the rifle—that is, the deliberate aim. But

Digitized by Google

the two weapons are totally different, one is a single-handed weapon and the other is a double-handed weapon. The methods of trigger pressing and firing are distinct. The rifle is a weapon for fixed aim, in which trigger pressing, except of course the preliminary pressure, commences *after* the sights are aligned. The revolver is a weapon that is fired during movement, the trigger pressing and the firing of the shot is *completed* by the time the sights become aligned. This principle of handling is proved by a study of the characteristics. The first characteristic is that the revolver is a one-handed weapon; and from this it can be argued that, being no support for the hand and arm, as with the rifle, the weapon is relatively unsuitable for steady, deliberate aim. The holding and trigger pressing will be of enhanced importance. All manipulations will have to be done by one hand as far as possible (cocking of the hammer), and both hands will have to be trained. The second characteristic is the short distance between the sights, restricting the shooting range of the weapon. The third characteristic is the short barrel, making the weapon handy, portable and quickly aligned on a surprise target. It makes it suitable for confined localities, trench and house-to-house fighting, consequently a dangerous weapon in the hands of a careless or untrained man, being easily pointed and accidentally discharged in a wrong direction. The fourth characteristic is the stopping power of the bullet, emphasizing its value for close-quarter fighting. The fifth characteristic is the rapidity of fire, the revolver and automatic pistol being the fastest hand manipulated firearms in the world. From the study of the characteristics the following lessons may be summarized :—

1. The weapon is one for quick shooting at close ranges against surprise and moving targets. Range practices must therefore be based on this principle.

2. Quick shooting should be the guiding consideration of training. The rapidity of placing a shot or succession of shots on a man figure target will be a more important criterion than the close grouping of the shots.

3. The method of using the weapon against service targets will be more along the lines of instinctive aim by sense of direction, rather than by deliberate aim with the sights.

4. The weapon (being a single-handed one) must be fired during motion and not brought to rest for the aim (as with the rifle or two-handed weapon).

Having formulated the above principles let us now devise a system of training based upon them. The guiding object will be quick shooting. Training, however, must be progressive, consequently a preliminary groundwork of accuracy must be established, and then the rapidity built up upon that groundwork.

Digitized by Google

Preliminary accuracy is gained by:

(*a*) A correct holding or grip.
(*b*) Developing sense of direction in eye and arm.
(*c*) Trigger pressing.

Take each in turn, commencing with the grip. The fundamental idea in the grip or holding is to utilize the pointing sense of the hand, and so to adjust the revolver in the hand that it is brought in line with the line of sight, when it is quickly raised to point at any target upon which the eye is fixed. This natural sense of pointing is used in many ways unconsciously. The tennis player learns by feel and instinct how to serve his ball to clear the net and land inside the court. The football player, running at top speed, learns to pass a Rugby ball straight to the hand of another player. It is the same with the man who shoots a bird with a shot gun or fires a revolver. When a man uses a revolver to fire at another man he uses his eye to guide the throw of his hand; and he trains his fingers in the art of pressing the trigger so that the shot is fired at the right second, straight for the line of the mark which the eye is watching.



CORRECT GRIP, SERVICE REVOLVER.

This instinctive shooting is not the first stage, but only a final stage of training. It is arrived at after the three preliminaries of grip, sense of direction or "throw," and trigger pressing are mastered in such a way that they finally become instinctive and habitual —then the sights can be dispensed with and the bullet "thrown" at the mark. In practising the grip the revolver should be held at full

Digitized by Google

extent of the arm pointing to the ground at an angle of 45 degrees. The eyes being fixed firmly on the mark the revolver is quickly raised to the alignment of the line of sight, repeating this up and down lift and altering the hand on the butt until the revolver rises correctly to the line of vision. The guide is to get the knuckles at the inside edge of the trigger guard, controlling direction, and the hand high on the butt, almost touching the hammer when cocked, controlling elevation. But this will depend, of course, largely upon individual hands and revolvers. The thumb must be extended along the side of the revolver or bent at the first joint. The tip of the second, third and little fingers must be clear of the palm of the hand, otherwise a larger sized butt on the revolver used. (Three sizes of butt plates for Webley's are now made.) The grip must finally be practised by sense of feel, drawing the revolver from the holster.

Developing sense of direction consists of strengthening the arm muscles used in raising the revolver quickly and developing control of the eye in the accurate lift and alignment of the weapon to the line of sight. For this purpose it is convenient to use an aiming mark level with the eye, with a long black line vertically below it to assist in the straight lift, called in shooting parlance the " vertical lift."*

The third preliminary is trigger pressing—perhaps the most important, certainly the most difficult of the three. The art of trigger pressing lies in releasing the trigger by a squeeze of the *whole* hand, using all the fingers to squeeze as well as the thumb, and not by an independent action of the first finger. The even pressure of the hand commences as the revolver starts its lift and increases steadily, firing the shot at the moment the revolver reaches the line of vision. In this way it will be seen that there is no deliberate aim, but the weapon is fired during its motion. There is no loss of time. The moment the revolver reaches the line of vision the bullet departs. It will be noted, too, how this method of trigger pressing for single-handed weapons differs from that for the two-handed ones (rifles), in which the principal trigger pressure *follows* after the alignment of the sights, the weapon remaining at rest during the time taken to press the trigger.

So much for the first preliminary stage of training. The second stage is the development of rapidity, the quickening of the vertical lift, combined with increased skill in trigger pressing and judging or timing the trigger release. There is no limit to speed except the minimum of time possible for the vertical lift. The degree of rapidity is a matter of individual attainment. The service test is to throw one shot in one second into a 16 in. by 12 in. rectangle at ten yards. It can be understood

*N.B.—In shooting from horseback the revolver may be brought down to the mark from above, instead of being raised from below. The principle of shooting, viz., trigger pressing during the movement of the weapon, is the same.

Digitized by Google

that practice leads to the eye and arm being so accustomed that the stage can be reached when the use of the sights on the revolver can be dispensed with and the shot fired by instinct or sense of direction alone

The above is the principal method of firing the revolver—the single action. The double action is used as well, generally at close range for rapid fire at a succession of targets at ten yards range or less. The method of trigger pressing remains the same, except that the revolver is kept in close alignment to the line of vision and not raised and lowered as for the single or cocking action. The trigger pressure is timed and co-ordinated with the return of the revolver to the line of vision after the recoil of the last shot, so that the hammer falls and the shot departs simultaneously with the revolver returning to the line of vision.

The revolver may, of course, be used sometimes from the prone position, from shell holes and parapets, but here the two-handed grip is used and the weapon becomes a two-handed one, fired in the same way as the rifle, by deliberate aim.

There often exists a controversy about the relative value of the single and double action methods of firing. The single action is the normal method. The double action being used only at close range, as it is not so accurate. Then, at close range, increased speed is obtained by firing by double action from the hip. Walter Winans wrote, in his "Art of Revolver Shooting": "No accurate shooting can be done, in my opinion, by the double action." Double action shooting being advocated, however, from the hip or full arm stretch when the closeness of the range will counteract inaccuracy of shooting (to hit a man target).

The above describes the theory of training. Practical training is carried out by drills, muscle exercises and empty pistol training combined with range practices.

Now that a practical course in the revolver has been introduced into army weapon training, it is hoped that the revolver will receive more attention. After the introduction of practical training the next thing we hope for will be the evolution of the tactics of the weapon. At present nothing can be found in any of the tactical manuals to serve as a guide to the handling of the revolver on service—what it can be used for, how it should be employed, how it should operate in combination with other weapons. Officers look upon their revolvers as weapons they carry merely for their self-defence. They never consider what tactical uses they can put their revolvers to. Now every weapon has its tactics. As none are given in the training manuals let us then reason them out from the characteristics.

The revolver, owing to its handiness, quick alignment and rapidity of fire, should be useful for trench work and all underground fighting. It should be useful for patrol work and raiding owing to its reliability under conditions of mud and dirt, portability (carried in the holster),

Digitized by Google

and rapidity of fire—two hands will be free for crawling and wire cutting. The revolver should also be useful for approaching and dealing with machine-gun nests, pill-boxes, etc., its portability aiding an unobserved approach and its rapidity of fire enabling a single man to tackle a numerically superior enemy, taken by surprise at close quarters.

Making a general category of the uses of the weapon one could say that they are as follow:

Attack.

1. Clearing trenches, leading local trench attacks, etc.
2. Trench raiding, house-to-house and street fighting.
3. Patrol work.
4. Helping the infantry advance by tackling machine-gun nests and points of resistance.

Defence.

5. Holding a sudden attack or raid
6. Blocking a trench.
7. Covering small local retirements.
8. Taking part, in co-operation with other weapons, for defence of machine-gun posts, redoubts, points of resistance, etc., by having the special duty of guarding underground approaches.

A good example of the use of a revolver for clearing a trench was that of 2nd Lieutenant Leach, V.C., of the 2nd Manchester Regiment, at Festubert in 1914. The Germans had attacked our lines at Festubert and driven out a company A counter-attack on our original trench failed. Leach and Sergeant Hogan went down a communication trench leading to our old trench and Leach shot with his revolver the German sentry at the end of it The two then worked their way down the trench from traverse to traverse. Using their revolvers they inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. Eventually the remainder of the Germans, who had been driven to the end of the trench, surrendered. The total enemy casualties in killed, wounded and prisoners was a little short of a hundred. This example brings out the first lesson in revolver tactics, namely, that boldness of handling is the essential basis of revolver fighting.

Examples of revolver work in helping the infantry advance, held up by machine guns, are those of Sergeant Downie, V.C., and Sergeant Cooper, V.C. The enemy were holding a strong position before which our troops were held up. Sergeant Downie crawled with two other men and a Lewis gun up to the wire about fifty yards from the machine-gun emplacement whence was coming most of the trouble. He turned his Lewis gun on to the emplacement and, leaving the two men and going on alone under cover of this fire, he got through the enemy's wire.

Digitized by Google

approached the emplacement from the flank and sprang upon the machine-gun team, killing all four men outright with his revolver. He then stood up on the parapet and waved the advance to our own men. Seized with



extraordinary enthusiasm at this action the whole line advanced and took the position, inflicting 100 casualties on the enemy by means of the bayonet.

Sergeant Cooper's action was quoted in the *Gazette* as follows:

"The V.C. No. 22794, Sgt. E. Cooper, K.R.R.C.

"For most conspicuous bravery and initiative in the attack. Enemy machine guns from a concrete block-house, 250 yards away, were holding up the advance of the battalion on his left, and were also causing heavy casualties to his own battalion. Sgt. Cooper with four men rushed forward towards the block-house, though heavily fired on. About

Digitized by Google

100 yards distant he ordered his men to lie down and fire at the block-house. Finding this did not silence the machine guns, he himself went forward and reached the block-house and fired his revolver into the opening. The machine guns ceased firing and the garrison surrendered. Seven machine guns and forty-five prisoners were captured in the block-



house. By this magnificent example of courage he undoubtedly saved what might have been a serious check to the whole advance, at the same time saving a great number of lives."

These examples bring out the second and third lessons in revolver tactics:

2. Covering fire is needed to enable the revolver to approach—the revolver approaching from the flank or rear to open a sudden, rapid assault.

Digitized by Google

3. The mobility of the revolver enables a single man to approach unobserved; and the fire power of the weapon is sufficient for a single man to attack superior numbers.

The above is only a brief sketch of the possibilities of the revolver as a tactical weapon. The subject is a new one and deserves study. All officers would do well, firstly, to practise revolver shooting and, secondly, to study the handling of their weapons on service so that they will be able to put their weapons to some definite tactical use instead of carrying them merely for their self-defence.

Digitized by Google

EQUITATION.

A few suggestions with regard to post-bellum instruction as the result of lessons learnt during the War.

By LIEUT-COLONEL MALCOLM BORWICK, D.S.O., *late Royal Scots Greys.*

WHAT has the War taught us about this subject?—one so important to the cavalry soldier; for surely, to quote the words of General Greenly: "Equitation is the basis on which the whole training of cavalry rests." As is inevitable in war, we have learnt many lessons.

One, I think, is that the time and trouble spent on equitation before the War was not wasted. Another, that our system of training was sound. Another, that in our training we must go for handiness and endurance, rather than for speed.

Another, and by far the most important, is that, to reap the fruits of victory, even in modern warfare, cavalry used as such is as essential as ever and that to beat the enemy you must close with him; also that if you wish to foster the real cavalry spirit in your men, which is the wish to close with the enemy, you must train them to use their white weapons and so train their horses that the men may be confident that they can manœuvre them with ease.

The results achieved by the British cavalry during the retreat and in the subsequent advance to the Aisne were, I do not think it is too much to say, a triumph for those who were responsible for the purchase of the horses and for those who had trained them.

None but good horses, none but well balanced and hardy horses, could have stood, as they did, the searching tests of that campaign.

But surely equitation, like all other forms of training, may be improved upon, and it is the object of this article to offer some humble suggestions as to how this may be accomplished, as the result of my experiences at the Cavalry Corps Equitation School in France and subsequently at Netheravon.

I was in charge of the equitation of my regiment when the War broke out, and, by the command of the late General Bulkeley Johnson, I often

Digitized by Google

attended both squadron and regimental drills to observe the results of the men and horses passed lately from the Riding School.

What struck me was how badly a certain, rather small, percentage of men and horses " went," when passed out into squadrons, and I was not satisfied that the training gave really uniform results.

On taking up the post as Chief Instructor at a Cavalry School I quickly became certain that what I suspected was correct, that to instruct with success the teacher had to study the physiology of both man and horse, and that at any rate I had made the instruction of the man too difficult and too dull by my ignorance of the functions of his body and mind, and that my demands in training the horse had been often too severe and stereotyped. As the result of my observations and study, the following suggestions may be of some help to those interested in teaching men to ride.

The first duty of the instructor must be to study the character and temperament of each individual in his class. Without individual instruction and study he will not be a success. The different emotions, such as fear, self-consciousness, temper, over-anxiety, set up in his pupils the very muscular contractions which so militate against good horsemanship and which it is the instructor's special duty to combat. The soldier should be erect without stiffness, he should be supple without looking slack.

The instructor must first give his pupils balance, and so confidence, during their first lessons when mounted. He must see that the horses are quiet and that the men, so far from being frightened, should, as far as possible, enjoy themselves.

First impressions are lasting. To learn quickly and well we must like our subject and be interested in it. The instructor must try to make his teaching as simple, as varied, and as interesting as possible.

The elements of equitation, like most subjects, are of necessity apt to be dull, and the human body can only be controlled by constant repetition ; it is for the instructor, by means of his initiative, to make the subject as little wearisome as possible. The equitation staff has a great responsibility. The instructors have much to do with the recruit during his first year's service and it is up to them to see that the first impressions of his life in the cavalry are both good and pleasant ones.

When the recruit has acquired balance and is comfortable under his new conditions, he must be taught how to maintain himself in the saddle ; in other words, he must be given a firm seat quite independent of the reins. While doing this the instructor should explain and demonstrate the aids, their uses, and their necessity in military riding.

The instructor should invariably ride a well trained horse, which will impress on the recruits the results that can be obtained by properly applied aids. Especially during this period, and in fact during his whole

Digitized by Google

training, the recruit has to practise certain physical exercises. Their object is to strengthen his muscles and to help him to gain perfect control over them, so that he will be able to contract certain sets of muscles and at the same time relax others.

The instructor must be careful to not only explain but demonstrate the exact object of each exercise and to impress on the recruits its results.

If he is able to make clear the ultimate beneficial results on their horsemanship they will take interest and concentrate on the exercises, for unless they do concentrate their minds they lose more than half the value.

When the recruit has attained his balance, has an independent seat and knows what the aids are and their object, and is able to use his limbs independently of one another, he must be taught the practice of the " application of the aids " on a trained horse.

The instructor must be careful to see that the recruit uses the adductor muscles of his thighs to maintain his seat and that the lower part of his leg hangs easily down and is used for the application of the aids and not for gripping purposes.

The head must be held erect but without any stiffening of the muscles of the neck. If the muscles of the neck become stiff they react on the whole body and the recruit becomes a mass of contractions, nor will he ever become a horseman until this state passes.

Good riding is the power to maintain your balance regardless of what the horse may do. It is as dangerous to grip too hard, as to not grip enough. This may be clearly seen when teaching the recruit to jump.

The instruction in jumping will be much easier if the instructor will grasp the fact that to get over an ordinary fence the recruit has to grip but not over-grip, that he has to distribute his weight correctly, and to approach the fence in a normal frame of mind. I think the chief difficulty the instructor has always had, and always will have, is in teaching the recruit to close his legs as the horse takes off and at the same time to relax the muscles of his back ; but if both the instructor and the recruit know what they are after and will concentrate on it, success is bound to come quickly. I would ask all instructors who have difficulty with a recruit in jumping, to watch the back of his neck and the small of his back, for these are the two parts of the body where the chief difficulty will arise.

To discuss the matter of grip: a muscle can only contract to two-thirds of its length, when it is in this state it is doing its utmost. If any recruits, from either fear or over-anxiety, approach the fence with teeth set, gripping with all their might, they will consequently have no reserve of grip to counteract the spring, when the horse takes off.

In the case of the recruit who opens his legs, it will be seen as a rule that he leans his body back and stiffens the whole of it from the neck downwards. Observation will show as a rule that such men are nervous

Digitized by Google

and lacking in confidence. They may be helped by strapping the stirrups under the horse's belly, and by being made to hold a strap round the horse's neck.

Much has been written about the distribution of weight and the position of the body when jumping. The practical horseman no doubt makes, and always has made, what one can only describe as " instinctive adjustments " when riding across country, which he has learnt from experience. Sometimes his body is back, sometimes forward, sometimes he helps the horse's balance by holding him up and sometimes by allowing the reins to slide through his fingers. But we know that a soldier, when in fighting kit, cannot get over a very big obstacle, and so it is, I think, safe to teach him a stereotyped seat, and a uniform method of distributing his weight.

From experience it appears that the best results are attained if the recruit is taught to ride up to the fence with his body perpendicular. As the horse takes off he should place his weight well into his stirrups, contract his adductor muscles and lean the body slightly forward, relaxing at the same time the muscles of his back. Control of the muscles is the secret of success in riding and more especially in jumping. The tendency is for the body to be thrown back when the horse takes off; this must be counteracted by getting the body slightly over or beyond the perpendicular.

When the recruit has learnt how to use his body in applying the aids to a trained horse he must be taught to use them in more advanced riding. The ideal would be, I think, to give each recruit the chance of riding a remount, but as this would be rarely possible, especially under present conditions, he may have his education completed, as regards the proper employment of the aids, which he has just to apply in the ordinary movements, on a trained horse.

It is on the assault course, in jumping the various obstacles, in making the various turns, in getting the different targets high and low, in halting rapidly and in turning sharp about that the recruit will learn to become a practical military horseman. He will discover that if he can employ the aids he has learnt correctly, if he can put his muscles to their proper use, he will not only manage his horse easily but he will improve him, and he will attain the confidence in the use of his weapon which is so essential to a cavalry soldier.

To sum up: teaching the recruit to ride is comprised in giving him balance, giving him a good seat, giving him the knowledge of the aids, teaching him to control his body and to apply the " aids," and teaching him the correct employment of the " aids " under all circumstances when he has learnt them.

I fear in this article there is very little that has not been written before, but I would appeal to all instructors to make the teaching of this

Digitized by Google

important subject as interesting, as enjoyable and as varied as possible. If they will study closely every individual, if they begin every lesson determined to attain some improvement, and if they will let their pupils realize at the end of it what improvement has been attained if they set about their task with good humour and unlimited self-control, they will send their recruits out to the squadrons imbued with a real interest in and love of riding, which will encourage them to improve every horse which passes through their hands and to be capable of doing so. This, in my humble opinion, is a very worthy ideal.

Digitized by Google

CAVALRY WORK IN ANATOLIA.

By MAJOR J. K. MCCONNEL, D.S.O., M.C., *20th Hussars.*

THE cavalry work performed east of Constantinople will be more readily understood if a few moments are first devoted to an outline of the general changes in the situation.

By the beginning of July, 1920, the Nationalists had wearied of their attempts to capture Ismid and to advance on Constantinople, although they still appeared to hope to cause a rising in the latter. Most of their troops had in fact been withdrawn from this area and were transferred to face the rapid Greek advance from Smyrna. Their remaining forces were believed to consist of a party near Beicos, some bands defending Gebze and others based in Adabazar, operating to the east of Ismid. At this time the British were holding on to the south-western extremity of the Ismid Peninsula, with a detachment at Beicos and others along the railway as far as Tuzla. Ismid was being held by a British group.

The first step was to get rid of the enemy round Beicos and Gebze. The troops at Ismid were then reinforced by the 20th Hussars and some artillery, an infantry battalion being stationed along the railway line. The garrison of Ismid was in the meantime making small raids on the surrounding villages. After this, larger columns were dispatched from Ismid to take in the country as far as the Black Sea; Greek infantry also giving assistance. By this time all organized resistance by the Nationalists had disappeared and friendly bands of Circassians had begun to rally in the country to the east of the River Sakharia, and had started to operate to the west of that river. As it was found that when the Allied columns withdrew roving bands of Nationalists reappeared, it was decided to place semi-permanent garrisons at Kandra and Armasha.

At the beginning of September the Circassian movement became more pronounced. The headmen were anxious for British co-operation in an advance on Adabazar. Finding that this was beyond the scope of our policy, they occupied the town themselves. The eastern end of the Ismid Peninsula was, by the end of September, being gradually handed over to a Greek Division, while the British troops were being withdrawn nearer Constantinople.

Digitized by Google

On the 3rd July the 20th Hussars arrived from Egypt; strength 536 all ranks, organized on a four-squadron basis. The ships arrived at noon, but berthing took time and the majority of saddles had not been carried on the horse-boat. The result of this was a seventeen-mile night march to Pavlo, after the four-day sea voyage. Taking into consideration that many of the horses were soft, this was hardly an attractive entry into the war zone.

The next ten days were spent in sorting out muddles that are inseparable from a sea voyage, and in preparing for coming operations. One or two reconnaissances by single troops were undertaken and efforts were made to adjust instruction, given on the treeless desert, to the broken and scrub-covered country in which the regiment now found itself.

One feature of this training period was the magnificent bathing from a sandy beach; this was greatly enjoyed by both men and horses.

The first serious affair to be undertaken by the 20th Hussars was to be a round up of Nationalists in the town of Gebze, on 13th July, in co-operation with the 30th Howitzer Battery, R.F.A., and the 2/39th Garhwalis. The plan of operation, which began with a night march to the assembly area, was for the infantry, supported by gun fire, to make

Digitized by Google

a frontal attack, while a turning movement was carried out by the cavalry round the left flank. Previous reconnaissances showed that the enemy were occupying some heights to the west of the town, with parties in a line of villages entrenching northwards. The regiment arrived beyond the town just as the enemy rear-guard was breaking away. The leading squadron managed two charges, in which fourteen enemy were sabred. In addition to the above, eight or nine enemy were killed by fire. During the operation the garrisons of the villages north of Gebze began a counter-attack, which they pressed with some vigour; it was, however, checked by our fire. One of the features of the operation was the inaccuracy of the enemy's riflemen, only one officer and one horse being hit.

This action at Gebze appeared to have a moral effect on the enemy. When the garrison at Pavlo moved a week later to join the 242nd Infantry Brigade at Ismid, it was satisfactory to find the villages well posted with reports by witnesses of the fate of the Nationalists' rear-guard the week before. The interpreters affirmed that they were much more frightened of the sword than of the rifle. At one place, however, during the evening of the second day out from Pavlo, some slight opposition was met with. A camp had been selected in a valley which was overlooked by some rugged hills; when the local brigands had appreciated their opponents' intention to stop the night, they tried to reach positions from which they could snipe at the camp. The squadron on day outpost duty was able to keep them back, but to ensure a quiet night the howitzers gave them a mild evening hate. Throughout the journey the road was bad—although the limbers had purposely been lightly laden, six mules had to be used on more than one hill. At some of the corners the track had to be widened to avoid wagons falling over the side. In spite of difficulties, only one wagon was overturned; much to the enjoyment of the onlookers that contained a small barrel of beer, which was damaged by the rough treatment.

On 23rd July three columns were dispatched from Ismid; they comprised a total of one Greek regiment of infantry, with the addition of one squadron plus one troop 20th Hussars. Two of these columns moved in a westward sweep from Ismid to Shile, the right-hand one touching Kandra. The third column was to meet the other on their return journey and to provide them with supplies.

The cavalry was divided, two troops with each of the two right columns, one troop with the left column.

The enemy put up a considerable opposition on the first day, making use of the scrub-covered hills to conceal his riflemen. The cavalry of the right-hand column drove back a party of about forty enemy by threatening to turn their flank with one troop, while the other troop covered the encircling movement with fire. Later the enemy were located occupying a strong position, of which the flanks were difficult

Digitized by Google

to assail; the Greek infantry made a frontal attack, killing or capturing a total of thirty-three. The 20th Hussars were less fortunate during the next day's fighting, as one sergeant was severely wounded and two horses killed. The Greek infantry again came up in support and several Turks were accounted for by a combined attack. After the junction of the first two columns, the country that was traversed was most unsuitable for cavalry, being covered by dense wood and scrub; even the infantry scouts were constrained to keep to the road, which over many stretches could be described as merely a good track. The column returned to camp after an eight days' outing with an excellent record as regards sickness and casualties, which might well have been considerable taking into account the adverse conditions.

The end of July saw another column dispatched from Ismid. This time the composition was one full squadron 20th Hussars, one section R.F.A., one section R.E., 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders, 1/10th Jats and a long column of train. This force, under Brigadier-General Montague Bates, proceeded to Kandra along the road taken by the right-hand Greek column. Opposition was met with at almost the same points, the 20th Hussars having one horse killed and one man slightly wounded. It was difficult to estimate the casualties to the enemy owing to the fact that they were nearly always encountered in thick scrub, but at the minimum ten were accounted for, some of their ponies also being captured. The enemy's fire was again found to be most inaccurate; they evinced a marked dislike to the Hotchkiss rifle, which was able to dislodge them from a good position by frontal fire.

After communication had been established with the Black Sea, Kandra was used as a centre of operations. Sirek, the base, which had no pier, but a beautiful sandy beach, was more suitable for bathing than for landing stores, especially in a north wind.

Cavalry patrols, varying in strength from a troop to an officer with six other ranks, were dispatched to search the densely wooded country to the north-east of Kandra, but little trace could be found of the enemy. On 3rd August an officers' patrol, of a strength of ten all ranks, visited Salmanli, about seventeen miles to the south-east. They were fortunate in discovering an excellent and moderately direct road, which had been entirely omitted from the map. Information concerning the enemy was obtained from the driver of an ox wagon, and the patrol set out to investigate the enemy's right rear. A picket was discovered taking its after lunch siesta and was so much frightened that it scattered without rifles into the adjoining scrub. Other enemy posts farther along the ridge were also seen and engaged. The patrol had the misfortune to lose two horses, one of which was shot by the interpreter when mounting. An attack by the main column was undertaken after a delay of two days, the arrival of a ration boat having to be awaited. Subsequent information

Digitized by Google

disclosed that the enemy withdrew in the meantime from their position, which stretched from Salmanli to Armasha and also temporarily from Adabazar as well.

The next day an officers' patrol was dispatched from Kandra to Sifler, on the River Sakharia. They were fortunate in falling in with a Nationalist convoy carrying grain for shipment in sailing boats to Constantinople This patrol stopped the night in a village between Sifler and Salmanli. It appears that a large party of Nationalists followed the patrol and visited several villages about which careful inquiries had been made by our patrol; the patrol was, however, not discovered, as the name of the village to which it withdrew was only once mentioned.

During the latter part of August and September garrisons consisting of a battalion with a couple of troops of cavalry were stationed at Armasha and Kandra. On one occasion the infantry were withdrawn from Armasha and a squadron replaced them. The 20th Hussars were also asked to provide escorts for supply convoys to Armasha and single troops were sent in conjunction with Greek infantry to the area south of Ismid. On occasions the intervention of cavalry was even required to check private quarrels between local villages—these are rather strenuous in this country. There was little or no fighting during this period, except on one occasion when a section of eight riflemen of the 20th Hussars killed or wounded five out of ten Turks running at 500 to 800 yards range. Amongst the enemy captured was a leader of an important Nationalist band.

The work of the columns and garrisons consisted largely of reconnaissance—this has naturally been the work of the cavalry. In contrast to the fighting in France the cavalry has done nearly all the work and the infantry as a rule has had little to do except to march quietly down the road.



Digitized by Google

SOME NOTES ON THE FORMATION, TRAINING AND TACTICAL HANDLING OF HOTCHKISS GUNS WITH CAVALRY.

By MAJOR H. V. S. CHARRINGTON, M.C., *12th (P.O.W. Royal) Lancers.*

HAVING had the good fortune to command a cavalry squadron throughout the greater part of the campaign on the Western Front, and having during part of that time had two of the keenest and most efficient Hotchkiss gun officers I have ever met under my command, some of the following ideas may prove worthy of consideration and discussion.

1.—THE FORMATION AND COMPOSITION OF A HOTCHKISS GUN SECTION.

There is reason to believe that in the new cavalry training the strength of the Hotchkiss Gun Section will be laid down as five men and six horses, the horse-holder being omitted. This would seem to reduce the section to a minimum as one man will hold six horses, or change position with them if they come under fire. If the No. 3 has to go back and help the packman with the led horses the rate and volume of fire from the gun may be considerably reduced perhaps at some critical moment. Under certain circumstances the attachment of a sixth man may be advantageous therefore in future. Let us examine the important question of manning this machine gun in the light of practical trial under war conditions.

Experience in the field proved again and again that it is no use attempting to lay down for a Hotchkiss Gun Section so great a strength as that of eight men and nine horses, or even seven men and eight horses.

Such strengths were often required of us in France, with the result that the remaining three sections of the troop were reduced to four or five men apiece, and on occasions became so weak that it was necessary to break up one section, thus reducing the troop to two sections, and a Hotchkiss Gun Section; and thereby considerably lessening its value either as a reconnoitring or a fighting unit.

Digitized by Google

Besides losses from casualties, sickness, etc., the large number of men taken away from squadrons for various regimental, brigade, divisional and corps duties reduced the strength of troops to never more than twenty-four rifles, often considerably less, so that if it was desired to maintain three efficient sections in a troop besides the Hotchkiss Gun Section, a strength of six men and seven horses was the maximum that could be allotted to the latter.

We found, moreover, that a Hotchkiss Gun Section composed of such numbers could carry out all tasks required of it as effectively and with less loss than if composed of any more men. Once an automatic weapon opens fire, it immediately draws upon itself the greater portion of any hostile fire in its vicinity, and provided that the gun can be effectively handled and controlled, the fewer men you have around it the better.

Casualties among Hotchkiss gunners in France were certainly 50 per cent. higher than among the remaining rank and file, and essential as it is, therefore, to have as large a reserve as possible in every troop of men trained in the use of the gun, once trained it is far better to distribute them among the remaining sections than to form one large Hotchkiss Gun Section of them all, which may be completely wiped out by one shell.

The man we always did without, thereby reducing the team by one man, was the so-called scout, as we found that when the gun was in action the corporal could quite easily perform all the duties required of this man, and by his elimination the number of men actually on the fire position was reduced to three, the corporal and the Nos. 1 and 2 of the gun.

The corporal should be close enough to effectively control and direct the fire with his voice, but not so close that the same shell could destroy both himself and the gun team (10—15 yards was a good average), and he, together with the No. 3, who was well in rear and under cover, were both at hand, to either continue firing or take the gun out of action, if both or either the Nos. 1 and 2 became casualties. The addition of a scout only increased the chance of losses among the party, without adding to its efficiency.

The details of the six men and seven horses are:

Men.	*Duties in Action.*
The corporal in charge section .	Acts as observer and controls the fire.
No. 1	Firer.
No. 2	Loader.
No. 3	Ammunition carrier and runner.
Horseholder	Holds the corporal's and No. 3's horses.
Packman	Leads gun pack horse and holds No. 1's and No. 2's horses.

and the diagram overleaf shows the suggested method of forming them

Digitized by Google

up on parade, which has been thoroughly tested on service and found most satisfactory.



It will be noted that in this formation the packman, with gunpack horse, always rides immediately in rear of the Nos. 1 and 2, and holds their horses when they are in action, so that when mounting or dismounting they are always next their gun, and consequently a great saving of time is effected, both in coming into and getting out of action.

The position of the N.C.O. on the left of the section leaves him free to ride out away from the section when wanted by his troop leader, or to lead them into action when so ordered.

II.—The Training of the Section.

It is impossible to go more carefully here into the technical training of Hotchkiss Gun Sections than to say that it is essential for every man of the section to have a thorough knowledge of the mechanism, be a good shot with the gun, and also be fully capable of filling any place in the team when required. A point in the duties of the No. 2 is, however, worthy of mention; this man's first and special duty should be to ensure that a constant supply of ammunition is always ready for the gun, he should always be ready with a fresh strip in his right hand to push into the feed piece directly the last strip is emptied, and besides examining each strip as he takes it out of the box to see that it is properly filled, must carefully watch the gun and tripod, ready to assist at once in the case of the tripod slipping or of any failure in the mechanism.

If he properly fulfils these duties he will have no time whatsoever to watch the strike of the bullets, which in some schools is now taught as one of the duties of the No. 2. It is most strongly urged that the No. 2 should be trained to look to the gun and ammunition, and nothing else; his natural inclination will be to watch whatever No. 1 is firing at, but if allowed to do so, or worse still, actually taught to do it, a great deterioration in the rapidity and accuracy of the fire from the gun is bound to ensue.

Digitized by Google

In the general training of the Hotchkiss Gun Sections special stress should be laid upon inculcating into all men a feeling of complete confidence and pride in their weapons ; prizes should be given for the cleanest guns and packs, and young hands should never be allowed to continue shooting with faulty weapons, as they at once begin to lose faith in the gun. Trained Hotchkiss gunners should always be given badges, and Inter-Troop and Squadron Hotchkiss Competitions should frequently be held on field firing ranges whenever possible. A Hotchkiss Gun Competition should figure on every Rifle Meeting programme, and instead of the musketry qualification for proficiency pay some similar test with their own weapon might serve as the necessary qualification for all Hotchkiss gunners. The section itself should not only be taught to consider itself " The Right of the Line " in its own particular troop, but actually given, when possible, the best billets and most attention on service or on manœuvres. This last suggestion may seem to be rather overdoing it, but when once the troop realizes what their Hotchkiss Gun Section will do for them when in action, particularly a rear-guard one, or in any dismounted fighting, they will be found not only to readily forgive but will appreciate any favouritism that may be shown to it.

As many men as possible in the squadron should be put through a short course of training with the gun, and in all tactical lectures the value of the gun as a weapon for cavalry should be instilled into all ranks. In the *tactical training* of the Hotchkiss Gun Sections short troop schemes should play the greater part. Such as : The troop leader calls out the gun N.C.O., and after rapidly describing a situation to him, and pointing out the direction of the hostile fire he wishes to be covered from, merely tells the N.C.O. to cover his movements with his gun and moves rapidly off with the remainder of the troop to execute his plan. It is then left to the gun N.C.O. to select his fire position, get his gun into action as readily as possible, at the right range and on the right target, and arrange for his led horses ; while besides exercising him in those duties he gets excellent practice in the rapid appreciation of a situation and grasp of orders. At the same time the remainder of the troop are all being exercised and the troop leader getting excellent practice, not only in making up situations and plans to meet them definitely and rapidly, but also in the giving of orders and in the use of ground. Such schemes avoid the remainder of the troop or squadron looking idly on while one or more Hotchkiss Gun Sections are being exercised, and besides, being very easy to criticize and correct, can be carried out on almost any ground, however confined, with the utmost benefit to all ranks taking part in them.

The most noticeable faults among young teams are :

(1) The whole team, once dismounted, will wander about fully exposed for much too long a time, seeking for a suitable gun position ;

Digitized by Google

whereas the N.C.O. himself should have gone forward alone and left the remainder under cover until he has selected one.

(2) The N.C.O., after once leading the Nos. 1 and 2 to their position and giving his fire orders, remains with them; instead of going some ten or fifteen yards away to a flank.

(3) The N.C.O. nearly always selects the summit of the nearest hill or else some very conspicuous landmark as his gun position; whereas from a position a little way off the summit, or behind some quite minor irregularity of ground, and not on the hill at all, he might have had an equally good view of his target.

As has been mentioned before, and the fact cannot be too often impressed upon gun teams, once a Hotchkiss gun opens fire it immediately draws upon itself any hostile fire in the vicinity, and an inconspicuous position is essential if very heavy casualties among Hotchkiss gunners are to be avoided.

III.—The Tactical Handling of Hotchkiss Guns.

The formation of a Hotchkiss Gun Troop in each squadron, by collecting the four Gun Sections, is a point I believe to be under consideration, but from tactical experience in France it is contended that such a formation would be the greatest possible mistake. The Hotchkiss gun was originally issued to increase the fire power of the troop, and the troop weapon it should certainly remain. The four Hotchkiss Gun Sections would of course be collected and trained together in times of peace by a specialist officer, assisted by a N.C.O., and on service these two individuals would be responsible for the general care of the guns and the training of the teams, whenever opportunity occurred, but that is a very different matter to the collection of the four Hotchkiss guns permanently in a so-called troop. The idea of a squadron going into action with its four Hotchkiss Sections marching as a troop in rear of it would, I think, make any squadron leader or troop leader of experience shudder, as the value of the gun with the troop itself cannot be over-estimated.

We are told that a Hotchkiss gun represents the fire power of twenty-five rifles, and the gun when first issued was considered as adding that additional fire power to each troop, so by taking his Hotchkiss gun away from him we at once deprive the troop leader of half his fire power, and thus hamper and reduce his powers of action. If sent out on advance guard, on encountering any opposition which his leading sections cannot at once deal with, he requires at once a strong fire pivot, which his Hotchkiss Gun Section furnishes him with in an almost ideal manner, and covered by the fire of this he can at once manœuvre and try and outflank the opposition.

If he has to send back to the squadron for a Hotchkiss gun, rapidity of action, the essence of cavalry tactics, is lost. It is said that the officer

Digitized by Google

or N.C.O. in charge of the Hotchkiss Gun Troop would always detail a section to accompany any troops sent out, but this individual might be elsewhere engaged at the moment the troop was sent out, or being in rear of the squadron, might not know when it was going. Then, with a young troop officer, in his excitement to get off at once on his mission, overlooking the fact that he had no Hotchkiss gun with him, and very probably being hurried by his squadron or regimental commander, the troop would go off without a Hotchkiss gun, and the fact probably not be realized till too late.

With the Hotchkiss Gun Section always forming part of the troop, such possibilities as those just suggested could never occur, and not only would the troop leader know, as he undoubtedly should, that his Hotchkiss Gun Section was as much part of the troop as any of the other three sections, but the Hotchkiss Gun Section itself and every man in the troop should know and feel the same. Occasions will undoubtedly arise when all the Hotchkiss guns of a squadron, or even of a regiment, would require to be used in mass, for instance to cover a mounted attack; but even in such cases, in the event of any troop or squadron being kept in hand to meet emergencies, each troop so used should have its Hotchkiss gun with it.

To my brother officers, Lieutenants Miller-Brown and Hammond, who died gloriously in the defence of their cherished Hotchkiss guns in Bourlon Wood, on the morning of November 28th, 1917, anything of value in these few notes is gratefully and humbly dedicated.



Digitized by Google

FALCONRY.

IT would be easy to fill a large volume with dissertations on the antiquity of the art which is now called falconry, and on the training and method of flying wild quarry with hawks or falcons.

Falconry was practised as early as 400 B.C., and since that time has included in its followers many of the most celebrated and powerful rulers in Europe and Asia. Ecclesiastics were not a whit behind the laity in their devotion to the sport, for no less a potentate than Pope Leo X was constantly in the field at Ravenna, and even incurred the criticism of the Great D'Arcassia for being apt to too soundly rate his followers during a flight. James I of England declared that if a man had only patience and good temper enough to continue with the disappointments inseparable from hawking, the sport was preferable to hunting.

The invention of shot guns struck the first and most deadly blow at the popularity of hawking. It was soon discovered that wild fowl, game and rabbits could be captured more easily by the aid of "vile saltpetre" than by the laborious process involved in training, conditioning and moulting hawks and falcons. Then the outbreak of the Great Civil War interrupted all peaceful sports, and its disasters destroyed a vast number of those who are the best patrons of hawking. It would be wrong to suppose that the sport has ever been extinct in the British Isles, as so many writers are fond of reiterating. But its devotees have kept it up without any of the pomp and show of old days, carrying it on in comparative privacy.

Many of the most successful amateurs of recent times have been officers who have acquired, while in India and elsewhere, a taste for, and a proficiency in, the art of training and flying hawks. In this country the peregrine falcon, the merlin, the goshawk and the sparrow-hawk are the hawks principally flown; and the quarry includes every game bird, hares and rabbits, also the rook, gull and lark.

In game hawking the peregrine falcon is mostly used and is put on the wing as soon as the setter or pointer indicates the presence of birds, being allowed to mount a considerable height before the game is sprung. The better the falcon the higher will be its pitch and the more deadly will be its stoop when the birds are flushed, because the higher the

Digitized by Google

altitude the better will the falcon be able to command the situation should the game get up wild, and the closer will the kill be to the spectators. A falcon placed well and high over the dog will knock over its bird in full view of the sportsmen, but a low flying one will merely chase the quarry down and probably no one present will see the actual kill.

In game hawking both grouse and partridge, the sportsmen are usually on foot. Heron hawking can no longer be practised, the reclamation of waste places has abolished most of the heronries, and modern falconers have sought a substitute in the shape of the rook, crow and gull. The falcons were flown at the heron when she was on passage, that is, flying from her feeding grounds back to the heronry, and those following had to be well mounted to keep up with the flight, so now with the rook and gull the falcon is slipped as soon as the quarry is on the wing and the followers are mounted so that they can keep up with the chase.

In game hawking the first stoop of a well-balanced hawk is very deadly, but not so in the case of the rook.

For many years past the old Hawking Club has flown the rook on the Wiltshire Downs every spring, in April and May, and no one who has not seen the flight would realize what speed the sable quarry is capable of when pursued, and how cleverly he uses his head to save his wings.

The falconer's life is not a bed of roses, he has his full share of disappointments, but this ancient field sport is a fascinating one and deserves all that has been said about it by the old writers.

Digitized by Google

THE MACHINE GUN CORPS (CAVALRY) IN FRANCE, 1916-1918.

By CAPTAIN T. PRESTON, M.C., *Yorkshire Hussars.*

V.—TRENCH WORK, SUMMER, 1917 (*continued*).

THE 10th, 11th and 12th Squadrons (4th Cavalry Division) went into the trenches east of Hargicourt on June 1st and 2nd. There were a few raids by the 4th Cavalry Division against Cologne Farm, which were supported by machine-gun barrages, the 12th Squadron losing a few men. The guns of the 10th and 12th Squadrons co-operated in a successful raid at this place on July 1st. These three squadrons remained in the line on and off till the end of September, as the 4th Cavalry Division stayed in the Péronne area after the rest of the Cavalry Corps had marched north.

On August 10th the squadrons came under the orders of the 35th Division, III Corps; this division on August 19th attacked Gillemont Farm and the Knoll, the squadrons helping to provide the machine-gun barrage. In the 10th Squadron Corporal E. J. Grant was awarded the M.M. for the way he worked his gun. The following extract from the III Corps' summary of operations, in regard to the machine-gun barrage for this attack, is of interest:

"The prisoners were unanimous in stating that our machine-gun barrage was extremely well laid, the bullets skimming the parapet with such regularity that firing machine guns or manning the parapet was practically impossible. . . . Prisoners agree that our machine-gun fire was very accurate and compelled everyone to keep their heads below the level of the trench."

The 12th Squadron came in for more "scraps" on September 10th and 11th. On the former date the enemy attacked our line opposite Villeret, and the squadron's guns fired when "S.O.S." signals went up. Our own troops attacked Farm Trench on September 11th, the squadron helping to provide a protective barrage. The enemy shelled our gun positions, Privates Vears, Mitchell and Moss being killed and three others wounded. On September 23rd an enemy counter-attack on Farm Trench failed, largely owing to the accuracy of our machine-gun barrage; on this occasion there were in action twelve guns of the 10th Squadron,

Digitized by Google

twelve of the 14th Squadron and eight infantry guns, all being under the orders of Captain Moncreiffe, acting O.C. 12th Machine Gun Squadron. Sergeant Besley and Privates Petrie, Rodgers and Burns, all of the 12th Squadron, won M.M.'s for their share in repelling enemy counter-attacks.

The 10th, 11th and 12th Squadrons left the trenches on or about September 28th, having been nearly seven weeks in the line. It is interesting to record that during this period the 12th Machine Gun Squadron fired 462,000 rounds in ten different barrages, of which four were in our attacks and six in enemy attacks.

The 13th, 14th and Canadian Machine Gun Squadrons (5th Cavalry Division) were farther south, in the Vadencourt sector. They were in the trenches from about May 15th to July 9th, and had a fairly quiet time, their portion of the line being less "lively" than the sectors farther north. The machine guns supplied barrages for raids which our troops made, notably one by the 7th Dragoon Guards on the night of July 7th, and one by the Canadian Cavalry Brigade on July 8th. In the latter raid the guns of the Canadian Machine Gun Squadron fired a total of 127,000 rounds, the fire being partly directed by telephone from the front line. The squadron was lucky in having no casualties on this occasion. Corporal S. Laker and Private H. A. Spencer received M.M.'s for the determined way they served their guns under fire. The 5th Cavalry Division official report on this raid says:

"The resistance put up by the enemy was on the whole slight. This is attributed to the moral effect of overhead machine-gun fire, accurate artillery barrage and surprise."

The 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th Cavalry Divisions all marched north in July, ready for the opening of the Flanders offensive on July 31st, but this battle never offered the remotest chance for cavalry action.

A Cavalry Corps Horse Show was held at Ramecourt, near St. Pol, on September 1st, 1917, and an event for the Best Turned-out Machine Gun Subsection was included. The result was:

First .. 5th Machine Gun Squadron (2nd Cavalry Division).
Second .. 8th Machine Gun Squadron (3rd Cavalry Division).
Third .. 9th Machine Gun Squadron (1st Cavalry Division).
Fourth .. 14th Machine Gun Squadron (5th Cavalry Division).

All the above had already beaten the other two squadrons in their respective divisions. The 10th, 11th and 12th Squadrons could not compete as they were still in the trenches. It is a pity that this event did not take the form of an "Action Competition," in which the fighting efficiency of the squadrons was brought out in some degree; in actual fact, it was largely a "spit and polish" event, in which points were given for burnished tripod-legs, belt boxes painted with divisional colours, etc. This meant that the competing subsections, for a fortnight or more before the show, suspended their training in order to devote their time

Digitized by Google

to an orgy of polishing! However, points were given for the condition and appearance of the horses, and in this respect perhaps the show did good.

As there had been several changes in the commands of the Machine Gun Squadrons since their formation, in February, 1916, it may be of interest to give the names of Squadron Commanders as they were about September, 1917:

1st Cavalry Division.

1st M.G.S. .. Captain F. C. Lacaita, M.C. (17th Lancers).
2nd M.G.S. .. Captain L. W. D. Wathen (8th Hussars).
9th M.G.S. .. Major R. H. N. Settle, M.C. (19th Hussars).

2nd Cavalry Division.

3rd M.G.S. .. Major A. Fleetwood-Wilson (4th Hussars, S.R.).
4th M.G.S. .. Major J. C. Petherick (3rd Hussars).
5th M.G.S. .. Captain E. S. D. Martin, M.C. (5th Dragoon Guards).

3rd Cavalry Division.

6th M.G.S. .. Major F. King (4th Hussars).
7th M.G.S. .. Major G. G. F. Chomley (1st Life Guards, S.R.).
8th M.G.S. .. Captain C. Kerr, M.C. (Royal Horse Guards, S.R.).

4th Cavalry Division.

10th M.G.S. .. Major G. W. Scratton, M.C. (19th Lancers, I.A.).
11th M.G.S. .. Captain J. C. Humfrey (Inniskilling Dragoons).
12th M.G.S. .. Captain J. A. Moncreiffe (Oxfordshire Hussars).

5th Cavalry Division.

13th M.G.S. .. Major E. C. Watson (7th Dragoon Guards).
14th M.G.S. .. Captain R. G. R. Davies, M.C. (16th Lancers).
Can. M.G.S. .. Major W. K. Walker, M.C. (Royal Canadian Dragoons).

There had also been considerable changes in the personnel of the squadrons. The Machine Gun Corps reinforcements, which came out from home to replace casualties, were drawn from various cavalry and yeomanry regiments, especially the latter. Many yeomen, whose regiments had been dismounted for service in Gallipoli and elsewhere, welcomed the chance of getting back into a mounted unit, and joined the Machine Gun Corps (Cavalry). The Machine Gun Squadrons in France were indeed lucky to get such excellent material.

During 1917 many of the officers and senior N.C.O.'s attended the "advanced course" at Camiers Machine Gun School, and learnt the latest ideas about indirect fire and machine-gun barrages. It was in the 1917 battles that these ideas (which meant using machine guns like field guns in addition to their ordinary duties) were first put into practice.

Digitized by Google

VI.—CAMBRAI.

The Machine Gun Squadrons played a prominent part in both phases of the Battle of Cambrai, i.e., in our attacks of November 20th-27th, 1917, and in the German counter-stroke of November 30th-December 1st.

First Phase.—The idea was for the whole Cavalry Corps to "go through," the 1st and 5th Cavalry Divisions leading on left and right respectively.

The 1st Cavalry Division was behind the 51st Division, which was at first held up by the resistance of Flesquières. But by 3.0 p.m. (November 20th) it was found possible to send the 2nd Cavalry Brigade forward; the 4th Dragoon Guards were leading regiment, and one squadron pushed on to Noyelles accompanied by "A" Subsection, 2nd Machine Gun Squadron (Lieutenant E. E. Roberts). One gun of this subsection, under Sergeant Berry, went with the leading troop 4th Dragoon Guards towards La Vallée Wood, and came into action against some German transport wagons. The range was 300 yards and the gun did great execution, killing about thirty Germans and all the horses; forty prisoners were also taken. Sergeant Berry then took up a position covering La Folie, and fired at more of the enemy there.

The Germans now launched a counter-attack and surrounded the gun position, but though all the detachment's horses were killed or stampeded, the gun was man-handled back to safety and joined up with the other gun of "A" Subsection, under Lieutenant Roberts, on the outskirts of Noyelles. Both guns now engaged a body of Germans advancing from Cantaing, at 700 yards' range; the enemy was checked and the machine guns rejoined the 4th Dragoon Guards at 4.30 p.m. Lieutenant Roberts was given the M.C. and Sergeant Berry and Lance-Corporal Fisher (wounded) received M.M.'s.

Next morning (November 21st) two more subsections 2nd Machine Gun Squadron, under Lieutenants White and Johnson, joined the 4th Dragoon Guards and 18th Hussars in taking up a defensive line north of Bois du Neuf. At 12 noon two further subsections joined the 9th Lancers, and got some shooting near Chateau Talma, on the right flank of the brigade line; one gun was placed east of the Canal de St. Quentin. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade was relieved by the 9th Cavalry Brigade about 11.45 p.m.

In the meantime the 1st Machine Gun Squadron (which had not been in action the first day) sent three subsections with the Bays to Cantaing; they took up positions to meet an expected counter-attack, which, however, did not develop. November 22nd was fairly quiet; on November 23rd the Bays were relieved in Cantaing, and the 1st Machine

Digitized by Google



Digitized by Google

Gun Squadron guns came under the orders of the 9th Royal Scots; during the morning four guns supported an infantry attack on Fontaine-Notre-Dame, Lieutenant W. P. Wild being wounded, besides one man killed and one wounded. These guns were relieved in the night November 23rd-24th.

We must now turn farther south, to the 5th Cavalry Division, which was supposed to pass through the infantry and cross the Canal de St. Quentin at Masnières. Unfortunately the bridge at this place was broken by a tank, otherwise the cavalry would, in all probability, have taken Cambrai.

The Canadian Cavalry Brigade on arriving at Masnières, on the morning of November 20th, and finding the bridge broken, determined to try and cross the canal somehow. The Fort Garry Horse was leading regiment, having with them two subsections Canadian Machine Gun Squadron. Major W. K. Walker, M.C., commanding the Machine Gun Squadron, quickly organized a party for repairing the bridge, including a number of French civilians and German prisoners. In spite of the place being under hostile rifle and machine-gun fire, Major Walker exposed himself freely in his efforts to get the bridge mended, and eventually got it sufficiently repaired to enable a squadron of the Fort Garry Horse to cross. He was given the D.S.O. (The adventures of the squadron which crossed the canal deserve a detailed account, which, however, does not come within the scope of this narrative.)

An order for the whole Canadian Cavalry Brigade to cross the canal to Rumilly was cancelled at 10.45 p.m. Four guns of the Machine Gun Squadron, under Lieutenant D. G. McNeil, went next day (November 21st) to reinforce the infantry at Mon Plaisir Farm, east of Masnières; they were in action from 11.30 a.m. to 1.0 p.m., and materially helped to break up an enemy counter-attack, forty or fifty Germans being seen to fall killed or wounded. By the evening of November 21st it was seen that mounted action was out of the question, and the Canadian Cavalry Brigade was withdrawn on the early morning of November 23rd.

In the Canadian Machine Gun Squadron besides Major Walker's D.S.O., Lieutenant McNeil won the M.C. whilst D.C.M.'s were given to Sergeant F. Hart (who got a commission soon after), Sergeant J. F. Hagland and Acting-Corporal J. P. D. Ryan. Sergeant A. V. Burnell and Corporal A. L. Ferguson were awarded M.M.'s, and later, Lance-Corporal J. Smith and Private W. Warwick obtained the Belgian Croix de Guerre, the former also being mentioned in dispatches.

It is now necessary to turn again to the northern part of the battle ground, where the 1st Cavalry Division had become involved in the struggle for Bourlon Wood. On November 23rd the 9th Machine Gun Squadron was ordered to send a dismounted party to support the 40th Division in Bourlon Wood, Nos. 1 and 2 Subsections (with the 15th

Digitized by Google

Hussars) going to the 119th Brigade, and the remainder of the squadron to the 121st Brigade.

Next morning (24th) news came that the enemy was massing for a counter-attack, and the 9th Squadron dug in some guns at 9.30 a.m. in a field west of Bourlon Wood. They opened indirect fire on the place where the Germans were massing, but heavy shelling compelled them to withdraw; one man was killed and one wounded.

Meanwhile, Nos. 1 and 2 Subsections, with the 15th Hussars, were holding a line along the south-east corner of Bourlon Wood; at 3.0 p.m. a battalion of Royal Welsh Fusiliers retired in a disorderly fashion through the line of guns. Enemy aeroplanes, flying very low, engaged the retreating infantry with machine-gun fire, and a heavy barrage was put down between Bourlon Wood and Anneux. The flank of the 3rd Coldstream Guards was exposed by the retirement of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, and at 3.30 p.m. they asked for the loan of No. 2 Subsection to protect that flank.

The situation was then quieter, and though Bourlon Wood was shelled during the night November 24th-25th, no further attack developed.

The 9th Machine Gun Squadron was relieved about 9.0 p.m. 25th; they lost Lieutenant F. Suckling and six men wounded and one man killed. Squadron-Sergeant-Major Hall won the D.C.M. for his services during these operations.

The 2nd Cavalry Division, on the morning of November 25th, received orders to capture Bourlon village, either mounted or dismounted; but these orders were soon afterwards cancelled and dismounted brigades were formed instead, the 3rd, 4th and 5th Machine Gun Squadrons each supplying eight guns and teams, with Major Fleetwood-Wilson (O.C. 3rd Squadron) in charge of the whole.

Bad weather had now set in, with wind and a certain amount of snow. The dismounted 2nd Cavalry Division came under the orders of the IV Corps, and on November 26th was sent in support of the 62nd Division near Graincourt, though it did not get into action on that date.

Next day, November 27th, the 2nd Cavalry Division was sent forward into Bourlon Wood; the 3rd and 5th Machine Gun Squadrons (under Captain E. S. D. Martin, M.C., 5th Squadron), reinforced the 186th Brigade, 62nd Division, whilst the 4th Squadron went to the 187th Brigade.

The latter squadron was shelled all the way to Bourlon Wood and after reaching it. There was a long halt in the middle of the wood, from about 8.30 to 10.30 p.m., whilst some of the officers went forward to reconnoitre. About 10.30 p.m. four shells fell right into the roadway where the 4th Squadron party was halted, killing Lieutenant A. L. Lemon and one man, and wounding Squadron-Sergeant-Major Taylor and thirteen men.

Digitized by Google

The guns then took up their positions, four guns at the north-east corner of the wood and four in reserve at Brigade Headquarters. The night passed fairly quietly, except for persistent shelling, Lieutenant Higgs and two men being slightly wounded but remaining on duty.

On November 28th the whole of Bourlon Wood was heavily bombarded, and at 8.0 p.m. the enemy tried to advance against the line held by the dismounted 12th Lancers and a section of the 5th Machine Gun Squadron; this advance was frustrated by our fire.

The 4th Squadron was relieved on the night of the 28th, and as the party left Bourlon Wood it had to pass through a bombardment of gas shells, losing four more men wounded.

The 3rd and 5th Squadrons, with their brigades, remained in the wood till the following night (29th-30th), when they were relieved by infantry. The 3rd Squadron had Lieutenants Arbuthnot and Clebourne and two men wounded, whilst Lieutenant Swann and sixteen other ranks were gassed; in the 5th Squadron one man was killed and eleven wounded.

(*To be continued.*)

ERRATA.—Vol. X, No. 38, October, 1920, page 499, lines 2, 11 and 20, for "Guillemont" read "Gillemont."

AUSTRALIAN LIGHT HORSE.

From a painting by Captain Adrian Jones, M.V.O. It will be utilized on the cover of the present volume.

Digitized by Google

FIELD TRIALS FOR GUNDOGS.

By THE SPORTING EDITOR.

THIS is a form of sport that not many cavalry officers have time to go in for, and possibly they may consider it not exciting enough to give the necessary time to. Most sports have a certain amount of danger about them which apparently increases the interest to many men. The only danger in field trials is that a careless man may give you a charge of shot, which is not very likely. In the early days of retriever trials the handlers of the dogs used to shoot the game, but owing to some of them being dangerous shots this had to be stopped. Official guns were told off to kill the game and the handlers were served out with blank cartridges, which they had to fire if there was anything in range. This latter I always thought a stupid arrangement, and I am glad to say it is now done away with. A handler may carry a gun if he likes, but he is not allowed to carry anything else in his hand. When first blank cartridges were done away with judges at retriever trials insisted on the handler carrying an empty gun—for what reason I could never make out, unless they wanted to be kind to certain handlers who used, on the sly, their guns rather like a stick. The muzzle of a gun carried just in front of a dog when they have had one or two knocks with it has a steadying effect. I know of nothing that varies in weight so much as a gun. If you are having lots of shooting you do not realize you are carrying one. On the other hand, when sport is bad, you are apt to think what a beastly heavy thing a gun is. At the Irish Retriever Trials, just before the War, I had to carry an empty gun for the two days of the trials; I am sure it weighed a ton, and as I did not use it as a stick I hated it.

The education of all sporting dogs ought to be commenced when they are quite young; the longer they are left to run wild the more bad habits they will have acquired, and the more time it takes to eradicate them. I know one retriever that was placed third at open trials at the age of nine months, and another that won the Kennel Club Junior Stake when under thirteen months old. At the Kennel Club Pointer and Setter

Digitized by Google

THE RIGHT AND THE WRONG WAY.

Digitized by Google

POINTER AND SETTER FIELD TRIALS.

THE RIGHT AND THE WRONG WAY.

Digitized by Google

Trials the chief stake is for puppies whelped the previous year. As this stake is run in April none of the dogs can be much more than a year old.

The training of gundogs is a fascinating amusement if you can spare the time. You have to first study their character. Some will take any amount of hiding, and others if you beat them once may be ruined for months. You have to get complete confidence between a dog and his handler, and the dog has to learn obedience and what his handler wants him to do. We have field trials for retrievers, spaniels and pointers and setters, and as the work is different in each case we will take them separately.

Retriever Trials.

Retriever trials are run much the same as an ordinary day's shooting, except that the object is to give hard tests to the retrievers and not to make a big bag. I have arranged many trials, and one of the chief difficulties has been to induce the keeper to alter his plan of campaign. The coverts have usually been shot the same way and, if possible, the birds dropped in a grass field where they can easily be found. This is no good at trials. If possible they should be dropped in thick cover or roots or over a stream. One of the best tests is walking up partridges in roots. On ordinary days shooting, if a bird is not marked and picked up by hand very often a dog is not allowed to be used in case he disturbs other game—the place is marked and the keeper hunts for it afterwards. At trials one of the dogs is sent immediately, and the more game in the field the better the test of steadiness and knowledge of his work. A wounded bird has a different scent to an unwounded one, and a retriever ought to take no notice of the latter. One of the most anxious times a handler has is if he is told to send his dog to retrieve a wounded pheasant that has fallen in a wood which he knows is full of game of all sorts. The bird may be a runner and have five or ten minutes start. If he did not see the bird shot he is told about where it fell and then he has to send his dog from where he is. The dog disappears and may be away some time. He may be getting into trouble or may be on the line of a strong runner. All you can do is to wait and hope to see the dog return with a strong runner in his mouth before the judge decides he has had enough time and you are told to call him up. Another difficult test is when a bird has fallen some way out, the other side of a fence or possibly over a river. If a dog has seen the fall and is a good marker it simplifies things as he will usually go straight to it. On the other hand, if he has not you are expected to remain on one side and get your dog to work well out on the other side. Dogs very quickly learn to do this if they are well trained. Dogs have to be tested in driving, walking up, and also in water. There are three judges, and two guns

Digitized by Google

are told off to each of them and also two handlers with their dogs. When a judge has tested his particular dogs they are changed. Every judge has all the dogs out with him in turn and they gradually eliminate the worst and so get at the winners. There is always a certain amount of luck in trials as it is impossible to give all the dogs equal tests. You may go through a day and never have a chance at a really hard test, and of course the judges have to decide on the best work they see. One dog may get an extraordinary good runner, when several of the other dogs would have got it too if they had had the luck to be sent for it. The year before the War I ran a bitch in five stakes. The only time she had the luck to be asked to do really hard things she won the stake. In the other four she had no luck, but was placed twice fourth and got certificates of merit in the other two. In a one-day stake there are usually twelve dogs; two days twenty-four. Ground is very often difficult to get; owners are very often frightened that there won't be enough game. What is wanted is a certainty of about 130 head each day. This is quite enough, especially if there are a good number of runners.

Some people seem to think that a field trial dog is no good for ordinary shoots. I could never make out why. The only reasons I have ever heard put forward are that they are expected to be very fast and that they gallop about too much, disturb ground unnecessarily, and are apt to gallop over the line when on a runner, owing to their pace. The first, that is being very quick, I think most important. A fast dog will pick up half a dozen birds while the slow one finds one. Nothing is more annoying than to see a dog find anything and then proceed to walk back slowly with it to his master. The other points I have mentioned would all be penalized by the judge, and a dog that did them would not get many prizes at trials.

1. If a dog is hard-mouthed he is kicked out immediately.
2. He must retrieve right up to hand and not put it down before he gives it to his master.
3. He must not run in.
4. He must walk steadily at heel.
5. If whistled for he must return at once.
6. A wave of the arm ought to make him work in the right direction.
7. If the hand is held high he ought to drop and stay where he is until told to return or go on working.
8. When driving he ought to stay perfectly quiet in the butt.
9. You ought to be able to put a dog down anywhere and know that he will stay there until you come back.

When a dog will do these things you can take him to field trials, and all you have to do is to hope he will have some very strong runners to find.

Digitized by Google

There is one point I have not mentioned, and unless the dog has it it is waste of time to train him. He must have a good nose and work out a line well. You cannot give a dog a good nose, and many retrievers are apt to use their eyes more than their nose. Judges at trials penalize a dog for doing this and it is usually a fault in the breaking.

Now for the training of a retriever. In my humble opinion more dogs are spoilt by being taken out shooting before they have been taught absolute obedience than in any other way. Teach obedience first, and if the dog is bred from a good working strain the work will come very quickly. Some people will breed from a dog because he has the points the show people have laid down as being correct. More breeds of gundogs have been ruined by shows than in any other way. Of course it is nice to have a good looking dog, and it is quite possible to breed them, but the two most important points to breed for are the ones you cannot see on a show bench—nose and brains. Get a dog and a bitch that you know yourself are good at their work, put them together and hope to breed something better.

We will now hark back to No. 1, hard-mouth. I have known people who say they can cure this. The best cure, I think, is a charge of No. 6 shot.

No. 2, retrieving. Most retrievers from their earliest days will do this naturally. Most puppies you will see running about with something in their mouths. I have known some retrievers very difficult to teach. You may have to put it in their mouth, holding your hand under the chin until they will hold it, then gradually draw away. You can then throw something for them to bring, but don't let them go until told. If they don't return quickly as soon as they have it in their mouth turn round and run away. Then make them hunt for something, and if you draw it along the ground first it makes them use their nose and work out the line. Make them give it up without using any force to get it, or you will make them hard-mouthed. Never make them retrieve anything hard.

Nos. 3 and 4 can be taken together. Walking at heel is not difficult to teach. You can check them going in front and if they hang back a boy with a whip is useful. They must learn that close to heel is the only safe place. A dog properly trained will seldom run in. One of the best ways to teach them steadiness is when you have taught the pup to lie down and stay where he is told take him out ferreting rabbits, let him see them bolting and shot but do nothing else. When he will do this for a whole day you have nearly got a trained retriever as far as steadiness goes. It is not a good thing to let a dog retrieve either a hare or a rabbit his first season. They must be thoroughly broken off ground game. Never from his earliest days put a slip on, it is only asking for trouble. If by any chance a pup does run in badly attach a long line to his collar; leave

Digitized by Google

it on the ground, and when he has gone some way get hold of the end of it and pull him up sharp.

No. 5. The boy with the whip comes in here. They must learn it is not safe to remain away when they hear the whistle.

No. 6. This takes time, but if persevered with the dog will learn he has to work in that direction especially when he finds the bird is there. I have known old dogs stop and look at their handler as much as to say "where is the blessed bird?" and then work in the direction required.

Nos. 7, 8 and 9 are all taught when you first teach the pup to lie down.

These are only a few elementary remarks on breaking a retriever. Most handlers have different methods. The chief thing to remember is that the dog should be taught to work entirely by hand and whistle. Nothing disturbs game more than the human voice. A good many ladies are very keen on retriever trials, and several of them handle their own dogs. Mrs. A. E. Butter and Mrs. Quintin Dick have been most successful, and few men know more about the game. During the War several very keen supporters of trials were killed: Admiral Sir C. Craddock, Colonel Roger Poore and Mr. Eversfield were great losses and their places will be hard to fill. Many gamekeepers who handled dogs at trials never came back, and at the moment there is a great dearth of trained gundogs of all kinds. The price has gone up tremendously; Lord Ludlow gave £200 for a Labrador at one of Aldridge's sales last July, and Mrs. Quintin Dick refused £300 for another Labrador, "Banchory Bolo." There are several different kinds of retrievers, but I think most people have come to the conclusion that Labradors are the best, and certainly their record at field trials leads one to think so.

I must thank Mr. J. C. Tunnard for so kindly drawing me some pictures for this article. The one of retrievers shows the right and the wrong way; one dog, without a lead, is standing perfectly steady, the other chained to his master, is trying to run in. I think it a disgrace to any man to bring a dog out shooting on a lead.

[I hope to deal with Spaniel and Pointer and Setter Trials in the next number of the JOURNAL.]

Digitized by Google

1. R.H.A. 2. LIFE GUARD. 3. OFFICER OF DRAGOONS.

From a Painting by John Atkinson, 1803.

Digitized by Google



4. LIGHT DRAGOONS. 5. DRAGOON GUARDS. 6. OFFICER LIGHT DRAGOONS.

From a Painting by John Atkinson, 1803.

Digitized by Google

HISTORICAL RECORDS OF BRITISH CAVALRY.

By J. PAINE.

WE are all, more or less, acquainted with the past history of the regiment we have the honour to be serving in to-day, and the majority of us have read at some time or other its " Historical Records," either in the shape of those compiled by Mr. Richard Cannon, one time Chief Clerk at the Adjutant-General's Office, or the " full dress " history of more recent times. It should therefore be of interest to our readers to know something about those " old unhappy far-off things and battles long ago " as they were rendered in print by the old school of officer and historian and to touch on a comparison here and there with the more exhaustive works produced by the writers of the twentieth century.

As far back as the year 1648 a publication of little more than a dozen pages made its way into print under the title of " The Displaying of the Life Guards' Colours, or a true narrative of the Late Actings of His Excellency's Life Guards since their order for Marching up to London to be Disbanded." Despite its size, the producers of this quaint little book thought fit to give it calf covers, and though doubtless a few pence secured its possession then, the few copies in existence to-day would command a high price. This was probably the very first instance of the printing of a regimental record, if it can be termed such, for distribution to the general public, and for that reason only is worthy of mention.

When Sir George Arthur's " Story of the Household Cavalry " made its welcome appearance, some ten years ago, in two bulky volumes, it established itself as the one standard history of these three regiments, and quite put into shade the record of the Life Guards from 1660 till 1835 by Mr. Cannon, who undertook the business of bringing out a sketch (one cannot honour the so termed " Historical Records " of this worthy scribe with a better designation than such) of the careers of every Regiment of Horse then in the pay of William IV. Although included in this series, the compiling of the record of the Blues was not left to the mercies of Cannon's pen, but was entrusted to a Captain Edmund Packe, who rather coldly recorded their exploits to 1846.

Digitized by Google

Although only treating of the Household Cavalry's war services down to Waterloo, their bibliography would be incomplete without mention of a well-written little narrative, " The Household Troops of England," by a Captain Rafter, and which was included in a series of miscellaneous works very appropriately described as " readable books."

It is quite a common occurrence for J. H. Stocqueler's " Personal History of the Horse Guards " to be mistaken for a record of the Blues, but it should be borne in mind that the title of this work refers to the edifice of that name in Whitehall.

The present seven regiments of Dragoon Guards have been unlucky in having had their traditions unrecorded, with few exceptions, save at the hands of Cannon. In the 'eighties Captain Sprot* accepted Cannon's record as a sufficient history of the Carabiniers' doings from their formation till 1839 and so brought out his " Continuation of the Historical Record " down to 1888, whilst a year prior to the departure of the Cavalry Brigades for Flanders in our last great conflict we see that " The Story of the 7th Dragoon Guards," by Colonel C. W. Thompson, C.B., D.S.O., had found its way into attractive book form from the pages of the " Black Horse Gazette."

Though it was not intended in this summary to enumerate the many small and abbreviated histories that have been on sale at Depots and Stations for the benefit of N.C.O.'s and men, one feels that it would not be out of place to mention a very concise little work compiled by Lieut.-Colonel E. Makins† (author of " The Royals in South Africa "), printed at Potchefstroom in 1914 and dedicated to " The Gentlemen Dragoons of the Royals." Commanding Officers of those hapless regiments, whose many gallant achievements in past and half-forgotten wars have failed to receive the proper recognition due to their services, would do well to follow this officer's example, and bring out just a brief outline of their regiment's history, failing the lack of material at hand for the production of a more detailed record.

In a work published twenty-seven years prior to Colonel Makins' little history, the services of the 1st or Royal Regiment of Dragoons had been recorded down to 1886 by the then Colonel of the regiment and author of the well-known book, " Life as I Have Found It," General C. P. de Ainslie.

Despite their peculiarly interesting early record as a regiment, the Greys have not been made the most of by the historian. Lieut.-Colonel Percy Groves, in his " Illustrated Histories of the Scottish Regiments," contributes one to the doings of the 2nd Dragoons to 1893, but it is condensed almost too much to be worthy of mention. Edward Almack's

* Now Colonel Sir Alexander Sprot, Bart., C.M.G., M.P.

† Now Brigadier-General E. Makins, C.B., D.S.O.

Digitized by Google

"History" was finished some twelve years back, but leaves a good deal to be desired, not so much in the text perhaps, but in the choice of illustrations. Such photographs, for instance, as those of the comb and spoon of General Dalzell should hardly have a place in a regimental history.

Fourteen years prior to the appearance of Cannon's "Record of the 3rd Light Dragoons," a gentleman by the name of Stisted wrote a brief record of this regiment's services from their formation till 1832. He was evidently of a modest nature, for one searches the pages of this little work in vain for the author's name, and all we are given is a short foreword and the name of the printer at Glasgow. It would be interesting to know how the authorities of the British Museum Library discovered his name.

In 1857 a Captain of the regiment, George E. F. Kauntze, whilst on half pay, put the results of his efforts into print and brought the record of his regiment up to date. This book is valued to-day more on account of its few coloured engravings of the regiment's dress than for anything else.

Since the publication of Cannon's brief record treating of the achievements of the 4th Queen's Own Light Dragoons down to the early 'forties, nobody as yet has shouldered the burden of writing for the 4th Hussars a more attractive history.

The appearance of an extremely well narrated record of the 5th Lancers since their embodiment as Wynne's Dragoons down to 1908 seems to have given the lead to other writers, for it was in the same year that the history of the 11th Hussars made its appearance; and since then some really first-class works have been produced.

Barely a twelvemonth elapsed before a very detailed record of the 6th Dragoons came forth and the regiment had something to really boast of when the author, Major E. S. Jackson, gave to the public his exhaustive history under the title of "The Inniskilling Dragoons: the Record of an old Heavy Cavalry Regiment." Five years previous to its appearance Colonel J. W. Yardley had written a very graphic account of the regiment's services in the last war in South Africa.

One of the latest regimental histories was a two-volume production, the work of the late Mr. C. R. B. Barrett, "The Seventh (Queen's Own) Hussars," and it surpasses in thoroughness all its predecessors, irrespective of regiment, and is in every way entitled to the appreciation devoted to it in the last issue of this JOURNAL.

It is seldom we have a Medical Officer dabbling in regimental history, but in the early 'seventies we see the name of John Francis Smet, M.D., late surgeon of the 8th Hussars, as the compiler of that regiment's records down to 1803, whereas the historical record published by authority told, though none too exhaustively, their services to 1844.

Digitized by Google

After Cannon wrote his account of the 9th Lancers' services it looked as if their subsequent services were to be left unrecorded till, the year following the close of the war in the Transvaal, Captain F. Reynard wrote their history to date and his results produced a model historical record, the general get-up of which is worthy of the highest praise.

The latter half of the last century had produced a few records, which in most ways were a decided improvement on the results of Cannon's efforts. A notable example was that of Colonel R. S. Lidell's "Memoirs of the 10th Royal Hussars," which narrated in brilliant form this crack regiment's career down to the early 'nineties. This was the very first regimental history that could boast of a brave show of rich illustrations to add to its otherwise indisputable worth.

All the past glories connected with the history of the 11th Hussars have been ably recorded by Captain Godfrey Trevelyan Williams in his exhaustive work published some twelve years ago. When a regiment has its story told in a book such as that written by this officer it needs no other workers to write a history till many fresh campaigns necessitate a more up-to-date production.

Since the publication of Cannon's historical record down to 1842, the 12th Lancers have not been fortunate enough to have any later historian to write down the traditions which have been so nobly maintained.

The year 1911 gave credit unsurpassed to the late Mr. C. R. B. Barrett when he completed his "Record of the 13th Hussars," one of the finest regimental histories ever written. Published in two volumes, arranged with the greatest care and increased in its unquestionable value by its wealth of well chosen illustrations, it leaves nothing to be desired either by the members of the regiment or the public at large. Lieut.-Colonel Sir Arthur Leetham was responsible for the design and method of illustration of this book.

Whilst the 14th Hussars were sharing with other regiments of the Cavalry Brigades the trials and triumphs of fighting a stealthy foe on the veldt of the Transvaal, Colonel H. B. Hamilton brought to a close in a highly successful manner the history of their gallant past, and no present member of the regiment could peruse its pages without satisfaction at the way the writer has presented to them so worthy a record of their famous predecessors.

The year that brought the outbreak of our last great conflict, when British cavalry had already started to add fresh laurels to their glorious history, gave us Colonel H. C. Wylly's "Fifteenth (The King's) Hussars, 1759-1913," and no one would gainsay us when we pronounce this volume a truly worthy work of art. Major Wymer deserves almost as much praise for the pains taken in his depicting in colour the various past uniforms as the writer does for his admirable text.

Digitized by Google

A couple of years prior to the appearance of the last-mentioned work a very handsome volume, "The History of the 16th The Queen's Own Light Dragoons (Lancers), 1759-1912," to give it its full title, was privately printed on the initiative of its author, Colonel Henry Graham. As it is a history that can be highly recommended for its literary and general interest and is not lacking in attractive illustration, it is a book to be strongly recommended to those who are interested in the development of the Empire in the East.

The 17th Lancers is the only regiment that can claim the advantage of having had its history written by the King's Librarian, the Hon. W. J. Fortescue, and the bare mention of his name is a sufficient proof of the authenticity and general arrangement of the work. D. H. Parry also wrote, some few years ago, the regiment's story in his "Death or Glory Boys," but this publication, from the nature of its title, would possibly be more attractive to civilians than to the military reader, the tactician, or to a collector of historical records.

The year 1869 saw the publication of quite a small record of the 18th Hussars since their formation as Drogheda's Light Horse to the year 1866. The author though, Captain Harold Esdaile Malet, on obtaining his colonelcy, brought out a somewhat more attractive and up-to-date history, thirty-eight years later, under the title of "The Historical Memoirs of the 18th Hussars."

The campaigns of the 19th Hussars, since their formation in 1858 to their departure for India in 1896, are dealt with in Colonel John Biddulph's "The Nineteenth and Their Times," which records separately the careers of the four regiments of cavalry that had borne at some time or other the number nineteen: Drogheda's Horse, 1759-1763; the 19th Light Dragoons, 1779-1783; the 23rd, afterwards the 19th, Light Dragoons, 1781-1822; and the 19th Princess of Wales' Own Hussars, as they were then styled. Lord Bacon's statement, quoted in the concluding chapter to this book, that "Soldiers in peace are like chimneys in summer," is hardly borne out by the many arduous duties that fell to the lot of this distinguished regiment during the brief periods of peace in four continents.

As yet the exploits of the 20th Hussars and the 21st Lancers have not been set down in the form of historical records, not even by Cannon, for these two regiments were not in the service of the Crown at the time he completed his series.

Considering the little interest taken in military literature in this country compared with that taken in foreign countries in the exploits of the Continental armies, the various histories turned out from time to time of the regiments comprising the British cavalry are surprisingly numerous and well compiled and it is hoped the near future will produce some worthy additions to a collection already both unrivalled and valuable.

Digitized by Google

GENERAL CHARLES, THIRD MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY, K.G., G.C.B., G.C.H.

CHARLES WILLIAM STEWART, a distinguished soldier and diplomatist, was the son of Robert, first Marquess of Londonderry, and was born in Mary Street, Dublin, on May 18, 1778. His mother was Lady Frances Pratt, daughter of Charles, first Earl Camden, and Lord Chancellor of Ireland. He was educated at Eton, where, in 1791, he showed great courage and generous disregard of self in an unsuccessful attempt to save his young school friend, Lord Waldegrave, from drowning; twice he sank and as nearly as possible lost his own life.

According to Alison, he entered the Army on April 3, 1791, as Ensign in the late 108th Regiment, became Lieutenant on April 8, 1793, and got his company in it on August 7, 1794. These dates, however, are not borne out by the Army List, and indeed there was no such regiment in existence at that time. It is more probable that he received his first commission in the regiment on October 11, 1794, his Lieutenancy on October 30, 1794, and became Captain on November 12, 1794. His first experience of active service was in the capacity of D.A.Q.M.G., in Lord Moira's expedition for the assistance of the Duke of York in Flanders in 1794. When this force was driven out of the Low Countries he was attached to Colonel Charles Craufurd's mission to the Austrian Army, which was actively engaged in 1795 and 1796. In this campaign he received his first wound at the action of Donauwerth, when he was struck by a musket ball in the left eye, while bravely charging a detachment of French Hussars at the head of some Austrian Heavy Cavalry.

On his return home he was appointed Aide-de-camp to his relative, Lord Camden, then Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland. He had succeeded, on July 31, 1795, to a majority in the late 106th Foot; and on January 1, 1797, at the early age of eighteen, was appointed Lieut.-Colonel of the 5th Royal Irish Dragoons, at that time, according to General Robert Dundas, "the worst of all possible bad regiments." By Lieut.-Colonel Stewart's exertions the discipline and efficiency were improved to such an extent that the General, in writing to him, was forced to admit that had he remained in command of it the regiment would have become "the best regiment of cavalry in this country." But during the Irish Rebellion of 1798, its insubordination and the discovery of a conspiracy in its ranks resulted

Digitized by Google

LIEUT.-GENERAL THE HON. C W. STEWART, K.G., G.C.B., G.C.H.,
THIRD MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY.

From an Engraving at the United Services Club.

Digitized by Google

UNIV OF
CALIFORNIA

Digitized by Google

in extreme measures, for the 5th Dragoons was disbanded and removed from the Army by General Order of April 8, 1799. Lieut.-Colonel Stewart's efforts were, however, fully acknowledged, for he was, four days later, appointed to the Lieut.-Colonelcy of the 18th Light Dragoons, at that time a skeleton, but which afterwards, under his able direction, became one of the most distinguished cavalry regiments in the Service. In command of two squadrons of that regiment he served in the expedition to Holland in 1799, and was highly distinguished in the Battle of Bergen. He was frequently under fire on outpost duty during the campaign, and was twice wounded on October 10. He was not again engaged on active service till the Peninsular War broke out. On September 25, 1803, he was appointed Aide-de-camp to George III. and Colonel in the Army, and for a short time occupied the position of Under-Secretary of State for War.

As Brigadier-General he commanded a brigade of Hussars, under Sir John Moore, in Portugal in 1808-9. On the advance into Spain he covered the march of Sir John Hope's division, during which he surprised a French post at Rueda, and took the whole escort of a valuable convoy of cotton. On the retreat of Sir John Moore's army to Corunna he was entrusted with the important duty of covering the rear. He showed much personal bravery in the brilliant cavalry actions of Sahagun and Benevente, where he routed the cavalry of the Imperial Guard. For these services he was repeatedly praised by Sir John Moore, who sent him home in January, 1809, to report on the progress of events.

A few months later he returned to the Peninsula, in the important position of Adjutant-General to the Army, under Wellington, an office which he held until May, 1813. In this capacity he distinguished himself during the pursuit of Soult's army across the Douro, by leading several brilliant charges against the enemy's rear-guard, for which he was specially mentioned by the Duke of Wellington. He was with the advance guard at the defeat of Soult's rear-guard at Salamonde, and was again commended for his brilliant services on July 27 and 28, at Talavera. For his repeated exertions, and especially for his services at Talavera, Brigadier-General Stewart, at the age of thirty-one, received in person the thanks of the House of Commons on February 2, 1810, and was promoted to the rank of Major-General on July 25, 1810.

Space will not admit of following in detail the further service which he rendered in the Peninsula as the Duke of Wellington's Adjutant-General. He returned to the seat of war in the spring of 1810, and played a distinguished part in the Duke's defeat of Massena at Busaco, and also at Fuentes de Onoro, the siege and assault of Badajos, the action at El Bodon, and the siege and capture of Ciudad Rodrigo. In February, 1812, he was invalided home and received from his Sovereign the Grand Cross of the Bath.

He was shortly afterwards appointed to an important military and diplomatic situation at the Court of Prussia as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary. During the summer of 1813, he was appointed Military Commissioner to the Allies, and in that capacity played a distinguished part in the campaigns of 1813-14. He was present at Napoleon's defeat of the Allies at Lützen, he was

Digitized by Google

at Bautzen and Wurschen, the combat at Haynau, the investment and capture of Dresden—on one occasion being one of the first of the storming party to enter the great redoubt, the battles of Culm (where he was severely wounded in the thigh), Mockern, the storming of Leipsic, battle of La Rothière, Arcis-sur-Aube, the combat of Fère-Champenoise, the battle and capture of Paris. For these important diplomatic and military services he received Swedish, Russian and Prussian decorations. For many years subsequently he represented Great Britain as Ambassador at Vienna.

On June 4, 1814, he was promoted to the rank of Lieut.-General, and a month later was elevated to the peerage as Baron Stewart. The same year he was sworn a Privy Councillor. On February 3, 1820, he was appointed Colonel of the 10th Light Dragoons, and when holding that appointment fought a duel with a Cornet of the regiment. In 1822, he succeeded to the Marquisate of Londonderry. He became General on January 10, 1837; Colonel of the 2nd Life Guards on June 21, 1843; and in 1852 was created a K.G., succeeding to the Garter vacant by the death of the Duke of Wellington. He had received the Peninsular Gold Medal, the Gold Cross with one clasp, and the Peninsular War Medal with five clasps, in addition to the Grand Cross of the Bath, and the Grand Cross of Hanover.

The Marquess of Londonderry on several occasions came forward as an author. In 1805, he published "Suggestions for the Improvement of the Force of the British Empire," in 1828 "A Narrative of the Peninsular War," and afterwards the "Correspondence of Robert, Marquess of Londonderry."

That Lord Londonderry was a soldier of distinguished ability is clear from his services in the Peninsula, first as a Cavalry Brigadier, and subsequently as right-hand man to the Great Duke. The importance of these services has, unfortunately, been too much shrouded from the general eye in the blaze of Wellington's glory. His duties with Bernadotte, in the campaign of 1813, and with the Allied Sovereigns in that of 1814, were not less diplomatic than military, while in his subsequent position as Ambassador at Vienna he upheld with firmness and tact the honour of his country.

On March 6, 1854, he died at Holdernesse House, Park Lane, aged seventy-six, and was buried at Long Newton.

R. H.

Digitized by Google

A CAVALRY SUBALTERN ON £200 A YEAR.

A remarkable scheme, by R. R. G., has been sent us dealing with the question of officers' expenses, of which the following are the salient points.

Most cavalry subalterns are believed to possess private means of £400 a year, but that does not endow them necessarily with the characteristics of a perfect cavalry leader, and many a cadet with aptitude for horse soldiering does not join the cavalry owing to the expense. Many good leaders are thus lost, and it is becoming a matter of difficulty to keep mounted regiments up to strength with the most suitable officers.

If certain advantages were given by the authorities, without any extra expense to the public, it would be possible for a subaltern at home to live on an allowance of £200, to hunt, play polo, ride in races under National Hunt Rules, and go in for show jumping, all of which are desirable, if not necessary, for the efficiency of a cavalry officer.

Of course rigid personal economy must be practised by the individual, and it will be as well if he eschews all but mounted sports. His tastes should be spartan and he should be of the type referred to by Horace,

"Gaudet equis canibusque et aprici gramine campi."

The scheme suggested is that after one year at Sandhurst the most suitable cadets for the cavalry should be selected and sent to the Cavalry School. The course at that School at present comes too late in the subaltern's career for him to derive full benefit, while his services are lost to his squadron.

The cavalry mess should be on the same scale of cost as in any other unit.

The officer should be allowed in winter to hunt a troop-horse, as well as his chargers, and to have a troop-horse in training for polo. In summer he should reorganize his stable and take from the ranks suitable mounts for polo.

The Remount Department must strive to send every regiment some horses suitable for polo, hunting, show-jumping and military steeplechases.

An orderly would be required to work under the second servant and look after the officer's two chargers (ridden on service by the officer and second servant) and two troop-horses, allotted to the first servant and orderly.

The charge of £10 a year made by Government for horses used off parade is considered unfair, because horses used in harness or for sport are thereby improved for military work.

Digitized by Google

They should be insured by a system of regimental insurance, which would be most economical and could advantageously be extended to larger formations.

Government horses should be allowed to run in steeplechases.

Concessions should be given as regards forage. A regimental forage barn should be organized, buying direct from the producer.

Each officer would have four boxes or stalls in Government stables.

Sets of saddlery should be provided fit to hunt in (as issued in 1914), also stable equipment, rugs.

Civilian clothes for officers' second servants are unnecessary.

The American Army Polo Team in England last summer played with army horses, saddles, bits, servants and forage, and were mounted up to tournament form.

Officers are of course faced with other difficulties in the matter of inadequate allowances, but if the above proposals were given a trial, with the good will of the Government, his colonel and his brother subalterns, a cornet of resolution and character could excel as a sportsman and a leader on a very limited private income.

Digitized by Google

NEW BOOKS REVIEWED

Modern Horse Management. By Major R. S. Timmis, D.S.O., Royal Canadian Dragoons. Published by Cassell & Co. Price 15/-

There are no less than 466 photographs and diagrams, which clearly illustrate all practical points in this most interesting and instructive book, which will be found to be equally valuable to the experienced or inexperienced lover of horses.

The author has compiled this work chiefly with the idea of helping our friend the horse. Several references to the cruelties practised on horses provide an unanswerable argument in favour of more humane methods.

Chapter 1 deals with the history of the horse, commencing from the year 1740 B.C. Chapter 3, the psychology of the horse, has been written from notes taken while actually training horses during the last ten years. A horseman is one who is always open to advice and who is always learning. It is a very regrettable fact that so many Englishmen are poor horsemen. The cause of this is our conceit, our unwillingness to learn. We ride more than any other nation; but more riding does not signify any knowledge of horsemanship. The exhibitions of bad riding and the large number of untrained horses in the hunting field are sufficient to prove this.

Chapter 4 goes very fully into the question of feeding, exercise, transport; and many useful and practical tips are given in connection with the above. Chapter 5, grooming and stable management. Chapter 6, driving and harness. Chapter 7, riding and saddles. In the last two chapters the author points out many of the common faults practised by horsemen to-day, considering them always from the horse's point of view. Due to the gross ignorance displayed on the part of so-called horsemasters, and to the bad riding of some cavalry, we find that armies have been handicapped in campaigns; and through the bad riding of some hunting men, polo players and others, cruelty has been inflicted on the horse. The question has been asked whether sore backs are not the inevitable result of domesticating the horse. The answer is in the negative. The trouble is the result of want of knowledge of the anatomy of the horse's back.

In Chapter 8, stable construction is gone into. Chapter 9 deals with surgical diseases, lameness, teeth and conformation. The illustrations in this chapter are especially useful and interesting. Chapter 10, pharmacopœia and medicine. Chapter 11, general diseases—organic, functional and contagious.

Digitized by Google

Chapters 12, 13 and 14 discuss the horse's tail, its anatomy and use and the crime and cruelty of "docking." "We live in a civilized country that boasts of its modern civilization, yet allows the reprehensible practice of mutilating the horse to exist—we will consider the practice of 'docking' systematically in the following order: The use of the tail; the operation; the reasons for and the uses put forward, namely, cleanliness, strengthening the hindquarters, safety, appearance, neatness, show and fashion." Chapter 15, humane education; the law. Chapter 16, anæsthetics; humane destruction. Chapter 17, for the benefit of the scientific mind, goes rather deeply into bacteriology and is replete with interest and importance.

Chapter 18 points out in detail the terrible blunders the modern farrier makes in the forge, giving the reasons and the correct methods and a brief description of the anatomy of the foot. Chapter 19 is concerned with the use and abuse of bearing reins.

This comprehensive work should prove an up-to-date addition to the library of any cavalry man.

J.H.

The Direction of War, a Study of Strategy. By Major-General W. D. Bird, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. Cambridge University Press, 1920. Price 40/- net.

A treatise of 300 pages, with examples from British campaigns and forty-one maps. In the first chapter the interference of Statesmen in military matters is dealt with, and there is a good quotation from Macaulay, that "an army has often achieved success under a leader of moderate capacity, but no army has ever prospered under a debating society." In chapter III, sea and air power are considered, and it is shown that maritime supremacy alone is inconclusive, an army is also necessary, and in the last chapter the necessity of cavalry is accentuated to confirm and check other auxiliary forms of intelligence. We recommend officers to read this book in a critical spirit in order to develop thought; many of the maps may be added to by the student of military geography, as, for the purpose of clearness, they contain only essential details. Everyone's verdict on this volume will be eminently favourable.

The Horse as Comrade and Friend. By E. R. Calthrop, M.I.C.E., M.I.M.E. Price 16/-

Few people, unfortunately, have the leisure to devote to a hobby that Mr. Calthrop has to spend on the training of his ponies. It has been a labour of love, as is evidenced by the meticulous care with which Mr. Calthrop has noted his progress with his pupils from day to day; the youngsters he has bred have grown up to be companions and pets. But it is a debatable point whether or no the best use is to be got out of horses by making pets of them; one Newmarket trainer certainly told me that he removed a horse from a boy's care as soon as the two became friends. It is all delightful reading and will appeal greatly to the fair sex.

Digitized by Google

NOTES.

THE CAVALRY WAR MEMORIAL.

The Committee of the above fund report that up to November the response to the circular issued to all Mounted Units last summer has been as follows:

	£	s.	d.
9 Regular Cavalry Regiments (paid up or guaranteed)..	1,659	19	7
19 Yeomanry Regiments	690	0	0
11 Indian Cavalry Regiments	637	8	8
Balance of Memorial Service and individual subscriptions	485	0	0
	£3,472	8	3

It is understood that most of the units are collecting subscriptions, and further substantial amounts, it is hoped, will be paid in by the end of the year. Until, however, the total amount which will be available is ascertained, the Committee are unable to take definite steps with reference to the design of the Memorial, for which the offer of a site in the Mall, subject to the approval of His Majesty, still holds good.

A minimum of £10,000, as stated in the circular, will certainly be required if a really worthy Memorial is to be erected. Subscriptions should be sent to the Honorary Secretary, Cavalry Memorial Fund, Cavalry Club, Piccadilly, W.1.

There is a feeling in Germany and Austria that the best officers have not been secured for the new armies, and that they are so small as to be incapable of protecting an outlying State. A military writer says the new Territorial Force is certainly different to our old army, but it is formed from it. It is in this most sad present an intermediary between a proud past and, if God wills, a better future. Let the bonds of comradeship be between us all, whether leader or private soldier, however much incitement there may be to excite class feeling and enmity.

General Ludendorff is now a private soldier of the Bavarian Civic Guard and participates in the duties of patrol work and sentry-go with shouldered rifle.

The American cavalry is budgeted for a strength of seventeen regiments, organized in two divisions and two brigades.

Digitized by Google

KICKING IN THE STABLE.



LANCE RIGGER HAYSEY, EX-R.A.F., OF THE GREYHOUND TROOP, ARRANGES TO GENTLE CICERO WITH THE COLD WATER CURE.

Every horse which is apt to kick in the stable or if touched on the hind-quarters should be methodically taken in hand with a view to curing the habit. Every horseman knows the usual remedies: "gentling" with a pole, as described in Major Hayes' "Horse Breaking"; passing a rope under the tail through the nose-band and attaching the two ends to shackles on the hind-legs; attaching the shackles to the bridoon; a piece of furze hung up in rear; strapping hind-leg to fore-leg or both hind-legs together; a log fastened to the hind-leg.*



The above contrivance of attaching lengths of chain has completely cured a horse that constantly kicked down partitions, posts and stable walls (in France),

* See CAVALRY JOURNAL, Vol. I., page 529.

Digitized by Google

broke his own shoes and disfigured his legs with scars and swellings. But horses which have been stopped from kicking in the stable by any one expedient learn after a time to circumvent it. Another plan must then be tried. We do not recommend retaliation, as depicted below :

AFTER KICKING HORSE : "YOU'VE BROKE MY TOE, YOU B—— IRON-GUTTED BEGGAR."
—From "Indian Memories," by Lieut.-General Sir Robert Baden-Powell, K.C.B., published by Herbert Jenkins, 1915.

The following is from the *Times* of 15th September last :

"A cavalry horse sold at Canterbury on Saturday, and removed by the new owners to Barham on Monday, was found yesterday halterless in its old stable at Shorncliffe Camp."

It speaks well for the horse-mastership in the cavalry and is an example of the homing instinct in horses which, if tested, may often prove infallible.

The writer once lost his way in a pathless African forest and, failing to find landmarks by climbing trees, threw the reins on the neck of his arab, which took him straight back fifteen miles to a waterhole where the party had bivouacked the night before.

There have been instances of riders being "bushed" through not giving the horse's sense of direction a trial. The homing instinct should be cultivated in every scout's horse.

Range shooting as a recreation is not extinct ; we therefore draw attention to the purpose and scope of the leading rifle associations :

THE ARMY RIFLE ASSOCIATION.

Competition is the salt of training. In peace it is the high standard of skill that is set up as a guide that leads to efficiency in the individual and the unit. In this respect the A.R.A. is a valuable aid to efficiency. The Army Rifle Association is a semi-official Army Rifle Club, which in the past has given considerable impetus to rifle efficiency. Entirely supported by voluntary contributions of units and individual officers, its main object is "the fostering of increased rifle efficiency on the battlefield." As such it deserves and obtains the entire support of the General Staff and of the Small Arms School. It is controlled by a representative committee of officers.

Digitized by Google

The conditions and regulations governing the various individual and team competitions may be seen by reference to the A.R.A. Year Book, which can be obtained from the Secretary A.R.A., Broughton Place, Ipswich, Suffolk.

Although the Association holds a championship meeting every year, in July, at Pirbright, lasting four or five days, its main energies consist in laying down standardized conditions and awarding prizes for competitions that can be competed for by units at all stations at Home and Abroad. As far as possible it caters for the many rather than a few (i.e., the individual gladiator), and endeavours to inculcate the doctrine of playing " for the side " rather than for the individual.

Territorial Army Rifle Association.

It has recently been decided to form a Territorial Army Rifle Association on the same lines as the Army Rifle Association. This is now in process of formation. It is probable that this Association, when formed, will cater for the competitive needs of serving Territorials only.

It is as yet early for the reconstituted Yeomanry to derive all the benefits offered by the T.A.R.A.

National Rifle Association.

This Association was founded in 1860, and its charter was " to give permanence to Volunteer Corps and to encourage rifle shooting throughout the King's dominions."

It secured a following, beyond the limit of the Services, of many civilian experts. At the beginning of the War it came to the assistance of the nation and formed a " School of Musketry " at Bisley Camp. The N.R.A. School of Musketry continued to turn out instructors for units till the end of the War, and its functions were similar to those of a Command School.

It holds an Annual Championship Meeting at Bisley in July, and has recently (1919) permitted serving soldiers to compete in most of the important competitions.

As a national asset it deserves the support of all patriotic citizens. The N.R.A. Council is at the present time considering a scheme of reconstruction, which has been formulated with the object of regulating the energies of the Association in accordance with modern requirements.

Snipers.

A more useful target than the running deer at Bisley must be a jumping kangaroo, to judge by the fine marksmanship of the Australians in war.

Trooper Sing, M.M., of the Australian Light Horse, picked off upwards of 130 of the enemy at the Dardanelles in trench warfare alone, while another " Digger " shot and captured a Hohenzollern prince near Bapaume. A sharpshooter, Corporal Francis Pegahmagabow, M.M., of the Canadian Corps, is officially credited with having " notched " 378 Germans during the War.

Digitized by Google

At a meeting of the JOURNAL Committee and Editorial Staff, held on 16th November, on the motion of the chairman, Field-Marshal Earl Haig, it was unanimously decided to send a copy of the bound volume for 1920 to H.M. the King of Spain, Colonel-in-Chief 16th Lancers, who acknowledged its receipt in the most gracious terms.

It is with great regret we have to record the death of Colonel J. W. Yardley, C.M.G., D.S.O., B.A., District Remount Officer for Gloucestershire, one of the founders of this JOURNAL and its first Sporting Editor, to whom it is greatly indebted for the excellent manner in which the Sporting Notes were first laid out, also for the time and energy which he devoted to the work for a number of years.

He joined the Inniskilling Dragoons from Cambridge University, in 1882, and served with the regiment in the Bechuanaland Expedition, 1884-5, the operations in Zululand, 1888, retiring as a Major into the Reserve of Officers in 1899. In the same year he rejoined his regiment and served with them throughout the South African War (dispatches), retiring in 1902 as a Lieut.-Colonel. His book, "With the Inniskilling Dragoons during the Boer War," will always be an important addition to the records of that regiment.

In 1914 he joined the Remount Department and served as Deputy Director of the Cavalry Corps, and in similar capacities with the Fourth and Fifth Armies, serving in France until 1918, being four times mentioned in dispatches.

He was a well-known sportsman and distinguished himself in the hunting field, racing and at polo. In South Africa, during six racing seasons, he steered sixty-four winners out of 135 mounts, and in this country rode winners at Bibury and on other courses; he rode Faust in the Grand National and finished well up, twice rode in the National Hunt Steeplechase, but was thrown on each occasion. He laid out the present Cheltenham Racecourse and was a steward of the club, also a playing member of the Cheltenham Polo Club, and was known as a big game hunter. He will be greatly missed in the Cotswold country. A.L.

The late Dr. T. Miller Maguire went to his long rest the day before his characteristic article on "The Cavalry Career of Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby" appeared in the October JOURNAL. He first came into prominence as an army crammer, and his loss will be generally regretted by a host of officers and civil servants who profited from his eloquence and unrivalled knowledge of military history.

On 16th November last a Complimentary Dinner was given at the Cavalry Club by officers who have been connected with the CAVALRY JOURNAL to the retiring Managing Editor.

Field-Marshal Earl Haig, who took the chair, in proposing the health of Lieut.-Colonel Sir A. Leetham, said that he had rendered the cavalry arm very valuable service during the past sixteen years as the Honorary Managing Editor of the CAVALRY JOURNAL, which had done so much to cultivate a spirit of

Digitized by Google

comradeship and mutual sympathy throughout the mounted forces of the Empire. His Lordship then spoke at some length on the services of the cavalry in France throughout the War, much of which was of a confidential nature; but he took great exception to the force being talked about as "the dud arm," stating that without cavalry the War would never have been won; especially mentioning their services in the retreat from Mons, and in the final advance in 1918 from Amiens, which alone justified the decision to retain the cavalry in France. He held that cavalry were indispensable, not merely to act as mobile infantry, but to reap the fruits of victory. With reference to the much discussed "Supreme Command," he intimated that it was at his direct request that Marshal Foch was so installed.

The Field-Marshal then presented to Sir A. Leetham a Georgian Silver Inkstand and Candlesticks and intimated that although Sir Arthur was giving up the active work of editing the JOURNAL, he was remaining on its Committee and would exercise a parental supervision of its finances.

Sir Arthur, in the course of his reply, expressed his thanks and said the JOURNAL is indebted to Lieut.-General Sir Robert Baden-Powell for its formation. Its first Editor was Colonel the Hon. Osbert Lumley, and together we put in some strenuous work in our endeavour to design and produce a magazine which should be worthy of the cavalry service. It was favourably received, the first number (1,500 copies) being very quickly all sold out.

Perhaps the most remarkable article in that number was on "The Cultivation of the Sense of Direction." The illustrations were original, and we had several applications from other publications for permission to reproduce it.

In some of the earlier numbers Sir Robert Baden-Powell gave us some highly attractive articles, viz., "The Balance of the Horse," "Manmastership," "Horsemastership"; and it may interest him to know that his two last articles with several others were reprinted by the War Office for lecturing purposes to the New Armies in 1915.

In 1908 General Lumley was again actively employed. Colonel W. H. Birkbeck succeeded him, and contributed some excellent articles on "Remounts, and the provision of horses for the Army in war," and it has subsequently been shown that his studies in this subject stood him in good stead when, as Inspector-General of Remounts, he had the biggest thing in remounting to do which ever fell to the lot of an Inspector-General. He was assisted by Captain Bertrand Stewart, West Kent Yeomanry, a very high-spirited young officer, who unfortunately got imprisoned by the Germans for two years, owing to his counter espionage activities, so we lost his services, and he was one of the first officers to be killed in 1914, possibly, it is hoped, getting a bit of his own back.

In 1910 the then Chairman of our Committee, Field-Marshal Lord French, appointed Major-General the Hon. Julian Byng, to the editorship. The JOURNAL under this officer reached a very high tone of excellence. Lord Byng certainly obtained extraordinary material, notably a series of articles entitled "An Account of the Work of the Egyptian Cavalry during the Atbara and Omdurman Campaigns," from the unpublished diary of an officer. It has now passed to the

Digitized by Google

domain of history. I feel I am not trespassing on editorial secrecy by telling you, gentlemen, that they were written by your chairman, the Field-Marshal.

Another remarkable article was one on " Prince Rupert as a Cavalry Leader," by Sir George Arthur, author of the Biography of the late Lord Kitchener, and I might mention here that Lord Kitchener of Khartoum was born a cavalry soldier, his father being a captain in the 13th Light Dragoons, and it was when commanding the Egyptian Cavalry that he first made his name as a commander in the field.

In 1911 Lord Byng was again actively employed and Colonel John Vaughan, the Commandant of the Cavalry School, became the Editor; he showed his versatility in an output which included articles on " The Battle of Naseby," " The Mechanical Laws of Balance, Flexion and Bitting," " Reconnoitring Squadrons," " Character Training," " The French Cavalry "; also a series of excellent letters on Polo.

Colonel R. B. Colvin, of the Essex Yeomanry, was our first Yeomanry Sub-Editor; he was very active in getting the JOURNAL circulated through his branch of our service. He was succeeded by Colonel C. W. Trotter, of the South Notts Hussars, who associated himself very closely with the work and provided many excellent articles and also brought in a number of new subscribers.

In Colonel Francis Whitmore, Essex Yeomanry, the JOURNAL has now been provided with a Sub-Editor of much active service experience.

Major F. D. V. Wing, R.H.A., was our first Artillery Sub-Editor; he, we know, was killed in 1916 commanding a division in France. He wrote well, and his articles on " Cavalry and Horse Artillery " are quite as true to-day as they were when he wrote them. Freddy Wing was a man of charming character and a very close friend of my own. He was succeeded by Sir Noel Birch, the present Inspector-General of Remounts, who contributed remarkable articles on " The Physical Development of the Horse " and " The Mind of the Horse." Our present Sub-Editor is Colonel Livingstone Learmonth, who, I am glad to see, started his career with the pen in the last number.

Of our Indian Sub-Editors, Major R. W. Grimshaw, of the Poona Horse, contributed a series of articles on " The Enlisted Classes of the Indian Cavalry," which were of great interest.

In the Sporting Notes a complete list of the winners of the Grand Military and the Irish Grand Military, compiled by Colonel Irwin, of the 20th Hussars, was published for the first time, a very interesting historical feature and one which took much research. Colonel J. W. Yardley, of the Inniskillings, was our first Sporting Editor. Colonel Coventry Williams, of the Greys, succeeded him and maintained the high standard of his predecessor. In Lieut.-Colonel T. B. Phillips, we have found a most industrious Sporting Editor.

Of the various contributors, some of the distinguished officers who have helped us must be recorded.

Field-Marshal Viscount French, in 1911, wrote the opening article, in which he asked officers to study recent scientific developments, and especially those relating to wireless and aeronautics. Field-Marshal Lord Allenby has written on tactics and

Digitized by Google

other subjects. The late Field-Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood gave us some interesting historical matter, and especially an article in which he described his early experiences as an officer in the 13th Light Dragoons in the Crimean period; Lieut.-General Sir Beauvoir de Lisle contributed a series of articles on "Great Cavalry Leaders"; Lieut.-General Sir Hubert Gough; Lieut.-General Sir Charles Kavanagh; Lieut.-General Sir A. J. Godley, who wrote on Mounted Infantry, and for some years was our Sub-Editor in New Zealand; Lieut.-General Mike Rimington; Major-General C. E. Budworth; Major-General Sir G. F. McMunn; Major-General W. H. Greenly, who wrote on Cromwell and his Cavalry; and the late Colonel G. K. Ansell.

I must mention another Field-Marshal, the late Lord Nicholson, who took the greatest interest in the JOURNAL and read it from its inception. He on more than one occasion informed me that the CAVALRY JOURNAL was the only Service publication worthy of its name. He had a very high opinion of cavalry officers and told me that if he had a responsible post to fill he invariably looked for such a one to fill it. He said "they never shirk responsibility."

The responsibility of obtaining professional articles falls on the Commandant of the Cavalry School, and Colonel Ewing Paterson, I understand, has already provided copy to fill the four issues of 1921.

Is it too much to claim that the CAVALRY JOURNAL, always modest in its ambition, played, if an inconspicuous yet a not altogether unimportant part, in promoting that excellence of cavalry of which yourself, Field-Marshal, Lord French and Lord Allenby, successively, made such use in the world struggle? I hope I shall not be held to share in any indiscretions if I lay emphasis on Lord Haig's wise, consistent and courageous championship of the cavalry arm. It is one of those secrets which have never been anything but an open secret, that strong pressure was put upon the Commander-in-Chief, in the latter stages of the War, to return the cavalry to England. He had to resist pleas—powerful and pathetic, economic and strategic; but as to the value—moral no less than physical—of cavalry, his mind was made up and steeled against every argument.

"Never," we can almost hear him exclaim, "shall the enemy allege that we have laid aside the hope of a final cavalry rush. Never shall the cavalry—so long as I am responsible for the campaign—be deprived of its supreme effort and its supreme success."

I must record an extraordinary prophecy made by my 5th Dragoon Guard brother. As long ago as in 1884 I went to see him when he was at Sandhurst and asked him if he knew of any Cadet who was better than anyone else. "Yes," he said, "there is a Cadet here called Douglas Haig, who is top dog at everything—books, drill, riding, sport and games; he's to go into the cavalry, and what's more he will be top dog in the Army before he's finished."

I congratulate you, Field-Marshal, on how well you have fulfilled his prophecy.

In my Explanatory Article, in the first number, I quoted from a book which at the time was much discussed, "The Letters of a Self-Made Merchant to his Son,"

Digitized by Google

where he says " Have something to say. Say it. Stop talking," and I urged our contributors to adhere to this precept. I must conclude :

" Nunc, opus si quid placet approbate,
Nunc ferat palmam bene qui meruit,
Quis leget scriptos titulos sepulchri,
Ipse Sepultus ? "

and here is a liberal translation by White Melville :

" If with pleasure you are viewing any work a man is doing,
If you like him, or you love him, tell him now;
Don't withhold your approbation till the parson makes oration,
And he lies with snowy lilies o'er his brow.
If he earns your praise, bestow it; if you like him, let him know it;
Let the words of true encouragement be said ;
Do not wait till life is over and he's underneath the clover,
For he cannot read his tombstone when he's dead."

Sir Robert Baden-Powell, vice-chairman, laid stress on the education in character which was formerly given by the cavalry life ; it was vitally important that the cavalry of to-day and to-morrow should enjoy the same training in moral qualities which had given us men worthy and capable of leading and inspiring large armies. You could run through the alphabet, beginning with Allenby, Birdwood, Byng, etc. The JOURNAL was a factor which would carry on the tradition and doctrine.

Among those present were Sir George Arthur, General Sir H. Bushman, General Sir Noel Birch, Sir Reginald Brade, Sir Herbert Creedy, Major-General the Earl of Scarbrough, Colonel Viscount Valentia, Brig.-General J. T. Wigan, M.P. Lieut.-Colonel Rex Osborne, Major M. Graham, Generals Commanding Cavalry at home, and past and present Editors and Sub-Editors.

There will be an extra Lecture at the R.U.S.I. on Friday, February 25th, 1921, at 5.30 p.m., on " The British Veterinary Service on the Balkan Front," by Colonel F. Eassie, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.V.S. The chair will be taken by Lieut.-General Sir T. E. Clarke, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., Q.M.G. to the Forces. All officers of the Mounted Forces are invited to attend.

Digitized by Google

SPORTING NOTES.

We do not think there is a better way to start the Sporting Notes in this number than by drawing the attention of readers to Earl Haig's Appeal to Sportsmen on behalf of his fund for the Officers' Association. Most Masters of Hounds are taking a cap for this object; racing men have already collected a fair amount and other forms of sport are doing their bit. It is an object well worthy of support. The tragedy of this Association is that it ought never to have been necessary. When men were wanted many promises were made and few carried out. When officers, after doing their bit in the War, find themselves, through no fault of their own, in serious financial difficulties it is up to their comrades to help them out if help is not coming from the proper quarter. We expect most officers have already subscribed to help their more unfortunate comrades, but in case there are any who have not had their attention called to this most important fund we hope to be excused for mentioning it. Messrs. Cox & Co. (K Branch), 16, Charing Cross, S.W.1, are the bankers and will receive any subscriptions.

HUNTING.

Several packs of hounds are prevented from hunting parts of their country owing to fresh cases of rabies. We are afraid that the half-hearted methods adopted by the Board of Agriculture are not bringing in the results they hoped for. No one who knows anything about this disease and the distance infected dogs can travel ever expected good results from putting the Muzzling Order on for small areas with a road or a hedge as boundary. Also dogs can be infected and show no signs of the disease for months after they have been bitten. Muzzling over a large area is the only way to stamp out this disease and, of course, strict quarantine for imported dogs.

The dispute in Essex is still unsettled and the Reconciliation Committee for the Whaddon Chase is no nearer a solution.

Hunters in Ireland are cheap and all sportsmen are weary of the Sinn Fein. It is not pleasant to know that you may be shot or kidnapped riding home in the evening after a day's hunting.

RACING.

Racing people have been horrified by some bare-faced frauds that have taken place lately. Three year olds have been run in two year old races and one horse substituted and run in the name of another. We are glad that the gang

Digitized by Google



Lady Juliet (Granville Stakes). He (Churchill Stakes). Scatwell (Wokingham Stakes). Grand Parade (St. James's Palace Stakes). Bright Folly (Windsor Castle Stakes). Dominion (Prince of Wales Stakes). Skyrocket (dead-heat, Visitors' Handicap).

THE GREAT ASCOT "RECORD"—LORD GLANELY'S SEVEN WINNERS AT THE MEETING OF 1919.

From the Painting by Gordon Stirling-Brown.

Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google

UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA

responsible for these frauds have met with their deserts. Many years ago a four year old, "Running Rein," ran in the Derby and won that race. The people concerned were found out, the horse disqualified, and we had hoped that this kind of fraud would not be repeated. The sentences passed on the present gang may have taught a useful lesson.

The Jockey Club are bringing out new rules to help that very much fleeced individual, the owner of racehorses. In many races they used to run practically for their own money; railway companies charged heavily for the carriage of race horses and race meetings were run at their expense, heavy charges being made for the accommodation of race horses and their attendants. The public imagine they have a grievance if an owner does not run a horse that they have backed, and in fact an owner's life is not a happy one. His friends, if he wins a race and they have not been told to back, think they have been badly treated, and if they have been told, and the horse does not win, nothing is bad enough for the owner.

"Kinlark," the steeplechase horse presented to the Prince of Wales in Australia, has arrived safely in England, and we wonder whether he will be put in training or carry his owner with the Pytchley Hounds.

One effect of the coal strike in October was that the Cambridgeshire was not run. Miners, we believe, take a great interest in racing, and many of them had backed the winner of the Cesarewitch coupled with a likely horse in the Cambridgeshire. We expect that the Union leaders who called this strike were not popular with many sporting miners who stood to win a good stake at long odds over the latter race.

America has again put up a record. The best horse in the United States, "Man o' War," was matched against the Canadian owned "Sir Barton" for a purse of £15,000 and a £1,000 cup. The race was over 1¼ mile, weight for age scale, and took place on October 12th, at Windsor, Ontario, "Man o' War" winning by eight lengths in 2 min. 3 sec. "Man o' War" in his two seasons on the turf has won $193,550. This is not a record, as "Isinglass," in days gone by, won something like $287,275. Matches between good horses are very sporting affairs and we wish there were more of them in England.

Lord Wilton was unfortunate when he sold "Caligula" a week before he won the St. Leger. The purchaser, Mr. M. Goculdar, is the first Indian sportsman to win one of our classic races. The horse has now been sent to India and must be one of the highest class horses ever sent there.

The Doncaster Yearling Sales again produced records, and that undefeated sportsman, Lord Glanely, gave 14,500 guineas for a half brother to his 11,500 guineas purchase of last year. The latter, "Westward Ho!" has still to see a racecourse, but is now doing work at Newmarket.

"Comrade" suffered his first defeat in the Champion Stakes, and we think it was rather asking for trouble to run him within a week of his return from France, where he had won the newly founded Prix de l'Arc de Triomphe to supplement his previous win in the Grand Prix de Paris.

Digitized by Google

Doping seems to be on the increase in France, and there have been several cases lately. We are glad that this pernicious practice has not been heard of in England for some time.

The Grand Military Steeplechases will take place at Sandown Park on the 11th and 12th of March, 1921. One of the most interesting races will be the Allies Grand Steeplechase of 800 sovs. and a piece of plate, value 100 sovs. presented by Admiral of the Fleet the Hon. Sir Hedworth Meux to the rider of the winner. Entries for this race close to Messrs. Weatherby & Sons, 15, Cavendish Square, London, on 15th February.

The Army Point to Point Races are to be held in the Cottesmore country by kind permission of Lord Lonsdale. 21st March has been proposed as a suitable date but is not yet definitely fixed. There will be light and heavy-weight races confined to officers on the active list, one for officers riding Government chargers, and possibly a race confined to members of Fernie's, Belvoir, Cottesmore and Quorn Hunts.

The conditions are not yet fixed as regards certificates. We believe Masters of Drag Hounds will be allowed to give them and there will also be a special dispensation for officers quartered in Ireland.

POLO.

It is the off season for polo in England. One of the few excitements over the game has been some rather heated correspondence in certain papers over the height of polo ponies. Is a height to be fixed and measurement started again or not? Breeders of polo ponies are naturally against a fixed height. If a pony will not measure of course his value decreases enormously. They argue that in the past great cruelty was used to bring the pony under the standard. We are afraid they have some reason for this. However, it is not a question of £ s. d., but what is best for the game, and we think that the smaller pony, as in the past, is all that is required. Heavy weights could mount themselves then, so why not now? A heavy weight on a very big pony gets an undue advantage over the small man on the small pony.

The Americans have been making very strenuous efforts to select the best team for next year's matches for the America Cup. They are leaving nothing to chance, and we expect will be beautifully mounted. Our Hurlingham Committee have got from twenty to thirty ponies to select from, and they are now being properly looked after and in time will be got fit.

The latest from America is that their team will be: 1, L. E. Stoddard; 2, T. Hitchcock; 3, J. W. Webb. Back: D. Milburn. Reserves: C. C. Rumsey and E. W. Hopping.

SHOOTING AT HOME.

Under the heading "Tips and Tipping" there have appeared lately a lot of letters in the *Field* on the question of tips to gamekeepers. It has been rather amusing to read the different ideas on this subject. We have had a large experience

Digitized by Google

of gamekeepers and believe that they would sooner receive a small tip from a man they know is not well off but who is a good shot, than a large tip from a bad shot. The game bag at the end of the season is most important to the keeper, and he can hardly tell his master that it would have been double if he had had better shots. Tips in different parts of the country vary tremendously. A keeper on a partridge beat that is driven every fortnight through the season naturally expects less than the keeper on a small pheasant shoot, who has to depend on a first time over, a second and possibly a third day. We think a fair tariff would be 2s. 6d. for a very small day; 5s. up to 100 head; 200 head, 10s.; over that £1; very big days, £2. Of course this is for the ordinary man who shoots a great deal and is not rich. When you shoot badly increase the tip and also when you know the keeper has to depend on a few days in the season.

A keen hunting man, if he sees foxes in the coverts, might also increase his tips as they always mean a smaller bag.

SPORTS.

Under the title of "The Army Sport Control Board" a committee has been appointed at the War Office with the object of organizing games in the Army on a uniform plan throughout the Empire. It is an ambitious plan, and they intend to improve or establish sports grounds and clubs for officers, men and their wives wherever British soldiers may be stationed.

It is wonderful what the War did for games, and most nations have now come to the conclusion that sportsmen make the best soldiers. They have to keep themselves fit and one fit recruit is worth a dozen loafers. Lieut.-General Sir Philip Chetwode, late 19th Hussars, Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff, has been appointed President of the Board.

ALDERSHOT.

1ST CAVALRY BRIGADE.

We have received the following details of sport from the three regiments comprising this brigade, the 3rd, 4th and 13th Hussars:

3RD HUSSARS.

Mounted Sports.—During September two meetings took place in the neighbourhood. One under the auspices of the S.P.C.A., at which the regiment were second in the Section Tent Pegging. The other, the sports of the Comrades of the Great War, at Reading, where the following prizes were taken: Section Jumping, 1st; Sword *v.* Lance, 1st; Individual Jumping, 2nd and 3rd; Individual Tent Pegging, 3rd.

Boxing.—At the 1st Cavalry Brigade Group Competitions held on 4th and 5th November, there were two classes of competitions. Class "B," open to N.C.O.'s and men, and Class "C," boys. Two points were awarded for a win and one point to the loser. The regiment won Class "B" with 18 points, but was third only in Class "C" with 14 points.

Digitized by Google

4TH (QUEEN'S OWN) HUSSARS.

BOXING.

Unit Teams Championships, Aldershot Command, 1919-1920. *Class "B."*—Light Weights, winner, Pte. Dyer (4th Hussars); Welter Weights, semi-finalist, Cpl. A. Lane (4th Hussars); Light Heavy Weights, winner, L/Cpl. Cook (4th Hussars).

Enlisted Boys' Challenge Shield, Aldershot Command. Class "C."—Fly Weights, winner, Boy O'Connor (4th Hussars); Feather Weights, runner-up, Boy Hall (4th Hussars). 4th Hussars and 1st Bn. Royal Dublin Fusiliers tied for first place for shield.

Individual Championships, Aldershot Command, 1919-1920.—Light Weight Champion, L/Cpl. Dyer (4th Hussars); Welter Weight Semi-Finalist, Pte. Thompson (4th Hussars).

Army Championships, 1919-1920.—Light Weight Champion, L/Cpl. Dyer (4th Hussars).

Imperial Services Championships, 1919-1920.—Runner-up, L/Cpl. Dyer (4th Hussars).

The regiment held a Boxing Tournament in the Riding School, South Cavalry Barracks, on 13th October, 1920.

Results.—Winners: Bantam Weights, Pte. Coe; Feather Weights, Pte. Quirolo; Light Weights, Pte. Bird; Welter Weights, Sergt. Woods; Middle Weights, Pte. Ayres.

Contests, 6 Rounds.—L/Cpl. Dyer (4th Hussars) beat Pte. Miller (13th Hussars), on points. Cpl. A. Lane (4th Hussars) beat Pte. Kane (1st Bn. East Lancashire Regiment), knocked out in fourth round. Sergt. Fletcher (4th Hussars) drew with S.S. Richards (13th Hussars), after a hard clean fight. Pte. Wells (13th Hussars) beat Pte. Bennewith (4th Hussars), who retired in second round.

No. 5 Group A.C.A.A. Boxing Tournament. Class "B," Novices.—Winners: Light Weights, Pte. Bird (4th Hussars); Welter Weights, Sergt. Woods (4th Hussars); Heavy Weights, Pte. Ayres (4th Hussars). *Class "C":* Light Weights, Boy Lane.

FOOTBALL.

1st Round Army Cup.—4th Hussars (4) *v.* 1st Bn. East Lancashire Regiment (2). Nearly 3,000 spectators witnessed this match in December last, on Wellesley House Ground. It was a fast and clean game, and the Blackdown team's defeat was due in great measure to the number of chances that the forwards missed. The defence and halves worked with a will, but their forward quintette lacked judgment. The infantry team came from Blackdown with an unbeaten record, being head of the Northern Division of the Command Senior League. The Hussars, who have yet to lose a game in the Southern Division of the League, were without Lieut. J. S. Thomson, an education officer who is attached to the regimen

Digitized by Google

and who is ineligible to play for the team in Army Cup or Cavalry Cup matches. Barry, whose customary position is at inside right, took Lieut. Thomson's place at left back, and in this new position he played well. Ayres was tried at centre forward instead of Harman.

Teams.—4th Hussars: Pte. Cooper; Cpls. Lane and Barry; Cpl. Martin, Pte. Bannister and Cpl. Hicks; Cpl. Shirley, Pte. Bowden, Pte. Ayres, Bdsmn. Littler and Tptr. Tennant. 1st East Lancashire Regiment: Pte. Leonard; Cpl. Yates and Pte. Kane; Pte. Durkin, Pte. Woolley and Cpl. Acton; Ptes. Craig, Eastwood, Wareing, O'Dowd and Taylor. Referee: R.S.M. Gregson, R.A.M.C.

Water Polo.

Semi-Final "Sir John French" Challenge Cup.—4th Hussars were beaten by the 1st East Lancashire Regiment, 6—0; the winners eventually winning the cup.

Swimming.

No. 5 Group Swimming Competition. 1st June, 1920.—3 Lengths Free Style, winner, Pte. Corderoy (4th Hussars); 2 Lengths Breast Stroke, 4th, Sergt. Fletcher (4th Hussars); 2 Lengths Back Stroke, 2nd, Sergt. Fletcher (4th Hussars); 1 Length Breast Stroke (Boys), winner, Boy Fosbrook (4th Hussars); 1 Length Free Style (Boys), 2nd, Boy Lea (4th Hussars), 3rd, Boy Jones (4th Hussars); 1 Length Back Stroke (Boys), 2nd, Boy Lea (4th Hussars), 3rd, Boy Jones (4th Hussars); 13 Lengths Free Style, winner, Trptr. Castle (4th Hussars).

Diving (High and Springboard).—Winner, Pte. Corderoy (4th Hussars).

Regimental Shooting.

Mappin and Webb Cup.—Winner, F.Q.M.S. Haydon.

Starker Cup.—Winner, S.S.M. Cooper.

Colonel Hoare Revolver Plate.—Winner R.S.M. Davidge.

Mounted Sports.

Colonel Lee Challenge Shield (for best man-at-arms).—Winner, Sergt. J. Lord.

Comrades of the Great War Sports.—Section Tent Pegging.—Winners, "C" Squadron 4th Hussars.

S.P.C.A. Sports, Aldershot Park.—Tent Pegging, winners, 4th Hussars.

Colonel Murray-Bailie's Cup.—Winners, 2nd Troop, "B" Squadron, 4th Hussars.

Jumping.

Odiham Horse Show.—1st, Lieut. G. M. Lawrence, M.C.

S.P.C.A. Sports at Aldershot Park.—1st, Lieut. G. M. Lawrence, M.C.

Guildford Horse Show.—1st, Lieut. G. M. Lawrence, M.C.

6th Brigade R.A.F. Sports.—1st, Lieut. G. M. Lawrence, M.C.

Cavalry School Steeplechase.—Winner, Lieut. B. T. Job (4th Hussars).

Digitized by Google

13TH HUSSARS.

FOOTBALL.

The following is a summary of the results of football matches played up to date.

Southern Division of the Command Senior League.—Played, 7; won, 5; lost, 1; drawn, 1; goals for, 28; goals against, 13. Points, 11.

Army Cup.—The regiment played the 3rd (King's Own) Hussars in the first round and won by 10 goals to 1.

Cavalry Cup.—The regiment was drawn against the 4th Dragoon Guards, but this match has yet to be played.

Aldershot Senior Cup.—The regiment lost to the Wellington Works Team, Aldershot, in the first round by 4 goals to 1.

L/Cpl. Bell, "A" Squadron, and Pte. Davies, "C" Squadron, have both been selected to play for the Aldershot Command, and L/Cpl. Bell has played for the Army on three occasions.

CAVALRY FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION.

The Annual General Meeting was held at the Cavalry Club on 18th October. Brig.-General A. E. W. Harman, C.B., D.S.O., the president of the Association, was in the chair. The balance sheet was presented and showed a balance credit of £328 7s. 6d.

It was decided to present a replica of the Cavalry Cup to the winning regiment each year, in addition to the silver and bronze medals to each member of the winning and runners-up teams.

Captain S. P. Keyworth, Royal Horse Guards, was confirmed in the appointment of hon. secretary, in succession to Lieut.-Colonel C. L. Rome, 3rd Dragoon Guards.

The draw for this season's competition resulted as follows:

Draw for Cavalry Cup, 1920-1921.

Teams in England.

	1st Round.	*2nd Round.*	*Semi-Final.*
Bye	6th Dragoons	6th Dragoons	
"A"	Royal Horse Guards *v.* 1st Life Guards	Winners of "A"	.....
"B"	4th Hussars *v.* 3rd Hussars	Winners of "B"	
"C"	13th Hussars *v.* 4th Dragoon Guards	Winners of "C"	.....

The first named team has choice of ground in 1st and 2nd rounds. 1st round

Digitized by Google

to be completed by 15th January, 1921. 2nd round to be completed by 15th February, 1921. Semi-final to be played at Aldershot on 2nd March, 1921.

Teams in Ireland.

	1st Round.	*2nd Round.*	*Semi-Final.*
"A"	15th Hussars v. 12th Lancers	Winners of "A"	.....
"B"	6th Dragoon Guards v. 10th Hussars	Winners of "B"	
Byes	Royal Dragoons	Royal Dragoons	.....
	17th Lancers	v. 17th Lancers	

The first named team has choice of ground in 1st and 2nd rounds. 1st round to be completed by 12th January. 1921; replays by 15th January. 2nd round to be completed by 12th February, 1921; replays by 15th February. Semi-final will be played at Curragh Camp on neutral ground. Date to be notified later.

The final will be played at Aldershot on Wednesday, 9th March, 1921.

Cavalry School Cricket Club.

The Cavalry School enjoyed a very successful cricket season last year, the results of matches played being as follows: played, 36; won, 19; lost, 17.

The team took part in two leagues, finishing second in the Larkhill Military League and fourth in the Salisbury and District League. An inter-group competition and several friendly matches were also played.

Care was taken that every officer, N.C.O. and man participated in the practice and trial games if they wished to do so, and as a consequence all matches were enthusiastically supported and the successes of the team keenly appreciated.

The successful season was due to a great extent to the efforts of the secretary, Major W. H. Callander, Royal Scots Greys, who, in addition to organizing the games, captained the team on many occasions and performed with marked success both in batting and bowling. Amongst the players who were the mainstay of the team, the following are worthy of note: Major H. F. Brace, D.S.O., M.C. (15th Hussars), Lieut. T. E. W. Brinckman (1st Life Guards), Sergt. Burton (2nd Dragoon Guards), an exceptionally good stumper, Sergt. Bennett (Inniskilling Dragoons), Pte. Maule (Royal Scots Greys), and Trooper Winterbourne (2nd Life Guards).

INDIA.

Racing.

For the 1921 racing season at Poona the Western India Turf Club are catering well for soldiers, sailors and airmen. They are giving eight closed steeplechases,

Digitized by Google

Rs.3,000 to the winner, Rs.1,000 to second, and Rs.500 to third; open to officers of the Army, Navy and Royal Air Force, and ridden by same. In addition, railway fares for starters will be paid.

MEERUT AUTUMN RACES.

Jodhpur Cup.—A steeplechase for horses the property of officers of the Navy, Army, and Indian Civil Service. Messrs. Byars and Sheppard's Reigning Star (Mr. Byars), 1; Mr. Elton's Lady Golightly (Mr. Bloomfield), 2; Captain Cameron's Glengarry (Capt. Stapleton), 3. Also ran: Captain Hodgin's Misty Morn: Major Pilcher's Hermit: General Gregory's Black Jester, Captain Fleming's Chatty Bit—all fell.

Kadir Chase.—A handicap steeplechase for horses. Distance 2½ miles.

Mr. Ivan Jones's China Egg, 12–5 (Mr. Gabe); Major Pilcher's Hermit, 9–0 (Harroway). Also ran: Messrs. Byars and Sheppard's Reigning Star; General Gregory's Black Jester; Captain Fleming's Chatty Bit; Captain Hodgin's Richard—all fell.

POLO.

Secunderabad Novices' American Handicap Tournament.—For a Challenge Cup presented by Mr. D. N. Chinoy. Played at Secunderabad on August 16th, 18th, 20th, 23rd, 25th, 27th and 30th. The following teams competed: 18th Royal Hussars "A," 18th Royal Hussars "B," 7th Hariana Lancers "A," 7th Hariana Lancers "B," 8th Cavalry "A" and 8th Cavalry "B."

This tournament was won by the 8th Cavalry "B" team.

Quetta Senior Handicap Tournament.—Played at Quetta on August 23rd, 25th, 27th and 30th. The following teams competed: Gymkhana "A," 3rd Skinner's Horse, "The Komics," "The Ishmaelites," 25th Cavalry, Staff College "A," Staff College "B," Gymkhana "B" and Rifle Brigade.

In the final the 25th Cavalry beat the Rifle Brigade by 5 goals to 3.

Meerut Autumn Tournament.—Nine teams competed in this tournament, and in the final the Cavalry School defeated the 2nd Bn. Seaforth Highlanders by 4 goals to 2.

EGYPT.

POLO.

The Cairo polo season ended in May. The Alexandria Polo Club held two tournaments, starting at the end of June.

First. The Open Cup.—This tournament provided some excellent games. The Queen's Bays, 16th Lancers and 4th Cavalry Division all sent teams down from Palestine, and Cairo provided a team from Gezireh and the 11th Hussars teams. The 18th Lancers sent a team from Tel-el-Kebir.

The semi-finalists were: 11th Hussars *v.* Gezireh and 4th Cavalry Division *v.* 18th Lancers. The former of these two games was one of the best seen in Egypt

Digitized by Google

throughout the season. At the end of six chukkers the score stood at 3 all. An extra chukker was played, and after many thrilling moments round the 11th Hussars' goal Major Sutton got away and shot a goal, leaving the 11th Hussars the winners. The 11th Hussars beat the 4th Cavalry Division in the final.

Second Tournament. Open Handicap.—There were many entries, and many good games were witnessed.

The semi-finalists were: "A" Team Hodson's Horse *v.* "B" Team Hodson's Horse and Queen's Bays *v.* 10th Division. "A" Team 9th Hodson's Horse, handicapped at 10 goals, beat the Queen's Bays, handicapped at 13 goals, 7—2 in the final.

Cricket.

The 11th Hussars, being stationed in Cairo, have had an interesting cricket season. They played 17 matches, winning 9 and losing 8.

The 16th Lancers came up to Cairo on several occasions. They beat the 11th Hussars when they visited them in Cairo, and also when the 11th Hussars took their side down to Bilbeis.

Boxing.

The 11th Hussars have held two interesting boxing tournaments, one in June and one in October.

In the first of these tournaments there were two 10-round contests of interest: (1) F/Sergt. Bristowe (11th Hussars), Light Weight Champion E.E F., and Sergt. Naylor (11th Hussars), Middle Weight Champion E.E.F. This fight ended in a draw. (2) Pte. C. Green (11th Hussars), Welter Weight Champion E.E.F., defeated Pte. Maylands (Middlesex Regiment).

In the second tournament an excellent fight was witnessed in a 10-round contest for the Robert Hughes' Cup, Cpl. S. S. Bristowe (11th Hussars) defeating Cpl. Austin (Royal Air Force) in the sixth round. The cup now becomes Bristowe's property, he having won it on three successive occasions.

E.E.F. Command Rifle Meeting.

The 11th Hussars won the Best Unit Competition, consisting of a team shoot of six men and an individual shoot of four men. They defeated nine infantry regiments.

The 11th Hussars won the Open Revolver Team Competition.

S.S.M. Weyman (11th Hussars) won the Revolver Medal for being first in the Warrant Officers' Class.

Pte. Hunter (11th Hussars) won the Revolver Medal for being first in the Corporals and Privates' Class.

The 16th Lancers and Queen's Bays, under orders for India, were unable to compete.

IN BELGIUM.

Since the War Belgium has lost no time in opening her race-courses, and numerous events at the meetings in the neighbourhood of Brussels are reserved

Digitized by Google

for Guards Regiments and military officers on the flat and across country. The most striking feature of the steeplechase courses is the *butte*, an embankment with a stiff ascent and down-grade slope, which tests a horse's shoulders and the rider. The word has been familiarized to some readers by the Butte de Warlencourt (an ancient barrow), and the Butte of the Polygon Wood (a rifle range stop butt), which were captured by the Australians during the Battles of the Somme and the third Ypres.

Schooling for show jumping has been actively practised in the military and civil riding manéges and at the Cavalry School where, as early as 1900, there were horses which leaped a wall of 6 ft. 11 in. and a width of 23 ft. A horse that cleared a series of obstacles 23 ft. in length, also a jump formed by three horses standing side by side, in 1914, was killed in the War.

A well organized polo club exists at Antwerp, and was much in evidence during the Olympic games. The final for the Olympic Polo Tournament was, however, played at Ostend, and won by the English team, who defeated Belgium in the second round.

As to hunting, there are harriers, stag hounds or roe deer hounds at Bievres, Vielsalm, Wareghem and in the Campine district.

BIG GAME SHOOTING.

In the last number we mentioned a big drive that was taking place in Zululand, with the object of killing off all the game, in the hope that it would clear the country of the tsetse-fly. Sportsmen in all parts of the world are most indignant at the methods used. Herds of zebra and other animals had volleys fired at them, sometimes up to 1,000 yards range. The white rhinoceros of South Africa, which was once so numerous, is now almost extinct, and in Zululand only about a dozen were left. In spite of this, in one of the drives at least four were killed. It is horrible to think of the number of wounded animals that were allowed to die a lingering death.

Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google

UNIV. OF
CALIFORNIA

From a painting by H. S. Power in the XIIIth Hussars' Mess.

THE CAPTURE OF RICHARDSON'S BLUFF AT SHARQAT, 29th October, 1918.

The 7th and 11th Cavalry Brigades in close co-operation with the other arms, blocked the retreat of the Turks, and were instrumental in the complete defeat of the enemy in Mesopotamia. See p. 164.

Digitized by Google

THE PROPOSED DISBANDMENTS.

It was announced in Parliament on the 15th March, by Sir Laming Worthington Evans, Secretary of State for War, that four historic cavalry regiments were marked for disbandment. In the course of his speech the Secretary of State said:

"The principle of choosing the four junior regiments had been adopted. These were the 5th Lancers, which were raised in 1858, the 19th Hussars, the 20th Hussars, and the 21st Lancers, all raised in 1861. Each of these regiments was originally raised at an earlier date. For the officers, he hoped they would be treated with generosity.

"They were asking for £500,000 for improved forms of tanks. Mechanical means of fighting must be developed to its fullest extent, the economy in man power in actual warfare was likely to be greater."

We do not propose to discuss the views expressed in the last paragraph, but the fact will doubtless be realized by every soldier that the Imperial General Staff has not recommended that such a step should be taken as the breaking up of the cavalry organization of these four magnificent regiments without sympathetic, long and deep scrutiny and investigation into every aspect affecting the question of Imperial Defence.

The student of strategy realizes that the task of independent or strategical cavalry has in effect been modified, and the main duties of cavalry to-day are *close co-operation* in the battle and the *pursuit*. These unquestionable facts are due to the advance of aircraft and air tactics.

There is no doubt that the General Staff has studied all the probable and possible campaigns which the country may be forced to undertake, and has formed a clear picture of the Empire's requirements in military resources. In this picture every unit fits into its place, but the financial situation absolutely prohibits the insertion of any redundant units.

In the event of certain campaigns, in which a large increase to the proposed cavalry organization might conceivably be desirable, we can count on immense cavalry reserves which are even now organized and provided with complete equipment.

The Italian cavalry has been reduced by a whole division and an almost general sweeping reduction of cavalry throughout Europe has taken place since the Armistice in 1918.

It is said that the cost of four regular cavalry regiments is *nearer* £450,000 per annum than £400,000.

As to the mechanical engines of war and their personnel, which may absorb the funds resulting from the economy foreshadowed, it must be clear to every cavalry soldier with war experience that they are bound to develop enormously in the near future.

We do not propose to canvass the weak points in tank tactics, or any other scientific development in mechanical warfare which Britain has especially evolved. We realize that flesh and blood is the first requisite in any army, and that a hardy race, inspired by a sense of duty and

Digitized by Google

possessing intelligent discipline can alone prevail in war, and it is for that reason that we are glad to learn that the position is now being closely examined as to whether it is not possible to *convert*, instead of disband, these four historic regiments, to preserve their identity and traditions and to translate their personnel to a new organization, trained for a rôle as glorious, as useful, as hazardous, as decisive, as that of Lancers or Hussars.

During the late War many cavalry regiments were converted as a measure of expediency to infantry and machine gun units, while innumerable cavalrymen of all ranks rendered magnificent service with the other arms, more particularly in the fourth arm.

In those stern days the inherent discipline of the cavalry and yeomanry resulted in their cheerfully adopting any tactics or armament which might conduce to winning the War. But, is our national character going to prove equally adaptable in peace time? The conversion of yeomanry cavalry to field artillery and armoured car companies during the past year, under peace conditions, and under our voluntary system of service, has met with opposition in some units, partly owing to the objection of experienced cavalrymen to undertake unfamiliar duties and training.

It is indisputable that any newly raised force would benefit if it could be grafted on to a regiment with a glorious tradition of many generations of discipline and heroism. There has been ample evidence that discipline is a plant of slow growth, and the case for conversion, instead of disbandment, is therefore a strong one. If the necessity for conversion was clearly demonstrated, surely it would be taken up as a patriotic duty, and might become an accomplished fact, but it is more probable that officers and men of a smart regiment of the matchless British cavalry would remain staunch to their early ideals, to the memory of the great examples which they had always cherished as the regiment's own sacred heritage, and spurning the thought of an uncertain future would declare for final disbandment and hurl back the magic Excalibur into the deep waters whence it had emerged on a day long past.

In any case the disbandment is not yet a *fait accompli*, the threatened regiments cannot cease to exist until the end of the present year, and during the period of discussion which is sure to supervene in the near future the question already referred to, of conversion, may be considered in connection with that of ***amalgamation.*** We understand that after careful inquiry it has not hitherto been held to be desirable to amalgamate British regiments. The plan has been successfully adopted in the Indian Army, where forty regiments have been formed into twenty, identified by double numbers; the combination of kindred castes being the basis of the reorganization.

The Committee of the CAVALRY JOURNAL desire to express their deep sympathy with the four regiments concerned.

Digitized by Google

THE

CAVALRY JOURNAL

APRIL, 1921.

THE FIFTH CAVALRY BRIGADE AT CERIZY, AUGUST 28th, 1914.

By LIEUT.-COLONEL R. G. H. HOWARD-VYSE, C.M.G., D.S.O.,
Royal Horse Guards.

I. PRECEDING EVENTS.

IT will be remembered that the British Expeditionary Force retreated after the Battle of Mons in two main columns, between which there existed a gap, originally caused by the Forêt de Mormal, and not satisfactorily closed till the army had passed to the south bank of the River Oise. The western column, consisting of the IInd Army Corps and the Cavalry Division, marched via Le Cateau, the country west of St. Quentin, and Ham to Noyon. The eastern column, the Ist Army Corps, retired through Landrecies and Guise to La Fère.

To the Ist Army Corps there was attached the 5th Cavalry Brigade, commanded by Sir Philip Chetwode, and containing the Royal Scots Greys, 12th Lancers, 20th Hussars, and J Battery Royal Horse Artillery.

On August 28th the Army Corps was to move from Guise to La Fère; the enemy was known to be moving south-west towards St. Quentin, while information regarding the position of our IInd Army Corps and Cavalry Division was conspicuous by its absence. A right flank guard, consisting of the 5th Cavalry Brigade, an infantry brigade, and some field artillery, was therefore formed and placed under the command of Brigadier-General H. S. Horne, then Staff Officer for Artillery in the Ist Army Corps. General Horne ordered his infantry to march down the left bank of the Oise, retained one squadron of the 20th Hussars to operate with his rear-guard, and directed Sir Philip Chetwode with the remainder of the 5th Cavalry Brigade to move down the right bank of the Oise.

Digitized by Google

The mission of the cavalry may therefore be characterized as that of "flank guard to the flank guard." Such a mission is one for which mounted troops are particularly well adapted, by reason of their ability to throw out detachments to relatively great distances. And on this

Sketch No. 1.



occasion the country, wide and open, like that of the Somme battlefield or Salisbury Plain, was such as to allow them to make full use of their mobility.

The method employed by the Brigadier was to keep the greater part of the brigade under his hand, and to occupy really important tactical points with small detachments of a troop or squadron. At no time were more than two squadrons, or their equivalent, detached. As the infantry

Digitized by Google

column progressed southwards the cavalry brigade moved to a new position of assembly, fresh protective detachments were sent out from the main body, and those no longer required were ordered to rejoin. In the case of mounted troops, at any rate, this method of flank protection, approximating to that of picketing, is probably usually preferable to that of detachments which remain out continuously and move parallel to the main body.

II. The Action.

At 11.0 a.m. the brigade was disposed as shown on Sketch No. 2. The infantry of the flank guard were making good progress towards La Fère, and our rôle was now that of a rear-guard, which accounts for the fact that we were facing north instead of west.

The enemy, of whom only small patrols had hitherto been encountered, now began to show up in strength. At 11.30 they occupied La Folie Farm, driving back a troop of the Greys on to its squadron. Between 12.0 and 2.0 several patrols advanced east of the main road, but were driven back by the Greys' squadron, which, with two machine guns, was well concealed in the hedges surrounding the two small woods shown on the sketch.

The valley between the enemy's position and our own was fairly steep, perhaps 1 in 10 to 1 in 15, and consisted of open fields of corn in shocks and of roots. The crest of the ridge on our side ran about 200 yards north of the Moy-Cerizy road, and the enemy skyline was roughly 1,200 yards distant. The wood at La Folie Farm could not be seen.

The scene of this minor encounter in 1914 was to become better known later on in the War, for the very same valley lay between the Allies and the Germans when the latter had completed their retirement to the Hindenburg Line in the spring of 1917, and it was here, a year later, that the enemy gained his greatest success in the big attack of March 21st, 1918.

Shortly after 2.0 o'clock the enemy, apparently exasperated by the ill-success of his patrols, or possibly merely tired of inaction, advanced straight down the slope towards the Greys, with two squadrons in close order. They were allowed to come as far as the bottom of the hill, and were then fired on by the dismounted squadron (Swetenham's) of the Greys, two machine guns, and a section of J Battery, which galloped into action and fired over the sights.

The enemy thereupon hastily dismounted in a root field and opened fire as they stood. The warm welcome they received was too much for their horses, many of which stampeded; and after firing a few ill-aimed rounds (one of which unhappily killed Major Swetenham of the Greys), the men began to retire on foot up the hill whence they had come, the only cover available being some stooks of corn.

Digitized by Google

At this juncture Sir Philip Chetwode, who had been away at a conference with Sir Douglas Haig, returned, and ordered :—

(*a*) The rest of the battery into action.

(*b*) Two squadrons 12th Lancers to make a dismounted attack against the enemy's left flank.

It would be difficult to imagine a more unpleasant situation than that in which the enemy now found themselves, pounded in front by a battery and two machine guns, not to mention the rifles of a dismounted squadron, assailed in flank by two other dismounted squadrons, and with no cover other than that which is provided by stooks of corn. White handkerchiefs began to be waved. It was evident that the time had come to reap the fruits of victory. The Brigadier accordingly ordered :—

(*a*) The remaining squadron of 12th Lancers to charge the enemy in front, supported by two squadrons of the Greys.

(*b*) The 20th Hussars (who it will be remembered had one squadron detached with the infantry) to advance down the St. Quentin road so as to threaten the enemy's right flank.

(*c*) The battery to support the charge and when necessary to lift so as to protect the cavalry after the charge.

The squadron of 12th Lancers, led by their C.O., Lieutenant-Colonel Wormald (who afterwards succeeded to the command of the brigade and was killed at Loos), advanced in column of troops extended, and made straight for La Folie Farm. When nearing the crest of the ridge they came under heavy fire from their left front, so went " files about," wheeled their head, and rose the hill some 300 yards farther to the east than had been originally intended. The charge was completely successful, and the enemy fled from the ground, leaving some seventy or eighty dead and wounded. One officer of the 12th got three Germans with his sword and one with his revolver.

A few only of the Greys found an opportunity to charge. In spite of emphatic denials by the officers of that regiment, the story is still current that this action provided a repetition of the " Scotland for Ever " episode at Waterloo, when the Greys charged with Highlanders holding on to their stirrup leathers. There were no infantry within three miles at the time.

The 20th Hussars got within 200 yards of a hostile battery without being seen, but, being very weak and unavoidably somewhat out of touch with the rest of the brigade, refrained from charging it.

The guns, when they lifted, had the luck to strike a formed body of hostile infantry, which had assembled in the wood north of La Folie Farm, and which was dispersed, leaving many dead and wounded behind. The total casualties caused to the enemy cannot have been far short of

Digitized by Google

300, while ours were about forty, including, unfortunately, two squadron leaders killed (the other being Captain Michell of the 12th).

Sketch. No. 2.

Situation at 11 a.m. and afterwards.



To our surprise we found that the German cavalry bore the badge V.R.I., like our own 21st Lancers. They were in fact Queen Victoria's Regiment, the 2nd Guard Dragoons, representatives of which had been entertained by the writer's own regiment in London two years previously. They formed the vanguard to a force of all arms which was marching south through St. Quentin. The advance of this force was stopped for at least four hours.

Digitized by Google

There was no pursuit. The brigade remained on the ground, unmolested by the enemy, till about 4.0 p.m., when, in accordance with orders, it retired through the infantry at La Fère. At the time, when news was for the most part bad, the appearance of our cavalry carrying captured German lances created some enthusiasm among the infantry, and the success, small as it was, provided a crumb of comfort to the readers both of the daily communiqué at the Front and of the London papers at home.

III. Remarks.

The most important lesson to be drawn from this action is that a defensive rôle, such as is necessarily imposed by a protective mission of this sort, should not preclude the assumption of a resolute offensive if a favourable opportunity offers itself. It is easier to remember this in training than in war, when human lives and personal reputations are at stake.

The performance of the German cavalry furnishes an excellent example of " how not to do it." Their patrols were bold enough, indeed, but were neither intelligently directed nor skilfully led. No attempt was apparently made to locate our flanks, and the presence of our small detachment on the very important spur north-west of Alaincourt was probably unsuspected. It is obviously useless, when the enemy has been located by one patrol, to despatch other reconnaissances in precisely the same direction. Yet this is what the Germans did from 11.30 till 2.0 on this particular day.

To advance in close order, in full view of an enemy who is known to be in position, is only slightly less suicidal than to follow up such an error by dismounting in the open when fired upon.

On the British side the importance is well shown of confining detachments to a minimum, so as to keep in hand (though not necessarily concentrated in one mass) as large a main body as possible, ready to strike or to move to a threatened point. The temptation must be resisted of trying to close to the enemy all possible avenues of approach. There are always only a very limited number of routes by which an enemy could advance who would be strong enough to interfere with the force to be protected. It is sufficient to block these routes, the selection of which demands a careful study of the map and of the general situation.

In the present instance the spur north-west of Alaincourt was a particularly valuable tactical point, because our possession of it enabled the dismounted attack to deploy against the enemy's left flank. It is interesting to note that, when the Germans occupied this line in 1917, they had a strong redoubt on this spur, which proved a thorn in the side of the Allied defences, since it overlooked the whole of the valley running up towards Cerizy.

Digitized by Google

The action furnishes a good pattern for the combination of fire and shock. We are taught that if possible the charge should be delivered in a direction different from that of the fire of the guns; but on the present occasion this was not necessary, because the shape of the ground enabled the guns to fire over the heads of the charging cavalry up to the last moment before the collision.

The result of lifting the fire of the guns to deal with possible hostile reserves is too obvious to need further mention; and the same remark applies to the value of discipline and mounted drill, which alone will enable a squadron to manœuvre under fire as was done by the 12th Lancers.

The whole action, judged from the moment when the German squadrons made their appearance till the 12th Lancers had completed their charge, took considerably less time than the reader will occupy who scans this account of it. To those who scoff at the value of the *arme blanche* one might address four questions. First, do they consider time to be of importance in war? Secondly, how long do they suppose it would take to carry out a dismounted attack across a steep open valley three-quarters of a mile wide? Thirdly, do they think that such an attack would suffer less than forty casualties? And fourthly, given an enemy whose moral is already shaken, which kind of attack do they conceive will impress him most, three squadrons (250 men) galloping at him, or the same number of squadrons (180 men) walking towards him?

The affair was, of course, a walk-over for the 5th Cavalry Brigade, with eight well-led squadrons against two which played into our hand. But its results are not to be gauged merely by the destruction of these two squadrons, for the latter were the vanguard of a force of all arms which was marching south out of St. Quentin; and the flattening out of their spear-head brought this force to a complete standstill for at least four hours, at a period when time was an all-important factor.

Moreover, it is suggested that the moral value of this small success was out of all proportion to its material results. Of its effect outside the brigade mention has already been made: and those who served in the 5th Cavalry Brigade will, the writer feels sure, agree that Cerizy created a spirit in the brigade which lasted till the end of the war.

Digitized by Google

KINLARK.

By kind permission of H.R.H. The Prince of Wales we publish a picture of Kinlark, the steeplechase horse presented to him in Australia during his recent tour.

KINLARK has run in twenty-nine races, winning six, including the Australian Steeplechase of four miles, carrying 12 st. 7 lb., second four times, third four times, once fourth, and fourteen times unplaced.

He was bred in New South Wales and is a brown gelding. We publish his full pedigree and performances. From the former it will be seen he traces back to some of the best English blood, such horses as St. Simon, Galopin, Stockwell, and Vedette appearing in the pedigree. He was foaled in 1911, so is now only ten years old, an age at which many horses have won good steeplechases in England. The Grand National was once won by a horse fourteen years old. Kinlark is now in Northamptonshire, being carefully acclimatized, and before long we hope to see him on an English racecourse and may he follow in the footsteps of Moifaa, another imported Australian, who won our Grand National in 1904, and was afterwards bought by the late King Edward.

Reference may here be made to another well-known Australian horse. H.M. King George, during his Indian tour as Prince of Wales in 1905-6, bought from an officer at Bangalore the black Australian charger Rupert, a winner over the course and a champion jumper in the show ring. A perfect charger for make and manners, he was admired by millions of His Majesty's subjects, and in particular by a Queensland horse-breeder visiting London in 1910, who was surprised to recognize his own brand upon the near shoulder of the horse which was ridden by His Majesty King George in the procession at the funeral of King Edward.

When the story became known to Australians the Queensland Government decided to ask His Majesty's gracious acceptance of another horse born and bred in the colony, and the arrival at Newmarket of Brisbane, a fine upstanding bay of about sixteen hands, was the result.

Rupert and Brisbane are no longer, and horse-lovers in the land of the Rising Sun will look to Kinlark as the representative in the Royal Stables of the thoroughbred in Australia.

Digitized by Google



Copyright.

H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES'S "KINLARK."

Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google

KINLARK

Brown gelding, bred in 1911, N.S.W.

- Kincumber (14)
  - Simmer (imp.) (2)
    - St. Simon (11)
      - Galopin (3)
        - Vedette (19)
        - Flying Duchess (3)
      - St. Angela
        - King Tom (3)
        - Aledine (11)
    - Dutch Oven
      - Dutch Skater (5)
        - The Flying Dutchman (3)
        - Fulvie (5)
      - Cantiniere
        - Stockwell (3)
        - Cantine (2)
  - Spaghetti
    - Splendor (imp.) (23)
      - Speculum (1)
        - Vedette (19)
        - Doralice (1)
      - Babette
        - Faugh-a-Ballagh (11)
        - Barberina (23)
    - Vermicelli
      - Gang Forward (imp.) (2)
        - Stockwell (3)
        - Lady Mary (2)
      - Queen of Naples (imp.)
        - Macaroni (14)
        - Vlie (14)
- Woodchat
  - Woodlark (5)
    - Gozo (20)
      - Wild Oats (14)
        - Wild Dayrell (7)
        - The Golden Horn (14)
      - Maltese Cross
        - Oxford (12)
        - Valetta (20)
    - Procella
      - Grand Flaneur (14)
        - Yattendon (18)
        - First Lady (imp.) (14)
      - Auk
        - The Marquis (2)
        - Seagull (5)
  - Palotta
    - Alchemist (24)
      - Sardonyx (13)
        - Fireworks (10)
        - Onyx (13)
      - Penitent (imp.)
        - Rosicrucian (5)
        - Lucy Hylda (24)
    - Janette
      - Maribymong (3)
        - Fisherman (imp.) (11)
        - Rose de Florence (imp.) (3)
      - Lady Emily
        - New Warrior (imp.) (24)
        - Cinderella (4)

Digitized by Google

KINLARK'S PERFORMANCES.

Date.	Placings.	Race.	Run at	Distance.	Weight.
1918.				m. f. yd.	st. lb.
2nd March	Won	Pines Hurdle	Flemington	2 – –	9 7
22nd June	Won	Toolamboul Hurdle	Caulfield	2 – 64	10 1
6th July	Second	Grand National Hurdle	Flemington	3 – –	9 10
20th July	Third	Leamington Hurdle	Caulfield	2 1 64	11 –
10th August	Won	Arkaringa Hurdle	Caulfield	2 1 64	11 1
1919.					
8th March	Second	Warrein Hurdle	Caulfield	2 – 64	11 10
14th June	Third	Port Philip Hurdle	Williamstown	2 1 64	11 7
21st June	Third	Toolamboul Hurdle	Caulfield	2 – 64	12 –
5th July	Fourth	Grand National Hurdle	Flemington	3 – –	11 6
1920.					
24th April	Won	Neirim Steeplechase	Caulfield	2 3 80	11 10
5th June	Third	Prince Edward Steeplechase	Flemington	2 – 110	12 5
7th July	Second	Steeplechasers' Flat	Flemington	2 – –	11 7
10th July	*Second	Grand National Steeplechase	Flemington	3 1 –	11 13
7th August	Won	Wilya Steeplechasers' Flat	Caulfield	1 7 64	11 8
14th August	Won	Australian Steeplechase	Caulfield	4 – –	12 7

* Run in record time.

Digitized by Google

THE BALKANS.

TRAVELLING in the Balkans at the present time " gives one furiously to think " as to whether the independence of small nations is a practical proposition.

The large and prosperous empire of Austria-Hungary has been carved up until each separate State is dying of want, for the necessities of life with which the other little States could provide it, but will not do so as they are not on speaking terms. One-third of the entire Austrian population is in Vienna itself—the town looks terribly neglected and uncared for. They lack coal and wood for domestic and factory purposes, the forests and mines being now in Czecho-Slovakia—they lack the agricultural benefits they had before from Hungary, which is a much more fertile part and is comparatively well off for food-stuffs.

They cannot exist except co-operatively, and at the moment resemble an armless and legless trunk that cannot feed itself.

By the Peace Treaty the new Austrian army (*Wehrmacht*) is not to exceed 30,000 of all ranks. These are divided into six brigades, which comprise, besides infantry, only five squadrons, six brigades of artillery and six cyclist battalions.

Hungary in like manner is limited to a force of 35,000, comprising twenty squadrons and twenty-two batteries.

The Danube, with its miles of banks and many bridges, touching innumerable countries, is one of the biggest problems. Most of the banks are artificially made and should be kept up by the State owning them; needless to say disputes are always arising as to where one State ends and the next one begins; consequently one small piece is left untended by both neighbours, causing danger to the whole stream.

The same with the bridges—each State has to paint and repair halfway across; there is bound to be a no-man's land in the middle; and what is to prevent one State, in a fit of anger, blowing up his end of the bridge, thereby holding up perhaps a great amount of European traffic? There used to be an excellent and continuous service of steamers from Vienna to Belgrade; now they are carefully arranged to miss each other at the frontiers, making a wait of some twenty-three hours at an impossible place.

We went from Vienna to Budapest by the river.

Digitized by Google

The first part is flat and not very interesting, except from a sportsman's point of view. The creeks and backwaters are alive with wildfowl, and as evening drew on duck of all sorts and geese came over in clouds.

The sunset that evening was one of the most beautiful I have ever seen —the wash of the steamer making great black furrows in the brilliant pink and orange reflected in the water. At the same time the full moon was rising in front of us, and by its light we were able to see the broken span of the fine bridge at Esztergom which the Czecho-Slovaks blew up just to show their independence of the Hungarians. This place has a very fine cathedral and palace, where all the kings of Hungary used to be crowned.

Our arrival at Budapest by moonlight was most impressive. This beautiful town lies on both banks of the Danube and has some splendid buildings. The Houses of Parliament are copied from ours, but the architect thought he would improve on them, so scattered a few domes and cupolas about promiscuously.

One of the features of the Danube is the quaint old-fashioned mills, like pictures of the Ark. They are moored a few yards from the shore, and have a large wooden wheel jutting out into the stream, which is slowly turned by the current. You see them every few miles, sometimes several clustered together.

On the way from Budapest to Bucharest we had to wait on the frontier for the Simplon Express, which might arrive any time between 9.0 a.m. and 9.0 p.m. or even later. We arrived at 4.0 p.m., and after a walk round the small town and a cup of excellent chocolate, we returned to the station to wait. Luckily there was a restaurant with a stove, for it had suddenly turned very cold. As night approached the waiters one by one tucked themselves away behind the stove and the only sound was their heavy snoring in varying keys. By and by other travellers came in, and at last the train arrived at 2.30 a.m. No sleepers to be had, only an unheated *voiture de luxe*, where we were fairly comfortable but deadly cold.

We had to buy tickets for ourselves and our luggage to cross the bridge from Hungary into Yugo-Slavia or the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. One must be thankful for small mercies, namely, that the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes saw fit to elect themselves into one kingdom and not three, else we should have had two more frontiers, passports, tickets, etc., with which to contend.

In Yugo-Slavia all the many officials of the train change, another set of tickets has to be bought to cross a few miles of that country, then on the Rumanian frontier the same process all over again, each in a different money, entailing much calculation and swindling in the exchange—not encouraging to tourist traffic, which might bring grist to their mills. And the fuss and formalities of passports beggar description.

Digitized by Google

In Yugo-Slavia the customs officials have a little habit of removing any surplus cash from a traveller should he be unwise enough to have more than four or five hundred francs visible, giving a receipt and saying that it can be claimed in three months' time; this happens during the passage of the train through their official-ridden country, without even a foot being set on the soil.

In Bucharest the continuous stream of small two horsed cabs—open victorias—is very noticeable. They are miserable little specimens of horseflesh, with dirty much ornamented harness and strings of blue beads round their necks. The drivers are much more imposing—of the Russian type—with fur hat, voluminous fur-lined dark blue velvet coats to the feet, very full in the skirt, with an ornamented belt. In the winter they are so stuffed out with clothes underneath that they cannot get on to their box without help.

From Bucharest we had to drive fifty miles in a motor, as there was a railway strike in progress—to catch a ferry across the Danube from Giorgiu to Rustchuk.

We left in the dark before 6.0 a.m., and as the front wheels of the motor squinted, we shaved lumbering farm carts by a hair's breadth as we shot from side to side of the rough and rutty road.

It was bitterly cold, the petrol choked twice (the driver said it was frozen) and we had a puncture. At each stop on our journey we gave up all hope of catching the boat and pictured ourselves marooned in the midst of the Rumanian plains.

At last we reached Giorgiu three-quarters of an hour before the ferry was scheduled to leave. No sooner had we got ourselves and our luggage on board than it pushed off. At Rustchuk much bribery secured us a *wagon-lit*, and next day we were in Sofia.

Sofia itself is situated high up in a plateau in the Balkan Mountains and is quite a presentable little town, considering that ex-King Ferdinand made it entirely in twenty years or so from a handful of Turkish mud huts. He ran the whole country like a private estate, very autocratically but successfully. His son Boris is king now, in name only, but that form of constitution seems more of a success than the republic of other States.

The Government has just instituted compulsory labour for all men of twenty and girls of sixteen, to work for short periods, making in all twelve months for the men and six months for the girls; the idea being the development of patriotism and the social organization of the State. It will be utilized in the making and maintaining of roads, railways, mines, canals, telephones, forests, etc., for men—hospital nursing, sewing, etc., for girls. It is already in operation in some districts, and so far is answering very well.

During the coal strike one of the leading newspapers tentatively suggested compulsory labour as the only solution of our troubles.

Digitized by Google

The large new mosque is a wonderful building, to commemorate the freeing of the Bulgarians from the Turks by the Russians in 1870. It was entirely completed in about ten years, and was to have been consecrated just before the great war. The Tsar had arranged to be present and it was to be dedicated to the Russian patron saint: then came the war, and the Bulgarians found themselves fighting against their deliverers this time, and the mosque still remains unconsecrated because they don't quite know to whom to dedicate it now.

It is a very Eastern building; the top part of the walls and the roof is covered with very highly coloured modern Russian paintings. The lower part of the walls, the floor, the pillars and balustrades are of many kinds of marble, and the effect is very fine. The main door is of beaten and carved bronze, and is a wonderful piece of work. In a few hundred years it will have toned down and found itself. It has two large domes of gilt, which are a great landmark and can be seen twinkling in the sun ten or twelve miles away.

In the country the peasants are about 500 years behind civilization, in their methods of farming, of living and of dressing. The women weave most of the material used. In Bulgaria it is a coarse dark stuff for aprons, skirts and bodices, brightly embroidered at the hem, with white cotton sleeves very thickly and closely embroidered—a coloured handkerchief on the head. In the winter men, women and children wear short jackets of sheepskin, the white skin outside, ornamented with strips of coloured leather, and the fur inside, and fur caps for the men. In the winter the country has a very dead-brown appearance, as there are no evergreens, or hardly any. The chief crop is maize and paprika, a sort of red pepper. The maize cobs and paprika pods are strung round the houses to dry and form a very decorative splash of colour. In some parts the maize stalks are stacked in branches of small trees—at first one wondered if it was to keep the maize dry or the trees warm.

It is a flat, ugly country except in the Balkan Mountains, where there are some fine ravines and gorges, with the red rock showing possibilities of mineral deposits, difficult of exploitation in this impoverished country.

You leave all thought of time behind you in the Balkans, the trains are anything up to fourteen hours late, or several hours early, in arriving or departing. They go about ten miles an hour, stop indefinitely at every station, take on an engine from the country of the moment, usually of the toy type, and quite incapable of drawing at all a large train. The ordinary local trains are a travesty of the name as we understand it, the window spaces boarded up, doors gone, seats smashed, yet always overcrowded. The travellers hang on to the footboards and crowd on to the little platforms at the end of each carriage, like a tram during the crush hours.

We crawled precariously over several very ricketty wooden bridges erected temporarily where one had been blown up; as one creaked and

Digitized by Google

groaned over them one had the feeling of being on a very small and very insecure plank, as looking out of the window there was nothing between one and the water and rocks many feet below.

From Sofia I had the opportunity of going out shooting with some officers, amongst them two Frenchmen, who were real sportsmen as well as being excellent shots. We drove about ten miles—the last few were very rough, practically across country, and the motor did a very good imitation of a tank over hills and dales and through mud axle deep.

We came to a village fringed by a thin wood, which we walked up, one gun walking through the village street; every inhabitant turned out to see the fun, and at the first shot the boys shouted, the dogs barked, the cattle lowed, the sheep bleated, and one old woman asked if the war had begun again. That beat produced several woodcock, and we drove on to the next village, where the same performance was repeated. There are many good snipe marshes in the neighbourhood, too. The flocks of sheep, guarded by a small boy with a large crook, enveloped in a long striped cloak to his heels, and a hood, are like a Bible picture; the various flocks are dotted about round their respective shepherds, but never appear to get mixed up.

The old time buffalos draw the carts, and it is difficult to distinguish their groaning squeals from the creaks of the wooden cart.

The well-to-do inhabitants have not quite the same ideas on washing that we hold. One young lady was invited by an English officer to a dance. She wrote and said she was very sorry she could not accept as she had had her bath the day before, and her mother thought it was too soon after it for her to go out.

There is a large gipsy population of many tribes—the Comb-makers, the Carrion-eaters, the Tinners, the Musicians, the Gimlet-makers, the Iron-workers, the Sieve-makers, to mention a few of the most distinct.

They each have a different language, though of the same foundation, and very occasionally intermarry, when a young "knut" will go and buy a bride from another tribe.

Their trades appear to be but a blind, for they are all thieves of the first water, except the Carrion-eaters, who beg but do not steal. The women get themselves up in the filthiest old rags and go out to beg and scavenger in the gutters and refuse heaps, while the men occasionally do a little portering on a market day. They admit the eating of dead animals found lying about, but say that what God has killed is better than what man has slaughtered.

The other tribes are constantly caught and imprisoned for stealing, horses chiefly, so much so that they use the prisons as poste restante.

They do their horse stealing by means of spurious certificates, as every *bona fide* transaction between Bulgaria and Rumania has to have a certificate. These are forged or tampered with by confederates, and

Digitized by Google

even though the gipsies cannot read or write they get to know the look of a certificate that fits a horse as to age, size, colour, and so on.

It is a very interesting study, but even a passer-by can see that there will never be real peace until there is a Balkan United States, or some of them are absorbed by a large Power. The giving, by the Peace Treaty, of a portion of the Bulgarian frontier to Serbia has caused tremendous feeling, and it will be an Alsace-Lorraine until they can win it back again.

Bulgaria is far the most industrious of the States, and now that she has not to spend her money in maintaining large armed forces like her victorious neighbours, she can afford to expand herself economically.

M.L.

Digitized by Google

OPERATIONS OF THE MOUNTED TROOPS OF THE EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (continued).

By LIEUT.-COLONEL W. J. FOSTER, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.,*
Australian Military Forces.

CHAPTER VIII. THE BATTLE OF ROMANI.

(*Reference.—Sketch Map B, Battle of Romani.*) †

A FEW minutes before midnight, 3rd–4th August, 1916, the 1st Light Horse Brigade reported that some thirty men had approached Hod el Enna. East of that place a larger party of about 500 could just be distinguished. The reserve regiment (1st Light Horse) was ordered to turn out and join its brigade. At midnight heavy firing broke out along the whole of the outpost line and columns of the enemy were reported both at Hod el Enna and at Mount Meredith. The 2nd Light Horse Brigade, in bivouac at Et Maler, turned out and remained ready to move just outside its lines. Matters were stationary in front of the outpost line for about forty-five minutes and then it became apparent that the enemy was in great strength opposite Hod el Enna and Mount Meredith. At 00.45 one squadron went forward from the reserve regiment to reinforce the line near Mount Meredith, two troops going north and two south of the hill. This move apparently checked the enemy, and the situation with him was probably as follows :

The enemy's plans were based on finding his line of approach clear until he was near the southern side of the Et Maler. His orders and plans subsequently captured showed this. When, therefore, his columns struck, in the dark, the unexpected line of the 1st Light Horse Brigade, it was taken merely for some weak posts and, failing to thrust it aside, his columns halted to report—and to recast plans.

* In collaboration with Lieut.-Colonel J. G. Browne, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, 14th (King's) Hussars, who served as G.S.O.1 of the Anzac Mounted Division, during the operations described. After the Armistice a historical section under Lieut.-Colonel W. J. Foster was formed in connection with the A.I.F., E.E.F. Much accurate information was thus obtained from officers who took part in the various actions, and many valuable sketches and panoramas were received, some of which are included, by permission, in this account.

† See page 144.

Digitized by Google

DELAYING ACTION BY THE 1ST LIGHT HORSE BRIGADE.

Dawn was about 05.00. At any rate up to 02.15 nothing went on except continuous, though not very heavy, firing. Apparently the order then was to attack whatever was in front, as at this hour the firing increased along the line, and the enemy commenced to press hard our troops at Hod el Enna and Mount Meredith.



At 02.30 a bayonet charge was made by the enemy at Mount Meredith, but was broken up by the 3rd Light Horse Regiment. The 2nd Light Horse Regiment, at Hod el Enna, was now attacked by greatly superior enemy forces, and was being gradually pressed back. Further pressure was now being made on Mount Meredith and the 3rd Light Horse Regiment was compelled to give ground. Another squadron was sent to reinforce them, but the enemy, whose strength was now about 8,000, continued to press. The brigade, pivoting on its left, fell back slowly, fighting bitterly and contesting practically every inch of the country, delaying

Digitized by Google

the enemy's advance by holding on behind the sand dunes and tussocks with which the country is covered. At 03.20 a little information came in from another source. The detachment of the Auckland Mounted Rifles at Bir Abu Raml had sent a patrol out under a non-commissioned officer directly the enemy was seen. The N.C.O. encountered the enemy advancing, almost at once, and, leaving the rest of the patrol to watch, sent back to Bir Abu Raml to warn the rest of the party there, but the enemy had already passed through the place, gathering the party with them. The N.C.O. found himself with Turks on all sides of him. He moved near enough to gather the information that there were two columns at this point, between Bir el Dhaba and Bir Abu Raml, moving north-west. He then rode quickly down one column until he struck a gap in the transport columns, went through, and then made off with his information, apparently unobserved. He managed to get to Pelusium, five miles north-west of Romani, and got his information through.

Meantime, the 1st Light Horse Brigade was falling back gradually on the Et Maler camp, not so much on account of the direct enemy pressure on their front, as the fact that strong bodies of the enemy were outflanking their right, passing through Hod el Enna, and so north-west. The attacks on Mount Meredith were gaining ground slowly as well. The last squadron of the reserve regiment was put in at 03.35, to strengthen the right flank. The outflanking movement continued, and by about 04.00 the brigade was forced back on the right to the southern slopes of Wellington Ridge, and on the left to the next sand-hills north of Mount Meredith, leaving the hill itself in the hands of the Turks, who at once lined the crest and brought machine guns into action. So far the 1st Light Horse Brigade had withstood the onslaught of about one Turkish Division. The 2nd Light Horse Brigade was brought up at 04.25. It had not been put in previously as it was still too dark, nor was it advisable to get it involved in a contest in the sand dunes, where it would be impossible to pick up the situation till dawn. This brigade had been standing by, ready to be put in if the situation had become desperate, but the gallant stand made by the 1st Light Horse Brigade obviated this necessity.

The enemy was now sweeping the ridges with heavy machine-gun fire, and, under cover of it, pushing forward behind the tussocks and sand Just as it was light enough to see (04.30), a large body of Turks, who had been collecting behind the western slopes of Mount Meredith, suddenly arose and charged over the crest of the hill and into a depression only 300 or 400 yards in front of the 1st Light Horse Regiment. The situation on the right was, however, the most dangerous, and the G.O.C. Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division ordered the 2nd Light Horse Brigade to extend the line from the right of the 1st Light Horse Brigade to the west. The 6th and 7th Light Horse Regiments took up this line, with the Wellington Mounted Rifle Regiment in reserve.

Digitized by Google

Just before 05.00 the enemy's guns came into action for the first time, firing shrapnel on Wellington Ridge and searching the ground in rear. Enemy aeroplanes appeared at this hour and bombed the camps, but effected little damage.

Meanwhile, the enemy's outflanking move continued, and at 05.15 it was evident that Wellington Ridge would soon become untenable. Hostile aeroplanes were very active with bombs in the neighbourhood of the Divisional Headquarters. It was also evident that the enemy had committed his troops to a decisive attack. The enemy's heavy guns opened at this time on the infantry posts east of Romani and the hills north of Katib Gannit. The enemy had also deployed some troops towards Abu Hamra, but contented himself on the east with a purely holding attack. The enemy who had occupied Mount Meredith now lined the crest of that hill, and from there were sweeping the crest of Wellington Ridge with machine guns. About 06.00 the Leicester Battery R.H.A. came into action near Et Maler and drove the enemy off the crest of Mount Meredith, and then shelled the country to the immediate south with, what was afterwards seen, heavy effect.

The 1st Light Horse Brigade fell back at 06.00 from the southern slopes of Wellington Ridge to a ridge in line with and to the west of it, held by some outpost troops of the 52nd Division. The enemy was now fighting desperately for the ridge, and succeeded in gaining it at 07.00. The 1st Light Horse Brigade in falling back came under heavy shrapnel fire, causing some casualties. The brigade then moved just north of the Et Maler camp. On the eastern edge of the ridge the 6th and 7th Light Horse Regiments were also forced to vacate their positions and slowly fell back, moving by alternate squadrons. The last high ground between Et Maler camps and the enemy was left in his hands. The enemy did not, however, move forward at once, apparently not knowing of the retirement, or else reorganizing his forces behind the ridge. The enemy (about one brigade, with some mounted troops) were still to be seen pushing between Et Maler and Mount Royston, and at 07.45 began to outflank the right of the 2nd Light Horse Brigade. The 3rd Light Horse Regiment was then sent to prolong the right of this brigade's front.

Action of the Detachment at Dueidar.

The 5th Light Horse Regiment left Dueidar shortly after midnight on the night 3rd-4th August. A short halt was made at Bir el Nuss, where the regiment was informed by the post of the Auckland Mounted Rifles that at dusk on the 3rd there had apparently been no change in the situation towards Mageibra, and that the enemy had not advanced during the day. Leaving Bir el Nuss at 02.45, the regiment moved in a south-easterly direction in order to arrive at Nagid from the south. Just before daybreak the advanced guard reported Nagid "all clear," but on moving

Digitized by Google

forward to a high ridge 200 yards south of Nagid two battalions of the enemy, strength about 1,500, were seen moving north-west. This force had out small advanced and flank guards of camel-men. These at once took up a position along a high ridge between the 5th Light Horse Regiment and the valley up which they were marching towards Hod el Enna. The enemy opened fire with machine guns and mountain guns at a comparatively close range. Having ascertained the position of the left flank, the regiment moved back to Bir el Nuss. Heavy firing in the Romani direction was heard. The regiment reported the position, and instructions were received from the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade to proceed three miles back on the road towards Dueidar and await instructions. On arrival there no communication could be got with the brigade, which had, in the meantime, moved towards Romani. At dusk on the 4th, still having failed in his efforts to get communication or orders and being absolutely in the dark as to events, the Officer Commanding decided to return with the regiment and the squadron of the Auckland Mounted Rifles to Dueidar, where the 3rd Light Horse Brigade had arrived at 19.30 from Ballybunion.

It was unfortunate that the regiment was not made more use of during the day, but its presence at Nagid had undoubtedly a substantial effect on the Turkish reserves. It later turned out that this force was stationed during the night 3rd-4th at Bir el Marieh. The two battalions seen by the 5th Light Horse Regiment were part of the Turkish reserves marching to reinforce the attack on Et Maler. When the firing opened at Nagid this force was delayed for some two hours before recommencing its march.

Action of the Section Troops.

At 07.00 the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade, which had been at Hill 70, was on the march for Dueidar, but its direction was changed to Canterbury Hill.

By 07.45 one squadron of the 5th Mounted Brigade had moved up from Pelusium and was in touch with the enemy. At 08.30 a column of the enemy, reported at between 2,000 and 3,000, began to appear opposite the infantry work No. 22A. They also began to line the crest of Wellington Ridge, and the camps at Et Maler came under a heavy rifle fire. The Ayrshire Battery R.H.A., and one section of the Leicester Battery R.H.A., however, swept the ridge with heavy shrapnel fire, inflicting heavy casualties. The Turks were driven off, and did not again attempt to cross the sky-line. At 08.35 a message got through from the 5th Mounted Brigade reporting that they were taking up a position about El Kaseba—Hod Negeiret Ali—Bir um Ziad, with one regiment to be kept back at Gilban. The armoured train was ready also at km. 37. Meanwhile, the 42nd Division was being brought up by train to Pelusium,

Digitized by Google

but there was greater delay than anticipated, and, during the morning of the 4th August, no infantry was available for an attack on the enemy's flank at Mount Royston. This caused the whole brunt of the fighting in this area to fall upon the 1st and 2nd Light Horse Brigades, whose casualties had not been light, and whose right flank was unprotected. It was not until 15.30 that two battalions of the East Lancashire Regiment, closely followed by a third, were on the march southwards from Pelusium station to take part in the attack against Mount Royston. At 09.45 the composite regiment of the 5th Mounted Brigade got into touch with the enemy two miles south-west of Mount Royston, where it also got connection with a squadron of the brigade which had been holding off enemy attacks since 07.45. *The main result of the Turkish rapid advance was that the Section Cavalry (New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade and the 5th Mounted Brigade), originally destined to operate against the enemy's rear, was diverted to strengthen the line of resistance on the north.*

The enemy continued to work his way along Mount Royston, while our right was working forward among the sand-hills at the foot of that point. The 5th Mounted Brigade and the right of the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division got into touch at 10.00. In order to extend our line westwards, two companies 156th Infantry Brigade took over part of the 7th Light Horse Regiment's line at 10.50. At 11.00 the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade (less 5th Light Horse Regiment) had got in touch with the 5th Mounted Brigade, and arrangements were made for an attack on Mount Royston by them, from the west. A section Ayrshire Battery R.H.A. opened on the enemy in the hods and valleys east of the hill.

The 42nd Division was asked to support the attack, and the 127th Infantry Brigade, which had been retained at Pelusium, was at once put on the move for this purpose.

Meanwhile, the enemy began to show more activity on our left. They were reported forming for an attack on the infantry line opposite works 22A, 21, 21A, 4 and 5—but this did not materialize.

At 11.30 an enemy mountain battery opened on Bir et Maler, but the dust thrown up by the firing was observed, and the section of the Ayrshire Battery R.H.A. was turned on it, and it ceased fire. Two considerable bodies of enemy were reported entering Abu Hamra at 11.40, and his reinforcements were also observed south of Wellington Ridge. They were also seen making their way into the hods west of that place. All available guns, including two 18-pounder batteries of the 52nd Division, opened on the hods and swept the ground in rear of Wellington Ridge, presumably with effect, as no attack developed.

Interest was now beginning to centre more on Mount Royston, where the 5th Mounted Brigade was hotly engaged. Just before 12.30 heavy rifle fire broke out on our right, caused by the enemy advancing on Bir

Digitized by Google

Abu Diuk, where they were met by the 6th Light Horse Regiment, and a hot fire fight ensued.

The enemy had now reached the farthest point of his advance, and his line ran from Bir Abu Diuk north of Mount Royston (which he held), thence straight to Wellington Ridge, of which he held the southern slopes but not the crest, and thence his line went round to the east and north, encircling the infantry posts.

Attack on Mount Royston.

At 13.10 the attack on Mount Royston began, the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade advancing on the hill from the west, supported by the fire of the Somerset Battery. The 127th Infantry Brigade was on the move from Pelusium, in support, whilst the 5th Mounted Brigade attacked from the north-west.

The 1st and 2nd Light Horse Brigades were to move forward directly Mount Royston fell. By 14.30 the attack had made some progress into the sand-hills, though the Turks on the hill were putting up a hard fight, being specially difficult to dislodge from the deep folds in the ground which surrounded the hill.

At 16.30 the enemy made his last attempt to move forward in his centre, supported by the fire of his guns from Mount Meredith. Our guns again swept the crest of Wellington Ridge, and drove the enemy back with heavy loss.

By 17.00 the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade and the 5th Mounted Brigade, closely supported by the 127th Brigade, were pushing forward steadily. At the same time, to help the attack, the 156th Brigade was asked to attack Wellington Ridge, but some considerable delay ensued and this attack did not develop.

Just after 18.00 the ridges north of Mount Royston were carried, and parties of prisoners surrendered as each point fell. At 18.30 Mount Royston itself, with 500 prisoners, was taken. A battery of mountain guns to the west of the hill, and previously put out of action by the Ayrshire Battery R.H.A., was also captured. The whole line now began to sweep forward, gathering up prisoners as it went. This movement continued until dark. The New Zealand Mounted Rifles and the 5th Mounted Brigades withdrew after dark to Pelusium to water. The 1st and 2nd Light Horse Brigades had been unavoidably mixed during the day. The position of regiments at nightfall was:—



Wellington M.R.	7th Regiment	2nd A.L.H.	3rd A.L.H.	6th A.L.H.	1st A.L.H.
	2nd A.L.H. Brigade.		1st A.L.H. Brigade.		

Digitized by Google

(1st Australian Light Horse Brigade consisted of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Australian Light Horse Regiments, and the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade of the 5th, 6th and 7th Australian Light Horse Regiments, whilst the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade was composed of the Canterbury, Wellington and Auckland Mounted Rifle Regiments. The 5th Australian Light Horse Regiment had been temporarily attached to the New Zealand Mounted Brigade and the Wellington Mounted Rifle Regiment had taken its place in the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade.)

Firing continued long after dark along the line, the enemy also using his artillery, and the firing did not die down till midnight. The enemy also expended a number of star shells, from time to time, presumably in anticipation of an advance.

Movements of other Troops.

At 19.30 the 3rd Light Horse Brigade and the Inverness Battery arrived at Dueidar. The Mobile Column from No. 2 Section, which had left Ferdan Railhead at 12.45, reached Bada, where it bivouacked that night.

No move during the night 4th-5th was made by our line, and under cover of darkness the horses were watered.

Our casualties during the day were :—

	Killed.	*Wounded.*	*Missing.*
1st Light Horse Brigade 2nd Light Horse Brigade	71	233	28
New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade	4	40	—
5th Mounted Brigade ..	4	40	approx.
Infantry	About 250, but no details.		
Other units	About 100, but no details.		

Altogether the battle cost us in killed, wounded and missing about 800.

The Section Orders for the next day were generally as follows :—

" The enemy had retired to a line of entrenched positions running Hod el Enna—Bir Qatia—Abu Hamra, with covering troops in front. The Section Commander wished to work the enemy southward to the line Katib Gannit—Hod el Enna, at the same time to envelop his flanks. The Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division was to push forward all along the line with its right on Hod el Enna, its left on the 52nd Division advancing on the line Katib Gannit—Mount Meredith, the 3rd Light Horse Brigade to push forward on Bir el Nuss and attack Hod el Enna from the south, keeping touch with the 5th Mounted Brigade on its left. The 5th Mounted Brigade was under the orders of the 42nd Division, and was to assist in linking up with the 3rd Light Horse Brigade and

Digitized by Google

the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division. The 42nd Division was to push forward in full strength on the Canterbury Hill—Mount Royston—Hod el Enna line in close support of the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division."

Beyond desultory firing by the enemy long range guns, the night passed without incident.

The Pursuit.

At daybreak on the morning of the 5th August a brigade of the 52nd Division, with the 7th Light Horse Regiment, took the remainder of Wellington Ridge by assault, capturing about 2,000 prisoners. Elsewhere the mounted troops pressed forward, meeting some opposition, but prisoners continued to come in steadily and it was soon obvious that the enemy's offensive was completely broken. An advance was ordered all along the line and at 09.30 all mounted troops were put under the G.O.C. Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division, with orders to push on as far and as vigorously as the resources at his disposal would admit. The mounted troops pressed steadily forward and found the enemy holding the ridges west of Qatia and supported by artillery. The 3rd Light Horse Brigade, which had moved from Dueidar to Bir el Nuss, came into contact with the enemy near Hamisah and captured 450 prisoners with machine guns and other material. The further advance of these troops was met with heavy fire from field guns and howitzers and no further progress was made.

Cavalry moving rapidly suffer very little from rifle or shell fire.

The 5th Light Horse Regiment was ordered to rush that part of Qatia consisting of the strip of timber separated from the main oasis by the salt pan and about half mile to the south of the road. Enemy guns were reported to be in the timber. The regiment with fixed bayonets was formed in two lines, squadrons in line of troop columns. After galloping half a mile the squadrons formed line, and covered a front of about 500 yards. In this formation they galloped another half a mile and charged into the oasis. No guns were there, but a few prisoners were taken. In the gallop only one man was hit and several horses slightly wounded. As the regiment was reforming, artillery and machine guns were turned on them. Men were dismounted and went into action whilst the led horses were galloped back out of range. A strong attempt was made to eject the enemy by dismounted action, but the attack failed to make progress and darkness found our troops and the enemy's facing each roughly on parallel lines.

On the morning of the 6th the enemy retired from Qatia and, while the cavalry pressed on in pursuit, the infantry moved forward and occupied the line Bir el Mamluk—Qatia—Er Raba. The day was intensely hot and it is doubtful if the infantry could have made another forced march

Digitized by Google

over the heavy sand. Those Australian Light Horse Regiments (1st and 2nd Light Horse Brigades) which had borne the brunt of observing and harassing the enemy's advance since 19th July were given a day's rest in camp whilst the remainder of the cavalry (3rd Light Horse Brigade, New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade and 5th Mounted Brigade) continued the pursuit. The enemy's rear-guard was found to be occupying his previously prepared position extending across the road and telegraph line between Hod el Reshafat and Hod el Dhaba. Our attempts to turn his flanks by Hod en Negiliat and Hod el Sagia on the south were frustrated by heavy shell fire.

On the same morning the Camel Corps detachment of Smith's Mobile Column occupied Bir el Mageibra without opposition.

On the 7th August the cavalry maintained their pressure on the enemy's rear-guard, which had fallen back to the line of his first entrenched position running from Oghratina to Hod el Masia, with flanks thrown well out to the north and south. There was continuous fighting throughout the day, but the enemy was too strongly supported by artillery for the cavalry to drive him from his position. Meanwhile the Mobile Column, operating from Bir el Aweidia, had fought a very successful action with an enemy force consisting of a thousand rifles, three machine guns and two twelve-pounders, in the neighbourhood of Hod el Muhammam. The camel detachment and a regiment of cavalry, the whole under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Grant, drove the enemy out of several successive positions, capturing fifty-three prisoners. This threat to his flanks was probably an important factor in determining the enemy to continue his retreat.

On the 8th August the enemy was found to have abandoned Oghratina and by the evening to have taken up a position covering Bir el Abd, his advanced base. It was here the enemy made his final stand to cover the evacuation of his camp and stores. Touch was now gained between the cavalry and Smith's Mobile Column and was maintained from this time onwards.

The Action at Bir el Abd, 9th August.

On the 9th August the cavalry made a desperate effort to encircle both flanks of the enemy at Bir el Abd and cut off his further retreat. It was, perhaps, the hardest fought action in this campaign. The cavalry, five weak brigades, attacked an enemy in position and whose numbers and artillery were greatly superior.

Royston's Column (the 1st and 2nd Light Horse Brigades) struck the enemy in position on a line with his right on the Sabkhet Bardawil, thence a mile west of Hod el Hisha and thence towards Abd. The Ayrshire Battery came into action and dispersed a small body of the enemy, but the advance was checked about 04.30. The New Zealand Mounted

Digitized by Google

Rifle Brigade, moving direct on Abd, encountered and drove in the enemy's advanced patrols and, pushing on, occupied the high ground overlooking Bir el Abd by 06.15. The 3rd Light Horse Brigade was, in the meantime, moving forward to the south in the direction of Hod el Bada. The 5th Mounted Brigade was in reserve at Oghratina. A counter-attack was made by the enemy some 10-12,000 strong in two columns of 5-6,000 strong each. These were dispersed by the fire of the Somerset Battery and rifle fire and some prisoners taken. By 06.30 the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade was engaged all along the line with the enemy, holding a position about two and a-half miles west of Bir el Abd. Royston's Column was in position two miles south of Hod Hamada, the 1st Light Horse Brigade on the left facing south-east with the right on the 2nd Light Horse Regiment in the sand dunes, and connected with the 2nd Light Horse Brigade on their right, whose right in turn was extended towards the left of the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade but separated by a gap of 800 yards. Both brigades had a regiment in reserve. The Ayrshire Battery was in action, firing south-east. To the south the 3rd Light Horse Brigade was meeting opposition and was in touch on its right with patrols of the Mobile Column near Hod el Muhammam.

At 07.30 the enemy was reported to be working round the right of the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade, their objective apparently being the long ridge running north and south across the telegraph line. A general move of camels out of Bir el Abd continued and the Somerset Battery made good practice on them. At 08.30 the 3rd Light Horse Brigade was ordered to get close touch with the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade and to make Bir el Abd their objective instead of Salmana. At 08.50 it seemed probable that the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade would get into Bir el Abd, as they were able to advance a little. They were, however, shortly afterwards held up. Meantime, the 3rd Light Horse Brigade had reached a point just west of Likmirdeh, where they were strongly opposed. The 8th and 9th Light Horse Regiments were attacking. By 10.30 the enemy's guns were showing great activity, and at 11.30 the Warwick Yeomanry was put in to reinforce the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade. By 11.40 our advance was completely checked. Our line was in a semicircle facing south-east, east and north-east and from three to three and a-half miles distant from Bir el Abd. The enemy had brought a large number of guns into action. Parties could be seen removing material and stores. From midday onwards the enemy made several counter-attacks against the Canterbury Mounted Rifles, which was in advance on the left of the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade. The Ayrshire Battery was at the same time heavily shelled and four men and thirty-seven horses killed and seven men and seven horses wounded before it could be got to another position. At 12.35

Digitized by Google

very heavy shell fire was opened on Royston's Column and the enemy began to advance against the centre of the line. At 12.58 the enemy made another determined counter-attack on the centre of the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade. Heavy firing was going on all along the line. All guns were turned on the enemy columns and the counter-attack

SKETCH MAP OF THE BATTLE OF BIR EL ABD



broke, the enemy retreating hurriedly. His heavy guns were firing on our line the whole time. Half an hour later the enemy delivered an attack on the left of the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade with three battalions. The gap which had existed had been filled by the Warwick Yeomanry, which met the attack; the Leicester Battery was turned on to it also and the pressure was relieved. At 14.00 the 3rd Light Horse Brigade reported that all troops, except the reserves, were in the firing line. The enemy was strong along the whole line and the continual

Digitized by Google

pressure by the enemy had forced the right back a little. At the same hour a determined attack was made on Royston's Column, supported by heavy artillery fire. The Ayrshire Battery was ordered back, but owing to casualties among the horses could not move. All reserves were called up and put into the fight, so that the guns could be withdrawn. By 14.30 the left flank of Royston's Column began a gradual withdrawal and at the same time the enemy pressure forced back the 3rd Light Horse Brigade for nearly a mile and the enemy concentrated about Um Diek, making apparently for the ridge which runs from the " H " of Hod Umm Zaghiya to Hod ed Debabis. The attacks on Royston's Column continued and at 14.48 he reported that he was just holding on but he would have to retire probably. All men were now in the firing line. By 16.30 his left was forced back, the enemy to the number of 3,000 pressing on the centre and about 1,000 against his left. The shell fire along the line was heavy and our line was going back gradually. The column succeeded in getting away all the wounded. At 17.00 a counter-attack was made on the 3rd Light Horse Brigade but was repulsed by the 8th Light Horse Regiment. By the forcing back of both flanks the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade became very exposed. Preparations were now made to withdraw, the regiments in front slowly falling back. At 18.30, as the withdrawal was taking place, the enemy delivered an attack on a front of about two and a-half miles. The rifle and the machine-gun fire was intense and continued until dark. The enemy was, however, held off and the withdrawal completed. During the day the Leicester and Somerset Batteries fired over a thousand rounds each and the Inverness about 500. In view of the large numbers of fresh enemy troops which appeared, the Division, less the 3rd Light Horse Brigade, fell back to Oghratina. The 3rd Light Horse Brigade bivouacked at Hod Abu Dhaba. Officers' patrols kept a watch on the enemy during the night.

Our casualties in this action were heavy, but those of the Turk greater, as was evidenced by the large number of killed still unburied when we occupied Bir el Abd on the 12th.

This action is a fine example of the ability of the cavalry to break off an action and withdraw in the face of greatly superior numbers.

During the next two days our cavalry was unable to do more than maintain continuous pressure, but the Mobile Column which occupied Bayud on the 9th continued to menace the enemy wide on his right flank. On the 10th a strong reconnaissance was made against the enemy, who was in strength at Hod el Mushalfat south-east of Bir el Abd. On the 11th an enemy force with two mountain guns approached Bayud. A sharp action, which commenced at 05.30, was fought, and in the course of it all the enemy's baggage camels and ammunition mules were destroyed. Towards the afternoon the enemy evacuated this position and retired on the main body of his rear-guard. On the following day patrols from

Digitized by Google

the neighbourhood of Bayud found the country to the east and north all clear.

Early on the morning of the 12th it was found that the enemy had retired from Bir el Abd and, though there was a small encounter with his rear troops about Salmana, the general pursuit stopped at this point, the enemy retiring through Bir el Mazar to El Arish. The cavalry were ordered to hold the line Bir el Abd—Homossia with two brigades and keep touch with the Mobile Column which remained at Mageibra. The infantry at Qatia (the farthest point of their advance) returned to the Mahemdia—Romani line.

The result of the operations in the Qatia district was the complete defeat of an enemy force amounting in all to some 18,000, of which 15,000 were rifles. Nearly 5,000, including fifty officers, were captured, and from the number of enemy dead actually buried it is estimated that the total number of enemy casualties amounted to 9,000. In addition, there were captured one Krupp 75 mm. mountain battery of four guns, complete with all accessories, and 400 rounds of ammunition, nine machine guns and mountings, especially constructed pack saddles for camel transport, 2,300 rifles, one million rounds small arm ammunition, 100 horses and mules, 500 camels and a large amount of miscellaneous stores and equipment. Two field hospitals complete fell into our hands, and large quantities of stores were burnt by the enemy at Bir el Abd to prevent their capture.

Notes on the Romani Operations.

1. The construction of infantry posts on Wellington Ridge would have relieved the cavalry of close outpost work at night on the right flank. The position overlooked the Romani line, and would have also relieved the cavalry for its legitimate purpose—pursuit.

2. It is difficult to understand why the 42nd Division and three brigades of cavalry were kept back until 4th August. An additional cavalry brigade forward would have relieved matters. The strain on two cavalry brigades for sixteen days harassing and checking the enemy was great, and when the opportunity came the cavalry brigades at Romani were too exhausted to take up the pursuit with anything like real vigour. It can only be said that there were difficult problems of feeding then and they must have been too great to allow of a concentration forward earlier.

3. The question of the use of the reserve cavalry in the hands of No. 3 Section on 4th August is interesting. The deflection of the march of the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade from Dueidar may have been influenced by the reports received by No. 3 Section. Both the 52nd and the Anzac Mounted Divisions believed early that morning that the main attack was on their front. Even if the 52nd was taking the main attack, it *looked* as if greater opportunities would come through Dueidar.

Digitized by Google

1. The MAIN ATTACK as it actually occurred, being met by the ANZAC Mounted Division (2 Bdes.)



2. HYPOTHETICAL MAIN ATTACK as it might have been, opposite the 52nd Division and through Abu Hamra



Digitized by Google

There seems to be no great reason why the 3rd Light Horse Brigade was not brought up on the 3rd instead of the 4th. The two cavalry brigades at Romani held the Turkish attack and could have done so until the arrival of the 42nd Division.

Sketches are shown: (1) the actual direction of the attack, and (2) as if the main attack was coming in opposite the 52nd Division. It looks as if the great chance lay through Dueidar. There was practicaly all day on 4th August when this might have been put into execution. If done earlier in the day, so much the better. The force available would have been the New Zealand Mounted Rifle and the 3rd Light Horse Brigades complete. There would have been some time to add to this force certain units of the 5th Mounted Brigade, which were not already engaged and possibly some from that body which were acting independently to the south. It is suggested that they should have been put under one commander and given the rôle of acting against the enemy's left flank and rear. Even taking the situation as in Sketch 2, it still looks as if greater results would have been obtained by an attack from the direction of Dueidar.

4. Section Headquarters were at Kantara, twenty-four miles away. Early on the morning of the 4th August all the lines back were cut (presumably by enemy agents) and our only means of communication for some two hours was by wireless.

5. The impossibility of infantry moving any great distance over the desert and fighting. On the 7th the 42nd Division made strenuous efforts to get up to the fight beyond Qatia but heat and thirst stopped them from sheer exhaustion

6. Touch was lost several times with the enemy, due mainly to lack of water and supplies, which necessitated a withdrawal at night and advance again next morning. The enemy was never really on the run. He conducted a skilful retirement, using the positions he had prepared during his advance.

7. The available camel transport was not enough for a long distance pursuit. It did not allow of the mounted division and one infantry division operating more than two days' march from railhead. In the final pursuit all camel convoys had practically to be concentrated on keeping up the supply for the mounted troops.

8. Turkish preparations had been going on for months. They had special equipment made for the expedition in Germany. Their camel pack equipment and saddles were quite the best thing of their kind. The machine gun and mountain gun packs taught us a great deal. Their camel equipment was especially good. A manual printed in Arabic on the care and treatment of camels, which was given to the supply and transport trains, contained nothing but the soundest advice, and it has since been found useful in our service.

Digitized by Google

8. It was not thought that the Turk could bring heavy guns across the desert. They adopted an ingenious plan for securing a sufficiently stable track. Practically all the way from El Arish to Qatia they constructed an artillery road by cutting two trenches, each a foot deep and about eighteen inches wide, which they filled with brushwood and tough scrub found all over the desert, and covered the whole with a layer of sand. When the sand was exceptionally soft, wide planks were used instead of brushwood, and a battalion of labourers were employed in carrying the timber from the rear of the batteries to the front of them until the soil became firmer and the scrub tracks could be resumed.

9. Later we constructed a wire netting road, along which infantry and light cars could move.

10. The main lessons to cavalry that were brought out were :—

(1) Picketing an enemy and close observation of his movements whilst avoiding being brought into an engagement, 19th July to 3rd August.

(2) Cavalry seizing the chance of a local success by an enemy's mistake. (Action at Um Ugba.)

(3) Delaying action against a greatly superior enemy. (1st Light Horse Brigade, night 3rd-4th August.)

(4) Ability of cavalry to break off an action and withdraw in face of greatly superior numbers. (Abd, 9th August.)

(5) Cavalry moving rapidly suffer very little from rifle or shell fire.

(6) Where it is impossible to bring off a mounted attack, cavalry can make use of suitable ground to gallop into action and then begin a dismounted attack.

CHAPTER IX. RAID ON BIR EL MAZAR, EXTENSION OF THE RAILWAY EASTWARDS AND FINAL PREPARATIONS FOR THE CLEARANCE OF THE SINAI PENINSULA.

(*Reference.—Sketch Map A, Sinai Peninsula.*)*

There is little to record beyond reconnaissances and patrols for the next month. On the 17th September a successful reconnaissance in force was made against the enemy's camp at Bir el Mazar. The troops engaged were the 2nd Light Horse Brigade, 3rd Light Horse Brigade and one company of camels, whilst the 1st Light Horse Brigade came as far as a point twelve miles west of Bir el Mazar to act as covering force and protect the water supply for the returning troops. Sufficient water was brought forward by a camel convoy to allow one complete watering for horses as well as drinking water for the men. The nearest adequate supply was Bir el Abd, twenty-six miles away.

* See CAVALRY JOURNAL, January, 1921, p. 4.

Digitized by Google

SKETCH MAP B



Digitized by Google

The force was concentrated near Salmana on the night 15th-16th, and remained hidden on the 16th in the palm groves. Aeroplanes provided continuous contact patrols. The force moved forward on the night 16th-17th, and at dawn on the 17th the camp was attacked from the west and from the south and south-east. On the west the troops occupied a ridge about 800 yards from the enemy's second line trenches and several small posts were rushed and taken. Our batteries came into action in a favourable position, partially enfilading some enemy trenches, which were seen to be occupied in strength, and inflicting considerable loss. The enemy replied actively with artillery and heavy rifle fire. On the south and south-east the troops drew fire on a front of two miles and in many instances occupied the enemy's original first line trenches. The instructions were that a general action against the enemy in entrenched positions was to be avoided. The action was broken off about midday and the column, having successfully carried out its mission, withdrew without any attempt on the part of the enemy to molest it. The aeroplanes co-operated effectively throughout the operation and the action of the seaplanes off El Arish diverted the attention of the enemy's aircraft from our troops at Bir el Mazar. Our casualties were slight, and the captures included one officer and thirteen men of the enemy's camel corps, besides a number of camels.

PLAN SHOWING DISTANCES IN MILES FROM CAMPS TO BIR EL MAZAR.



The distances covered were :—

1st Light Horse Brigade ..	72	miles between 08.00 on 15th and 13.30 on 18th
2nd Light Horse Brigade ..	59	miles between 02.00 on 16th and 07.30 on 18th
3rd Light Horse Brigade ..	56	miles between 02.00 on 16th and 07.30 on 18th
D.H.Q. and certain divisional units	96	miles between 08.00 on 15th and 13.30 on 18th

(Times shown include the start from and return to camp, as well as five and a-half hours whilst in concealment at Salmana.)

Digitized by Google

The success of the operation, apart from the casualties inflicted, which were heavy, lay in the fact that it gave the enemy a new and unexpected proof of our extended radius of action, and induced him in the course of the next few days to evacuate his camp at Bir el Mazar and withdraw the troops to camps near El Arish. The enemy's force at Mazar consisted of the 31st Turkish Regiment, about 2,000 strong. Remnants of the 39th Regiment, about 300, with four mountain guns, were also attached to this force. The whole operation was carried out in intensely hot weather and the marches were over very heavy sand.

Gradual Extension Eastwards.

From now on to November the railway was gradually pushed on towards El Arish, covered by the cavalry. The infantry were advanced as food and water supplies became available. During the month the railway reached Mazar. Reconnaissances by the cavalry were pushed forward to within eight miles of El Arish by the 17th November, and on the 28th November a patrol got through to Bir el Masmi, a little more than three miles south-west of El Arish. From now on our patrols were constantly in touch with the enemy's position at El Arish—Masaaid.

A successful reconnaissance against the enemy's position at Maghara, sixty-five miles east of Ismailia, was carried out between the 13th and 17th October by a small force of Australian Light Horse, Yeomanry and Camel Corps. This operation not only needed careful preparations but entailed two night marches over exceedingly difficult country, the difficulties being increased on the second night by the presence of a thick fog. On the morning of the 15th the enemy was located holding a strong position on the precipitous hills of Maghara. The force, attacking in two columns, dislodged the enemy from his advanced position, capturing a few prisoners. At the same time the enemy's camp was repeatedly bombed by our aeroplanes. The force then withdrew unmolested and reached Bayud without any loss.

Throughout the month the enemy's aircraft showed considerable activity, attacking the railhead and the bivouacs of our advanced troops with bombs. Little damage was done. Our own aircraft visited Magdhaba, Sheikh Zowaid and Khan Yunus for reconnaissance purposes, and on the 11th November made very successful bomb attacks on Bir Saba and Magdhaba. At Bir Saba special attention was paid to the aerodrome and the railway station, both of which were damaged.

By the 1st December the railway was east of Mazar. In the meantime the enemy maintained his position at El Arish and Masaaid, and in order to afford him no inducement to withdraw until such time as the force was ready to strike, the patrols were ordered to be as unostentatious as possible.

Digitized by Google

Since January the force had gradually pushed across the desert, fighting when necessary, organizing and constructing in the heavy sand and hot sun. The main factor of our success was work, intense and unremitting. To regain the Peninsula, the true frontier of Egypt, hundreds of miles of road and railway had been built, hundreds of miles of water piping had been laid, reservoirs and filters capable of supplying 1,500,000 gallons of water a day had been installed, and tons of stone transported from distant quarries. Kantara had been transformed from a small canal village into an important railway and water terminus, with wharves and cranes and a railway ferry; and the desert, till then almost destitute of human habitation, showed the successive marks of our advance in the shape of strong positions firmly entrenched and protected by hundreds of miles of barbed wire, of standing camps where troops could shelter, of tanks and reservoirs, of railway stations and sidings, of aerodromes and signal stations and wireless installations. Thus was the desert subdued and made habitable and an adequate line of communication established between the advancing troops and their ever receding base. While British troops had laboured incessantly through the summer and autumn, the body of organized native labour had grown. The necessity of combining the protection and maintenance, including the important work of sanitation, of this large force of workers, British and native, with that steady progress on the railway, roads and pipes which was vital to the success of the operations, put the severest strain upon all energies and resources. But the problem of feeding the workers without starving the work was solved by the good will and energy of all concerned.

Organization had kept pace with construction. The equipment of the fighting units with camel transport, which had reached its first stage of completion at the time of the Romani battle, had been perfected by the middle of December, the allotment of camels to units having been worked out with minute precision. A large number of additional camels were provided for convoying supplies and water from the railhead to the front. The striking force was now completely mobile, and the troops had grown skilful in solving the special problems of desert campaigning.

But no organization could entirely overcome the chief difficulty which had to be faced all through the year, the adequate provision of water for the troops. In fact, during this final period, this difficulty was accentuated by the rapid advance of troops and railway, with which the water supply could not keep pace. Moreover, the troops had passed out of the water-bearing Qatia basin and had reached a tract in which local water was almost non-existent. From Romani to Bir el Abd the local water, though generally somewhat brackish, had always been employed for the horses, mules and camels, and it had been found that, if the necessary precautions were taken, it had no ill effect upon our troops, at all events for a limited

Digitized by Google

period. East of Bir el Abd the situation was altogether different. Water is found in comparatively few and widely separated localities. Such as exists is generally too brackish for human consumption, and the wells east of the water line are so widely separated and are of so small capacity that it is a matter of great difficulty—sometimes a complete impossibility —to water any large number of animals. This latter fact greatly restricted the employment of mounted troops during the first half of November, also the pipe line was not yet delivering water at Romani, and the water for the advanced troops had therefore to be brought up by rail in tank trucks and stored in improvised tanks at railway sidings made for the purpose. Since the railway had reached km. 109 (about sixty miles east of Kantara) considerable strain was thrown on its resources for this period owing to the necessity of maintaining the rate of construction, for forwarding material for the construction of the pipe line, for supplying the troops, and for undertaking the long haulage of great quantities of water in addition. By the 17th November, however, the water situation was somewhat relieved by the delivery of water through the pipe line at Romani. Thereafter the water difficulty again increased as the railway advanced until the pipe line delivered water at Bir el Abd, thereby again reducing the distance over which rail-borne water had to be carried. But, as the month advanced, the water question presented itself more insistently than ever. Every tactical preparation for the offensive had been made, naval co-operation planned, and the arrangements made for the landing of stores and construction of piers as soon as El Arish was in our possession. But the difficulty of water supply, even with the advanced railhead, was immense. (The enemy was so disposed as to cover all the available water in the neighbourhood of El Arish and Masaaid.) Between his position and ours, and south of his position, no water could be found; nor had search in the Wadi el Arish south of the town, by parties sent in by night, proved more successful. If, therefore, he should be able to force us to spend two days in the operation of driving him from his position it would be necessary to carry forward very large quantities of water on camels for the men and animals of the formations engaged. This entailed the establishment of a very large reserve of water at railhead, and the preparation of elaborate arrangements for the forwarding and distribution of water.

The Turkish garrison at El Arish consisted of 1,600 infantry in a strongly entrenched position. Between the 9th and 14th December increased activity was shown by the Turkish and our aircraft. Mounted patrols reported the construction of new works. Enemy camps at Magdhaba and Abu Aweigila increased in size. On these indications of a probable reinforcement of the enemy the final preparations were pushed on with strenuous determination. Had rain only fallen an earlier move could have been made, but as it was the water supply for the striking force was not adequately secured till 20th December.

Digitized by Google

The swiftness of the final preparations was rewarded, but not immediately, by a successful engagement. We had been too quick for the enemy, but he had recognized it and, knowing that reinforcements would arrive too late, had hurriedly withdrawn his troops from Masaaid and El Arish. This retirement was reported by the Flying Corps on 20th December late in the evening. As some doubt still existed as to whether the whole or only part of the Turkish forces had gone, the cavalry were ordered to move that night on El Arish.

The Dash for El Arish.

It was a long night march by the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division and the Imperial Corps in order to effect a surprise at dawn. It was quite successful and the troops arrived in their positions under cover of night, but the Turk had already evacuated the place. It was a dark, moonless night and the march lay over the usual heavy sand. Scottish troops were to move in support of the mounted troops and arrived at El Arish on the 22nd.

By dawn the place was surrounded and reoccupied by us after an interval of over two years.



Sketch to show Moves of Troops night 20th-21st December, 1916.

The 1st Light Horse Brigade left the starting point at 22.15 on 20th December and, after a twenty-three miles march, was at its objective at 05.15 on the 21st.

Divisional headquarters, 3rd Light Horse Brigade and the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade left starting point at 22.15 on 20th December and arrived at the objective at 03.45 on 21st December, that is fifteen miles in five and a-half hours. Divisional Headquarters and divisional units had to do eight miles before reaching the starting point.

Digitized by Google

Turkish Retirement.

During the day our aircraft reported about 1,600 of the enemy on the march in two columns in the neighbourhood of Magdhaba and Abu Aweigila. Sheik Zowaid and Rafa appeared to be clear of the enemy. Maghara had been evacuated and the enemy was apparently in the process of withdrawing from the neighbouring posts. By the night of the 21st December, therefore, the reoccupation of El Arish had been effected and the enemy was evacuating or had evacuated his positions west of a north and south line through that place, except those at Nekhl and Hassana. The aircraft, moreover, reported that the garrison of the latter place seemed also to be reduced.

On the 22nd December the Scottish troops were about El Arish and Bittia. Mine-sweeping operations were at once commenced in the roadstead, while the preparation of piers was taken in hand. In forty-eight hours the Navy had cleared the roadstead of mines and the supply ships from Port Said began unloading stores and supplies on the 24th.

The enemy having temporarily succeeded in eluding us, it was of the utmost importance to strike any of his forces that remained within reach. It had always been anticipated that, should the enemy choose to abandon El Arish, his lines of retreat would be through Magdhaba and Abu Aweigila towards El Auja. These anticipations were confirmed by the report of the Flying Corps that an enemy force of about two regiments was at Magdhaba. It appeared likely that this force consisted of the 1,600 infantry which had composed the garrison of El Arish, and that it was preparing to hold Magdhaba as a rear-guard. Orders were given for the mounted force to push forward with all haste against the enemy, and a Flying Column of the available mounted troops and the Camel Brigade was quickly organized and left El Arish the same night.

Chapter X. Action at Magdhaba.

Reference.—Sketch G, Plan of Magdhaba action.

Starting at 01.00 on the 23rd December, the Flying Column (consisting of the 1st and 3rd Light Horse, New Zealand Mounted Rifles and the Camel Brigades, the whole under Major-General H. G. Chauvel, C.B., C.M.G.) reached a point in open plain about four miles from Magdhaba at 05.00, whence the enemy bivouac fires could plainly be seen. General Chauvel, with his staff and subordinate commanders, immediately undertook a personal reconnaissance of the enemy's position, and soon after 08.00, by which time the first aeroplane reports had been received, the attack was set in motion.

The enemy had taken up a position on both banks of the Wadi el Arish, and was very strongly posted in a rough circle of from 3,000 to 3,500 yards in diameter. Five large closed works, exceedingly well sited, formed the

Digitized by Google


G
Bare open Plain
Rough and broken
Undulating Sand and Sparse Low bushes
Wady el Arish
Sand dunes and Small bushes
A.M.R. Regt
N.Z.M.R. Bde
Telegraph Line
Line of advance 3rd attack by C.M.R. Regt
Line of attack
Firm gravelly loam covered with low mounds and bushes
Sand Dunes
3rd L.H. Bde
Route taken by 10th L.H. Regt
Kutib el Teir
Redoubt
Rifle pits
Telegraph
Formed Road (Metalled)
Bare plain
Low Cliffs
Undulating sand and Small bushes
EL MAGDHABA
Slight depression
Very broken ground
Sand
Small Bushes
Wady el Arish (Un-surveyed)
Auiled Ali
MAP showing OPERATIONS of A and N.Z.M.T. Division
on 23-12-16 at
EL MAGDHABA
Contours at 25A.V.I.

principal defences, and between these works was a system of well constructed and concealed trenches and rifle pits.

General Chauvel's plan of attack was as follows :—

" The New Zealand Mounted Rifle and the 3rd Light Horse Brigades, both under the command of Brigadier-General E. W. C. Chaytor, C.B., were to move to the east of Magdhaba and to swing round to attack the enemy's right and rear. The Imperial Camel Brigade were to move direct against Magdhaba to attack the enemy in front—that is, from the north-west. The 1st Light Horse Brigade was at the outset in reserve."

Between 08.45 and 09.30 the attack developed and, at the latter hour, General Chaytor moved the 10th Light Horse Regiment and part of a machine-gun squadron on a wide turning movement round the rear of the enemy's position, with orders to come in from the south. A little later two regiments of the New Zealand Brigade were despatched in more or less the same direction, though making a less wide detour, with orders to move on Magdhaba from the east. In the meantime the Imperial Camel Corps was making progress, though somewhat slowly.

At 10.00 aircraft reports indicated the possibility that the enemy might try to escape. The mounted troops in reserve, less one regiment, were ordered to push in from the north-west. The troops moved forward at a trot and, coming under shrapnel fire, increased the pace to a gallop. The enemy then opened a very heavy shrapnel and machine-gun fire, whereupon the force swung to its right and gained cover in the wadi, dismounted and began an attack against the left of the enemy position. Between noon and 13.30 the enemy's position was practically surrounded, but for some little time it had been found increasingly difficult to make progress. The Horse Artillery batteries had been greatly hindered by the mirage and the difficulty of getting forward observation, the ground round the enemy's position being absolutely flat and devoid of cover but scattered over with very small bushes and excrescences in the ground which completely hid the trenches and pits.

In the meantime reports were received from the field squadron that no water could be found. Unless Magdhaba could be taken during the day it was probable that our troops would have to withdraw, as none of the horses had been watered since the evening of the 22nd and the nearest water, except that in the enemy's position, was at El Arish. The situation was reported to the Desert Column and orders received to maintain the attack. But before this communication arrived the situation had begun to improve. The 1st Light Horse Brigade, pressing in against the enemy's left, captured a work on the west of the wadi, taking about 100 prisoners. At 14.00 two regiments of the 3rd Light Horse Brigade, coming in from the north-west, were within 200 yards of the position, in close touch with the Camel Corps advancing from the north-west. A quarter of an hour later the attack of the third regiment of this force was pressing heavily on the

Digitized by Google

enemy from the south. By 15.00 the New Zealand Mounted Rifles were within 600 yards of the enemy's trenches on the east. From this time forward the pressure on the enemy increased from all sides. Before 15.30 the 1st Light Horse Brigade and the Camel Corps attacked the enemy's second line trenches. At 16.00 the former carried one of the main redoubts, taking 130 prisoners, including the Turkish commander. Immediately after this, part of a Light Horse Regiment charged in from the south and by 16.30 all organized resistance was over and the enemy were surrendering everywhere.

The total number of prisoners taken was 1,282, including some fifty wounded. A large number of the enemy were buried by our troops on the position. Four mountain guns, one machine gun and 1,052 rifles were captured and 200 more rifles were destroyed.

Our casualties were twelve officers and 134 other ranks killed and wounded. It was possible to give every attention to the wounded before moving them back to El Arish, owing to the fact that the enemy had a permanent and well-equipped hospital at Magdhaba, to which the wounded were taken as soon as the action was over. The troops marched back to El Arish during the night 23rd-24th December, our third night march in four days.

Chapter XI. Action at Rafa, 9th January, 1917.

(*Reference.—Sketch H, Rafa Sketch and Panoramas.*)

On the 27th December the Air Force reported that an entrenched position was being prepared by the enemy at Magruntein, near Rafa. Work on this position was continued during the following day, and it was occupied by a garrison equivalent to about two battalions with mountain guns. Lieutenant-General Sir Philip Chetwode, who commanded the Desert Column, set out from El Arish on the evening of the 8th-9th January with a force consisting of the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division (less the 2nd Light Horse Brigade), 5th Mounted Brigade and the Imperial Camel Corps with a battery of artillery attached.

It was a long-distance raid of some twenty-nine miles, with a view of completely surprising the enemy. So efficiently was the approach march carried out that the enemy by dawn on the 9th January found himself almost entirely surrounded before he became aware of the presence of any large forces in his vicinity. The position was a formidable one. It consisted of three strong series of works connected by trenches, one series facing west, one south-west and one south-east. The whole was dominated by a central keep or redoubt, some 2,000 yards south-west of Rafa. Moreover, the ground in front of these works was entirely open and devoid of cover and in their immediate neighbourhood was almost a glacis.

Digitized by Google



Digitized by Google

VIEW OF THE BATTLEFIELD OF RAFA FROM THE NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED RIFLE BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS.



ATTACK ON EL MAGRUNTEIN AT THE ACTION OF RAFA, DRAWN FROM THE "LARGE TREE."



The guns with aeroplanes observing began to register at 07.20. The main attack was carried out by Major-General Sir H. G. Chauvel with the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division and was timed for 10.00. The New Zealand Brigade on the right attacked from the east, whilst the 1st and 3rd Light Horse Brigades attacked from the east and south-east, and the Camel Corps attacked the works on their front from the south-east

Digitized by Google

also. One regiment of the 3rd Light Horse Brigade was in reserve with the 5th Mounted Brigade in column reserve.

Shortly after 10.00 parties of Turks who were attempting to leave Rafa by the Khan Yunus road were met and captured by the New Zealand Brigade, who galloped the police barracks and machine-gun post, capturing six Germans (including one officer), two Turkish officers and 163 other ranks.

Before 11.00 Rafa was occupied. The Australian Light Horse and the Camel Corps were ordered to press their attack on the works facing south-west, and about the same time the New Zealand Brigade, with a body of Light Horse, galloped an open space south of the police post and established themselves 300 yards east of the nearest enemy work. The Yeomanry were also ordered to deploy against the western works, and to attack in conjunction with the Camel Corps. The encircling movement was now practically complete, save for a gap in the north-west between the New Zealand Brigade and the Yeomanry.

At 12.20 one of the Horse Artillery batteries moved forward 1,500 yards to support the attack of the Yeomanry. By 13.00 our troops were within 600 yards of the southern and western trenches, which were being shelled by our artillery. By 14.00 the right of the New Zealand Brigade had linked up with the left of the Yeomanry and was pressing its attack on the rear of one of the enemy's works. The column commander now issued orders for a concentrated attack on the " redoubt " or central keep by the New Zealand Brigade, and all other available troops of the Mounted Division to commence at 15.30. The Yeomanry was ordered to co-operate against the rear of the work. By 15.15 two of the enemy's works had been captured and further prisoners taken.

While the attack on the central redoubt was developing, information was received both from patrols and from the Air Force that an enemy relieving force was marching from Shellal on Rafa. This force was attacked frequently with bombs and machine-gun fire by our aeroplanes with success. At 16.45 the New Zealand Brigade captured the redoubt with brilliant dash, covering the last 800 yards in two rushes, supported by machine-gun fire. By this achievement they were able to take the lower lying works in reverse and these soon fell to the Camel Corps, the Yeomanry and the Australian Light Horse. By 17.30 all organized resistance was over, and the position with all its garrison was captured. A detachment of the Australian Light Horse, which had come in contact with the force marching from Shellal, drove the enemy off without difficulty. Our troops now withdrew, taking with them all prisoners, animals and material captured. One regiment (8th Light Horse) and a light car patrol were left to clear the battlefield and withdrew unmolested on the following day.

In this action, which lasted for ten hours, the entire enemy force was accounted for. More than 1,600 unwounded prisoners were taken. The

Digitized by Google

Turkish killed were about 252. In addition, six machine guns, four mountain guns and a number of camels and mules were captured. Our casualties were comparatively light, amounting to 487 in all, of whom seventy-one were killed, 415 wounded and one missing.

The result of these successful operations was that the province of Sinai, which for two years had been partially occupied by the Turks, was freed of all formed bodies of Turkish troops. The destruction of his rear-guard at Magdhaba compelled the enemy to withdraw by the 31st December, and the victory at Magruntein had driven him over the frontier at Rafa, which he did not attempt to reoccupy.

Notes on Rafa and Magdhaba Actions.

A criticism was made that the attacks of the Mounted Division at both of the above fights were made on too wide a front and that, as a result, there ensued want of control, hence it became practically impossible to bring off an assault at a given time. In addition, that such an unduly dispersed line has no depth, makes slow progress, and if held remains stuck until it overpowers the enemy by rifle fire.

At Rafa and Magdhaba we sallied out to round up an enemy in an entrenched position. This meant blocking all exits and hence getting right round. The ground by which the enemy could retreat had to be observed at any rate. The effect was to draw our encircling lines out, and as numbers were, to say the least of it, rather limited for the task in hand, the force became spread over a great area.

Plan of Attack as actually carried out at Rafa.



This method of course leads to an extraordinary extension and, as a matter of fact, troops in some cases were extended right across the front of attack.

In working this out at 5,400 rifles to 18,000 yards, it means about three and a-half yards per rifle, provided all units adopted the same extensions. Once we got round the enemy it was not possible for anybody

Digitized by Google

to escape, and it is suggested that brigades might have driven home their attack on a narrower front and more depth and at the same time keeping under observation the ground between units by means of patrols.

AN ALTERNATIVE PLAN OF ATTACK.



Frontage of attack thus ▬

Remainder of ground under observation.

The problem at Rafa was a difficult one. It was whether a force of 5,000 men could first cut off the retreat of a force of about 2,000 and then carry an entrenched position held by the enemy with six machine guns, four mountain guns and well placed modern entrenchments, backed up by a force of unknown strength within twelve miles. The attacking force also had only field guns to support the attack, and were operating twenty-nine miles from a base and carrying out a long day's fight after a night march. The place had to be taken against time and, if it did not fall, there was some doubt if part of the attacking force would ever get away.

Ammunition.—The expenditure of ammunition was heavy. Something like 410,000 rounds was expended. The Turkish killed were 250 and 162 wounded. Taking it at 2,700 rifles at the most, 108 Lewis guns and thirty-six machine-guns, it looks excessive. In addition, the three batteries expended 1,637 rounds. It must be remembered that:

(*a*) The attack was over a glacis slope on all sides. The field guns were not effective in keeping down the Turkish fire, which, having an ideal field of fire, prevented an advance. It therefore finally came to the point that only by a sustained rifle and machine-gun fire on the Turkish trenches could any advance be made.

(*b*) The attack, particularly during the last three hours, when the enemy reinforcements were approaching, was against time. The attack had to be helped forward at all costs.

Digitized by Google

(*c*) The moral effect must also be considered. Once an attack has reached a certain point, and been obliged to drop back again, it would be difficult to get forward again. Since the artillery was ineffective, the only other means of helping the attack forward was by rifle fire.

(*d*) No doubt there were certain faults in this great expenditure. Some Lewis guns were used as if they were machine guns, with the inevitable result, they were soon out of action.

Timing of an Assault.—Even though there may have been undue extensions, there was not sufficient time given in the Rafa action to bring off a concerted assault. To bring it off at a given time plenty of notice must be given. The assault should be carried out by those nearest the enemy, and to be successful it must be delivered at once. There is no possibility of that unless all those about to take part in it know about when it is to come and can rise at the same time and go on.

Notes on the Sinai Campaign Generally.

(1) In addition to the lessons brought out in the various actions, the following were found to be of general application:

Framing of orders and reports.—The value of orders is dependent on something more than a matter of regulations; they require practice, clearness of thought and military knowledge. A mounted division operates over a large field, and consequently brigade commanders are required to adopt an independent rôle and act on their own initiative in a manner which is exceptional with infantry. Orders will therefore be frequently more general in tenor than would be permissible with the other arms. From this arises the enhanced necessity for uniformity of thought in a mounted division. Orders are not a thing apart; they are intimately connected with training as they are with operations. A true interpretation of cavalry orders can only be ensured by means of a clear and unmistakable doctrine inculcated during the period of training. It is not a new lesson, but one which is emphasized by the result of these operations.

As regards reports, a framework is doubtless helpful to the framer, but too often leads to a generalization which is the reverse of helpful to the recipient. When a report is called for, it is generally with reference to some particular information which is especially required. This information should form the principal subject of the report, and should find its place in the first paragraph, whatever the form of a report may be. The information a commander or staff requires should be explained clearly to whoever is detailed to obtain it. If, in the course of acquiring this information, other information of a useful nature is gained, well and good, but this should only be treated as incidental to the main object, which should never be obscured by a quantity of irrelevant matter.

Digitized by Google

(2) The country did not lend itself to shock tactics, as the going was all against it, nor were the troops employed armed with the sword or lance. Nevertheless, whenever the opportunity offered and the ground was hard enough to go right home at the gallop, the troops availed themselves of the chance. Time and time again instances showed that mounted troops are to-day, as in the past, capable of crossing a fire-swept zone.

(3) *Fire Control.*—The tendency to open fire at excessive ranges was noticeable. The disadvantages of long range fire, except in special cases, such as rear-guard actions, are

(i) Waste of ammunition, for it does no damage.

(ii) Disclosure of one's position prematurely.

(iii) Moral effect and discipline because :

(*a*) The morale and discipline of men, who retain their fire till the enemy is close, is good, and *per contra*, fire at long ranges leads to, if it does not originate from, a deficiency in these two essential qualities, and

(*b*) The effect on the enemy is multiplied a hundred-fold if we advance against the enemy, of whose presence we are aware, but show no signs of his existence till it is to our advantage to do so.

(4) *Camel Brigade.*—As this brigade was with us during the greater part of our operations in the desert, the following notes may be useful:

(*a*) If a camel brigade is working with mounted troops it should be considered the infantry of the column, and kept on the inner flank, because even in heavy sand horses move a great deal faster. In the Mazar operation the camel company with us was given the wide turning movement through Bir el Kasseiba. Although they were given two hours start they did not appear until the end of the action, some four hours after we had been engaged.

(*b*) They should be used by themselves for a specific duty in waterless country where they will be away two days or more, as the camels do without water for that period and the men are self-contained for five days.

(*c*) They should be kept back on a night march, especially if a halt is intended. Camels when barracking or getting up again always roar and grunt and give away their position.

(*d*) As they carry 500 rounds of ammunition per man and five days' rations, they can in extremity supply rations and ammunition (to a limited extent) to troops working with them. (Remarks as to pace refer principally to the Sudan camel, who was always slow in the heavy sand.)

Digitized by Google

(5) *Communications.*—Visual was possible over large areas of country, but had the disadvantage that there was usually a considerable haze; if a khamseen* sprang up, it was impossible. Although the high sand-hills gave a great view, any slight wind caused a continuous cloud of sand on the top, which greatly handicapped visual.

Cable was much used. Either we repaired and made use of the old air line which ran through Sinai or laid down our own cables. In connection with this, however, we got gradually to rely on cable and, as a result, we missed it later, when moves became longer and more rapid in Palestine.

The danger of using a telegraph line which also runs through an enemy country was exemplified by the Turks when they were at Oghratina after the retreat from Romani. They were using the line back to Abd but had forgotten to cut out forward of their station, and for some three hours on the 7th August we were listening to their conversations and obtained some really useful information as to the state of their morale.

Wireless was used in Sinai but was not so important a feature as it became later. With the greater practice in later operations, we found that the pack wireless station could be set up and pulled down again very quickly.

In the desert, owing to the heavy sand, any system of despatch riders and relay posts was not of much use. In hard sand desert, such as existed on the western desert of Egypt, they may have been of use. Later in Palestine motor despatch riders were invaluable.

(*To be continued.*)

* A sand-storm, more particularly a hot south-west wind often blowing for about fifty days from about the middle of March.

Digitized by Google

AN ARMOURED CAR EXPERIENCE.

DURING the operations on the Tigris in October, 1918, which resulted in the complete overthrow and capture of the whole of the Turkish forces on this front, an independent force of armoured cars had been despatched to get round the enemy's right flank and to co-operate with the main attack on the Turkish positions about the Fathah gorge by raiding the enemy's line of communications. This we had attempted to carry out on 25th October, by raiding the Turkish supply dumps at Sharqat itself, but had found it too strongly defended, both by infantry and guns, for us to be able to effect more than a fleeting surprise on the garrison, and we had then had to turn and run, pursued by the vicious crumps of a large calibre howitzer. On the 26th October we had effected more, by getting across the Sharqat-Mosul road, which constituted the Turkish line of communications, shortly after daybreak, and by cutting the telegraph wire, the only means of communication between the Turkish commander at Sharqat and the Army Commander's headquarters at Mosul; this had been accomplished just before the arrival on the scene of a small party of Turkish infantry, moving north and escorting some baggage animals. These we had engaged all the morning and had eventually persuaded to retreat.

Up to the 26th, we of the armoured cars had been the only British troops between the Turkish forces and their base at Mosul, but on the forenoon of the 26th, from the high bluffs on the right bank of the Tigris near Huwaish, we had been able to see long sinuous columns of troops winding north along the foot of the rising ground, a mile or so to the east of the left bank of the river. These we had recognized at once as cavalry, and had realized that they could be none other than a British cavalry brigade, which, according to prearranged plan, had moved round the enemy's flank and was then marching north to reach a point on the river about four miles above the bluffs on which we were, where a ford was known to exist.

On the evening of the 26th October we bivouacked in the desert, about five miles west of the river and six miles N.N.W. of Sharqat. During the night our wireless, which had accompanied us in our venture, received a message from the cavalry Commander requesting us to establish touch

Digitized by Google

with him next day, and informing us that his brigade had crossed to the right bank of the Tigris and had established itself in a strong position. Accordingly at 5.45 a.m. on the 27th October, when it was still hardly light, a section of two armoured cars left the bivouac with the object of striking the Sharqat-Mosul road at the point where we had been the day before, and of then following the road northwards until our cavalry were met with. This section, which I accompanied in the leading car, was to be followed by another four cars, as soon as one car, which had got into difficulties in trying to cross a deep and narrow nullah, could be extricated. We followed our tracks of the preceding day, which led over undulating country, and as the going was good we were able to push along at a good pace. As we approached the high ground near the river, where we had cut the telegraph line the preceding morning, sounds of rifle fire were audible, punctuated every now and then by the reports of field guns; I surmised at once from the direction of the sounds that the Turks were attacking our cavalry. When a mile away from the Sharqat-Mosul road we could see, in the early morning light, lines of Turkish infantry, in extended order, advancing northwards astride the road, and could also observe what were evidently shells from British guns bursting over groups of the enemy. As the ground between us and the enemy was all known to us, having been traversed several times during the preceding day, and afforded excellent going for the cars, and as, moreover, the line of our advance would lead directly against the flank of the lines of enemy infantry, who were evidently unaware of our proximity, the order was given to push on, word having first been sent back by motor cyclist to the cars, which were known to be following, that an action was in progress ahead. The officers in charge of the two leading armoured cars, who had up to this point been standing up behind the turrets, in order to see their surroundings better, now got inside the turrets, which were then closed for action, the rear doors being shut and the flap in front of the driver lowered; the driver and the officer in charge of the car, whose seat was beside him, had each now only a narrow slit, 9 in. long and 1 in. high, to look through, so their field of vision was very limited and confined to the direction in which the car was travelling. The two gunners on the Vickers gun had a rather more extended field through the porthole in the turret, but this also only afforded a view in the direction in which the gun happened to be pointing. No hostile guns had been seen before closing down, but, nevertheless, the cars advanced zigzagging from side to side, to disconcert the aim of hostile artillerymen. Bullets soon began to patter like hail on the off side of the turret, and we could also hear overhead the bursts of shell, which we took to be from our own guns, but our objective, the leading line of the Turkish infantry, was still ahead of us and we went straight on. These had seen us now and had drawn back their flank, forming a line across our path. When the car was about a hundred yards away from

Digitized by Google

them the car was stopped in order to allow the gunners to get an effective burst on to the target in front of us, it being impossible for the machine gun to be fired with any accuracy while the car was in motion, owing to the jolting caused by the rough ground. The car had hardly commenced to move on again when we suddenly felt it receive a violent blow, the inside of the turret at the same time becoming filled with smoke. The car itself, after going on a few yards, came to a standstill, and the driver reported that the engines had stopped and could not be restarted by the self-starter. We realized that the car had been hit by a shell; our chief fear was that the car was on fire, owing to all the smoke, and that the petrol might catch alight, so the back doors were opened. Through them we could see the ground behind the car churned up by rifle and shrapnel bullets, which were continually kicking up spurts of dust; the thought of abandoning the car and escaping under cover of the cloud of dust caused by the last shell-burst flashed across one's mind, but was dismissed as impracticable. One of the gunners then gallantly jumped out of the back of the car, to see if the engines could be restarted by means of the starting handle, but returned at once and reported that the radiator and half one side of the engines had been blown away; at the same time a bullet hit the water jacket of the machine gun and, penetrating into the mechanism, caused it to jam. A heavy fire was being all the time maintained on the car, and splinters from bullets splashed in through the machine-gun port-hole and through the slits in the flap in front of the driver, drawing blood from two of the crew.

We were now without means of offence: the Turks on our right, who had not been under fire from our machine gun, had advanced, and were now only 50 yards away, and at any moment we felt we might receive another direct hit from the enemy's guns, which we now saw, for the first time, 200 yards away to our right. Being in such close proximity to these guns also precluded all hope of a successful rescue by the cars which we knew were following in our tracks; there was therefore no alternative but to surrender, which we did. Fortunately we were shortly afterwards liberated, as the entire Turkish force had its retreat cut off by the British cavalry and surrendered. The outstanding impression of the Turks which we carried away was the kindliness and friendliness shown to us by all ranks, and their evident desire to show us that they were not, and never had been, our enemies at heart.

LAMBADE.

Digitized by Google



SURVEY WORK IN MODERN WAR.

A DH 9 carrying out photographic work 6,000 ft. above Antoing, near Lille, during the War. The craters on the railway lines are very distinct, as also a hospital amongst the trees and the pontoon bridges across the Scheldt.

Digitized by Google



SURVEY WORK IN MODERN WAR.

A BE 2E in flight, a useful type of machine both for directing Artillery shoots and for photographic work.

Digitized by Google

SURVEY WORK IN MODERN WAR.

By MAJOR M. N. MACLEOD, D.S.O., M.C., R.E.

ALTHOUGH training in " Military Topography " is part of the curriculum at both Woolwich and Sandhurst, it is to be feared that the meaning which the word " Survey " conveys to the average officer often bears only a remote relationship to what it really is.

The impressions he carries away from these institutions, if he carries any at all, associate it with map reading and " field sketching " only.

Most officers retain this impression unmodified through the rest of their service, and regard survey work in relation to military operations solely from the point of view of the maps and mapping indispensable to any war.

Survey and map-making are, however, not quite the same thing; nor, as will be seen later, is the connection between survey and war by any means confined to maps.

Survey may be defined as the exact measurement of the distances apart, relative heights, and mutual directions of terrestrial objects; mapping as their representation in pictorial form on a piece of paper.

Survey deals with the measurement of angles and distances in situ and supplies the data from which maps are afterwards prepared in an office. Its application to mapping is old, but its application to military operations, outside the question of maps, is a new thing, initiated and developed during the Great War just concluded.

The growth of the survey organization of the B.E.F. can hardly have been equalled, much less surpassed, by any other branch of his Majesty's forces, not excluding the R.A.F. and the R.A.S.C.

The survey " staff " of the original B.E.F. consisted of one G.S.O. II and one clerk At the time of the Armistice it comprised in round numbers 400 officers and 6,000 other ranks, an increase of some 300,000 per cent. Even with these numbers the survey organization was seriously undermanned, and had the war continued even a few months longer it would probably have been found necessary to augment them considerably.

Even as things were the numbers would have been greater had it not been for the acuteness of the " man power " difficulty after March, 1918,

Digitized by Google

when new establishments were under consideration. From that time onwards there was a certain reluctance on the part of the A.G.'s branch to find additional men for any but the principal fighting services. Nevertheless, it is probable that the men employed on survey work, although not one of them fired a rifle, a bomb, or a gun, or committed in the course of their duties any similar act of frightfulness, contributed to the final undoing of the enemy in as great a degree as those of any other branch of the service.

Little has been heard of what they did and still less of how they did it, although they served many masters. Even at this time the number of officers who really understand the full significance and details of their work is very small. The ordinary officer on reading the figures given above may be tempted to exclaim " What on earth did they all do ? "

In this article an attempt will be made to give the answer to this question.

Survey work in the B.E.F. was carried out by units known first as " Field Survey Companies," and afterwards, as their numbers increased, as " Field Survey Battalions,"* of which there was one for each army and one at G.H.Q.

The duties of these battalions may be divided into three more or less distinct categories, all of which depend directly, but in a different way, on survey, that is on the measurement and determination of distances and directions.

These categories are :—

(1) The provision of fighting maps.
(2) The location of targets for the artillery.
(3) " Map shooting " (known as " predicted shooting ") by the artillery.

Each of these involved an organization and methods for which there was no precedent. Each had to be built up from virtually nothing at all.

The fact that at the end of the war the British Army was almost certainly ahead of both its allies and its enemies at all three, is a striking testimony to British powers of improvisation and practical capacity.

That no proper organization for survey work existed in the British Army in 1914 was due to the fact that at that time mapping, particularly large scale mapping, was a slow and laborious process which could only be done by going over every yard of the ground on foot. The possibility

* Note.—A Field Survey Battalion consisted of a Headquarters Section some 200 strong, dealing with survey and mapping, and from four to eight "Sound Ranging Sections," each about fifty strong, and the same number of "Observation Groups," each about seventy strong, and three to six Corps Topographical Sections (one for each corps in the army) of some ten or twelve men each. The average strength of a Field Survey Battalion may be taken as about 900 all ranks.

Digitized by Google

of making maps during the course of any operations, and especially maps of territory occupied by the enemy, was so fantastic that it had not been contemplated.

Nevertheless, this was the first problem which our survey officers were called upon to solve after the Battle of the Aisne in 1914, and which they had virtually solved by the end of the next year.

It is a problem which will probably have to be solved again in the next war and in a more difficult form, for there are very few countries in the world which have yet been accurately mapped on so large a scale as even 1/20,000.

It may be argued by some that large scale maps are an attribute of position warfare and that, for that reason, the need for them should be exceptional. This view is unsound for several reasons. The most important of these, and one which is probably decisive, is that unless an accurate, large scale, gridded map is available, co-operation between aircraft and troops on the ground becomes exceedingly difficult, if not actually impossible.

One of the most important functions of aircraft in war is the location of hostile forces and of our own forward troops. An aerial observer can only "locate" these with reference to topographical features on the ground in their immediate vicinity. If there are no such features, or if they are not shown on his map, he has no means of locating anything at all; nor, even if he could locate something, could he accurately and quickly transmit the information he had acquired to troops on the ground who have to act upon it.

On a small scale map, that is to say a map on a scale of one inch to one mile or less, all but the main topographical features have to be omitted because there is not room to show them on the paper. Location of anything from the air on such a map, which necessarily bears little resemblance to the appearance of the ground, becomes very difficult and cannot be more than approximate. Approximate information is, however, of little use in modern fighting. It does not, for example, help a battery commander to know that the front line is about 300 yards south or north of a certain point. His F.O.O. can probably tell him that without assistance from the air. It does not help him much to know that a hostile battery is firing from some point which may be anywhere in a circle 500 yards across.

Such information is perhaps better than none at all, but if one side has to rely on this, while the other, with the help of a better map, can obtain it ten times more accurately, there is no question but that the latter gains an important advantage.

Before the war it was the considered policy of the General Staff to train troops to work with small scale maps. Our "tactical" map was the

Digitized by Google

" half-inch " (two miles to one inch). The use of large scale maps was discouraged, on the grounds that they would not be available in war.

There are probably some conservatives who consider that we should revert to this policy. It is noteworthy, however, that even during the comparative mobile operations at the end of the war, the fighting troops almost invariably asked for the largest scale map which was available.

The fact is that a small scale map, such as the " half-inch " or the 1/100,000, is a *manœuvre* map, useful for the movements preliminary to action when troops move in formed bodies. When it comes to a stand-up fight something larger is required; the larger the better, provided it can be carried about and includes a sufficient area on a single sheet of paper.

If full advantage from the map is to be obtained, the scale should be somewhere round about 1/25,000 or 1/20,000 at least, and the survey organization should be prepared to supply this.

Can this be provided under all conditions and circumstances?

It is probable that it can, though this is as yet by no means certain.

The process of mapping can be divided into four parts :—

(*a*) Fixing of a certain number of selected points as a sort of skeleton or framework on which to build up the details of the map.

(*b*) Filling in the " detail " between these points and fitting it to them.

(*c*) Fair drawing.

(*d*) Printing.

Each of these constitutes a separate operation which cannot be commenced until the one above it is finished.

The " control " points which form the framework of the map are generally fixed by a process known as " triangulation." They are chosen so that the lines joining them form a network of triangles covering the area to be mapped. At each point the angles of these triangles are measured with a theodolite. When two of the three angles of a triangle have been determined the lengths of all the sides can be calculated if any one of them is known.*

The process starts with one initial measurement along the ground between two selected points and an astronomical observation to determine the direction of one from the other. From these two things, and from the observed angles of the triangles, the mutual distances apart and directions of all the other points can be calculated, and their relative positions determined with great accuracy.

* NOTE.—It is, of course, preferable to measure all three angles of a triangle when it can be done, i.e., when all three points are accessible.

Digitized by Google

Having fixed a sufficiency of points in this way the " detail " is then filled in. Before the war this could only be done by surveyors working over the ground bit by bit. Aerial photography, which was started in 1915, has however introduced an alternative method which is of particular value in war, in that it can be applied to areas occupied by the enemy which the surveyor on foot cannot enter.

There are, however, certain difficulties to be overcome in the use of air photos due to the fact that it is not at present possible to ensure that the camera is always pointed perpendicularly towards the ground.

When this is not the case the ground will be viewed in perspective, and its image on the plate distorted, so that a map traced or copied directly from the print will be inaccurate.

There are various ways in which this distortion difficulty can be overcome, but it is not as yet certain that the methods hitherto employed for overcoming it can be applied everywhere, as most of them postulate a certain minimum of ground survey work for fixing " control " points, analogous to and supplementing the triangulation framework referred to above.

It is sufficient to say that our survey services in the future will probably have to be prepared to produce quickly large numbers of accurate large scale maps of any theatre of operations immediately after the outbreak of war.

This will require a fairly large staff, as the work must always be done against time, and a considerable quantity of heavy and intricate machinery, which must be kept "on the spot" and carried about if necessary.

The next, and perhaps the most interesting, of the functions of survey work in war is the location of targets for the artillery.

Before the war virtually all artillery shooting depended on the target being visible from some point or other in our own positions. The approximate range of the target was measured with a range-finder and the gun laid on it, either over the sights, if the target could be seen from the gun, or by means of a compass. Both range and direction were checked and corrected by observing the fall of the first few rounds.

Very soon after the commencement of the war it was found that the universal adoption of " indirect " fire by the artillery of both sides made it impossible to attack the hostile guns in this way.

Ranges could not be measured at all, as the guns could not be seen from our lines; nor could they be located, although they could be seen, from the air, as no large scale map was available.

Even when suitable maps became available there were still many difficulties to be overcome.

Aeroplane observation, even when a good map is available, has more limitations than are generally realized. It can, for example, only be used by day and then only in reasonably fine weather.

Digitized by Google

Nor is it always a very accurate means of "locating." If the hostile battery does not happen to be close to some feature marked on the map the observer must estimate its position by eye alone. How difficult it is to do this accurately is easily tested by trying to transfer the position of an object in the middle of a large field on to a map from an aerial photograph without the aid of instruments.

It is true that an aerial observer on seeing an hostile battery can "call up" one of our own batteries and, having reported the approximate position, can "range" the battery on to it; experience, however, shows that this procedure is not so easy as might be supposed and is not infrequently unsuccessful.

Some other means of observing hostile artillery is obviously desirable —preferably one which can remain ready for use and action all day and all night, so that at whatever time a hostile battery opens fire it can be at once located and if necessary attacked and silenced.

Two methods of doing this have been evolved during the war—they are known as "flash spotting" and "sound ranging."

The first consists in fixing the position of the flash of discharge of a gun by observations from accurately surveyed observation posts in our own lines, and the second effects the same thing by observations made on the sound "wave" in the air caused by the explosion of the charge.

The principle of fixing the position of an object by means of intersecting "rays" observed from surveyed stations in our own lines is, of course, very obvious and well understood, and many "inventors" came forward at different times with methods and apparatus for doing so.

With hardly an exception, however, all failed to grasp the true nature of the problem. The flash of a gun is generally most conspicuous by night when no other objects to guide the eye can be seen, and it then appears only for an instant. A ray or "bearing" to it cannot, it is true, be accurately observed with a compass or ordinary surveying theodolite because such observation depends on being able to intersect it with the cross-hair or other sighting arrangement of the instrument, and this is admittedly difficult, if not impossible, at night.

Provided, however, a suitable instrument is available, that is to say one having a "graticuled" eye-piece with means of illuminating the graticule, this difficulty can easily be surmounted.

The real problem of "flash spotting" consists, not in actually observing the flash, but in selecting successively one particular flash out of many which appear, and in ensuring that all observers, who must necessarily be placed a considerable distance apart, take their observations to that one. This problem is much more difficult and for some time defied solution. It was solved early in 1916 in the following way.

Instead of allowing each observer to select his own flash, the observation stations, known as flash-spotting posts, are worked in "groups" of

Digitized by Google

from three to six. All the flash-spotting posts in each group are connected by telephone to a central headquarters or plotting-centre from which the observations of each are directed and controlled, and where the results are worked out.

The control is effected by means of a special pattern of telephone exchange and a specially arranged plotting board, which enables the officer directing the work first to select any particular flash out of several visible, then to direct or concentrate all his observers towards it, to know when all have " picked it up," and finally to quickly work out the results of their observations. Without going into details of the equipment and procedure it may be said that the method of control now in use, when worked by well-trained detachments, enables a hostile battery to be located with precision and certainty after five or six rounds have been seen.

The degree of accuracy obtainable depends principally on whether the actual gun flash or only the glow or sky reflection of it can be seen. Flashes from howitzers or anti-aircraft guns rise to considerable heights in the air and seem to cause a certain amount of " searchlight " effect, enabling them to be detected at night even when they are defiladed two or three hundred feet below the crest of a hill.

High-velocity low trajectory guns cannot generally be sighted in deep valleys, as the shells have to clear the crest in front, and are therefore equally difficult to conceal even though the flash does not rise so high in the air.

In favourable circumstances it is easy to " pin point " the position of each gun of a hostile battery in this way to within twenty or thirty yards of its true position, up to a distance of 5,000 to 6,000 yards from our own front line. At greater distances the precision of the location naturally decreases, but, nevertheless, even at extreme ranges the locations are generally quite accurate enough for our own artillery to take effective action on them.

(A "flash-spotting" group, for example, working in the Nieuport sector in 1917 located a battery of coast defence anti-aircraft guns at a distance of eleven miles behind the German lines. Their location proved to be within sixty yards of the true position, as determined from an aerial photograph of the same battery.)

" Flash spotting " of course depends for its operation absolutely on good visibility. In foggy weather it cannot operate, and when the terrain is unfavourable and suitable observation stations cannot be found little use can be made of the method.

Sound ranging, on the other hand, is at its best in foggy, still weather, and is moreover practically independent of topography. It is, however, very dependent on wind.

Digitized by Google

To explain the principles of sound ranging it is necessary to refer to a diagram :—



The discharge of a gun causes a " vibration " or " wave " in the atmosphere analogous to the ripple caused by throwing a stone into a still pond. In still air this wave travels outwards from the gun in all directions at an approximately uniform velocity which is fairly constant at any given temperature, and is known within fairly small limits. This velocity is about 370 yards a second at 50° Fahr.

The position of this wave at any instant is known as the " wave front," and since the wave travels with a uniform velocity in all directions the form of the wave front at all times will be approximately a sphere and its intersection with the ground a circle.

Suppose now that " G " is the position of the gun, and " A " and " B " are two points in our own lines at which have been placed instruments which will detect and record the arrival of a sound wave, and that " A " and " B " are connected to a timing apparatus which will record the interval of time which elapses between the arrival of the sound wave successively at each.

When the sound wave reaches " A " the wave front is represented by the circular arc " A-C." It has to travel the distance " B-C " before it reaches " B." The timing apparatus will record how long it takes to travel this distance and, since the velocity of the wave is known, the length of " B-C " can easily be calculated.

Suppose this recorded time interval to be one-tenth of a second. The velocity of sound being, say, 375 yards a second at the particular temperature prevailing, if the air is still, the length of " B-C " will be 37·5 yards. Describe a circle of 37·5 yards radius round " B," using " B " as centre. The centre of any circle which touches this circle and also passes through " A " is evidently a possible position for the source of the sound.

Digitized by Google

All such centres lie on a certain type of curve which approximates more and more closely to a straight line the farther it gets away from "A-B." At the distance at which hostile batteries usually lie this curve may be regarded, without appreciable error, as a straight line passing through the mid-point of the line "A-B." The direction of this line can be calculated by a very simple formula derived from the length and direction of "B-C," the time interval recorded by the apparatus, and the known velocity of sound.

Suppose now a third detector, "D," is placed in position and also connected to the timing apparatus. The latter will now record three "time intervals," namely, the time which elapses between the arrival of the sound wave successively at "A-B," "B-D" and "A-D." These time intervals give three lines which should intersect at one point. This point must be the origin of source of the sound.

In practice the time interval "A-D" is not used, but three more detectors or microphones are employed and the time intervals between adjoining microphones only are used, giving five lines intersecting at the position of the hostile gun.

These lines can be quickly laid out on a specially prepared plotting board.

The microphones are generally set out at equal intervals, which may be anything from about 1,200 to 1,800 yards.

Each microphone has to be connected by an electric circuit to the timing apparatus and its position very accurately surveyed. The time intervals are recorded automatically by an apparatus set in motion electrically by a "forward observer," so placed that he can hear the sound of a hostile gun in any given locality a second or two before the sound reaches the line of microphones.

In plotting the results allowances or corrections have to be made for wind and temperature. Sound, being a vibration in the atmosphere, is affected by wind which moves the atmosphere bodily in one direction. The velocity of sound where there is any wind is not therefore uniform in all directions. It travels both faster and farther with the wind than against it.

When the wind is steady the wind correction can be made with considerable accuracy, but it more often happens that the wind blows in gusts and its velocity varies from minute to minute, while its velocity some distance up in the air is greater than that on the ground. When this is the case the wind correction can only be made approximately and the accuracy of the location suffers in consequence.

In spite of this, however, it is generally possible to locate the position of a gun by sound, whenever it is possible to obtain a sound "record" of it, to within 100 yards of the truth, up to a distance of 5,000 or 6,000 yards from our front line.

Digitized by Google

When the wind is blowing directly away from the microphones towards the gun it is seldom possible to obtain a record. Sound does not travel far against a wind along the ground, and in an adverse wind it is virtually impossible for all the microphones to detect a hostile gun report.

The inability to work in an adverse wind is the greatest drawback to "sound-ranging." The only other serious difficulties which have to be overcome are due to the fact that the microphone, unlike the human ear, can only discriminate to a limited extent between the *quality* of different sounds. It records all sounds of a certain type, and therefore records the sound of all our own guns as well as those of the enemy. It may easily happen that after the sound from "G" has reached "A," and before it reaches "B," a similar sound wave from some other source reaches "B" and there will be two "time intervals" recorded by the timing apparatus, one given by the wave "A-C" reaching "A" and "B" and one by the wave "A-C" at "A" and the other wave at "B."

The use of six microphones instead of the minimum possible (i.e., three) is chiefly due to this trouble. If several "records" of the same gun are taken, clearly the five "time intervals" recorded on each will be identical, whereas it will be an impossible coincidence for the intervals caused by other sounds to be the same on all. Except in very heavy bombardments a skilled man can generally select the particular intervals required from a series of four or five records of the same gun, though it may take a little time to do so.

With the present apparatus the time taken to work out and plot a single record where there is no doubt about the intervals, is about five minutes. When there is much "interference," caused by reports of other guns or shell bursts, it may take half an hour or more; depending on the skill and experience of the man working out the record.

Once, however, the records have been taken it is generally possible to sort out the "intervals" and arrive at the correct location. It is perfectly feasible, for example, to locate four or five guns at the same time, i.e., from a single series of records.

It is in this that the special advantage of the sound ranging method lies. In flash-spotting the guns have to be located one at a time; until one has been marked down attention cannot be given to the rest. In sound ranging the observation is automatic and the record is virtually instantaneous. It is theoretically quite possible to record as many as ten or more at once, though it would take some time to sort out so many "intervals" as this would cause on the record.

Like flash-spotting, sound-ranging requires an elaborate system of electrical wiring. The microphones are generally, as explained, placed about 1,200 to 1,800 yards apart, and each has to be connected to the central H.Q., where the time recording apparatus is kept, by an electric

Digitized by Google

circuit of very well insulated low resistance cable. This necessarily takes a certain time to set out, and cannot, of course, be maintained if it is placed too close to the front. In spite of this, however, the use of these methods need not be confined solely to position warfare. The laying out of the cable and microphones for a sound ranging section can be done by a well-trained detachment in eight hours, while flash-spotting sections have got ready for action in three to four hours.

Except, therefore, when movement is rapid and continuous, there will always be ample opportunity for their use. Much valuable work was done by them in the battles of September and October, 1918, even though all sections were very short of men, and still more so of transport, which made it exceedingly difficult for them to keep up with the advance, quite apart from the necessity of laying lines or surveying their observation posts and microphone positions, which is generally the slowest part of the installation.

No very accurate statistics have been kept of the number of locations effected by the various agencies employed on the location of hostile batteries, but it is probable that during the period of position warfare in France the number of hostile batteries detected and marked down by flash-spotting and sound-ranging sections was at least three times that located by observers in aeroplanes and balloons, and it is noteworthy that as a rule their locations proved the more accurate of the two.

There is no valid reason why equally good results, given adequate personnel and transport, should not be obtained in more mobile warfare, such as that which characterized the concluding stages of the war.

When " location " work is not required both methods can be used for ranging and " calibrating " our own guns, for which purpose " flash-spotting " in particular gives very good results.

The " calibration " of guns is another modern development due to the Great War which is intimately connected with survey work, particularly map shooting, the third use to which survey work has been applied.

In order to hit his target the gunner must not only know the exact range and direction of the target, but if he cannot correct his fire by observation, he must also be able to lay his gun exactly in the direction of an object he cannot see, and to know at what elevation it must be fired to attain the required range.

The correct " elevation " at which to lay a gun depends primarily on its muzzle velocity, which in its turn depends on a number of factors, such as wear of the bore of the gun, temperature of the charge, nature of the projectile, and so on. A determination of the muzzle velocity has to be made from time to time. This can be done in various ways, and is called " calibration." It is a gunnery rather than a survey matter, which need not be described here.

Digitized by Google

Exact measurement of distance, or range, and direction are, however, the ordinary business of the surveyor who, for any particular job, only requires to know the permissible limits of error in his work. It was not long before his services were enlisted by the gunner.

At first these were confined to the preparation of a special fighting map for each battery known as an " artillery board " or planchette.

This consisted of a plain map or " grid " mounted on a special board on which the exact position of the gun, as fixed by a surveyor, was plotted, together with an accurately graduated arc, enabling angles from the battery " aiming point," or other suitable zero, to any target plotted on the board, to be quickly read off.

The map or grid being on a large scale, generally 1/20,000 or 1/10,000, any range could be scaled off correctly to within fifteen or twenty yards.

In this way the gunner, by plotting his target (as located by flash spotters, etc., or in other ways) on his artillery board, could find out the exact range and direction of his target without any of the preliminary " registration " invariably required by former or previous methods. The introduction of the artillery board in 1915 undoubtedly effected an immense improvement in the accuracy of our shooting. Still more, however, remained to be done, for although the board enabled the exact range and direction of the target to be determined, it was still necessary, when the latter could not be seen from the gun position, as was almost always the case, to lay or point the gun accurately in the required direction.

When the target cannot be seen from the gun position this laying has to be done off an " aiming point " which can be seen from the gun, usually either behind it or to one flank. It ls necessary to know the angle at the gun between the line to the target and the line to the aiming point. The gun-sight is so constructed that when this angle is set on it, and the sight laid on the aiming point, the gun points in the direction of the target.

To understand how accurately this angle must be known it may be pointed out that an error of only five minutes in laying the gun for direction, or " line " as it is termed, will at 10,000 yards throw the shell to one side or other a distance of fifteen yards.

To this error must always be added an error of perhaps another fifteen yards or more caused by incorrect estimation of the effect of wind.

Errors in laying, however, may be to some extent absorbed or neutralized by the inaccuracy of the gun itself, that is to say by the slight variations in the performance of the gun, which even when fired several times exactly in the same direction and at the same elevation, cannot expect to land every shell precisely in the same spot.

A series of rounds fired in this way will form a " pattern " on the ground. The accuracy of the gun, apart from the laying of it, may be

Digitized by Google

gauged by the size and shape of this pattern which, as is well known, is almost always oval or elliptical in shape, the greatest diameter being along the line of fire.

This may be 100 or 200 yards in length or even more, according to the type of gun, but the least diameter at right angles to this is very much smaller and may not be more than twenty yards.

It is clear, therefore, that the permissible limits in laying for range are much greater than those in laying for line, and that an error of five minutes in the latter may shift the pattern right off the target.

It is unfortunate that it is rather more difficult to measure angles accurately from a map than linear distances. It is easy to scale off a range from a map to within twenty to thirty yards, to measure an angle correctly to five minutes is rather difficult. Even with the help of an artillery board it was still found necessary to correct the laying by observing the fall of the first few rounds.

Each battery, in fact, habitually " registered " as soon as possible after coming into a new position to verify the angle between its aiming point and a selected " datum " or ranging point in the vicinity of its targets.

The disadvantages of this are self-evident. Time and ammunition are expended in the process, and it is impossible to concentrate large bodies of artillery in one sector without the enemy becoming aware of it through the increased amount of " registration " fire.

The system received its final condemnation in the great Passchendaele offensive. It became necessary to lay out the initial " line " of a gun in a more accurate way. To do this the surveyor was again called in. Instead of the gunner measuring the angle at the gun between target and aiming point from the map, this was calculated and laid out by a surveyor on the ground at the gun itself.

The new method received its first trial at the " Tank " battle of Cambrai in October, 1917. For this attack none of the guns brought up to reinforce the line registered at all. Every heavy piece, and some of the lighter natures, was given its " line " by survey officers of the Third Army and opened fire for the first time at zero hour.

The result, as is well known, was not only a highly successful bombardment, but a complete surprise for the enemy — a complete and final vindication of the method. Steps were at once taken to extend and simplify its application, and it was used on many subsequent occasions; notably for the attack on Hamel by the Australians on 4th July, 1918, for Lord Rawlinson's great attack on 8th August, and for the attack of the Second Army at Ypres on 28th September.

On each occasion, though there was no preliminary registration at all, the bombardment was thoroughly effective, besides coming to the enemy as a complete surprise.

Digitized by Google

It must be admitted now that " registration " is " dead " if not buried, and that survey must be an integral part of gunnery. The gunner must know exactly how far his gun shoots at any and every elevation, and under all conditions of wind and temperature, and must be able to lay it exactly in any required direction. With the former the surveyor as such has little concern, it is a question of ballistics, but the latter is a purely survey problem soluble by any trained surveyor with the aid of those deadly weapons—a theodolite and a book of logarithm tables.

During the war all the duties described above were carried out by the Royal Engineers. In view, however, of the close connection between survey work and gunnery, it is obviously desirable that many of them should be performed by the artillery themselves.

It has been decided accordingly that in the future, location of targets by flash spotting and sound ranging, as well as the survey work required for shooting, will be done by the Royal Regiment, while the " triangulation " on which ultimately all survey work depends, and the preparation of maps, will remain as heretofore the duty of the Royal Engineers.

From the point of view of numbers employed the bulk of the organization will thus pass to the Royal Artillery, at any rate for the present. For the future, who can tell? Right up to the end of the war the demands on the surveyor were still increasing, both in volume and variety. That he has not yet reached the limits of his rôle is certain.

The demand for maps alone was steadily and rapidly mounting. The increase may be gauged from the following figures:

	Sheets.
Maps issued to the original B.E.F. (including strategical small scale as well as tactical maps)	335,000
Total number of maps issued to the troops in France and Belgium (chiefly tactical maps on large scales)	31,000,000
Maps printed and issued by one Field Survey Company in July, 1916 (Somme Battle)	5,000
Maps printed and issued by the same Field Survey Company in September, 1918	432,000

At the end of the war the average *daily* issue of maps to the B.E.F. was somewhere round about 50,000 sheets, representing some seven tons of paper.

Nor did this represent the total numbers, for large numbers of small maps were issued by Corps Topographical Sections which have not been counted in the above.

The accurate map is, in fact, tending more and more to replace the " personal reconnaissance " of the past, which is becoming increasingly difficult as the range and power of weapons and the extent of battlefields increases.

Digitized by Google

Nor can we say that the next war will not bring forth, as this one has done, altogether new developments and applications for survey methods.

The difficult problem of co-operation between the various arms in battle is, after all, largely a matter of letting "the other man" know where you are and where the enemy is — the old problem of mutual directions and distances, for which the surveyor, who has other weapons in his armoury besides his theodolite and his book of log tables, can probably find a solution.

Wireless telegraphy is solving the problem of intercommunication, perhaps the surveyor can help to supply something useful to communicate, and prove as useful in the future to the foot-slogger or the cavalryman as he has been in the past to the gunner.

Digitized by Google

THE MACHINE GUN CORPS (CAVALRY) IN FRANCE, 1916–1918.

By CAPTAIN T. PRESTON, M.C., *Yorkshire Hussars.*

VI.—CAMBRAI (*continued*).

Second Phase.—On 30th November, 1917, came the German counter-stroke, the villages of Gonnelieu, Villers-Guislain and Gouzeaucourt falling into the enemy's hands by 9.0 a.m.

It has been stated already that the dismounted 5th Cavalry Brigade left Bourlon Wood on the night 29th-30th. It was marching back to its horses at Fins when the German attack started. The 5th Machine Gun Squadron, having only sent eight guns with the Bourlon Wood party, had still four guns left at Fins with the " horses " part of the squadron ; two of these guns were manned at once, and moved to a position near the Fins—Gouzeaucourt road. About 10.30 a.m. one gun successfully engaged parties of the enemy in Gouzeaucourt, which village was soon afterwards retaken by the Guards Division.

In the meantime the 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions (which were at Athies and Monchy Lagache) had been ordered up mounted as quickly as possible ; by 12.15 p.m. the 5th Cavalry Division had reached Villers-Faucon, and was directed to attack towards Gauche Wood and Villers-Guislain.

Accordingly, the Amballa Cavalry Brigade pushed on to Vaucellette Farm, and about 2.30 p.m. sent forward the 8th Hussars towards Gauche Wood, with two subsections 14th Machine Gun Squadron under Lieutenants Robinson and Kernick. Hostile machine-gun fire from the wood compelled the regiment to stop before reaching it, and a position was taken up in a sunken road, the horses being sent to the rear. The rest of the 14th Machine Gun Squadron, under Captain R. G. R. Davies, M.C., was then brought up dismounted to stiffen the line, which was held during that night.

The next day, 1st December, saw heavy fighting by units of the 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions in gallant but unsuccessful attempts to recapture Villers-Guislain. The Machine Gun Squadrons chiefly engaged were the 11th (Mhow Brigade) and the 14th (Amballa Brigade)

Digitized by Google

The Mhow Brigade was directed to attack the high ground south-east of Villers-Guislain, and advanced mounted. The Inniskillings had with them two subsections 11th Machine Gun Squadron, under Lieutenants A. W. G. Windham and J. H. Walmsley. "D" Squadron, with Lieutenant Walmsley's subsection, formed the advanced guard and went forward at a gallop under very heavy fire, but they were soon surrounded by Germans who appeared on all sides; the squadron and machine guns were "scuppered," many men and horses being killed and wounded and the remainder captured. Lieutenant Windham's horse was shot under him during the advance, and this probably saved him the same fate.

The rest of the Inniskillings were ordered to retire, otherwise there is no doubt that the whole regiment would have been annihilated.

Simultaneously with the Inniskillings' advance, and on their right, the 2nd (Indian) Lancers rode forward against the enemy. With the advanced guard went one subsection 11th Machine Gun Squadron under Lieutenant R. C. Hollis, whilst Lieutenant R. R. Oakley's subsection followed with the main body. Advancing with the greatest gallantry, the regiment got through the enemy's wire and captured his first position, dismounting for action in Pigeon Ravine, where "C" Squadron Inniskillings joined them. The four machine guns of the 11th Squadron at once got to work and materially assisted in beating off several attacks.

Major Knowles (commanding 2nd Lancers)* afterwards paid a high tribute to the machine-gun sections, stating that the trench could not possibly have been held without them. Lieutenant Oakley was severely wounded, and Lieutenant Hollis then took charge of all four guns: both these officers were awarded the M.C., whilst M.M.'s were won by Corporal Harper, Lance-Corporal Greenway, Private Lane and Private Barnett, all of whom displayed the utmost coolness and courage.

During the night 1st-2nd December it was decided to withdraw the troops in this part of the line, which was done without mishap.

We must now turn to the 14th Machine Gun Squadron, which we left on the night of 30th November in position with its brigade south of Gauche Wood. The task of the Amballa Brigade was to take the wood, and at 7.45 p.m. on 1st December the attack was started by the 18th (Indian) Lancers, dismounted. One subsection 14th Machine Gun Squadron went forward behind the attacking troops to consolidate the position when won; a second subsection was placed to cover the right flank of the 2nd Grenadier Guards, who were attacking on the right of the 18th Lancers; whilst a third subsection, under Lieutenant C. S. Kernick, covered the advance of the 18th Lancers from a sunken road. Lieutenant Kernick was badly wounded just before the attack, and subsequently died.

* The Colonel having been killed,

Digitized by Google



MAP SHOWING CAVALRY OPERATIONS AT CAMBRAI (2ND PHASE)

Digitized by Google

The attack succeeded, and at 9.0 p.m. four guns of the 14th Squadron were relieved by the 13th Squadron (Major E. C. Watson), the remaining guns being relieved next day by the 2nd Machine Gun Squadron. Squadron-Sergeant-Major Flight of the 14th Squadron received later the Belgian Croix de Guerre for his services.

By the evening of 1st December the situation had become quieter. The 10th and 12th Machine Gun Squadrons had come into the line near Vaucellette Farm, the latter squadron getting some shooting and losing one man killed and four wounded. The 13th Squadron, which had four guns in the front line and four farther back for indirect fire, had no casualties.

The Canadian Machine Gun Squadron had sent a dismounted party into the line on the evening of 30th November, and lost four men wounded; on the night 2nd-3rd December all the dismounted Machine Gun Squadrons of the 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions were relieved by those of the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Divisions.

The 2nd Machine Gun Squadron (which took over from the 13th Squadron in Gauche Wood) had Lieutenant Johnson and two men wounded.

On 4th December the 3rd and 4th Squadrons each sent eight guns nto the line between Vaucellette Farm and Chapel Crossing; the 4th Squadron diary mentions that the weather was so cold that great difficulty was experienced in keeping the guns from freezing. These two squadrons relieved the 2nd and 9th Squadrons, and were themselves relieved by infantry (9th Division) on 5th December, by which date the second phase of the Cambrai Battle may be considered closed.

The 3rd Cavalry Division was not in action at all during the battle, so the 6th, 7th and 8th Machine Gun Squadrons were not called upon.

VII.—Winter, 1917–1918.

It had been arranged that the Cavalry Corps should relieve the 24th Division about 1st December, 1917, in the sector Villeret—Le Verguier —Pontruet, a distance of about four miles. This relief had been slightly delayed by the German counter-stroke at Cambrai on 30th November, but four guns of the 8th Machine Gun Squadron (3rd Cavalry Division) went into the line on 1st December, shortly followed by the 6th and 7th Squadrons. They were under the 24th Division until 7th December, when the cavalry took over the sector.

This portion was in December the extreme right flank of the British line, the French joining up near Pontruet; indeed, the two right flank machine guns of the cavalry sector were actually in a French trench, and the British subsection officer shared a dug-out with a French officer.

At the end of January, 1918, the Cavalry Corps took over more line to the south, in consequence of the Fifth Army relieving the French down to the Oise.

Digitized by Google

In order to understand the task of the dismounted Machine Gun Squadrons during the winter 1917–1918, it is necessary to describe the defensive arrangements in this part of the line. The front line consisted of a series of posts (often 200 yards or more apart) manned by riflemen and Hotchkiss gunners. The Vickers guns were placed entirely in the second line, roughly 1,000 yards behind the front posts: this second line was a more continuous and more strongly organized trench system, with "strong points" at intervals, the village of Le Verguier being one of these.

The duty of the Vickers guns was twofold: (1) They were laid normally on S.O.S. lines, to fill gaps in the artillery barrage; and if an S.O.S. signal went up from one of the forward posts, the machine guns, firing from behind, would place their barrage about 400 yards in front of the threatened point. The machine guns would be firing at about 1,900 yards range, though this varied at different parts of the line. (2) If the front posts were captured and the second (main) line attacked, the Vickers guns would defend it in the ordinary way by cross-fire: the lines of fire were very carefully worked out, and the belts of wire were arranged to correspond with them. As a matter of fact, no attack took place at all while the cavalry were holding the line, but the defensive arrangements are interesting seeing that, when the enemy made his great effort on 21st March, the elaborate barrages were largely ineffective owing to the fog.

Each Machine Gun Squadron sent eight guns up to the line, the three Squadrons in each division (twenty-four guns) being grouped together under a Divisional Machine Gun Officer; the squadron leaders took this duty in turn and lived at Divisional Headquarters. The D.M.G.O. was responsible for working out the various S.O.S. barrages in conjunction with the O.C. Royal Horse Artillery.

Beyond firing some barrages in support of raids, the Machine Gun Squadrons had a very quiet time, and the cold weather was a greater enemy than the Boche, careful precautions having to be taken against trench-foot and frost-bite.

The 6th, 7th and 8th Squadrons (3rd Cavalry Division) were in the line about six weeks, from 1st December to 14th January; they first held the whole sector, but on 21st December the northern half (Villeret —Le Verguier) was taken over by the 3rd, 4th and 5th Squadrons of the 2nd Cavalry Division. The 3rd Cavalry Division was relieved by the 1st Cavalry Division (1st, 2nd and 9th Machine Gun Squadrons) on 14th January; these latter were only in the trenches till 25th January, but did another tour of duty from 27th February to 11th March; the 3rd, 4th and 5th Squadrons also did a second spell from 4th March to 10th.

The 10th, 11th and 12th Squadrons (4th Cavalry Division) went into the line on various dates in January, the former squadron going

Digitized by Google

to the Hargicourt sector on 6th January. The 5th Cavalry Division Squadrons (13th, 14th and Canadian) relieved the 1st Cavalry Division Squadrons in the Le Verguier—Pontruet sector from 25th January to 13th February.

The Machine Gun Squadrons when not in the line supplied, with their brigades, working parties to help in digging trenches and wiring in areas behind the line, notably in the Hervilly—Hesbécourt—Jeancourt area, and on the Péronne bridgehead defences, as it had by the end of February become evident that the enemy would attack on this front.

During the early part of 1918 the Germans started a series of air raids on the back areas behind the line, and strict orders had to be issued against lights being shown after dark. For some time none of the raids did much damage, but at 8.15 p.m. 9th March several bombs were dropped on the huts occupied by the 8th Machine Gun Squadron and the 10th Hussars. The 8th Squadron had nine men wounded, of whom two unfortunately died next day; the 10th Hussars were even more unlucky, losing ten killed and thirty-five wounded.

Reorganization of the Cavalry Corps.—In February, 1918, the Cavalry Corps was reduced from five divisions to three, the Indian regiments of the 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions being ordered to Palestine. The Canadian Cavalry Brigade and the British regiments in those divisions were transferred to the 3rd Cavalry Division,* the 8th Cavalry Brigade being broken up and the 7th Cavalry Brigade reorganized so as to make room for them.

These alterations affected certain of the Machine Gun Squadrons as set forth below:—

7th Machine Gun Squadron (Household Cavalry, Major G. G. F. Chomley).—Was dismounted about 1st March and was transferred, with the 1st and 2nd Life Guards and Blues, to the Guards Machine Gun Regiment. NOTE.—Captain C. D. Leyland, O.C. 6th Machine Gun Squadron, being in 1st Life Guards, went with them.

8th Machine Gun Squadron (Captain T. Preston).—Ordered to be broken up with 8th Cavalry Brigade, 8th March, but was "reprieved" and posted to new 7th Cavalry Brigade (i.e., 7th Dragoon Guards, Inniskillings and 17th Lancers) 10th March. It retained the title "*8th* Machine Gun Squadron" for the time being, but on 4th May the name was changed to 7th Machine Gun Squadron to correspond with its Brigade. It must not be confused with the original 7th Squadron mentioned above.

Canadian Machine Gun Squadron (Captain J. W. Boulter).—Transferred, with its Brigade, from 5th Cavalry Division to 3rd Cavalry Division.

* Except the 8th Hussars, which went to the 9th Cavalry Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division.

Digitized by Google

10*th Machine Gun Squadron* (Major G. W. Scratton, M.C.).—Ordered to Egypt, 4th March, and had actually got its transport on the ship at Marseilles when fresh orders came for squadron to remain in France; fought as infantry 26th March to 8th April; broken up 11th April.

11*th Machine Gun Squadron* (Major J. C. Humfrey).—First ordered to join new 7th Cavalry Brigade 8th March; then ordered to be broken up (and Major Humfrey posted to 6th Squadron); fought as infantry 23rd March to 14th April; then broken up.

12*th Machine Gun Squadron* (Captain J. A. Moncreiffe).—Ordered to be broken up 4th March; fought with infantry 25th March to 3rd April; finally broken up about 11th April.

13*th Machine Gun Squadron* (Major E. C. Watson).—Sent with 10th Squadron to Camiers to be broken up 4th March; fought with infantry 26th March to 8th April; finally broken up about 11th April.

14*th Machine Gun Squadron* (Captain R. G. R. Davies, M.C.)—Ordered to Egypt 14th February; order cancelled 1st March; fought with infantry 25th March to 3rd April; broken up 11th April, except two subsections which were kept at Camiers for demonstration purposes.

The Machine Gun Squadrons in France were, therefore, reduced from fifteen to nine by the middle of April, 1918.

NOTE.—On page 272 of the July CAVALRY JOURNAL the Sialkot (afterwards 10th) Machine Gun Squadron is stated to have been attached to the 62nd Division during the Ancre Battle. This should read 63rd (Royal Naval) Division.



Digitized by Google

FIELD TRIALS FOR GUNDOGS

(*continued*).

By THE SPORTING EDITOR.

IN the January number of the CAVALRY JOURNAL we wrote chiefly about retrievers. In this number spaniels and pointers and setters will be dealt with. It is a very open question which class of gundog is the easiest to train. If a man goes in for one kind you may be sure he will maintain that they are the most difficult. The first part of the work of a pointer, setter or spaniel is practically bred in them. The pointer or setter hunts and works his ground, and when he winds game he comes to a point. After that the training commences to make him steady and not chase. In the same way the spaniel is a born hunter, and his instinct when he puts up a rabbit is to chase it. That is where his education commences.

The retriever instinct is also to hunt and kill, so his education has to start earlier than the others. He has to be taught that there is nothing to do, except take an interest in the proceedings, until the game is on the ground, either dead or a runner; then he is told to go and retrieve it. The pointer and setter, of course, have to be taught to quarter their ground properly, and the spaniel to work his ground so that any game put up is within range of his handler. Personally we do not think there is much in it, and to bring any kind of dog up to field trial form takes a lot of breaking. One of the chief reasons the men who started the field trials had was to find out which was the best kind of dog tor the purpose. At the present moment if any one refers to the result of field trials for the last few years he will come to the conclusion that the English setter has proved his superiority, and that the pointer has to take a back seat. Only one pointer ran at the last Kennel Club Trials.

At spaniel trials the English or Welsh springer seems to be on top. Many breeds of spaniels, which used to be most useful gundogs, have been spoilt by breeding and exaggerating what the show people laid down as the correct points. The idea in some of the breeds seems to have been to breed a long dog, low to the ground, with a lot of feather on the legs. Result: a dog about as long as a boat, with very short legs and a lot of feather. The body and legs are against all activity and the feather

Digitized by Google

collects all the mud in the country, and in a very short time the dog is too tired to work and chucks it, not to mention that at his best he is slow and pottering.

At retriever trials there is no doubt that the Labrador has proved his superiority, but unfortunately he has become the fashion and many people keep them for shows regardless of work, and the breed may deteriorate rapidly.

For the uninitiated we may explain that the Kennel Club give at shows what they call Challenge Certificates. When a dog has won three of these, under different judges, he used to be allowed to call himself champion, which was a great advertisement, and the general public seeing a dog advertised as champion naturally imagined he was a top-hole dog. If he was a gundog he might obtain this honour without ever having heard a gun let off. We put up an agitation against this and now are glad to say no gundog can become a champion unless he has also won a prize or certificate of merit at trials. This ensures that at one period of his career he was a useful gundog.

We have no doubt that the natural instinct of gundogs is bred in them, or can be bred out of them by using dogs that have not been trained to the gun and their proper work, especially when this has been done for several generations.

Moral.—Never try to breed a gundog of any kind unless you know that both parents were really good at their proper work. Toy dogs and dogs of no use, except as companions, do not matter. You want what you consider a good looking one, so breed as you like, but in all probability you will breed a fool unless both parents are intelligent animals.

Now we will go on to spaniels and spaniel trials.

Spaniel Trials.

The ideal spaniel will work all day, go into the thickest cover, as soon as he puts anything up he will drop and stay where he is until told to retrieve or go on working. The whole time he will work so that he puts any game towards the gun. When told he will retrieve tenderly and right up to hand. If more than one spaniel is at work and a shot is fired they all ought to drop and stay where they are until told to continue work. In Mr. Tunnard's picture of spaniels at work, that appeared in the last JOURNAL, he has depicted the right and the wrong way. They have just flushed a brace of pheasants, one spaniel is flat on the ground, the other, instead of dropping, as he ought to, is evidently going to chase and make a perfect nuisance of himself. One of the greatest treats we ever had was watching the late Mr. Charles Eversfield work a team of six spaniels. The moment a gun was fired they were all flat on the ground. He could send any one of them to retrieve and then

Digitized by Google

Drawn for the CAVALRY JOURNAL *by J. C. Tunnard.*

POINTER AND SETTER AT WORK.

Digitized by Google



Drawn for the CAVALRY JOURNAL *by J. C. Tunnard.*

"IT'S ALL RIGHT, THE MAJOR'S UP."

Digitized by Google

when told they all started working again. Mr. Eversfield went to France early in the War but broke down in health and died shortly after his return to England. He was out with his spaniels at the time. Gaunt, the Duke of Hamilton's head keeper, gave south country people a great treat last autumn, when he brought a team of four of the Duke's spaniels and ran them as a team at spaniel trials in the south of England. They all worked beautifully and were under perfect control. Gaunt is a wonderful man with gundogs, and when with the late Mr. A. T. Williams he won, in the same season, with spaniels, retrievers and pointers and setters which we think is a record.

In the *Field* lately there have been letters advocating holding stakes at spaniel trials confined to amateur handlers, as there is an idea about that the amateur cannot hold his own against the professional and that the latter has an undue advantage. This we think is a great mistake. At retriever trials the amateur wins as often as the paid handler, and we are sure the latter cannot give many points to such amateurs as A. E. Butter, C. Alington, E. E. Turner, Lord Sherborne, Lord Chesterfield and many others. Mrs. Quintin Dick and Mrs. A. E. Butter also run the professionals fairly close. If this can be done at retriever trials why not also with spaniels? The amateur will never get to the top of the tree unless he competes against the best professionals. Every time he sees one handle a dog he will learn something.

The usual way to train a spaniel is to have a wire enclosure with thick bushes about, put rabbits in and then let the spaniel hunt for them. He naturally chases to start with, but as he can never get very far from his handler he can soon be taught that his job ceases for the time when he has found, and that he must drop and stay where he is until he receives permission to move. Mr. Carlton's book, published at the *Field* office, is the best one on the education of a spaniel.

Pointers and Setters.

Mr. Tunnard's picture shows a setter on the point and a pointer doing what is called "backing him," viz., as soon as he sees another dog pointing he must stop immediately as if he was also pointing. This is of great importance. To get two dogs that will really work as a brace, quarter their ground independently, and back each other properly, is the height of training. When the brace is first put down one should go one way, the other in the opposite direction, and gradually quarter all the ground. It is no good if one dog gallops after the other over the same ground; it means two dogs are doing the work of one. It is a great pity that in England now these dogs are seldom used. Modern agriculture shaves the ground so close that there is very little cover to hide birds, so the pointer and setter have to find their work chiefly on grouse in Scotland, where the heather gives good cover. Another reason is

Digitized by Google

that the shooting over dogs is not as difficult as when the birds are driven. The modern sportsman cares little for dog work, he is out to make record bags, with as little exertion as possible to himself. He looks on the dog as a necessary evil, and we quite agree that a badly broken unsteady dog is worse than an evil. How seldom you meet a man out shooting with a really steady retriever or spaniel; but thanks to field trials you do oftener now than a few years ago.

Mr. Tunnard's picture in the last number gives a good idea of pointer and setter trials. There are the handlers with their dogs waiting their turn, some of the spectators, the two judges, and a handler working a brace. These trials are usually held in the spring of the year.

As the dog's work ends when the birds are flushed it is not necessary to shoot. A gun is always fired off once over each dog to see if he is gun shy, but that is all that is necessary. Pointers and setters can be taught to retrieve, and a good retrieving setter is a very useful dog to a man out for the pot.

The Kennel Club Pointer and Setter Trials are fixed for April 19th and 20th, over Mr. Pretyman's place, at Orwell, Suffolk. Headquarters at the Felix Hotel, Felixstowe. Anyone wishing to see the trials is welcome, and for men keen on dog work we can promise them two interesting days' sport.



Digitized by Google



FIFTY YEARS AGO.

Staff Sergeants of the School of Musketry,
Now the Small Arms School, Hythe

Digitized by Google



FRENCH CARICATURES OF THE BRITISH ARMY OF THE PERIOD OF NAPOLEON III.

Digitized by Google

THE SMALL ARMS SCHOOL, HYTHE, KENT.

By LIEUT.-COLONEL T. G. DALBY, D.S.O., *King's Royal Rifle Corps.*

FORMATION.

IN July, 1919, "The School of Musketry" at Hythe changed its name to "The Small Arms School" and took over increased responsibilities compared with those undertaken by this school before the war. The Colonel Commandant of the school is also Inspector of Weapon Training at Home. It is unnecessary to enlarge on "The School of Musketry" before the war. Known to all officers and non-commissioned officers in the army as "the Mecca" of musketry, it was largely responsible for the excellent system of training in the rifle and machine gun that existed in the service on the outbreak of war.

During the war expansion of the weapon training machinery became necessary to meet the instructional needs of our nation in arms, and approximately the following schools for weapon training had come into existence at Home and in France before the signing of the Armistice :—

AT HOME.

The (Central) School of Musketry (temporarily located at Bisley Camp).
Seven Command Schools of Musketry (i.e., one for each command and one for Ireland).
The Machine Gun Training Centre at Grantham.
A Light Mortar School.
A Bombing School.

IN FRANCE.

Under G.H.Q., B.E.F...	A Lewis Gun School at Le Touquet.
	A Light Mortar School at Le Touquet.
	A Machine Gun School at Camiers.
	A Physical Training and Bayonet Training School at Paris Plage.
Under each of the five Armies	An Army Musketry Camp, afterwards called "Army Rifle Training School."
Under each Corps ..	A Lewis Gun School.
	A Light Mortar and Bombing School.

Digitized by Google

Amongst many things brought to light throughout the late struggle, experience in modern war proved:

(*a*) The correctness of our pre-war views on the necessity for rifle (or musketry) efficiency in the soldier.

(*b*) The necessity for a larger proportion of machine guns than had been visualized by some hitherto, and also for the provision of an automatic firing weapon within cavalry, artillery and infantry units.

(*c*) The necessity for the fostering of "the spirit of the bayonet" in the soul of the British infantryman.

(*d*) The necessity for the revival of certain high trajectory weapons, such as the mortar and the bomb or rifle bomb, especially during periods of static warfare.

It was therefore decided to form a Small Arms School which should include within its scope the technical and tactical training in all the weapons considered necessary for the infantryman and their combined use in battle.

Training in the following weapons is therefore now included in the syllabus of the school:

The Rifle (including Bayonet).
The Light Gun (i.e., Lewis and Hotchkiss).
The Light Mortar (3-inch Stokes).
The Rifle Bomb and Bomb.
The Revolver.
Use of Smoke.

India is on the point of forming Small Arms Schools on approximately the same model as Hythe.

As regards machine gunnery, this training is not included in the scope of the school. For various reasons this is carried out at the Machine Gun School, Seaford.

Object, Scope and Duties.

The primary object of the Small Arms School is to turn out officer and non-commissioned officer instructors in the various weapons already enumerated for units at Home—including in a limited degree Militia, Territorials and Officers Training Corps.

The definition of "Instructor" as far as the school is concerned may be said to be—

"An officer or N.C.O. capable of:

(*a*) Training the recruit from the commencement of his career as a soldier.

Digitized by Google

(*b*) Exercising and refreshing the trained soldier.

(*c*) Making an officer or N.C.O. into a good fire unit leader."

This definition holds good for all weapons.

In addition to making instructors for units, the instructing and refreshing of the following also comes into the scope of the school:

Senior Officers.

Students of { Senior Officers School, Woking. / Staff College, Camberley.

Cadets at the Royal Military College, Camberley.

A small weapon training staff of ten W.O.'s and N.C.O.'s from the school establishment is continuously doing duty at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, and instructs the cadets in skill at arms and weapon training.

A brief enumeration of courses held at the school during the year 1920 is given below in fuller explanation.

Programme of Courses.

In making up the programme for 1920 certain special features were then introduced.

(*a*) *Winter Classes.*—At the beginning of the year the Small Arms School sent out all the W.O. and N.C.O. Instructors to commands, so that they could start classes on the snowball system. The officer instructors also visited commands and stations to give any help by means of lectures, etc. These classes have been continued during the winter of 1920-21.

The essentials for these courses are:

(i) Very clear instructions as to the object and scope of the classes to all concerned. It is made perfectly clear that the instructors are out to help and not to inspect.

(ii) Classes of officers or N.C.O.'s should be formed of sections of not more than eight.

(iii) Sections should be brigaded or assembled in some central spot and students struck off regimental duty.

(iv) On completion of the class the students should *without delay* take regimental classes in their units.

(*b*) *A special course* of a fortnight for *Assistant Adjutants and C.S.M.I.'s of M.* in the use of the rifle.

(*c*) *A similar course in the light gun* was attended by *captains and subalterns.*

(*d*) *A special fortnight's course for Command Weapon Training Officers, Adjutants and R.S.M.'s* in all the weapons taught at the school. Attendance was compulsory.

Digitized by Google

This course was a great success, from the point of view of the army generally, and from that of the Adjutants and R.S.M.'s individually. The sympathies of these officers and warrant officers were enlisted for the school and the methods of teaching.

(*e*) *One week's course for O.T.C. Senior and Junior Divisions.* In the former division there were undergraduates from universities and in the latter were schoolboys, most of whom were in their school shooting eights.

The chief points noticed during this course were the keenness of all and the intelligent criticism made, especially by the schoolboys during demonstrations.

(*f*) One month's special course in Rifle and Light Gun for *Officers and N.C.O.'s of Depots.*

(*g*) In addition to the above there were the usual courses, i.e.,

Two qualifying—Rifle Wing .. .. each five weeks
Two qualifying—Light Gun Wing .. each five weeks
Seven qualifying—Light Mortar .. each five weeks
Fifteen qualifying—Bombing.. .. each two weeks.

Three Senior Officers' Courses in all weapons. (One of these was allotted to the Senior Officers' School, Woking. The visit of this school will probably take place half-yearly in future years.)
Six Refresher Courses in Rifle.
Four Refresher Courses in Light Gun.

In addition, the Staff College students came for two short special courses of two and a-half days each. As the time was short the course consisted mainly of demonstrations, but the most valuable discussions took place at the two conferences held during the visit of each party.

THE PERSONNEL TRAINED IN 1920 AT THE SCHOOL DURING THE QUALIFYING COURSES FOR THE YEAR WERE APPROXIMATELY :—

	Officers.	*N.C.O.'s.*
Rifle	100	140
Light Gun	90	150
Light Mortar	70	105
Bombing	150	225
	410	620

TRAINING.

The training at the school is not confined merely to the technical handling of the particular weapon that is being taught, but considerable emphasis is laid on its tactical employment. However, in this connection

Digitized by Google

efficiency and output of students throughout the year must necessarily be nicely balanced or the needs of the army could not be met, and it has been found necessary on account of time to limit the scope of the tactical side to minor tactics only, i.e., mainly platoon and troop training. Also it should be remembered that, with the exception of the Light Mortar, all the weapons taught at the school are handled within the platoon or troop itself.

As to Minor Tactics.

Working on the basis that these may be defined as the use of (*a*) the weapon, (*b*) ground, (*c*) formations, the use of these three fundamentals and their relation to one another are studied and taught on a definite system in as simple and thorough a manner as time permits.

With the object, however, of avoiding water-tight compartments and giving students the opportunity of considering co-operation of all arms, simple lectures are given on the following, with special reference to their co-operation with the infantry and cavalry:—Machine Guns, Artillery, R.A.F., Tanks, Gas.

Recreation and Sport.

The Small Arms School is happy in its location, as Hythe is generally popular amongst students and staff, being within easy reach of Folkestone and within one and a-half hours of London.

Week-end leave is usually obtainable.

The school possesses four hard *en tout cas* tennis courts, two squash racquet courts, a sticky court, a football and hockey ground. There is a good cricket and tennis club available during the summer months, and two golf courses within a few minutes' walk of the school.

A certain amount of shooting is usually obtained by the officer staff during the winter months. The East Kent Foxhounds and a drag at Shorncliffe are within easy reach.

The Cavalry Journal Committee suggest that the regiments to be disbanded should deposit their guidons, drum-banners, historical pictures and relics with the Council of the Royal United Service Institution, for exhibition in the museum and safe custody, on the understanding that the Council will return them, in the event of the regiments being re-raised, to their successors.

Digitized by Google

A PAGE OF UNRECORDED REGIMENTAL HISTORY.

INSPIRED by the article on Cavalry Records in the January Number of this JOURNAL, and having had impressed upon me the lack of *Light* Cavalry history, as also the importance of night operations, the following account is "released" of

"HOW THE GREEN HUSSARS FINISHED THE WATERLOO PORT."

It is hardly necessary to inform those readers who are members, for instance, of the Old Methusiliers' Association (sometimes mis-spelt the Methusiliars) that 1815 was a famous vintage year for port wine, possibly owing to the Peninsular War terminating in 1813, with the result that the Portuguese had no longer any cause to *whine* but more time to export their national beverage.

* * * *

'Twas in the Victorian era, the Green Hussars were quartered in a city famed for its cotton, gins and yarn spinning, in a county famed for the lengths men went to, and for tall things generally, to wit Lankyshire.

Your humble servant being President of the Officers' Mess, an invitation arrived as follows:

"Dear Sir,

"Having a few bottles of Waterloo Port left in my cellar, I cannot deal with it better than by asking the Officers of such a distinguished Waterloo regiment as the Green Hussars to dine with me on the 18th June, Waterloo Day, and assist me in finishing them.

"I shall be pleased to put up for the night such officers as will honour me with their company.

"Yours very truly,

_____"

I do not give his name, but the writer lived in a fine old place about twelve miles from barracks.

Readily recognizing the importance of this invitation I took it to the orderly room to get my instructions from that excellent Commanding Officer, Colonel J. K. Splashing, asking who should be selected for this important affair.

"Well," said he, "I leave it to you. I cannot go myself, but you must select, including yourself, six representative officers with powerful heads and good digestions."

Digitized by Google

I set to work to carry out his instructions and shall give no names but a short description of those chosen.

No. 1 was a major who had been in another well-known Waterloo light cavalry regiment, and appreciated a glass of good wine.

No. 2, a captain of sylph-like figure, great at polo and pig-sticking, who has since commanded the regiment. We always called him Tacitus. On the occasion to be described his anecdotes rivalled his Roman namesake's, and I can assure you there was nothing taciturn about him.

No. 3, a very good-looking sporting captain, who has since commanded the Royal Roans, no mean judge of the good things of this world.

No. 4, a very tall subaltern who excelled at *ball* practice, especially in the ball room in the *hop* season, has since appropriately been mayor for a number of years in a great hop growing and consuming district and, becoming stout, been a butt for the pleasantries of his friends. He came from the Gold Dragoons, where he had been well instructed in discriminating between good and inferior wine.

No. 5, a young captain, whom we knew as "The Boy," perhaps the best polo player ever produced in the regiment.

No. 6, your humble servant, unanimously elected Mess President without a dissentient vote, and hence believed by my maiden aunt to be "the most popular officer in his regiment."

The day arrived! In order that the deputation should be properly conveyed we went on the regimental coach with the stepping chestnut team, driven to the extremity of being driven by No. 4.

That excellent drag servant of inspiriting name, old Hollands, was at the back, and in order to impress the natives by suitable coach-horn music the trumpet-major was disguised as the second drag servant. The hills were, of course, taken at the pace of the charge, to the consternation of the itinerant poultry and dogs of the neighbourhood.

Digitized by Google

We arrived without mishap and found our host a delightful old white-headed bachelor, a man of substance in both senses, who had known the regiment two generations earlier in Canada.

He fully expected to find his former acquaintances among the party. However, we were made duly welcome, especially when he was assured that, although his old officer friends had all left the regiment, the traditions were the same and that we were all good men and true.

We were then shown to our various apartments; mine with its antique furniture looked as if it might well be haunted by spirits of the past.

In due course we assembled in the dining hall, and there they were, in a row on the sideboard, the crusted, dust-covered, cobwebbed bottles, six in number. Not of the modern thin bottle type, but of the fine round, fat, black specimen with large heads and bulging necks, without doubt their origin was Portugal.

We enjoyed a splendid banquet of every luxury that hospitable Lancashire could provide; the golden sherry and Johannesburg Cabinet were irreproachable, Cliquot flowed like water, but nothing could quench the fire in the eye of our host, the warmth of his welcome, the heat of his arguments, which actually made light of everything. He was a grateful man, even his voice grated, for he was well into his anecdotage; his most arresting feature was his determined jaw.

He told story after story, the local or Manchester yarn followed yarn, there was no winding up; his endless or pointless wit drove us to our wit's end to keep awake, till at length the table was cleared for the business of the evening.

The first bottle duly decanted was placed on the table, bumper glasses filled, the trumpet-major sounded the Last Post from the open door, and our host, on his mettle and on his legs, proposed the toast of the evening. Bodily as well as oratorically, he was a great speaker—he must have practised at the bar in his youth, or at many bars, for his capacity was remarkable.

"The glorious memory of the *bottle* of Waterloo, coupled with the name of the Green Light Dragoons."

The toast was drunk with applause and our host followed its example.

Be not shocked, gentle reader. He was affected only by sentiment, intoxicated merely by his own verbosity and, blind to the consequences, he collapsed into his chair, where he became suddenly insensible, in short, more senseless than before.

The butler was summoned and reported it "a mild case of appyplexy," to our unhappy perplexity.

Supporting their porty or portly master, the servants carried him to bed, whence he was able to send a message that I was to take his place and be responsible that the Waterloo Port was finished.

He was the last casualty of Waterloo.

The wine, though seventy years old, was found to be in excellent order. Toast followed toast, chorus followed chorus, glass followed glass, till at length Tacitus burst into song!

Digitized by Google

The words of the refrain, it should be stated, were not intended to refer to our host :—

" Then pledge the boar, the mighty boar,
Fill high the cup with me,
Here's health to all who fear no fall,
And the next grey boar we see."

That sent us to bed, sober, but in a martial frame of mind.

True to tradition, the Mess President was the last to leave, reciting the paraphrase " Lee boy stood on the burnished deck whence all but he had fled."

Sleeping soundly I dreamt I saw Lord Hill congratulating the Green Light Dragoons on their splendid charge at the close of the Battle of Waterloo, and then to the clarion call of trumpets the avalanche of horsemen swept out of my ken and I awoke to find the trumpet-major sounding the Reveille. It was 4.0 a.m.

Our kind host recovered and saluted as we mounted the coach to speed back to barracks in time for early parade.

Thus the Waterloo Port was finished.

Digitized by Google

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

"Map Reading," by John W. Cameron, M.A. (late R.F.A.). Forster, Groom & Co., 15, Charing Cross. 4s. 6d. Complete, clear, legible, light, and of a size to be carried in the pocket; in accord with official manuals. We especially commend the chapters on calculating cover for guns; battery problems; plotting and traversing (which we recommend should never be used for military purposes in preference to a sketch except in forests); preparation of fighting map; panorama sketching; aerial map-reading. In "Points to observe for Cross-Country Flight" the scale of the map should read four to six miles to one inch, and not as printed.

Our former contemporary, the *Revue de Cavalerie*, after lapsing since 1914, reappears, for the thirty-first year, every two months. The price is six francs per copy, but special terms to subscribers. The first number contains an introduction by General Weygand, historical reports on cavalry achievements, a translation of Field-Marshal Earl Haig's memorable lines on the cavalry in his final despatches in 1919; and under the question "Does the tank form a substitute for Cavalry?" Captain Daubert expounds very clearly the limitations of tanks and armoured cars in every kind of warfare, and terminates by suggesting that they may completely disappear before the gun.

A Short History of the 6th Division, by Major-General Marden, C.B., C.M.G., price 2s. 6d. Hugh Rees, Ltd.

The History of the 2/6th (Rifle) Battalion "The King's" (Liverpool Regiment), by Captain Wurtzburg, M.C. Messrs. Gale & Polden.

Two diaries of the Great War which, written by men who took part in the deeds which they chronicle, each achieves its purpose, though on totally different lines. Would that there were more of them.

General Marden's book is a simple record of the division which he latterly commanded, published at a price within the means of every member of it. The author acknowledges his book to be mainly taken up with the work of the infantry; certainly the share of the artillery should bulk larger in a Divisional History, and one may be permitted to suggest to General Marden, with reference to a paragraph on page 39, that cavalry has its objectives as well as infantry, and that the attack on guns, though undertaken on occasions with success in the past, is not its usual rôle, and is unlikely to commend itself when those guns are protected by trenches and capable of holding up the attack of an entire Infantry Division.

Captain Wurtzburg's volume is a very much more ambitious production, with first-class maps and illustrations. The 57th Division, to which the battalion belonged, was commanded by General Broadwood, Colonel 12th Lancers, at the time of his lamented death, an account of which will be found on page 104. E.S.J.

Digitized by Google

In the weekly Austrian *Wehrzeitung*, Field-Marshal Bauer records in serial form the work of the 10th (Buda-Pest) Cavalry Division in the world War, including the siege of Przemysl, in February, 1915, and, after the Russian cavalry had been encountered, they entered Stanislau, where the population accorded them a wildly enthusiastic welcome. Then came the retreat and war in bitter cold and snow-storms, with untold privation and misery. In the alternating general advances and retreats the covering duties and flank movements of the Cavalry Division are traced up to November, 1916, when the Russians were forced back across the Styr. During these indispensable services to their army the cavalry constantly fought their way through swamps, forests, rivers and mountain chains, covering long distances and surmounting obstacles which no other arm could have compassed.

NOTES.

Back numbers of the CAVALRY JOURNAL from 1906 to 1914 are on sale at 3s. post free.

These form an encyclopædia of knowledge invaluable to the horseman and the military student. Annual volumes bound in white cloth, and covers ready for binding, are available on application to the CAVALRY JOURNAL, Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W.1.

The Cavalry Benefit Association is doing good work in its capacious new offices at 92, Victoria Street. Fourteen Regimental Aid Societies, Old Soldiers' Funds and Regimental or Old Comrades' Associations use the organization, carrying out under their own committees the mode of management and working most suited to their own traditions, and utilizing the machinery of the Cavalry Benefit Association staff for such purposes as the investigation and assistance of individual cases on sympathetic lines, without the delay and difficulty inseparable from amateur efforts. Within the last year 768 cases requiring guidance or help were dealt with systematically, ex-cavalrymen being put in communication with the best authorities for their particular object, and monetary advances being made without disclosing the identity of those concerned.

The 5th Lancers Old Comrades Association has recently made arrangements to place its work with this office.

CAVALRY WAR MEMORIAL.

The Committee report that though the response to their appeal for subscriptions has been fairly satisfactory, there are at present many units from which no answer has been received. A sum of £6,000 approximately has been received or promised, but as the minimum required is £10,000 the Committee hope that units which have not yet subscribed will do so as soon as possible.

LECTURE.

On Wednesday, 27th April, at 5.30 p.m., Brigadier General G. A Weir, C.M.G., D.S.O., commanding 3rd Cavalry Brigade, will lecture in the Theatre of the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W., on "Some Reflections on Cavalry in the Campaign in Palestine." The chair will be taken by Lieut.-General Sir P. W. Chetwode, Bart., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., D.C.I.G.S.

Digitized by Google

SPORTING NOTES.

RACING

As this is the Steeplechase season, although flat racing will have started before the next JOURNAL appears, we will refer to steeplechasing first. One of the most interesting bits of news is that H.R.H. The Prince of Wales has been elected to the National Hunt Committee. We hope that this means that his colours will soon be seen under National Hunt Rules.

In another part of the JOURNAL appears a picture, pedigree and account of the performances of the steeplechase horse "Kinlark," presented to H.R.H. in Australia. This horse has been registered in England, so when acclimatized may appear on an English race-course. We hope so. Racing men are divided. One lot love steeplechasing and do not care much about flat racing. The others, in many cases, would not go a yard to see a steeplechase but never miss a flat race meeting. The betting man does not like seeing his money "in the air," which accounts for a lot of people preferring the flat race.

The sportsman we like is the one who can watch and take a great interest in a race, simply for the love of horses, without having any money on. The English Turf owes everything to this class of sportsman. Men who go in for it on business lines and to make money, in many cases, do more harm than good to the Turf and very often to themselves. One of the best sportsmen of modern times was the late Mr. J. H. Houldsworth. He started by running a few of his best hunters in hunt races. They were trained by his stud groom, Ryan. On the death of the late Mr. Merry he bought some of his thoroughbreds and decided to go in for racing. Ryan, the stud groom, was put in charge and at one time had about seventy horses under his care at Newmarket. Mr. Houldsworth allowed a few of his friends (Mr. D. Baird, J. Wallace, Fairy Cox) to send horses to him. Mr. Houldsworth never bet, he had an objection to trying his horses, as he argued that a hard gallop just before a race might do more harm than good, and he was quite content to wait till the race as he had no intention of betting. Poor Ryan on several occasions got greatly blackguarded. Not being able to try Mr. Houldsworth's horses sometimes two out of the stable would run in the same race and the outsider win. Mr. Houldsworth's one idea was to win classic races. He spent about £20,000 a year on his stud farm in the hope of breeding a Derby winner. If a horse was not up to a very high class he was got rid of, although he might have been placed to win many races. He had an objection to running in handicaps, although on one

Digitized by Google

occasion he won the Cesarewitch with " Balsarroch." I don't think he ever ran a horse in a selling race. This is racing on royal lines and the more people we have that will do this the better for the Turf. In spite of all his trouble, he never succeeded in winning a classic race. " Springfield " might have done so, as he beat the Derby winner at Ascot, but unfortunately had not been entered in the Derby.

It may be of interest to readers to compare the pace of horses on the flat and over jumps. The average time, for the last ten years, taken by the Derby winner to cover 1½ miles at Epsom works out at 2 mins. 38⅖ secs. For the same period the average time for the 4½ miles in the Grand National, at Aintree, works out at 9 mins. 48⅘ secs. We have not worked it out but have been told that if you took the time for the slowest Derby and the fastest National the average per mile and a-half would be rather in favour of the National winner. When you think of the thirty-six big jumps at Aintree and the extra distance this is rather marvellous.

We always regret that the majority of steeplechase horses in England are geldings, and so cannot be put to the stud. In France many of them are entire horses. For troop horses we would sooner breed from a high-class steeplechase horse than many of the best flat race horses. The trouble is, there are so few of them available. " Grudon," who won the National in a blizzard, was an entire horse. " Caubeen," who, from memory we think, ran second was a really good horse over a country. When we last heard of him he was standing at Mr. F. Bibby's stud at Exning, near Newmarket.

There is still a great demand for blood stock, and at Tattersalls' December Sales, at Newmarket, a brood mare, Salamandria, by St. Frusquin—Electra, and covered by The Tetrarch, fetched 16,000 guineas, a record price for a brood mare.

From the following figures it can be realized the value of blood stock:

Tattersalls' Sale, December, 1920.

Monday	Lots sold,	123;	aggregate 27,852 gs.
Tuesday	,, ,,	154;	,, 83,185 gs.
Wednesday	,, ,,	158;	,, 102,465 gs.
Thursday	,, ,,	160;	,, 123,605 gs.
Friday	,, ,,	95;	,, 21,438 gs.
Total	Lots sold,	690;	aggregate 358,545 gs.

It will be of interest to note that the following mares were bought for the National Stud:

Coronation, by Isinglass—Sceptre, by Persimmon, 3,800 gs.

Welsh Rarebit, by Llangibby—Crown Gem (sister to Sceptre), 2,600 gs.

Mary Mona, by Chaucer—Marienworth, by Isinglass—St. Marguerite, 2,000 gs.

Digitized by Google

National Hunt Steeplechase.

The National Hunt Races at Cheltenham, on March 2nd and 3rd, attracted the usual large crowd, a large proportion of them being hunting men from all parts of the country. The racing was most interesting, although the class of horse in the big race was not very good. One of the best races was the Foxhunters' Challenge Cup. That well-known Belgian officer, Comte d'Oultremont, rode a very good race and was second. At one of the early fences his horse made a bad mistake, and it was really wonderful how the rider got back into the saddle. The horse, Chevalier Bayard, is by that high class horse, Bayardo, and is the only one of his stock that we have seen over fences.

Bugler, the winner of the National Hunt Steeplechase looks like a National horse.

The National Hunt Steeplechase of 1,000 sovs.; four miles: Mr. H. A. Brown's Bugler, ch. g., by Fugleman—Marie Louise, aged, 12.3 (Capt. Bennet), 1; Capt. A. S. Hewson's Pillage, br. g., by Frustrum—Try Again, aged, 12.3 (Mr. Firth), 2; Mr. R. Hardinge's Such a Sport, aged, 12.3 (Capt. Delmege), 3. (Winner trained by H. A. Brown, Atherstone). Betting: 9 to 4 agst. Cupid's Dart, 4 to 1 agst. Bugler, 7 to 1 agst. Ned Carver, 10 to 1 agst. Pillage, 100 to 8 agst. Mingle, and 25 to 1 agst. any other. Won by five lengths; a bad third. Colleen V. was fourth, and Fop-Doodle the only other to complete the course.

The Foxhunters' Challenge Cup of 500 sovs.; four miles: Lord Kenmare's Barca, ch. g., by Eminent or Barcadaile—Parrakeet, aged, 12.3 (Mr. Murphy), 1; Capt. A. Loewenstein's Chevalier Bayard, b. g., by Bayardo—Ormeda, aged, 12.3 (Comte d'Oultremont), 2; Capt. A. Fitzgerald's Eager Prince, ch. h., by Oppressor —Princess Eager, aged, 12.3 (Mr. H. A. Brown), 3. (Winner trained Ireland). Betting: 2 to 1 agst. Eager Prince, 9 to 2 agst. Barca, 5 to 1 agst White Swan, 8 to 1 agst. Clonhugh, 100 to 8 agst. each Jumper, Ah Well, and Chevalier Bayard, and 20 to 1 agst. any other. Won by eight lengths; two lengths between second and third.

Grand Military Meeting.

The Gold Cup day was 11th March, when Sandown was, as usual, accessible to officers who are not members. Three of the finishes were thrilling, and aroused the immense crowd to a high pitch of excitement. The members' enclosure was uncomfortably packed; indeed, for once in a way there was more elbow room in Tattersall's ring. In the Royal box were the King, the Prince of Wales, the Duke of York and Prince Henry. The uniforms of a number of French and Belgian officers gave a touch of colour to the scene, which has scarcely been exceeded in brilliancy in the history of Grand Military meetings. The weather was ideal, and so was the going, though perhaps a shade on the hard side for some of the veteran 'chasers.

The Selling Steeplechase of 200 sovs.; two miles: Lord Londesborough's Gay Mac, ch. g., by Uncle Mac—Girsha, aged, 12.3 (Owner), 1; Mr. P. Whitaker's

Digitized by Google

Scrabo, b. or br. g., by Kroonstad—Ardcarrig, aged, 12.3 (Capt. Bennet), 2; Major T. F. Cavenagh's Mont Royal II, b.g., by Champaubert—Milady, aged, 11.12 (Owner), 3. Won by three-parts of a length; four lengths between second and third.

The Sandown Military Gold Cup of 650 sovs.; three miles: Mr. W. Filmer-Sankey's Pay Only, ch. m., by Walmsgate—Teddie III, aged, 11.10 (Owner), 1; Lieut.-Colonel G. Brooke's Secretive, b. g., by Ben Alder or Pam—Secret, aged, 11.7 (Capt. Doyle), 2; Sir H. Meux's White Surrey, gr. g., by Nabot—Dejeuner, aged, 13 (Major Walwyn), 3. (Winner trained privately). Betting: 2 to 1 agst, Pay Only, 11 to 4 agst. White Surrey, 7 to 1 agst. Pillage, 10 to 1 agst. Rufus XXI. Delirium, and 100 to 8 agst. any other. Won by a neck; four lengths between second and third. Pillage was fourth. Lieut.-Colonel G. Brooke declared to win with Rufus XXI, which he rode.

The Past and Present Handicap Steeplechase of 260 sovs.; two miles and a-half: Mr. C. Leveson-Gower's Simon the Tanner, b. g., by General Symons—Reverendine, aged, 11.7 (Capt. Bennet), †; Mr. H. A. Brown's Craganock, b. h., by Carpathian—Rosy Tidings, aged, 10.9 (Owner), †; Colonel W. S. Anthony's Clashing Arms, br. g., by St. Martin—Glen Inch, 6 yrs., 12.9 (J. R. Anthony), 3. Betting: 6 to 4 agst. Craganock, 11 to 4 agst. Simon the Tanner, 5 to 1 agst. Clashing Arms, and 10 to 1 agst. any other. A DEAD HEAT; four lengths between dead-heaters and third. Stakes divided.

The Maiden Hunters Steeplechase of 250 sovs.; two miles and a-half: Capt. R. Higgins' Clear Money, b. g., by Matchmaker—Mollusc, aged, 11.9 (Mr. Lumsden), 1; Colonel G. Paynter's Bulgaden, ch. g., by Bonaparte, dam by Barcadaile—Miss Emmett, 6 yrs., 12 (Owner), 2; Mr. G. Heath's Portland Star, br. g., by Portland —Three Star II, aged, 11.4 (Owner), 3. Won by five lengths; a bad third.

2ND DAY.

Allies 'Chase an Annual Event.—It is not surprising to learn that the Stewards of the Grand Military Meeting have definitely decided to make the Allies' Grand Steeplechase an annual event. The race proved immensely popular on Saturday, when the crowd was just as vast as it had been on the preceding afternoon. The eight officers who competed, equally representing France and Belgium, received a wonderful reception as they rode in the parade which preceded the race. The Belgians were in khaki jackets and white breeches. Their rivals wore the French blue uniform complete.

No race for the Eclipse Stakes has brought a larger throng round the parade ring than mustered to see these eight good sportsmen get into the saddle. It was not surprising to see Razzle Dazzle made favourite. The fact that he had been schooled by Goby, at Epsom, for two or three weeks was a point in his favour, and those who had seen Commandant Comte Hermann d'Oultremont ride so well at Cheltenham, decided that he was the man to follow. Huguenot, who has won races in Belgium, and was giving seven pounds to Razzle Dazzle, was a good second favourite.

Digitized by Google

Bad Luck for the French.—At the first two fences in this two and a-half mile gallop no mishap occurred. Two of the Belgians, Comte d'Oultremont and Baron Gaffier, at once went to the front, being clearly bent upon making it a strongly-run race. The third jump, taken just before reaching the turn, brought grief to two—one of each nationality. The French horse galloped on riderless, but Lieut. van de Werve caught his mare and completed the course on her. At the formidable ditch just before reaching the stands there was sad disaster. A cry of dismay went up from the crowd as the three remaining French competitors were seen to fall together. One rider, Lieut. Cosse, becoming entangled in an iron, was dragged for a stride or two and received a severe kick on the head. He was removed on an ambulance suffering from concussion. Everybody was distressed by this calamitous collapse of the French entry, and we must sincerely wish them better luck next year.

Meanwhile Razzle Dazzle and Huguenot were jumping in fine form. Having taken the lead, the former was never overhauled. Except for a fall, his success was assured some distance from home. Ultimately the favourite won by four lengths from Huguenot, with Southern Joy a good third.

Capt. Doyle was the hero of the day in the Service events. Secretive, on whom he had been second in the Gold Cup, he rode to an easy victory in the Grand Military Steeplechase. He won the United Service Steeplechase on Curraghgour through sheer persistence, and captured the Tally-Ho Steeplechase on the outsider, Pamponyx.

Results.

The United Services Selling Handicap Steeplechase of 200 sovs.; two miles: Capt. N. H. Huttenbach's Curraghgour, bl. or br. h. by Kroonstad—Bude, aged, 10 (Capt. Doyle), 1; Mr. R. B. McCreery's Macadam, b. g., by St. Brendan—Rolling Stone, aged, 10.4 (Owner), 2; Mr. H. A. Brown's Prickly, ch. g., by Picton—Bramble Jelly, aged, 11.4 (Owner), 3. Won by a head; three lengths between second and third.

The Grand Military Handicap Steeplechase of 400 sovs.; two miles and a-half: Lieut.-Colonel G. Brooke's Secretive, b. g., by Ben Alder or Pam—Secret, aged, 10.12 (Capt. Doyle), 1; Major T. F. Cavenagh's Down Under, b. g., by Australian Star—Primavera, aged, 11.6 (Owner), 2; Colonel G. Paynter's Delirium, b. g., by Barcadaile—Fever Heat, aged, 11.3 (carr. 11.13), (Owner), 3. Won by eight lengths; a bad third.

The Allies' Grand National Steeplechase of 800 sovs.; two miles and a-half: Commandant Comte Hermann d'Oultremont's Razzle Dazzle, aged, 12 (Owner), 1; Lieut. Baron Osy de Zegwaart's Huguenot, aged, 12.7 (Baron Gaffier), 2; Lieut. G. Visart de Bocarme's Southern Joy, 6 yrs., 11 (Lieut. Llame), 3. Won by four lengths; six lengths between second and third. Princess XII was the only other to finish in a field of eight.

The Tally-Ho Hunters Steeplechase of 250 sovs.; three miles: Capt. E. J. Speed's Pamponyx, aged, 11 (Capt. Doyle), 1; Capt. H. E. de Trafford's Animosity,

Digitized by Google

br. g., by Myram—Anna Boleyn, aged, 12 (Owner), 2; Capt. F. Crossley's Minister of Munitions, b. g., by Primer—Minta, aged, 11.9 (Owner), 3. Won by five lengths; a bad third. Ten ran, only three finished.

GRAND NATIONAL.

Thirty-five starters and the winner the only horse to complete the course without a fall. This is what happened on 18th March, and reminds one of the National of 1911, when the winner, "Glenside," was also the only horse that did not take a toss. "The Bore" started favourite, but fell two fences from home. His rider, Mr. H. A. Brown, who also owns and trains the horse, in spite of breaking his reins and also his collar bone, managed to remount and finish second. A very fine performance. This reminds one of Mr. C. Thompson, who at Sandown hit the rails with his leg and broke it at the last turn, but still managed to finish the race, and we think he won, but are not certain. "All White" was third.

"Turkey Buzzard" finished fourth, the only other horse to complete the course.

The Grand National Steeplechase (Handicap) of 50 sovs. each, with 5,000 added; about four miles and 856 yards: Mr. T. McAlpine's Shaun Spadah, b. g., by Easter Prize—Rusialka, aged, 11.7 (F. B. Rees), 1; Mr. H. A. Brown's The Bore, b.g., by Ormondale—Bettie Bramble, aged, 11.8 (Owner), 2; Lord Wavertree's All White, br. g., by White Eagle—Colonia, aged, 10.13 (R. Chadwick), 3; Mrs. H. M. Hollin's Turkey Buzzard, aged, 12.2 (Capt. Bennet), 4. Betting: 9 to 1 The Bore, 100 to 9 Shaun Spadah, 33 to 1 All White.

POINT TO POINTS.

At the Guards' Point-to-Point races, held at Warden Hill, in the Bicester country, H.R.H. the Prince of Wales rode in the Grenadier Guards' race. He finished third in spite of a fall at the second fence; but for this piece of bad luck his horse, Pet Dog, would have won.

Grenadier Guards' Race, for Lord Manners' Cup; to carry 12.7: Earl Dalkeith's False Hope, 1; Lord Henry Seymour's Bronfay, 2; Prince of Wales's Pet Dog, 3. Sixteen ran.

H.R.H. The Prince of Wales at his third attempt won a point-to-point race on 16th March, and so followed in Prince Henry's footsteps, who won a point-to-point race a few days earlier.

It was at the Pytchley Hunt Meeting, and the 1st Life Guards held their Regimental Race the same day, won by Lieut. J. Emmet's Ballyrafton, owner up.

The Pytchley Hunt Light-Weight Point-to-Point Steeplechase; about 3½ miles: H.R.H. the Prince of Wales's Rifle Grenade (Owner), 1; Capt. R. Henderson's Suzette (General Vaughan), 2; Capt. T. McDougal's Abalon (Owner), 3. Won by a length; four lengths between second and third. There was a field of fourteen.

Mr. F. Marten Hale, Bromley, forwarded the following telegram to the Prince of Wales on Thursday: "As the inventor of the 'Rifle Grenade,' first and successfully used in the Great War, I beg to congratulate you on your Pytchley Hunt win yesterday and name of horse."

His Royal Highness replied: "Many thanks kind telegram. The name as successful as your invention."

Digitized by Google

First Cavalry Brigade Point-to-Point.

Prince Henry Wins a Race.

These races were held at Alton, and resulted as follows:

13th Hussars Race: Mr. A. H. Wood's Starlight (Owner), 1; Major E. H. Stocker's Fat Anne (Owner), 2; Mr. J. H. Hirch's Dairymaid (Owner), 3.

3rd Hussars Race: Mr. C. L. Huggin's Spring Moon (Owner), 1; Mr. J. H. Eliot's Antelope (Owner), 2; Major C. Petherick's Milking Maid (Owner), 3.

4th Hussars Race: Mr. M. S. Close's Red Seal (Owner), 1; Capt. M. F. Radcliffe's Knocked Out (Col. Neilson), 2; Capt. M. F. Radcliffe's Dewin Rhudd (Owner), 3.

Infantry Cup: H.R.H. Prince Henry's (K.R.R.C.) Rathgarogue (Owner), 1; Major M. C. C. Harrison's (R.I.Regt.) Crimson Rambler VI. (Owner), 2; Major W. W. T. Torr's (W. Yorks Regt.) Ginger VII. (Owner), 3.

1st Cavalry Brigade Race: Lieut.-Colonel W. Neilson's (4th Hussars) Golden Rose (Owner), 1; Mr. E. H. Gage's (Royal Horse Artillery) Connarbary (Owner), 2; Mr. H. Lumsden's (Royal Horse Artillery) Jimmy II. (Owner), 3.

H.R.H. Prince Henry received a great ovation after winning the Infantry Cup, but he was unplaced in the last race.

H.R.H. The Prince of Wales finished ninth in the Brigade of Guards' Inter-Regimental Race at the Grafton Hunt Point-to-Point.

The Army Point-to-Point Steeplechases.

The races took place on 21st March, at Burrough Hill, in the Cottesmore and Quorn Countries, by kind permission of the Earl of Lonsdale, M.F.H., and Major Burnaby, M.F.H.

This is the first time the meeting has been held since 1914. The weather was fine and warm, and owing to the kindness of Lord Lonsdale, who made all the arrangements on the ground, the meeting was a great success.

The course was ideal from the spectators' point of view, as every jump could be seen. The only complaint on the part of the competitors was that there was rather a lot of ridge and furrow, which told severely on horses which were not accustomed to it.

Every one was delighted to see H.R.H. The Prince of Wales ride second in Earl Haig's Cup, The Chargers' Point-to-Point Steeplechase. Results:

The Prince of Wales' Cup; a military light-weight steeplechase; catch-weights, 12.7 and over; about three and a-half miles: Capt. R. T. Stanyforth's (17th Lancers) b. g. Vanguard II., aged (Owner), 1; Capt. H. E. de Trafford's (Coldstream Guards) br. g. Flintlock, aged (Owner), 2; Major C. L. T. Walwyn's (Royal Artillery) b. g. Bachelor's Boy, aged (Mr. G. P. Hedges), 3. Twelve starters; won by a length, half a length separated second and third.

Digitized by Google

The Earl of Lonsdale's Cup; a military welter steeplechase; catch-weights, 14 and over; about three and a-half miles: Major G. Blewitt's (Oxford and Bucks L.I.) ch. g. Orman, aged (Owner), 1; Lieut. J. C. Campbell's (R.A.) b. g. Warrior, aged (Owner), 2; Major W. E. T. Morland's (Oxford and Bucks L.I.) b. g. Moon Devil, aged (Owner), 3. Twelve starters; won by a length.

Earl Haig's Cup, a chargers' steeplechase; catch-weights, 13 and over; about three and a-half miles: Lieut. M. S. Close's (4th Hussars) ch. g. Red Seal, aged (Owner), 1; Colonel H.R.H. the Prince of Wales's (Welsh Guards) b. g. Rifle Grenade, aged (Owner), 2; Major G. Reynolds's (9th Lancers) ch. g. Dennis, aged (Owner), 3. Also ran: Lieut. B. T. Job's (4th Hussars) Ladbrooke (Owner), Capt. J. S. M. Wardell's (10th Hussars) Fettle (Owner), Lieut. F. F. F. Spicer's (12th Lancers) Naboth (Owner), Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Little's (20th Hussars) Soloman (Owner), Major G. M. Harbord's (R.A.) Wrack (Owner), Lieut. G. P. Hedge's (R.A.) Welfare (Capt. de Fonblanque), Lieut. G. P. Hedge's (R.A.) Wild Cat (Owner), Colonel G. C. B. Paynter's (S.L. & C. Inf. Bde.) Warrior (Owner).

Rifle Grenade was taken to the front at the start, and after going a mile his closest attendants were Wrack and Soloman, with Red Seal most prominent of the well-strung-out remainder. This order was practically maintained to the top of the hill, and coming down the slope Red Seal took closer order. Rifle Grenade was very slow at the brook, and although landing first, he could not hold Red Seal for speed. The latter kept the straighter course, and, with Rifle Grenade blundering at the last fence, Red Seal drew away to win by ten lengths, with Dennis half that distance farther away. Wrack was fourth, and two or three of the others straggled in at intervals.

Earl Beatty's Cup; catch-weights, 13 and over: about three and a-half miles: Sir John Grey's (15th Hussars) ch. g. Wynnstay, aged (Owner), 1; Major Ian A. Straker's (9th Lancers) gr. g. Glengarry II, aged (Owner), 2; Capt. M. B. Beckwith-Smith's (Coldstream Guards) bl. g. Cheek (Owner), 3. Seven starters; won by half-a-length; five lengths between second and third.

The Inter-Hunt Cup, presented by the Masters of the Cottesmore, Quorn and Belvoir collectively; catch-weights, 13.7 and over; about three and a-half miles: Capt. A. Lowenstein's (Quorn) br. g. Adam's Gorse, 7 yrs. (Mr. Wilson), 1; Sir John Arnott's (Quorn) br. g. Roger, aged (Lieut. Arnott), 2; Capt. A. Lowenstein's (Quorn) b. g. Brutus, 8 yrs. (Capt. Sherrard), 3. Also ran: Mrs. Mynor's (Quorn) Stargazer (Lord Burghersh). Won by five lengths, with ten lengths between second and third. Stargazer was pulled up.

HUNTING.

Hunting will be nearly over by the time the JOURNAL appears. There are not many packs which now kill a May fox. Mr. Curre's hounds usually do so, but a lot of his country, in Monmouthshire, is rough, and so not much damage is done to agriculture. In many countries the farmers stipulate that hunting must stop on 1st April.

Digitized by Google

The Whaddon Chase dispute is settled and Colonel Selby Lowndes has sold his pack to Lord Orkney for £5,000. They will therefore remain in their old country.

An amicable settlement has been arrived at between the Essex Union and the Farmers' Hunt in the Denjie Hundred. Boundaries have been agreed to, and the Masters of Foxhounds' Association notified. The Farmers' Hunt will now be able to have their point-to-point races, permission for which was refused last year, as the pack was not recognized by the authorities.

General Strickland, Military Governor of Cork, has been forced by the unsettled state of the country to prohibit hunting, point-to-point races and coursing meetings in parts of the South of Ireland. The United, Muskerry, South Union and Tipperary Hunts come under this ban, which came into force on February 7th.

In England, owing to rabies and foot and mouth disease, some hounds have been prevented from hunting parts of their country. The Glamorgan hounds were most unfortunate. Owing to a case of rabies in the kennel the whole pack had to be destroyed. After much trouble and expense a new pack were got together but owing to another case they had to follow in the footsteps of their predecessors.

We saw a case reported in the papers a short time ago, of a man being had up for taking his dog out of a scheduled area. The magistrate remarked that he had done the same thing, and imposed a fine of 2s. 6d. This makes a farce of all the regulations which try to wipe out this awful disease and encourages ignorant and selfish people to break the law. It reminds us of a distinguished member of the Government, who once stated in Parliament that he had often shot without a gun licence.

A year before the first case of rabies at Plymouth, an officer told us he was getting a friend of his in the Flying Corps to bring back a dog from France for him, and so escape the quarantine. We told him straight that if he did so we would report him and pointed out the danger of bringing rabies to England. We wrote a long letter to *The Field*, pointing out that unless the authorities were more careful we were bound to get it into England. We saw an officer at the War Office who had something to do with the War dogs. We begged him to get orders that all dogs embarking or disembarking should immediately be reported to the quarantine authorities by the officer in charge. We went to the Air Board, as it was called at that time, and pointed out that dogs were being brought over by flying officers in their machines, and asked for special orders to be issued to stop it. In spite of all, nothing, or very little was done. Result: rabies in England a very short time after and ever since. Under present regulations there is very little chance of getting the country clear again for many years. Put the muzzling order on, for the whole of the South of England. Make the penalties for avoiding, in any way, the quarantine order (especially by aeroplane) far more severe. In about one year we should be clear, and if the regulations were kept to we should never have another case. The trouble is that so many people do not realize the facts. Many of them think that a dog can go mad at any time, the same as a human being. It is a proved fact that no dog or human being can get hydrophobia unless bitten by some one already infected, or unless the germ is

Digitized by Google

introduced through a cut. Anyone handling anything slobbered over by a mad dog can get the germ introduced into his system. This adds to the terrors of the disease, and if people interested will get a doctor to describe the symptoms of death from hydrophobia we are sure they would do anything to wipe the disease out, even at the expense of making a favourite dog wear a muzzle for a few months.

There used to be a superstition, especially in France, where hydrophobia has always been very prevalent, that if you were bitten by a dog and that dog was killed immediately you would be all right; but if he was allowed to live and developed rabies twenty years after you were bound to get it. This is on a par with the idea that so many people have that a pure bred bitch, lined by a mongrel, will produce mongrels in all her subsequent litters. Of course this has been proved to be an impossibility. Ignorance is at the root of so many troubles in this world; people get fixed ideas and won't take the trouble to consult authorities on the subject. Many people think that muzzling is useless red tape—and as carried out now we quite agree; but if they would realize that the only way to stamp this disease out of England is by muzzling, properly enforced, over a large area, we are sure every one would do their best to get the order put on and would carry out the regulations implicitly.

This affects all classes, not only the rich man who hunts and shoots, but so many poor men who, as most others, like to have a hobby of some kind. Many of them breed dogs and show them at shows, and very often make a good thing out of it, besides having the pleasure of the dogs in their spare time. A case of rabies —no shows. They have a dog that only wants one more challenge certificate to qualify him as full champion, and become a very valuable dog. As there are no shows this cannot be obtained, result financial loss.

POLO.

Hurlingham Fixtures.

Major F. H. Blacker, who has been appointed as Major Barrett's successor in the Hurlingham polo management, has arranged the following dates for the leading fixtures at Hurlingham, when the great feature of the season will be the International matches for the America Cup.

It is proposed to have trial matches for the America team on Whit Monday, 16th May, and on Saturday, 28th May; and similar trials for the England team on Saturday, 21st May, and Saturday, 4th June. The first of the test matches will be played on 18th June (Ascot Saturday); the second on Wednesday, 22nd June; and a third (should one be necessary) on Saturday, 25th June.

The dates of the Hurlingham tournaments will be as follows: Social Clubs' Cup, 16th-21st May; Whitney Cup, week beginning 23rd May, with the final at Roehampton on 28th May; and Champion Cup, 27th June to 2nd July. The closing stages of the Inter-Regimental tournament will take place as usual at Hurlingham during the week beginning 4th July, the final being fixed for 9th July.

Digitized by Google

The annual match between England and Ireland for the Patriotic Cup, which is played alternately in either country, will take place at Hurlingham on 23rd July. Weather permitting, the Hurlingham polo grounds will open for play on Monday, 2nd May.

Paris Polo Club.

Several English players last season accepted the Paris Polo Club's invitation to play there, and the committee would again welcome a few English players, handicapped at not less than four points. The club offers to defray all travelling expenses as well as the upkeep of the visitors' ponies during their stay in Paris. Players wishing to accept the club's invitation can obtain all information from M. Maurice de Plument, secretary of the Paris Polo Club, Bagatelle, Paris.

The Paris polo season opens about 15th April, and lasts until the middle of July. The Executive Committee of the Paris Polo Club comprises the Duke de Decazes (president), Count Louis Réné de Gramont (vice-president), Baron Robert de Rothschild, M. W. Van Ryck, Prince Léon Radziwill and Count Jean Pastré.

Roehampton Fixtures.

Lieut.-Colonel E. D. Miller, the polo manager of the Roehampton Club, has arranged the dates for his 1921 tournaments. The principal event, for the Roehampton Open Challenge Cup, which is open to any team without restriction, is fixed for the week beginning 30th May. Mr. Buckmaster's Old Cantabs are the present holders of this cup, which was the gift, in 1913, of the golf members of Roehampton.

Other Roehampton tournaments, with their weeks of play, are appended: Roehampton Junior Championship (holders, Capt. F. A. Gill's Foxhunters), 6th-11th June; Roehampton Public Schools' Cup, 27th June to 2nd July; Roehampton Cup, 4th-9th July; and Roehampton Ladies' Nomination Tournament, 11th-16th July.

As regards the Whitney Cup tournament, this is a joint Hurlingham and Roehampton tournament, the final taking place alternately at either club. It will be Roehampton's turn to have the final; the preliminary ties starting there on 16th May. Mr. H. P. Whitney, captain of the great Meadowbrook team between 1909 and 1913, will doubtless be present next season to see his cup played for. It was won last season by the 2nd Life Guards.

County Polo Association.

With the exception of the County Novices' competition, which has not been revived since the War, all the County Polo Association's tournaments are to be held this year. According to the usual custom the preliminary ties will be decided locally, and the four winners in each division will come to London for the semi-finals, which, like the final, will take place at Ranelagh during the County Polo Week, 11th to 16th July. Any team of an affiliated club or a composite divisional team is eligible to compete for the Open Divisional Championship Challenge Cup, which is otherwise an unrestricted tournament, and not played under handicap.

Digitized by Google

Only teams representing affiliated clubs outside the Metropolitan area of eight miles from Charing Cross are eligible in the County Cup and Junior County Cup tournaments, and both are played under handicap, with unlimited starts. In the former tournament no team may total more than twenty-four points, or less than sixteen points; while for the Junior County Cup the aggregate handicap of a team must not exceed fifteen points. There is a further proviso that no one shall be eligible to play for a club in the County Cup or Junior County Cup tournaments unless he became a member of that club before 1st May of the current season, and has played at least eight times on his club ground before 7th June. Also he must not have played more than four times in all on grounds within the prescribed Metropolitan area before 1st July.

Ranelagh Fixtures.

June 6–11—Ranelagh Open Cup.
,, 8—Ranelagh Horse and Pony Show.
,, 13–18—Ranelagh War Cup.
,, 27–July 2—Ranelagh Novices' Cup.
,, 30—Ranelagh Aldershot Day.
July 2—Lords *v.* Commons Match (Harrington Cup).
,, 4–13—Ranelagh Military Handicap.
,, 11–16—County Polo Week.
,, 13–16—Ranelagh Coronation Cup.
,, 18–23—Ranelagh Subalterns' Cup.

International Polo.

Practice Teams and Dates.—A series of practice games in preparation for the International Cup matches have been arranged at the London clubs, to be held in May and early June. Two sides have been arranged, the one captained by Mr. Buckmaster and the other by Major Barrett, to play a series of matches with both the England and America teams.

Mr. Buckmaster's team will consist of the Duke of Peñaranda (No. 1), Mr. F. M. Freake (No. 2), Mr. W. S. Buckmaster (No. 3), and the Earl of Rocksavage (back).

The other team will be: Lieut.-Colonel H. G. M. Railston (No. 1), Lieut.-Colonel H. C. S. Ashton (No. 2), Major F. W. Barrett (No. 3), and Major J. F. Harrison (back).

The arrangement of dates for these International practice games is that the America team will play at Hurlingham on 16th and 28th May and 8th June; at Ranelagh on 7th, 21st and 25th May and 4th and 15th June; and at Roehampton on 11th, 14th and 18th May and 1st, 11th and 13th June.

Matches for the England team will take place at Hurlingham on 25th May and 4th June; at Ranelagh on 11th, 14th, 16th and 28th May and 1st and 11th June; and at Roehampton on 7th and 21st May and 8th and 15th June.

Judging by the contingent of ponies at present being trained at Tidworth Garrison, Hants, the American Polo Association, to whom they belong, are going

Digitized by Google

to make a bold bid for the International Cup at Hurlingham in June. Before the ponies departed for England it was decided that a permanent trainer was necessary, and the Association were fortunate to secure for the post J. Lambert, a well-known racehorse trainer, who has had many turf successes on the other side during his eighteen years' experience. The ponies were none the worse for their voyage when they arrived in England a few days before Christmas, and Tidworth has apparently suited them, for both trainers and grooms are satisfied that if they go on as well as they are doing at present they will be in excellent condition for the practice matches.

Height of Polo Ponies.

No Limit in Next Season's Tests.—At a meeting of the Hurlingham Polo Committee a proposal again to impose a height standard for ponies was under discussion. This, however, was not agreed to, it being decided that "ponies of any height may be played," subject, as last season, to the proviso that no pony shall be permitted to play unless licensed by the club or regiment concerned as suitable and safe. In the event of a dispute an appeal is allowed to the Hurlingham Polo Committee.

With regard to the International matches, it is laid down in the conditions drawn up when the International Polo Challenge Cup was formally handed over, in 1911, to the joint custody of the Polo Association of America and the Hurlingham Club, "that the organization accepting such challenge shall have the incontestable right to have the games played under the recognized rules of its own country." The Hurlingham Polo Committee have, however, decided that the question of the eligibility of ponies for next season's International matches at Hurlingham shall be waived by both sides, except with regard to Hurlingham Polo Rule 2, which states that no pony showing vice or not under control shall be allowed in the game.

The Hurlingham Polo Committee, which already included representatives of the leading polo organizations, has been still further enlarged by the allotting of two seats to the new Egypt, Soudan and Palestine Polo Association.

RIFLE SHOOTING.

A.R.A. Matches.

Cavalry regiments have been most successful in these matches and the 14th Hussars have done particularly well.

We can remember when musketry was looked upon as a great bore. As long as the returns were fairly good and the colonel satisfied that was all that was necessary. The good shots used to shoot for the bad ones, and in those degenerate days if a man did not care about shooting, as it hurt his shoulder, he could usually manage to get a good shot to do it for him. We remember once hearing of a squadron whose returns made out every man a marksman. The district musketry man was a nuisance. He wrote in to the colonel, saying that the shooting was so good he would like to see some of them perform, and forwarded a list of a dozen

Digitized by Google

men he would like to meet on the range on a certain day. On arrival they were put through the ordinary course, with the result that most of them came out third class shots. The officer in command of the squadron does not know to this day how he saved his commission, but practically no notice was taken. We are glad to know that now great interest is taken in musketry and that many of the young soldiers are as keen as the best shots in the regiment. This is one of the results of the war in the trenches, when sniping was a great feature of the proceedings.

The Year's Prizewinners at Home and Abroad.

The prizewinners in the various matches held during last year at home and abroad, under the auspices of the Army Rifle Association, are announced by the Association as follows:

Queen Victoria Cup.—Home: 14th Hussars, 1; 1st Lincolnshire, 2; 4th Hussars, 3. Abroad: 11th Hussars, 1; 2nd Seaforth Highlanders, 2; and Dorsetshire, 3.

King George Cup.—Home: 1st Lincolnshire, 1; 14th Hussars, 2; 2nd Suffolk, 3. Abroad: 3rd King's Royal Rifles, 1; 2nd Seaforth Highlanders, 2; 1st Cameron Highlanders, 3.

Young Soldiers' Cup: 14th Hussars, 1; 1st Royal Dublin Fusiliers, 2; 3rd Coldstream Guards, 3.

Squadron Match.—Home: "A" Squadron, 14th Hussars, 1; "C" Squadron, 4th Hussars, 2; "A" Squadron, 4th Hussars, 3. Abroad: "C" Squadron, 11th Hussars, 1; "A" Squadron, 11th Hussars, 2; "A" Squadron, 19th Hussars, 3.

Duke of Connaught Cup: 14th Hussars, 1; 11th Hussars, 2; 1st Lincolnshire, 3.

Revolver Cup: Lieut. T. G. Upton, D.C.M., 11th Hussars, 1; Capt. J. W. McClure, Supply and Transport Corps, Indian Army, 2; Company-Quartermaster Sergeant L. Evans, 2nd Devonshire, 3.

SHOOTING AT HOME.

The shooting season is over, and taking it all round has not been a bad one. The trapping of vermin has been resumed and keepers are waging war against all sorts and we hope in a short time they will be reduced to the pre-War scale. Judging by the advertisements in the papers there is a demand for pheasant and partridge eggs, but we don't expect to hear of the huge pre-War bags of pheasants, when thousands were shot in a day. We always looked on these very big days as rather a mistake, 500 pheasants and various ought to satisfy anyone.

H.M. The King sent two Labrador retrievers to Cruft's Show. One of them, a very nice dog, was second for the Championship. He looked a workman all round, and we should like to see His Majesty's kennel represented at Field Trials next season.

We saw in the paper the other day that a very fine specimen of the European sea eagle, a rare visitor to our shores, had been shot on the Surrenden estate, at Pluckley, Kent The bird, which was in fine plumage, was 37½ inches in length,

Digitized by Google

and measured 7 feet 9½ inches across the wings. It had been hovering about the district for some days before it was shot by the head keeper on the estate. We wish head keepers and others would leave these rare visitors alone, and then possibly the bird life in England would become still more interesting.

Possibly we ought not to mention rabies again, as we have already written fairly strongly on the subject under Hunting. We must, however, mention that numbers of shooting men have been unable to take their dogs to Scotland and other places owing to being in a muzzling area. This is a great nuisance. We, a short time ago, started with two retrievers from a Southern county to go to Suffolk for a two days' shoot. Half way to London we got the papers and one of the first things we read was that there had been another case and that London was made a muzzling area. There was nothing for it but at the next station to send the dogs back, otherwise they would have got into the infected area and had to undergo a six months' quarantine. This state of affairs will go on indefinitely unless strong measures are taken to wipe out the disease. Muzzling over a large area and strict quarantine are the only ways and we must appeal to all sportsmen and lovers of dogs to carry out any regulations that the Board of Agriculture can be induced to put in force. The present regulations are a farce and will take many years to accomplish their purpose, if they ever are successful in doing so.

FOOTBALL.

France.

A Football International.—The development of the game is proceeding by leaps and bounds. The Association International match between France and Italy created considerable interest throughout the country, and the result—two goals to one in favour of Italy—confirmed the superiority that the Italian players had previously manifested over France at Milan. All round the outskirts of Paris the various championship games aroused unbounded enthusiasm, and most of the important grounds drew crowds of a magnitude which speaks volumes for the increasing popularity of the game. The growth of public interest in football is almost mushroom-like. New clubs, new combinations, new federations, and all kinds of controlling bodies are springing up everywhere. During a visit to any of the open spaces or suburbs of the capital on a Sunday groups of boys and young men may be seen practising the game. Indeed, but for the language and the day (Sunday) one could imagine oneself on the outskirts of a large English town.

Football at Home.

Army Cup.

1st Round : 13th Hussars beat 3rd Hussars, 10—1. 2nd Round : 13th Hussars beat 4th Hussars, 2—0. 3rd Round : 13th Hussars lost to 1st Bn. Dublin Fusiliers, 5—3.

Cavalry Cup.

1st Round : 13th Hussars beat 4th Dragoon Guards, 5—2. 2nd Round : 13th Hussars beat 4th Hussars, 3—0. Semi-final : 13th Hussars drawn against the Inniskillings, who won at Aldershot on the 2nd March.

Digitized by Google

Final.

The Inniskillings beat 15th Hussars.—A hard and fast game, in which the better team, although it won, was not so good as the score of 4—0 suggests, was played in the final tie of the Cavalry Cup, at Aldershot. The protagonists were the Inniskilling Dragoons and the 15th Hussars. The former set up a tremendous attack during the opening half, but nothing tangible resulted, thanks in great part to Scott, or rather to a well-combined defence, of which he was the mainstay. Once or twice during the earlier phases of the second half it seemed that the 15th might break through, but it was their opponents who opened the scoring, and one of their opponents who continued the scoring to the close of the game. While the Inniskillings counted the first goal to their score, it was presented to them by Henney, who, attempting to clear a centre by Vince, deflected the ball into his own net. Then Armand set out to accomplish the hat trick. His first contribution came on top of a hot Hussar attack. No. 2 was added a few minutes later by the conversion of a centre from White. The match was very nearly completed when Armand got his third goal home by utilizing a forward pass from Bullen.

Teams.—Inniskilling Dragoons: Pte. Orrell; Sergt. Jones, Lance-Corpl. Fowler; Sergt. White, Pte. Allrecht, Lance-Corpl. Bullen; S.S.M. Steward, Sergts. Vince and Bennett, and Ptes. Armand and Daly. 15th Hussars: Pte. Scott; Sergts. Burton and Henney; S.S.M. Hannan, Ptes. Bishop and Vigore; Lance-Corpl. Plackett, Sergts. Bradford and Buckingham, and Ptes. Eady and Rose.

ALDERSHOT.

Aldershot Command Horse Show.

The King continues his patronage of the Aldershot Command Horse Show, which is to be held under the presidency of Lieut.-General the Earl of Cavan, on the 5th, 6th and 7th of next July, on the Stanhope Lines Recreation Ground. New classes and new military spectacles are promised. The encouragement of Army horse breeding is one important innovation, and in connection therewith the Hunters' Improvement and National Light Horse Breeding Society is presenting two large gold medals for young horses suitable for military purposes.

Aldershot Racecourse.

Meeting Abandoned.—The Stewards of the Aldershot Races have reluctantly decided to abandon the meeting provisionally fixed for 26th and 27th April this year. This decision was rendered necessary by the fact that large numbers of the Aldershot garrison are away. During the War the upkeep of the stands and racecourse has cost a considerable amount.

The Royal Artillery who, since 1892, have held their annual race meeting at Aldershot, will hold their meeting at Sandown Park this year. This means a financial loss to the Aldershot Race Fund. The Royal Army Service Corps also hold their race meeting at Sandown Park this year.

The whole future of the Aldershot Racecourse must depend upon what support is likely to be forthcoming in 1922. Military steeplechases have been carried on

Digitized by Google

successfully since 1883 at Aldershot under the management of Colonel Toogood. It will be a loss to the Army generally if this racecourse has to be closed for financial reasons.

INDIA.

Polo.

The 15th (King's) Hussars Cup, played for at Lucknow in January, was won by the 19th Hussars, who defeated the Cavalry School in the final by nine goals to one. Six teams entered for the cup.

Teams.

19th (Royal) Hussars: (1) R. B. Sheppard, hcp. 2; (2) Colonel Parsons, 1; 3) Capt. Tremayne, 1; (back) G. Fanshawe, 1. Total hcp. 5.

Cavalry School: (1) Major Viscount Ebrington, hcp. 1; (2) Capt. Fleming, 3; (3) H. Jordan, 0; (back) E. D. Holder, 0. Total hcp. 4.

Delhi Polo Tournament.

The Duke of Connaught's Trophy.—This tournament commenced on 4th February, and the following teams entered: 19th Hussars, 21st Lancers, 10th Lancers, 20th Deccan Horse, Viceroy's Staff, Jodhpur, Patiala; also Jaora, 18th Hussars and Poona Horse, but the three latter were unavoidably prevented from competing.

H.H. the Maharaja Sir Partap Singh Bahadur of Jodhpur presented a magnificent silver-gilt trophy and four miniatures. The teams were:

Patiala: Major Jaswant Singh, Colonel Joginder Singh, Capt. Thakar Singh and General Chanda Singh.

10th Lancers: Rissaldar Malsingh, Capt. Cuhusac, Capt. Lawrence and Mr. Hudson.

Viceroy's Staff: (1) Major Mackenzie, (2) Capt. G. Harvey, (3) Capt. A. L Anderson, (4) Major Brooke.

21st Lancers: (1) Mr. Harford, (2) Capt. Evans, (3) Capt. Godfree, (4) Capt. Lister.

19th Hussars: (1) Mr. Sheppard, (2) Major Francis; (3) Capt. Tremayne, (4) Mr. Fanshawe.

Jodhpur: (1) Rao Raja Hanut Singh, (2) Thakur Prihi Singh, (3) the Maharaja of Rutlam, (4) Thakur Ram Singh.

20th Deccan Horse: (1) Capt. H. Nunn, (2) Jemadar Siddi Nur, (3) Capt. Tinley, (4) General Worgan.

Patiala beat 10th Lancers, 13 goals to 1; 21st Lancers beat Viceroy's Staff, 13 goals to 4; Jodhpur beat 19th Hussars, 16 goals to 4.

2nd Round.—Jodhpur beat 21st Lancers, 14 goals to 4; Patiala beat 20th Deccan Horse.

The final game was played on the 10th February, before an enormous gathering of spectators. Long before the advertised hour crowds had assembled, not only

Digitized by Google

in the stands but on the farther side of the ground and at both ends. Unfortunately for the Jodhpur team, the injury to the Maharaja of Rutlam's hand was found to be so severe that he was unable to take part in the game, and his place was taken by Thakor Bhoor Singh. The Patiala side were at full strength. The trophy and the four handsome miniatures were on exhibition in front of the Royal enclosure. The donor, Maharaja Sir Partap Singh, requested His Royal Highness to present them to His Highness the Maharaja of Patiala, whose team so worthily upheld the polo traditions of the State.

As regards the game, it can only be said that it was full of interest from start to finish. Both sides played well, and at the commencement it looked as if Jodhpur were easily the winning team. At the end, however, the combination of the Patiala team told, and they outclassed the younger players in tactics and in steadiness. The result of the chukkers in detail is as follows :

1st Chukker.—An attack by Patiala had an almost immediate reward, and they scored from a melée in front of the goal. Jodhpur then assumed the offensive and amidst much applause equalized.

2nd Chukker.—Jodhpur were at the top of their form and a good shot by Hanut Singh put them ahead. On changing ends Prihi Singh, who was playing a very fine game, put in another goal. Score : Jodhpur 3, Patiala 1.

3rd Chukker.—The Patiala team assumed the offensive. Jaswant Singh scored with a good backhander, which was quickly followed by another goal ; and half time found the scores at 3 goals all.

4th Chukker.—After the interval Jodhpur seemed to be off play, due to Patiala's hustling tactics.

5th Chukker.—Patiala were a goal ahead and added another ; and in the final period they put on two more, thus winning by 7 goals to 3.

An interesting and attractive addition to the afternoon's programme was a musical programme by the Band and Pipers of the Seaforth Highlanders. After His Royal Highness had presented the trophy and cheers had been given for the winners, the runners up and for the Duke, the bugles sounded the Retreat ; the Pipers played a stirring selection of marches, and the Band concluded the day's events by playing the National Anthem.

General Sir Henry Watson and Major Cannon umpired the game and Major Ley officiated as timekeeper.

EGYPT.

The 5th Dragoon Guards, who only arrived in Egypt a short time ago, and are now quartered at Tel-el-Kebir, have been very busy with sport of all kinds. In spite of only having been six weeks in the country they entered for the Visitors Polo Cup. In the second round, after a very exciting game, they were defeated by the small margin of three goals to two by a team calling themselves " Mixed Grill." This team was composed of four officers of the 11th Hussars.

In the Inter-Regimental Tournament the regiment was defeated by the R.H.A. in the first round. This was also a very close game, 5 goals all till the last minute, when the R.H.A. secured the winning goal.

Digitized by Google

SHOOTING.

Tel-el-Kebir has always been a famous place for duck shooting. The regiment have had two good days. On 16th January, 300 duck were bagged, and on 25th January, 280.

BOXING.

In the Egyptian Command Individual Boxing Competition, held in Alexandria, in the last week in January, the 5th Dragoon Guards did very well.

Lance-Corpl. Lloyd won the Welter Weight Competition. Trumpeter Irwin won the Feather Weight Competition. Sergeant Barton was runner-up in the Heavy Weight.

There were only three officers out of the whole Command, two of whom were cavalry officers. Captain Martin, 5th Dragoon Guards, got a walk over in the Light Heavies.

FOOTBALL.

The 5th Dragoon Guards were allowed to enter for the Command Tournament, and defeated the Greys and 2nd Battalion H.L.I. in successive rounds, but were beaten in the semi-final by the Gunners.

An Inter-Troop Competition for a Challenge Gramophone has been held at Tel-el-Kebir, and the final was fought between two troops of " B " Squadron.

PALESTINE.

We have received the following notes from the headquarters of the 10th Cavalry Brigade, at Jenin, Palestine:

The sporting doings of the cavalry in Palestine since October last have been much interfered with by the changes that have taken place in the 10th Cavalry Brigade. Several regiments have left and in their places have come the 8th Cavalry, 4th Cavalry and 31st (D.C.O.) Lancers, in order of arrival from India.

Hunting at Sarona has been kept going despite changes and the old 4th Cavalry Divisional pack, under Capt. Joynson, Warwick Yoemanry, the new master, has given good sport. The hounds covered eleven miles in the best run of the season, of this the first six miles was slow with several checks, but the latter end of the run was a five mile point and as fast as you wanted. The pack has suffered severely and the pups were decimated by distemper. It now consists of three and a-half couple of hounds with two promising pups.

The 8th Cavalry have a " Selugi " or Persian greyhound pack of their own at Jenin—five and a-half couple Persian and one Rampur hound—the foundation of the pack being bought from that well-known Indian master of hounds, Lieut.-Colonel F. Lance, 19th Lancers. Despite the rain and heavy going at Jenin they have given very good sport, under Major Hamilton, O.B.E., who was some years ago master of the Quetta Hunt.

Shooting has been good this year at Sarona. In one week four guns, after lunch each day, got 108 snipe and 15 duck on the Tuesday, and 121 snipe and 15 duck on the Thursday, off the same Jheel.

At Jenin good mixed bags of woodcock, chukoor, snipe and duck have been made, with big bags of snipe at Beisan, the Schythopolis of the ancients.

Digitized by Google

MESOPOTAMIA.

There seems to be some discontent among soldiers quartered in Mesopotamia with certain rules which have been made controlling the shooting of small game. The limit that guns are allowed to shoot does not make Mespot a paradise for sportsmen. It is quite possible that, owing to the number of men out, it is necessary to make rules, but if the following are carried out small game ought to flourish in Mespot:

(1) All ground within a three-mile limit of Mosul Bridge is reserved for dismounted parties. Mounted parties must shoot outside the three-mile limit, and motor parties must shoot outside the ten-mile limit. This does not apply to flight shooting of sand grouse and wildfowl.

(2) Parties to be limited to four guns, with only one beater to each gun.

(3) The daily bag of black partridges will be limited as follows: Within the three-mile limit: No gun will shoot more than two brace. Outside the three-mile limit: No gun will shoot more than three brace. Outside fifteen miles, an average of four brace per gun may be shot.

To reserve hares for coursing, no hare will be shot within five miles of the Bridge. Outside this limit an average of one hare per gun may be shot.

We hear from General Haldane that several race meetings and polo tournaments have been held lately in Mesopotamia. We have received no details, but hope in the next JOURNAL to be able to give full accounts of sport in Mespot.

ABYSSINIA.

We are pleased to hear that last December a most successful race meeting was held at Addis-Abeba. There were seven events on the card, and two of the principal were won by the Abyssinian Prime Minister; Major Dodds, C.M.G., who has been Chargé d'Affaires for the past ten years, also had a good day. He won the Gentlemen Riders' Race on his own horse Battleaxe, was third in another race, and won the Love Cup for the second year in succession.

BIG GAME SHOOTING.

With reference to the big game drive in Zululand, which has been already mentioned in the JOURNAL, we now hear that the man in charge estimates the bag at about 3,000 head. He publishes the following figures:

"Four lions were reported as having been seen. At least four white rhinos were killed. Officially ascertained details of the bag are the following: buffalo, 11; kudu, 20; wildebeest, 55; waterbuck, 36; zebra, 947; bushbuck, 232; warthog, 213; reedbuck, 82; duiker, 204; steinbuck, 13; rheebuck, 11; klipspringer, 2; total 1,864, including various."

This confirms that four, if not more, of the few remaining white rhinos were shot. We suppose that the difference between the 3,000 estimated as killed and the actual bag of 1,864, were animals that were wounded and allowed to die a lingering death. We wonder if the man in charge of the proceedings is satisfied with himself as a sportsman. Several correspondents have written from South

Digitized by Google

Africa, saying that the whole drive was a disgraceful affair. With which we must cordially agree.

It is reported from the Northern Province of Uganda that last November an elephant met rather a curious death. A native had set a trap for pig which were damaging his crops. Part of the trap was a running noose, which apparently caught the elephant's trunk. Next morning he was found dead about 200 yards from where the trap had been set. The noose was tight, about three inches from the end of the trunk, and had completely obliterated the passages. We do not know of any similar case on record.

We have had several inquiries about the drawings by Mr. J. C. Tunnard that have appeared in the CAVALRY JOURNAL. We may say that Mr. Tunnard is prepared to paint pictures of favourite horses or dogs on very reasonable terms. Letters addressed to this Office will be forwarded.

The 4th Royal Irish Dragoon Guards and the Cavalry School held their combined Point-to-Point Meeting at Penton (by the kind permission of Captain F. R. Sutton) on 16th March, and, although it was somewhat windy, the rain held off and an excellent day's racing was the result.

The course of three and a-half miles as usual was in splendid order and the fences suffered little damage in spite of the five events.

First race. 4th Royal Irish Dragoon Guards Welter Race; catch weights, 13.7: Major Dorman's Pushful Joe, 1; Mr. H. B. Frink's Absinthe, 2; Major H. S. Hodgkin's George, 3. A fast run race. Pushful Joe made the running throughout and won by five lengths; one length between second and third; seven starters.

Second race. Cavalry School Welter Race; catch weight, 14: Major W. H. Callander's (Royal Scots Greys) Peter Pan, 1; Sir H. K. Floyd, Bt.'s (15th Hussars) Peter, 2; Major H. F. Brace's (15th Hussars) Bay Rhum, 3. A fast run race throughout; Mr. Astley's Silverstick led to the water, five fences from home, where he fell; the running was then taken up by Peter Pan, closely followed by Peter, neck and neck over the last fence, the former winning by one length; two lengths between second and third. Nine starters.

Third race. Nomination Open Race; catch weights over 12.7: Mr. H. Adamthwaite's Pale Ring, 1; Mr. A. F. Chillingworth's Prime Dutch, 2; Lord Killeen's Bowman, 3. A very fast run race throughout; Pale Ring winning by four lengths; one length between second and third. Twenty-two starters.

Fourth race. Cavalry School Light Weight Race; catch weights over 12.7: Mr. R. B. McCreery's (17th Lancers) Kilbay, 1; Mr. T. J. Arnott's (15th Hussars) Russel, 2; Capt. H. A. Pelly's (7th Hussars) Speck, 3. An excellent race throughout and all the twelve starters were well together for the first two and a-half miles; Kilbay coming to the fore at the third last fence and won by three lengths from Russel; two lengths between second and third.

Fifth race. 4th Royal Irish Dragoon Guards Regimental Race: Major E. M. Dorman's Pushful Joe, 1; Mr. H. B. Frink's Silly Dick, 2; Capt. D. G. Darley's Little Chap, 3. A capital race from start to finish; a length between first and second and the same between second and third. Twelve starters.

Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google

THE CHARGE OF THE 5th DRAGOON GUARDS AT HARBONNIÈRES,
August 8th, 1918.

From the Painting by Fortunino Matania in the possession of the 5th Dragoon Guards.
Exhibited in the Royal Academy.

Digitized by Google

THE

CAVALRY JOURNAL

JULY, 1921.

OPERATIONS OF THE MOUNTED TROOPS OF THE EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (continued).

By LIEUT.-COLONEL J. G. BROWNE, C.M.G., D.S.O.,*
14th King's Hussars.

PHASE II. THE FIRST AND SECOND BATTLES OF GAZA AND THE PERIOD PRIOR TO THE OPERATIONS BEGINNING IN OCTOBER, 1917.

CHAPTER XII. PERIOD PRIOR TO THE OPERATIONS FOR THE FIRST ATTACK ON GAZA.

WHILE the mounted troops were at El Arish the Imperial Mounted Division was formed and came into being on 16th March, 1917. The 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade left the Anzac Mounted Division and the 22nd Mounted Brigade came to it.

The Desert Column commanded by Lieut.-General Sir P. W. Chetwode therefore became as follows:

Anzac Mounted Division.	*Imperial Mounted Division.*
1st A.L.H. Brigade.	3rd A.L.H. Brigade.
2nd A.L.H. Brigade.	4th A.L.H. Brigade.
N.Z.M.R. Brigade.	5th Mounted Brigade.
22nd Mounted Brigade.	6th Mounted Brigade.
With Ayrshire, Inverness, Leicester and Somerset Batteries R.H.A.	With Berks, Notts, "A" and "B" H.A.C. Batteries, R.H.A.

IMPERIAL CAMEL BRIGADE.

The Turks had meantime been strengthening their position at Weli Sheikh Nuran, south of the Wady Gaza, and were also reported to be holding Khan Yunus. Reconnaissances were carried out daily by the

* The author desires to acknowledge the most valuable assistance in this compilation from Lieut.-Colonel W. J. Foster, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Australian Military Forces, who was G.S.O.2 of the Anzac Mounted Division, and G.S.O.1 of the Yeomanry Mounted Division.

Digitized by Google

mounted troops; but the Turks did not come far from their trenches. The pushing forward of the railway and pipe-line continued, covered immediately by the infantry, while a brigade of cavalry was pushed forward sufficiently far ahead to ensure full notice of any hostile enterprise.


Map to show country where operations took place from the start of the 1st Gaza operations in March 1917 to the beginning of the GAZA-BEERSHEBA operations in October 1917.
Deir Sineid
Tel el Nejile
Sheikh Zowaiid
El Burj
Rafa
Khan Yunus
Gamli
Scale of Miles
Route of the Anzac Mounted Division
To 1st Battle of GAZA
To 2nd Battle of GAZA
To Destruction of Asluj-Auja Railway
Action on Reconnaissance to Beersheba

As soon as the railway was well beyond El Burj, the whole of the Anzac Mounted Division (less one brigade) went forward on 19th February to Sheikh Zowaiid, and General Chaytor, commanding the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade, went forward with his own brigade and the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade and reconnoitred Khan Yunus, which was found strongly held. On (about) 27th February, however, the Turks left Khan Yunus, and on 5th March they retreated from the whole

Digitized by Google

of their prepared position at Weli Sheikh Nuran, leaving a few posts on the Wady Ghuzze. These were chased away by the cavalry, who now patrolled beyond the wady.

The Gaza Operations.

On 23rd March the position of the Desert Column was as follows:

Headquarters at Rafa.

Anzac Mounted Division (less one brigade) along the beach about Bir Abu Shunnar, close to the Sinai—Palestine border.

Imperial Mounted Division on the track south of the Anzac Mounted Division.

Imperial Camel Brigade, Abasan el Kebir.

Armoured cars, Abasan el Kebir.

Railhead was a little beyond Rafa.

The Turks were entrenching round Gaza, and were reported to have 4,000 in the place. Strong detachments were also known to be at Nejed, Huj, Abu Hareira, Tel el Nejileh and Beersheba.

General instructions for the coming operations were issued. These were for the Desert Column to move round the east side of Gaza by night and cut the town off from the north, while the infantry attacked from the south and south-east. Prior to this the troops had to be assembled within striking distance, and the ground beyond the wady, as near as possible to Gaza, had to be reconnoitred.

The mounted troops especially had to reconnoitre the route to be followed by night over the Gol el Taire, a rough ridge broken up by wadys and the crossings over the Wady Ghuzze. Orders for the assembly and the reconnaissance were issued on 24th March.

At 02.30 on 25th March, the Anzac Mounted Division left their bivouacs on the beach, crossed the two miles of heavy sand-hills, and went through Rafa, moving a little north of east, so as to get on the right flank of the infantry, who were to march north-east from Rafa.

The result was that they struck the marching infantry columns in Rafa, and some delay and crossing of columns occurred.

The mounted troops then marched east of Khan Yunus, skirting Abasan el Kebir, and pushed across the Wady Ghuzze, only encountering opposition when about two miles from the town.

The route to be followed that night was then carefully reconnoitred as far as the Wady Ghuzze, a selected officer from each brigade was taken over it, sign boards put up where required, and a trench cut across the track at one point where the column had to leave it and go across country for about 150 yards to another one.

After dark this route was again reconnoitred for a considerable distance by the Divisional Staff.

Digitized by Google

The reconnaissance completed, the mounted troops withdrew to Deir el Belah, the Anzac Mounted Division bivouacking just north-east and the Imperial Mounted Division just west of the village.

Orders were issued at 17.00 by the Desert Mounted Corps and got to brigades by 19.15.

The Night March to encircle Gaza.

At 02.30 on 26th March, the Anzac Mounted Division left Deir el Belah. The Imperial Mounted Division followed them.

In spite of all the arrangements a check occurred at once.

Between the time of the last reconnaissance of the road to be followed by the mounted troops and the hour of starting, a body of infantry had marched in and camped across the track. A deviation had to be made



In the map showing the 1st Battle of Gaza at 18.30, the 22nd Mounted Brigade is indicated one mile east of Gaza and of the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade below Fryer's Hill.

to avoid the infantry bivouacs, and, in the darkness, some difficulty was experienced in picking up the track again. Moreover, while this was going on, the column parted owing to an accident, and some anxious minutes were spent before it was joined again.

Digitized by Google

As the head of the column reached the foot of the Goz el Taire a thick fog came on and was absolutely dense when the column was at the top of the hills.

The leading brigadier was obliged to halt his brigade until he got a message back from his advanced guard that they had made good the crossing over the Wady Ghuzze.

At 04.50 the leading brigade of the division crossed the wady; but for some time, owing to the fog, advanced and flank detachments had to keep close in to the column.

At 07.55 the fog began to lift, just as the head of the column passed Sheikh Abbas, and it cleared about twenty minutes later.

In front, along the top of a slight rise, ran the main road from Gaza to Beersheba, with the telegraph line alongside it. Here the first shots were fired; the Turkish camelmen occupying some rough ground near the road. They were driven off at once, and the march went on.

At 08.15, 08.35 and 08.55 the hostile aeroplanes attacked the column, coming low over it and using machine guns. Parties had to dismount and fire back at them to drive them off; and some slight delay was caused.

Just after 09.00 the advanced guard, coming over a rise, nearly caught a Turkish aeroplane on the ground; but it rose and got away.

The 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade now swung to the left, and moved rapidly north-west, towards Jebalieh, with the object of cutting off Gaza from the north.

Divisional Headquarters reached Beit Durdis at 09.30, and established themselves there, the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade sending a detachment to the high ground north of that place to watch the country northwards.

Some pools of water were found, due to the late rains, in the wadys near Beit Durdis, and here many of the horses were watered.

Communication was established with Desert Column by 10.10. A cable was laid from Desert Mounted Corps as the troops advanced.

At 10.30 the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade Headquarters was established at Jebalieh.

As the leading regiment of this brigade galloped down on to the road running into Gaza from the north, they caught the Turkish Commander of the 53rd Division and Staff, just driving into Gaza in a carriage, on his way from his division to take command of the troops in Gaza. The division itself was coming down the road, and the brigadier of the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade sent a detachment from his brigade up the road towards Deir Sineid to watch its movements. This detachment reported later that the Turks were bivouacking north of Deir Sineid.

In addition to the Turkish Commander the brigade also captured a convoy of thirty wagons, driven by Germans and Turks.

Digitized by Google

The first Turkish guns opened fire from Gaza at this time, dropping shells near the troops approaching Beit Durdis.

At 11.30 the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade reported that their right was on the sea, so that Gaza was now completely cut off from the north. A body of Turks trying to march north-east from the town had been caught in column on a road between cactus hedges and driven back with loss.

Chapter XIII. The First Battle of Gaza.

The attack on Gaza by the infantry had begun and shells were bursting about Ali Muntar and neighbouring points. Only that part of the attack which was directed on Ali Muntar could be seen from Beit Durdis.

At 13.33 orders came to General Chauvel, from Desert Column, to tell him to reconnoitre towards Gaza to assist the infantry attack, and, acting on these orders, the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade began pushing southwards, through the olive trees and gardens which lie to the north of the town, while their extreme right pushed forward through the sand towards Sheikh Redwan. The Turks up north of Deir Sineid were still quiet, but reports from the Imperial Mounted Division and from the detachment from the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade north of Beit Durdis showed that there was some movement going on, both from Nejed and Huj.

A heavy Turkish gun was shelling from Abu Hareira towards Sheikh Abbas.

At 14.00 the following order came from Desert Column: General Chauvel was put in command of General Hodgson's Division as well as his own. He was to attack Gaza from the north, using his own division and such troops of the Imperial Mounted Division as were not required for other purposes. He was to use the Imperial Mounted Division to keep off the enemy advancing from the direction of Huj and Nejed.

Orders were got out at once for brigadiers of the 2nd New Zealand Mounted Rifle and 22nd Mounted Brigades to meet General Chauvel at a point two miles nearer Gaza, whither Divisional Headquarters were to move at once. General Hodgson was asked to send one brigade to General Chauvel, to be in reserve, as he intended to put in the whole of the Anzac Mounted Division (less certain detachments) to attack Gaza. Hodgson was ordered to move his headquarters to Beit Durdis.

By 14.35 Anzac Divisional Headquarters was at its new position, north-east of Gaza. General Chauvel explained the plan of attack to the brigadiers, and at 15.40 it began.

The 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade attacked from the north, keeping their right on the sea.

Digitized by Google

The New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade, in touch with the left of the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade, attacked along the continuation of the Ali Muntar Hill, one point being now called Chaytor's Hill.

The 22nd Mounted Brigade attacked on the left of the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade.

At this time the infantry could be seen moving rapidly up to Ali Muntar, and apparently making good progress. By 17.00 they had taken the hill.

The position now was as follows:

Around Gaza everything going well. On the right the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade pushing their way south on foot, through cactus hedges and sand. Their right hand regiment was into Sheikh Redwan.

The New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade had got the ridge east of Gaza, and were into the outskirts of the town.

The Somerset Battery had silenced two Turkish guns, which the New Zealanders then captured and turned on to buildings still held by the Turks, compelling their hurried evacuation.

A detachment of the Canterbury Mounted Rifles was with the infantry on Ali Muntar Hill.

The 22nd Mounted Brigade was concentrated close to a hill now called Fryer's Hill.

Prisoners were coming in, and the report of the brigadiers pointed to complete collapse of resistance in their front.

Towards the north and east, however, matters had taken a turn which gave cause for anxiety. The Turks north of Deir Sineid appeared to have woken up, and small bodies had pushed south and were engaged with our detachment at Deir Sineid.

The Turks from Nejed and Huj were now in considerable strength, and General Hodgson was hotly engaged. He was obliged to send to General Chauvel to ask him to send back the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade, which General Chauvel did, keeping one regiment of that brigade; while the brigade went off at a gallop to Beit Durdis, arriving just in time to save an awkward situation.

The advanced troops of the 5th Mounted Brigade, facing Abu Hareira, were also engaged with bodies of Turks pushing forward from that place.

The Imperial Camel Brigade were in the gap between General Hodgson's right and the left of the 5th Mounted Brigade; but the gap was too wide and the enemy appeared likely to work round Hodgson's right, so that he was obliged later to ask for the remaining regiment of the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade, the 10th Light Horse, to be returned to him to fill the gap. The fighting in this area increased as darkness came on.

Digitized by Google

It was at 17.00 that orders came from Desert Column that all slow moving stuff should be sent back. The camels with wireless and some of the wheels therefore left.

At 18.10 a conversation took place on the telephone between Desert Column and General Chauvel. It lasted some time, as the information the General gave as to his true position had to be considered at Headquarters East Force, which was alongside Desert Column. At any rate the outcome of the conversation was that the mounted troops were to concentrate at once and withdraw during the night to Hill 310, close to Inseirat.

The Withdrawal from Gaza.

The difficult operation of a night march was rendered far more so by several circumstances. It was dark when the order arrived. The troops, thinking naturally of the success they had won, were still pressing on among the cactus hedges and houses of Gaza, taking prisoners and material. The two captured guns and a large party of prisoners, including many wounded, had already been sent in to Divisional Headquarters. Owing to the enclosed nature of the ground the horses of the attacking troops, and particularly those of the right hand regiment of the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade, had been left far behind; and just before dark these horses had been sent to water in a large pond north of Gaza. The 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade and New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade were on a front of over three miles.

There was also the detachment to the north to be withdrawn.

And it was not until the Anzac Mounted Division had passed Beit Durdis, on its way back, that the Imperial Mounted Division could even begin to withdraw its detachments.

Under ordinary circumstances it would be light enough by 06.00, and all the mounted troops should be back at least as far as Sheikh Abbas by that time, so that allowing everything to go well the Imperial Mounted Division should at least start its arrangements to withdraw not later than 03.00.

It was not until 23.55 that the Anzac Divisional Headquarters were able to close down and march. They went via Beit Durdis and Sheikh Abbas, passing Beit Durdis at 00.45. The New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade made a march across country to Beit Durdis.

The division reached a point near El Mendur at 05.15, and crossed the Wady Ghuzze at 06.00, south of Ummjerar, and bivouacked about Inseirat, being held in readiness for the rest of the day.

On 28th March, when it was definitely decided that the first attempt to take Gaza should be abandoned, the division withdrew to a bivouac north-west of Deir el Belah.

Digitized by Google

The results of this battle for the Anzac Mounted Division were as follows:

Captured Material.—2 Krupp 75 mm. guns.

Prisoners.—462.

Casualties.—

	Personnel.		*Horses.*
	Officers.	Other Ranks.	
Killed	—	6	23
Wounded	6	40	30
Missing	—	2	3
	—	—	—
	6	48	56

Shell Expended.—304 rounds.

S.A.A. Expended.—150,000 rounds.

Points with regard to the First Battle of Gaza.

The first battle of Gaza was a success for the mounted troops as far as they were allowed to go. The situation at dark was dangerous; but all those round Gaza considered they had won. Hence the order to break off the action and withdraw was very hard to carry out. The description of the infantry part of the battle does not belong to this account.

The following questions naturally arise:

(*a*) Did the fog cause much delay, and hence influence the course of the battle?

The distance which Anzac Divisional Headquarters had to cover from the bivouac at Deir el Belah to Beit Durdis was about seventeen miles, of which the first seven included the rough and difficult Goz el Taire and the crossing of the Wady Ghuzze, had been carefully reconnoitred and marked. The remainder was unknown ground.

It was just light at this period at 06.00. The column left their bivouac at 02.30. Normally, therefore, they would have marched for three and a half hours under night conditions, whereas they had to go for nearly five and a half hours under those conditions, as the fog began to dissipate at 07.55.

This does not mean that the pace of movement is so much affected as that the advanced guard and flanking detachments have to keep close in to the column, and that the movement to successive positions is very restricted. At the ordinary rate of marching, taking the two periods, in the dark and after daylight, the division should have reached Beit Durdis by 08.50. They did reach it at 09.30, that is forty minutes later.

There were two other causes for delay, however:

1. The check and detour which had to be made immediately after starting, to avoid the infantry bivouacs; say ten minutes.

Digitized by Google

2. The action with the camelmen, and three aeroplane attacks, which between them may have caused another ten minutes delay.

The delay by the fog to the mounted troops is hardly half an hour.

On the other hand, it certainly must have seriously delayed the infantry arrangements for attack by delaying reconnaissances which could have started immediately after daylight. This would put the whole sequence of events back two hours, and one has only to consider the great difference had Ali Muntar fallen at 15.00 instead of 17.00 as it did!

One must also admit the fog had its effect on the enemy. Their forces from Huj and Nejed would have marched sooner had our attack come sooner.

(*b*) It has been stated that the cavalry were short of water.

This may have been the case with the Imperial Mounted Division, though there were pools in the wadys near Beit Durdis due to recent rains, where Anzac Divisional Headquarters and some other troops had already watered.

As regards the Anzac Mounted Division, however, apart from these pools already mentioned, the large pond on the northern outskirts of Gaza was in their hands, and horses of both the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade and the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade were already watering there.

(*c*) *Could the attack by the Anzac Mounted Division have been pushed in sooner?*

It must have been apparent that the longer the delay before Gaza fell the more would the Turkish forces from the north and north-east begin to make themselves felt. The order came at 14.00. However, the whole timing of the infantry attack was probably affected two hours, as has been suggested before. Otherwise the order might have come at midday. The division was in a position to attack by 11.30, so that they were really doing nothing for two hours; but through no fault of their own.

(*d*) *Could the mounted troops have held on where they were and continued the fight next morning?* (All the facts of this battle not being in my possession, I can only state what was known at Divisional Headquarters.)

The situation, as far as we know, is shown in Map II. The enemy seemed in greatest strength opposite Beit Durdis, and had been only just checked at dusk. They were holding on opposite the Imperial Mounted Division. To hold off the Turks coming from this direction, and including Abu Hareira, next morning the Imperial Mounted Division and the Imperial Camel Brigade would have had to fight on a front of ten miles at least, to include Beit Durdis in the north and the Wady Ghuzze in the south.

Digitized by Google

The rifles available would be about as follows:

Imperial Mounted Division	about	3,600 rifles.
Imperial Camel Brigade	„	2,000 „
	or	5,600 in all.

And as regards guns:

4 R.H.A. Batteries.
1 Mountain Battery.

This was not a great force to hold off a probably very superior enemy force, which might, moreover, put in strong attacks at three different points, that is, north or south of Beit Durdis or from Abu Hareira.

And in addition to this there was the force coming down from the north, and already engaged about Deir Sineid. General Chauvel could hardly have continued his attack on Gaza with his whole division. He must have taken steps during the night to pull back certainly one, and probably two, brigades. The 22nd Mounted Brigade were easy to get hold of; but to disengage either the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade or 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade would have been difficult, and even then it is not certain that the force available would have been enough. If Gaza fell early next day all would be well. But if it did not, one can see that the mounted troops would have to stand determined attacks from three or four directions. Except for the attack from Deir Sineid, if any of these were successful, the retreat of at any rate part of the mounted troops would have been cut off.

A further consideration was that, if any hard fighting occurred before Gaza fell, these troops would be in a very difficult situation as regards ammunition supply. Another possibility is, that even if the Imperial Mounted Division and Imperial Camel Brigade could not hold back the Turkish attack, could they delay it for such time as to enable the Anzac Mounted Division, with the help of the infantry, to mop up what was in Gaza, and withdraw through it? After this the Imperial Mounted Division and Camel Brigade to effect their own withdrawal. This all again depends on the unknown quantity of the Turkish resistance in Gaza. The following point is, however, of interest and is, I believe, not generally known.

The Gaza garrison sent wireless messages out to say "all was lost," and this was picked up in Cairo; but did not reach East Force in time.

One final point about the route taken by the Anzac Division in its withdrawal. Late in the day an officer was sent by General Chauvel to reconnoitre a possible route back direct from Anzac Divisional Headquarters, passing west of Sheikh Abbas, and thus avoiding the long and possibly dangerous way east of Sheikh Abbas. The officer got back and reported the route impracticable. Some time later, when the ground was examined, it was found that it would have been quite easy to retire

Digitized by Google

that way. The difference in the situation for the General Officers Commanding Anzac and Imperial Mounted Divisions is obvious.

It may be asked why a possible alternative route for retirement was not reconnoitred before. There was no idea of any retirement as regards the Anzac Mounted Division until the order came at 17.00 for all slow moving stuff to go back.

Chapter XIV. The Second Battle of Gaza.

Preparations for the Battle.

At the beginning of April preparations for the second attempt on Gaza were begun. During the period following the first battle the Turks had concentrated their main force in and about Gaza, and thus



The map shows the approximate Turkish *line* facing S.W.
For "March of Anzac 10th Div." *read* "Mounted Div."

gave the opportunity for a very similar operation to the last one. But they changed their dispositions, putting a strong force to hold Gaza,

Digitized by Google

detachments at Khirbet Elbir, Rijm Atawineh and Khirbet Erk; a strong force at Abu Hareira and a reserve in rear about Beit Durdis. Beersheba was strongly held.

They began to extend their trenches at Gaza, along the high ground towards Abu Hareira, and constructed redoubts. This work progressed rapidly. This disposition of the Turkish forces precluded all chance of a turning move by the mounted troops round the flank, which was now Abu Hareira; and therefore the battle took the form of forcing a gap in the enemy's line through which the mounted troops could pass.

From the cessation of the first Gaza operations the mounted troops kept out a day line of observation beyond the Wady Ghuzze. The night outpost line was along the Goz el Taire, up to and including Sheikh Hammuda.

The Turks made no move forward; but any attempt of our patrols to push forward beyond the Wady Ghuzze met with opposition.

Under cover of this outpost line a reserve of water was put into the cisterns at Tel el Jemmi and Umm Jerar, being brought from Deir el Belah on camels.

Preliminary instructions for the next operations were given out, and as the first move for the Anzac Mounted Division was a night march from Deir el Belah, through Sheikh Hammuda and El Imaain, through ruins west of Weli Sheikh Nuran to El Shellal on the Wady Ghuzze, the route was carefully reconnoitred, and as far as the ruins west of Weli Sheikh Nuran was marked by heaps of earth dug up every fifty yards.

On 15th April, at 15.00, there was a conference at Desert Column Headquarters, in which instructions for the next operations were given. These were, shortly, the infantry to secure the Sheikh Abbas ridge, while the Anzac Mounted Division, after completing the night march, helped this operation by strong demonstrations towards Abu Hareira and Beersheba.

On 16th April, at 07.00, a final conference was held by Sir A. Murray at Khan Yunus. This was attended by all Divisional Commanders.

In the afternoon officers from the Divisional and Brigade Staffs of the Anzac Mounted Division rode over the first five miles to be followed that night.

The route wound through the infantry bivouacs before striking the western slopes of the Goz el Taire, where it turned south-east. As an additional precaution a signaller with a lamp was put at this point, with orders to flash A.V.A. from 19.00 onwards, this being the hour of starting.

The 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade also had marched into Khan Yunus from Bir el Abd, and the point where they joined the column had to be arranged.

Digitized by Google

THE OPERATIONS, 17TH AND 18TH APRIL.

At 19.00 the head of the division passed the starting point.

Two points made the march difficult at the start. The country was now very dry, and the marching of columns of troops had cut it up. Hence a thick dust cloud added to the difficulty of the darkness. The lamp, however, in front helped the direction. Beyond that the route was marked with the heaps of earth; but with no moon these were invisible at fifty yards and progress was slow.

17th April. At 04.25 the advanced guard crossed the Wady Ghuzze



at El Shellal. A cable was run into El Shellal by Desert Column, but it was cut several times by enemy agents, and communication was not at first obtained.

The division crossed to begin the demonstrations as ordered, and as the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade were crossing they were attacked

Digitized by Google

by enemy aeroplanes, who inflicted some damage on men and horses with bombs. The two light armoured motor cars joined the division after daylight.

The 22nd Mounted Brigade moved towards Abu Hareira with the armoured cars, and the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade went along the road towards Beersheba. Scattered bodies of enemy were met and their guns, about Abu Hareira, came into action. A good deal of firing went on, and after dark the division withdrew to the southern side of the Wady Gaza. The infantry took Sheikh Abbas during the day.

On 18th April the division again pushed forward towards the Wady Imlieh. Enemy aeroplanes attacked the column from time to time; but practically the only damage was an unlucky shot which struck one of the Leicester Battery ammunition wagons. In the afternoon General Chauval interviewed Sir P. Chetwode at Tel el Jemmi, and orders for the next day's battle were given.

In this battle the Anzac Mounted Division were in reserve; but most of its units were engaged throughout the day.

The Battle.

At 01.00 on 19th April, the division was assembled on the northern side of the Wady Gaza and marched.

1st Australian Light Horse Brigade led with orders to cross the Wady Imlieh at Point 280, and thence turn east and occupy Baiket el Sana, and hold up any enemy who might push forward from Abu Hareira.

The 22nd Mounted Brigade remained on the Wady Ghuzze with orders to watch the country towards Beersheba and the south, and prevent any hostile advance from that direction.

At 03.50 the head of the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade reached the Wady Imlieh where a delay occurred, as the tail of the Imperial Mounted Division was still crossing on their way north. The 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade finally crossed at 04.15, and went off to Baiket el Sana, the Leicester Battery R.H.A. going with them.

Divisional Headquarters was established on a small hill just north of Point 280.

The 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade and New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade were held in reserve south of Wady Imlieh, opposite Point 280. At 05.40 an officer attached to Divisional Headquarters was sent out to select a position for a line of posts to connect Point 280 with El Shellal, where the 22nd Mounted Brigade were. As the ground was practically dead flat there was not much choice of position.

By now the battle had begun, and at 06.00 the C.R.A. went forward to select gun positions to support the attack of the Imperial Mounted Division.

Digitized by Google

Two batteries went forward shortly afterwards, and at 07.45 the Inverness Battery opened fire on the Sausage Ridge, and the Ayrshire Battery on the Atawineh Redoubt.

At the same time orders came to General Chauvel to send up a squadron to fill temporarily a gap in the front line. It was promised back as soon as another regiment from the Imperial Mounted Division was available; but it did not return.

At 08.50 General Chauvel, by orders of Desert Column, sent up the Wellington Mounted Rifles. They were brought up on the right of the 5th Mounted Brigade, and put in the attack on the Sausage Ridge.

At 09.15 Khor Sihan was taken by the 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade. The 5th Mounted Brigade were close to Atawineh, and the Wellington Mounted Rifles were working up the Sausage Ridge, closely supported by the Inverness and Ayrshire Batteries.

At 10.28 matters seemed to be going well, and orders came for the Anzac Mounted Division to be ready to go through the gap.

Two cars of the Light Armoured Motor Battery were put in to help the advance of the Wellington Mounted Rifles up the Sausage Ridge, which was still pushing on.

Patrols of the 7th Australian Light Horse Regiment, who were pushed out in observation in the direction of Beersheba, reported patrols of the enemy could be seen coming from that direction. The 5th Australian Light Horse Regiment were already engaged in digging on the line already selected between Point 280 and El Shellal.

At 11.28, to help the advance of the Wellington Mounted Rifles, the guns of the Leicester Battery were turned on the Sausage Ridge from Baiket el Sana. So far the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade were not seriously engaged; but their advanced troops to the east and north-east were engaged with scattered parties of the enemy.

At 12.20 the two Light Armoured Motor Battery Cars returned much damaged. The advance of the Wellington Mounted Rifles was held up by 13.22, though the Commander of the Ayrshire Battery pushed his guns forward and engaged the enemy in their trenches at 700 yards.

At 14.15 the enemy counter-attacks began, and most of the ground gained was lost. Orders came to General Chauvel to send up a brigade to report to the Imperial Mounted Division, and the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade (less the Wellington Mounted Rifles and a squadron Auckland Mounted Rifles, who were already up) went up at once.

This left the 6th Australian Light Horse Regiment only, with the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade, forming General Chauvel's only reserve, and as it was intended that this regiment should go up with the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade to make that brigade complete, orders were sent to tell General Fryer, General Officer Commanding

Digitized by Google

22nd Mounted Brigade, to send two of his regiments up at once to report to Divisional Headquarters.

About the same time a message came in from General Fryer to say that he was engaged with the enemy's cavalry coming from Beersheba, and shortly afterwards the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade reported that the 7th Australian Light Horse Regiment was engaged about Hill 350.

At 14.30 the Turks counter-attacked north-east of Sausage Ridge, and a quarter of an hour later the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade reported Turks advancing on Baiket el Sana.

Both these attacks were stopped; but the Leicester Battery had to change position under heavy shell fire.

At 16.00 Turkish cavalry moved against the right of the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade; but were driven off by the Hotchkiss rifles and mounted attack of the 3rd Australian Light Horse Regiment.

At 17.35 came a big attack of Turkish cavalry and camelmen from the direction of Beersheba, coming off the high ground in the direction of that place and over Goz el Basal and Goz el Gelieb, towards Tel el Jemmi. They brought several batteries of light guns down and these shelled the crossings of the Wady Ghuzze, getting right into the field squadron working at El Shellal and causing some casualties.

It seemed likely at one time that the Turks would press right on; but, except for small bodies, they did not come beyond Goz el Gelieb, from which place they kept up fire until dark.

No further progress was made in the main battle, and night found both sides as they had started the day.

At 19.45 the Anzac Mounted Division got orders to withdraw to Izraain. This was done after dark; but, owing to the dispersion of the division, it took some time to collect them.

The division reached Izraain at 22.00.

No material or prisoners were taken by the Anzac Mounted Division in this battle, and it had the following casualties:

	Personnel.		*Horses.*
	Officers.	Other Ranks.	
Killed	2	17	119
Wounded	7	170	102
Missing	—	—	10
Injured	—	—	2
Sick	—	—	60
	9	187	293

Digitized by Google

Points about this Battle.

As regards the Anzac Mounted Division, since it was mainly in reserve as a division, there are few points to bring out. The following, however, should be noted:

1. The great dispersion of the troops of the division.

The intention was to use the Anzac Mounted Division as soon as the gap was forced in the line. Yet from 08.50 up to 13.00, the period during which this was probable, the only troops on whom General Chauvel could lay his hands for immediate action were the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade (less two regiments), the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade (less one regiment and one squadron) and the Somerset Battery, as the following list shows:

Divisional Headquarters on Point 280.

1st Australian Light Horse Brigade, Baiket el Sana.

*2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade (less two regiments), just south of Point 280.

5th Australian Light Horse Regiment, digging on the Point 280—El Shellal line of defence.

7th Australian Light Horse Regiment, watching country towards Beersheba.

*New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade (less one regiment and one squadron), just south of Point 280.

Wellington Mounted Rifles, attacking Sausage Ridge.

1st Auckland Mounted Rifles, in front line with the Imperial Mounted Division.

22nd Mounted Brigade, on the Wady Ghuzze watching country south and south-east.

Ayrshire Battery, Inverness Battery } In action supporting attack on Sausage Ridge and Atawineh.

Leicester Battery, Baiket el Sana.

*Somerset Battery, just south of Point 280.

* Available for going through the gap.

After the time for attack had passed and we were on the defensive, the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade, Somerset Battery and later the 6th Australian Light Horse Regiment (the remaining regiment of the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade), were sent to help in the defence, and two regiments of the 22nd Mounted Brigade coming up to Point 280.

2. Could any mounted troops have been sent to deal with the Turkish cavalry when it advanced late in the day? This was probably what the Turks intended, and, except for small bodies, they did not come beyond Goz el Gelieb, so that any troops sent after them would have had to go

Digitized by Google

a long way. The only troops who could have been used at that hour would have been the 7th Australian Light Horse Regiment, possibly the 5th Australian Light Horse Regiment, and the two regiments of Yeomanry. But as the main battle was still going on it would not have been justifiable to send these troops off on a chase, when they might at any moment be urgently needed elsewhere.

Subsequent Operations.

In the early morning of 20th April the division was collected, and two brigades sent off to take up a defensive line along the old Turkish position at Weli Sheikh Nuran, facing south, as it was expected that an attack



might come that way. When there they were attacked by enemy aeroplanes, and had thirty killed and wounded and about one hundred horses hit.

Digitized by Google

For the next few days, 21st April and onwards, the division was employed in patrolling north of the Wady Ghuzze in the direction of Abu Hareira and Beersheba. The Turkish cavalry were met daily at first; and there occurred the case of a troop of light horse charging a troop of Turkish Lancers, though they themselves were only armed with rifles and bayonets, A hand-to-hand fight occurred, in which the Australians accounted for the whole Turkish troop, in either killed, wounded or prisoners.

All the mounted troops were also engaged in digging a defensive line which, after several changes, was chosen to run along the northern side of the Wady Ghuzze. A chain of redoubts were dug and wired. These were taken over by the infantry about the second week in May.

From the end of the Gaza operations until the operations against the Gaza—Beersheba line in October, 1917, was a period of trench warfare for the infantry and of minor enterprises for the mounted troops.

Chapter XV. The Asluj—Auja Expedition and the Period of Minor Enterprises, May, 1917.

From the time the Gaza operations ceased until the preparations were begun for the Gaza—Beersheba operations, in October, was a period of minor enterprises for the cavalry. It was arranged that each division in turn should be in the forward line, while each took a period of resting.

At first only the two divisions were available, and the division which was resting was kept at Abasan el Kebir, so as to be near enough to support if required. But later the Yeomanry Mounted Division was formed, and the Imperial Mounted Division renamed the Australian Mounted Division. Each division became also one of three brigades, instead of four as up to the present, and were organized as below:

Anzac Mounted Division.	*Australian Mounted Division.*
1st A.L.H. Brigade.	3rd A.L.H. Brigade.
2nd A.L.H. Brigade.	4th A.L.H. Brigade.
N.Z.M.R. Brigade.	5th Mounted Brigade.
With the Ayrshire, Inverness and Somerset Batteries.	With three Batteries.

Yeomanry Mounted Division.

6th Mounted Brigade.
8th Mounted Brigade.
22nd Mounted Brigade.
With three Batteries.

Digitized by Google

One mounted brigade, the 7th Mounted Brigade, became corps troops.

The whole of the above formed the Desert Mounted Corps. Once this organization was completed divisions could take a period in the front line, a period in support at Abasan el Kebir, and a period resting on the beach.

As regards the minor enterprises, each division was left a free hand in their inception, only reporting to Desert Mounted Corps what they intended to do.

The object of the enterprises was :

(*a*) To obtain moral superiority over the enemy.

(*b*) By making it dangerous for his patrols and posts to push forward, to stop him gaining information.

And as would possibly follow from his inability to gain information by small bodies to induce him to send larger ones, and so give a chance of inflicting loss on him.

There is no record available of the minor enterprises carried out by the Anzac Mounted Division between April and May, 1917.

On 23rd May was undertaken the expedition to the Asluj—Auja railway, by which it was still possible for the Turks to rail troops as far as Auja, and thus be a threat, if not a danger, to our communications. The Anzac Mounted Division and Imperial Camel Brigade carried out this raid. Before undertaking it parties of men from the division were put through a regular drill of placing, securing and firing a charge to cut a rail. In the end it was possible to cut every rail for a mile in twenty minutes. To cover the operation, the Australian Mounted Division marched across the Wady Ghuzze, and at dawn on 23rd May, they pushed out strong parties towards Abu Hareira, the Wadi Imlieh and Beersheba. Some opposition was encountered from Turkish cavalry, and armed Bedouin ; but the Turks kept well within their defences.

The Anzac Mounted Division left their bivouac near El Shellal on the evening of 22nd May and took up a position some four miles north of Khalasa. The 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade, with 6th Australian Light Horse Regiment and raiding parties, pushed on in advance, reaching the railway about Asluj at 06.55 on 23rd May, destroyed four miles of railway, all points, switches, etc., in Asluj station, and one 18-arch bridge, one 5-arch and one 3-arch, and two smaller bridges by 10.20, and returned. The covering troops had some fighting with some hostile Arabs.

The Imperial Camel Brigade destroyed the railway about Auja; but I have no details.

The force were back at El Shellal by 22.30 on 23rd May.

The demolition and covering parties of the Anzac Mounted Division did fifty-eight and sixty-four miles respectively between 15.00 on 22nd May and 22.30 on 23rd May.

Digitized by Google

From 4th July to 18th August the Anzac Mounted Division were again in the front line. Sixty-two minor enterprises were carried out, which took the forms of:

(*a*) Drives by day or night; or surprises of certain localities by forces up to one brigade.
(*b*) Small parties lying up to catch patrols.
(*c*) Raids on to the Beersheba—Gaza Railway.

The enemy were very cautious, and gave no chances; but now and then some loss was inflicted.

On 19th July the Turks attempted a reconnaissance in force, which led to a long day's desultory action, in which a great deal of shell fire occurred; but practically the only casualties to the division were caused by an aeroplane bomb.

On 22nd July a report came that the Turks were evacuating Beersheba, and the whole division went out, and were able, by 09.00 that day, to report that the defences were strongly held.

At the end of the third week in October preparations for the attack on the Gaza—Beersheba line were begun.

(*To be continued.*)

Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google



GENERAL THE RT. HON. JAN CHRISTIAN SMUTS.

From the picture by Capt. ADRIAN JONES, M.V.O.

Digitized by Google

OUTLINE OF GENERAL SMUTS' CAMPAIGN IN EAST AFRICA.

By BREVET LIEUT.-COLONEL W. A. C. SAUNDERS-KNOX-GORE, D.S.O.,
The King's Royal Rifle Corps.

IT was decided towards the end of the year 1915 to commence offensive operations against German East Africa on a large scale. General Sir H. Smith-Dorrien was appointed Commander-in-Chief, but his health broke down on the voyage to Cape Town and he was consequently unable actually to assume command.

The command of the British forces in East Africa was then offered to and accepted by General Smuts, who arrived at Mombasa to take command on 19th February, 1916.

At this time not only was German territory in East Africa intact, but a German detachment was in occupation of British territory near Taveta as far east as Salaita, against which an abortive British attack had been launched on the very day that General Smuts sailed from South Africa.

The broad outlines of General Smuts' initial movements were necessarily dictated by the plans of his predecessor in command in East Africa (Major-General Tighe) and by the location of the troops. If anything was to be accomplished before the commencement of the rains, which were imminent, it was necessary to act without delay. General Smuts' columns moved early in March and by the end of that month had occupied the Aruscha and Moschi districts, having manœuvred the enemy out of their strongly prepared defensive positions about Taveta covering the gap which formed the only practicable line of advance from British East Africa.

The arrival of the rains caused a temporary cessation of operations on a large scale, but in April the 2nd Division, under General Van Deventer, was pushed southwards to Kondoa Iranji, an important strategical point only some eighty miles from the central railway.

The importance which the German commander attached to this threat may be gauged from his action in the withdrawal of a large proportion of his available troops, then facing General Smuts' main columns, to the threatened point and their determined but unsuccessful counter-attack there on 9th May.

At the end of May the advance of the main British columns was resumed and by the end of June the country as far south as the Nguru Mountains was occupied. A further halt then became necessary owing to transport difficulties and the heavy wastage of personnel due to sickness. By the beginning of August the columns again moved forward and by the end

Digitized by Google

of the month the Germans had retreated southwards from the central railway through the Uluguru Mountains to the line of the Mgeta River.

Meanwhile, General Northey's force co-operating north-eastwards from the Nyasaland and Rhodesian frontiers of German East Africa had occupied a large tract of country as far north as Iringa, whilst Belgian and a British column under General Crewe had cleared Tabora. By the end of September, then, two-thirds of German East Africa was in British or Belgian hands, including Dar es Salaam and the whole of the central railway.

Again a halt became necessary, owing to lack of transport for the hundreds of miles of communications. The central railway had been effectually destroyed, and its repair was not found possible until the end of the year.

During this halt General Northey's force, which had now been placed under General Smuts' command for operations, was engaged in severe fighting, mainly with the German western forces, which had eluded the Belgian and British columns about Tabora and moved south-eastwards to join the main German army in the south-eastern part of the colony, thereby cutting across General Northey's lines of communications between Lake Nyasa and Iringa.

After a somewhat critical period General Northey succeeded in clearing his communications and inflicting very serious losses on the enemy's western forces, whose casualties in killed and prisoners in these operations amounted to 50 per cent. of their strength.

General Smuts' last offensive was begun at the end of December, and consisted of converging movements by his main force southwards from the Mgeta to the Rufigi River, by General Hoskins north-westwards from Kilwa, and by Generals Northey and Van Deventer eastwards and south-eastwards from Lupembe and Iringa respectively. Its results were to give General Smuts the line of the Rufigi River; but the commencement of the rains then effectually put a stop to further operations on a large scale.

Meanwhile, about the middle of January, 1917, General Smuts was ordered to relinquish his command in order to represent South Africa at the Imperial Conference shortly to be held in London.

He therefore left Dar es Salaam on 20th January, handing over his command to General Hoskins.

General Smuts' period of command had lasted ten months, during which by far the greater part of German East Africa had been occupied by the British and Belgian troops, but an enormous area in the south-eastern portion of their colony still remained in German hands.

Much of the severest fighting of the campaign was still to come, before Von Lettow Vorbeck's final surrender in north-eastern Rhodesia, after the Armistice, nearly two years after General Smuts' relinquishment of the East African command.

Digitized by Google

THE CO-OPERATION OF ARMOURED CARS WITH CAVALRY.

By MAJOR A. J. CLIFTON, O.B.E., *The Durham Light Infantry.*

IN a short article it is only possible to touch the fringe of a subject similar to the one under discussion. Nothing more has been attempted in the present case, therefore, than to try to indicate in a general way what, in the view of the writer, appears to be the most satisfactory method of combining the action of cavalry and armoured cars in joint operations, only entering into details when these are necessary for a clear understanding of the cases in point. Brief notes on armoured cars, their characteristics and functions, are included for the benefit of those not already acquainted with this arm.

Mobile armoured fighting machines are in their infancy and the armoured car is an elementary form of these contrivances. The tank is, in many ways, an advance on the armoured car, but in its present form it does not equal the latter in speed, reliability, durability or ease of maintenance. On the other hand, it can move where the armoured car cannot, is better protected and carries more armament. At the moment, therefore, there is ample scope for both machines, each in its own province.

Developments, however, are proceeding apace, and in the near future we shall have to relegate the present tank and armoured car to the show armoury, and it will be necessary to modify and enlarge our ideas on the functions and scope of these machines.

In the meantime, the end of the Great War being by no means the end of war, our troops are still fighting in many parts of the world, and in these operations mechanical adjuncts, despite their existing limitations, are valuable accessories to our fighting forces. For the moment, then, it behoves the practical soldier to limit his vision and, avoiding hazards of what may be possible later on, to consider how he can best apply such means as are now at hand to aid him to hit the enemy harder, while lessening damage to himself. It is the purpose of this article, therefore, to discuss armoured cars as they exist at the moment, and their use in conjunction with cavalry.

Digitized by Google

The whys and wherefores of various controversial points which are extant on technical matters are avoided, but it may not be inappropriate to suggest an addition to the existing equipment of armoured car companies.

Great difficulty is experienced in maintaining effective communication between armoured cars and other troops with whom they are working, particularly if the former are operating out of close touch with the other troops, as frequently happens, or when working with aircraft. Arranging satisfactory channels for intercommunication is often the most complicated part of an operation in which armoured cars co-operate. Without adequate means for this service the delay which occurs in conveying information to the proper quarter may often result in the serious loss of opportunities.

This problem would be greatly simplified by the inclusion of portable wireless apparatus in the equipment of each company.

To keep issues clear, no mention is made of aircraft and it is realized that the article is incomplete by this omission, but it will be readily understood what valuable assistance can be given by this arm.

Mention of means for circumventing armoured cars has also been omitted, for obvious reasons, but these no doubt will suggest themselves to the average reader.

A full account of the part played by armoured cars in the late War would form no mean addition to the glorious annals of our arms. Brought into being some time after the outbreak of the War, the conditions on the Western Front were not favourable for their employment till the later phases of the War, and they were used chiefly in the smaller theatres of operations, consequently their exploits were hidden to a certain extent from the public eye. Nevertheless, when the opportunity occurred in France they fully justified their existence, and had the honour of being the first of the Allied troops to cross the Rhine. On other fronts their experiences were numerous and varied. In the deserts of Egypt, Mesopotamia and South West Africa, in the bush of East Africa, across trackless Russia, in the rugged regions of the Caucasus, Palestine, the Indian Frontier and Persia they played many an important part, both as independent forces and in conjunction with other troops.

A study of these operations would provide a good indication of the value of the application of mechanical science to warfare, and would show the vast possibilities in this direction in future wars, and to assist in the ever-present problems which exist in policing the various turbulent districts on the outposts of the Empire.

This study would also emphasize yet again the oldest of all the rules of war, that the chief factor which counts is the *man* behind the gun.

This latter thought is commended to the consideration of my cavalry brethren serving in the distinguished regiments which are at the present

Digitized by Google

time under the shadow of being disbanded. They have the deepest sympathy of the writer, whose heart has always been with their branch of the service and all that appertains thereto. This fact makes it easy for him to understand that the alternative proposal to disbandment, that of converting the regiments concerned to tank or armoured car units, which is now under consideration, may offer but small consolation to them. It must be remembered, however, that the same human qualities — those of dash, enterprise, self reliance and hardihood — which have built up the glorious reputation of the British cavalry, are just as necessary in the arm which approximates to their own splendid branch, but where machines replace the horse.

It may not be without interest to observe that up to within a year or so of 1914 the writer was himself a sceptic on the subject of the utility of motors in war, except for transport purposes or kindred uses, and strongly resented any suggestions that the horse could in any way be replaced for purely cavalry duties. To strengthen this favourite theme for argument it became a habit to consider this matter in relation to varying types of country and imagined military conditions, frequently making solitary expeditions solely for this purpose. Alas! even from the fancied security of a horse's back, from which this line of investigation was invariably indulged in, it soon became evident that it was largely a case of the wish being the father to the thought, and, though it appeared that the boot was not altogether on the other foot, it was at least largely interchangeable.

Early in the War the opportunity came to put into practice, in an out-of-the-way corner of the Empire, ideas, suitably modified, which had been generated while hacking through leafy lanes and over breezy moorlands in old England. Thenceforward, the master's eye, which had hitherto found its chief delight in making the horse fit, found additional pleasure in supervising the care of a fleet of Rolls-Royce cars, which, assisted by *men* of the right sort, stood him in good stead in many an awkward corner. Before dealing with the co-operation between the two arms, a brief description of the organization, characteristics and tactics of armoured cars is desirable.

Organization.

Armoured cars are part of the Tank Corps, and are organized into companies. The chief fighting unit is the company, but for training and administrative purposes they are sometimes formed into groups of two or three companies, under the command of a lieutenant-colonel. A company consists of headquarters and four sections, each section consisting of four cars. The section is the tactical unit. Each company has attached to it a certain amount of light transport and a mobile workshop for carrying out its own light repairs.

Digitized by Google

The company is commanded by a major, with a captain as second-in-command. Each section is commanded by a captain or a subaltern. Companies are not included in the normal establishment of divisions or cavalry divisions, but are allotted to commanders of forces as required.

Types of Armoured Cars.

The chassis at present in use are conventional types slightly modified and fitted with armoured bodies. The main types now in use are the medium, of which the Rolls-Royce is the best example, and the heavy, of which the Peerless is the most representative.

The medium type is armed with one Vickers machine gun, carried in a single revolving armoured turret. The engine and petrol tank are also armoured. The maximum speed is about sixty miles per hour, and they can maintain an average speed of twenty miles an hour. The radius of action, without carrying additional petrol, is 300 miles, working on good roads, and about 150 miles when working on loose ground or when low-gear work is incurred. The total weight is about four tons. It carries a crew of four, including the car commander and driver.

The heavy type is armed with two Hotchkiss guns, each carried in its own revolving armoured turret, the engine and petrol tank also being armoured. These cars have a maximum speed of twenty-five miles an hour, and an average sustained speed of ten miles an hour. The radius of action on good roads is about ninety miles; when low gear-work is necessary about fifty. The total weight is approximately seven tons.

This type of machine has duplicated steering at the rear end.

Characteristics.

The armoured car is a mechanically propelled vehicle, provided with armoured protection for the crew and vulnerable parts of the machinery, and with the weapons so carried that they can be used from the car whether stationary or moving, thus combining fire power with mobility. Their main characteristics are:

(1) *Mobility*, which enables them to move rapidly on a good surface and to continue their movement for a considerable period without the crew being appreciably affected by fatigue. Although largely dependent on good surface for movement, mobility can be increased by good driving, "eye for country," and the employment of such aids as the use of pick and shovel, wire mats or tarpaulins.

(2) *Armour*.—This enables them to operate with comparative safety in situations highly dangerous for other arms. Moreover, the moral effect of the protection afforded by the armour encourages careful observation when reconnoitring and good shooting in action. Positions can be

Digitized by Google

taken up and changed without exposing the personnel. The armour affords protection from small-arm fire, but not against heavy artillery fire, although it is proof against shrapnel, provided direct hits are not obtained.

(3) *Fire Power.*—Armed with machine guns, the fire power of one armoured car is equal to that of a large number of rifle men.

(4) *Instant readiness for action and ability to fight while moving.*—The machine gun is always "in action" and can be kept ready loaded. Thus no time is lost when the enemy is sighted before fire is opened. In many circumstances effective fire can be maintained while the car is moving.

(5) *Economy in Personnel and Material.*—Each car is self contained, carrying its own crew, weapons and ammunition and motive power for at least 200 miles, thus saving transport usually required for these purposes.

(6) *High Command.*—The high command of the machine gun makes the armoured car especially suitable for giving overhead fire in level country, when lack of commanding positions prevent ordinary machine guns from doing this.

It will thus be seen that armoured cars are particularly suitable for employment in areas where roads are good and numerous or in open country where the surface is not too soft; for reconnaissance, flanking movements or operations requiring extensive and continuous movement; for fighting in towns, villages or in country where concealed snipers or machine guns are likely to be met; for advanced and rear-guard actions.

They are not, however, suitable for employment under conditions where they are likely to be exposed to concentrated artillery fire.

General Functions.

(1) *Reconnaissance.*—When the country admits of free movement independent reconnaissance is often possible. The invulnerability and speed of the cars permits of them acting boldly, thus facilitating the effective carrying out of this operation in a short time. When movement is limited they may be usefully employed in conjunction with cavalry.

(2) *Advance Guards.*—They are able, by reason of their mobility, to operate well in advance of the force they are covering, while their invulnerability and fire power enables them to drive back slight opposition without delay, and to seize and hold tactical points until the arrival of the slower moving units.

Digitized by Google

(3) *Rear Guards.*—The ability to fight while in movement, and their invulnerability, assist them in offering a stubborn resistance, while their mobility permits of speedy withdrawal, and makes them suitable for operating widely on the flanks to guard against turning movements on the part of the enemy.

(4) *Outposts.*—They may sometimes be useful for augmenting outpost mounted troops or for replacing ordinary machine guns in the line of resistance.

(5) *In the Attack* they can be employed for reconnaissance before and during the action, to support either cavalry or infantry, or be held as a mobile reserve.

(6) *In the Defence,* during the earlier stages, they can be employed for reconnaissance or with the screen formed compel the enemy to deploy; while in the later stages they can either be used as a mobile reserve or on the flanks.

(7) *The Pursuit.*—Their speed and fighting power and the fact that the personnel are not so susceptible to fatigue as other troops, enable them to take up a vigorous pursuit or to exploit local successes without loss of time. They are also useful for turning movements, to intercept the enemy's line of retreat, and they may often be able, by a rapid advance, to prevent the enemy carrying out demolitions.

They can also be used for independent missions, such as seizing important tactical points in advance or on the flank of a force; or for wide turning movements and raids in rear of the enemy.

Against a savage or semi-savage enemy armoured cars are a useful form of mobile column for dealing with small raids or risings, as their characteristics enable a small force of cars to deal promptly and effectively with comparatively large forces of the enemy, while in operations on a large scale ample opportunities for their use will present themselves, as indicated in the foregoing paragraphs.

Tactical Handling.

The tactics of armoured cars are the same in principle as all tactics, and their mechanical advantages do not in any way lessen the importance of the two supreme military qualities, of the will to go forward and the skill to defeat the enemy. Their rôle, as will be seen above, resembles that of the cavalry, and their employment demands the same initiative, rapid decision and instant action. In fact, their special characteristics, making as they do for the boldest offensive action, make these qualities,

Digitized by Google

perhaps, still more important than is the case with cavalry. Despite inherent advantages good results are not likely to be obtained without the concerted action of all the cars comprising the unit. The isolated action of single cars not only robs the unit commander of the ability to apply the fire power at his disposal to the best advantage, but is open to the following objections:

(*a*) A single car is at a serious disadvantage, both offensively and defensively, being unable to use its weapons effectively at a target either above it or very close to it.

(*b*) If obstacles are met with, either natural or artificial, more man power is required to deal with them than is carried on one car, and usually more than one car is required to establish a suitable covering party, should the operation of overcoming an obstacle be liable to interference by enemy action.

(*c*) Should a car working alone break down it may either have to be abandoned or left stranded with its crew. It is therefore essential to have at hand at least one car which can tow away a broken down vehicle, and another which can retain its power of independent manœuvre to cover the removal.

(*d*) Watching flanks and observation generally can be carried out more effectively by a series of cars than by a single car.

In view of these objections it is now accepted as a principle that single cars should never be used. Normally they should not work in smaller forces than the section, the section being at all times so disposed that the cars can mutually support each other, thus enabling them to push on in circumstances under which a single car would be hung up.

The commander of a section exercises control of his section by means of code signals, made by ordinary signalling flags, in which manner he can issue orders while on the move regarding movements, formations, direction, general indication of targets, opening and ceasing fire and other general orders. Car commanders can transmit certain information to the section commanders by the same means. If opening fire from a stationary position, as would be necessary when accurate fire at long ranges is required, fire orders are issued verbally, and other detailed orders are similarly given. As a force larger than a section becomes unwieldy for the direct command of one man, the usual method of employing them in operations which require more than one section is to allot a definite task to each section, either giving to each a distinct objective or detailing one or more sections to carry out a certain task, the remainder to support them. Each section then acts separately, conforming generally

Digitized by Google

to the remainder, and keeping in communication with each other to enable such assistance to be given or obtained as may be necessary. Communication between sections and other units is maintained by signalling or messages sent by a motor cyclist or an armoured car. Occasions, however, frequently arise when the exigencies of the moment will not permit of any of these means and when support can only be assured by the commander of the supporting section keeping himself in close touch with the situation as it develops, and acting as the circumstances dictate.

There are three code signals, which should be understood by other arms. These are :

Signal.	*Indicates.*
Green and white flag ..	Enemy opposition crushed, all clear for you to advance.
Red and yellow flag ..	This car is broken down.
Red, white and blue flag	Car coming out of action (to refill with petrol, etc.).

In ordering the employment of armoured cars consideration must be given to the nature of the country ; the character and armament of the enemy ; the number of cars available and the general situation ; and the rôle allotted should be the one most suited to the special characteristics of this arm. They may be used independently or in co-operation with other troops, the chief deciding factor being whether the locality consists of country over which the cars can move freely or where roads and passable tracks are numerous, or whether movement is restricted to one or two routes which could be blocked easily by the enemy. If sufficient cars are available it would, of course, be desirable to detail different units to distinct tasks, but as the personnel are not affected by continuous movement to the same extent as other troops, and as the cars can break off a fight with comparative ease, it is possible, should the number of cars be limited, to detail them for one task in the first place and later on to another.

In these cases, however, there should be no confusion between a protective rôle and one which will necessitate giving the armoured cars freedom of movement to carry out their mission, and should the first task allotted them include protective or supporting functions, great care must be taken that the troops they are working with for the time being are informed in ample time before the cars withdraw, to enable them to make arrangements to support themselves.

Co-operation of armoured cars with other troops may be either close, when each arm makes move by move in conjunction with the other, or the armoured cars may be given a task to assist other arms, being given a free hand in carrying it out, moving and acting, within the limits

Digitized by Google

imposed by the operation, as may be most suitable to themselves. In the latter form the timing of the movements and knowledge of the intentions of all concerned, and means for intercommunication to ensure that each benefits by the action of the other, are the chief considerations. In the former case a much more intimate connection between the arms participating is required; it is therefore this class of operation which it is proposed to discuss in the following paragraphs. The remarks postulate, of course, suitable conditions, these being chiefly a matter of ground, as do all the remarks on armoured car operations made in this article, and, while it is thought that the suggestions made are a good general guide, it must be realized that they are not intended as inflexible rules, but more as principles to be adapted to suit a variety of different circumstances. Although opportunities for the use of armoured cars are by no means as rare as we are sometimes asked to believe, it must be remembered that opportunities are intended to be made and not waited for. One of the primary qualities for an armoured car commander must be an insatiable desire to see his command taking part in every possible operation, and it is his duty to assist staffs, who will always have many other things to attend to, to see the opportunity even when this is not obvious. He should, therefore, be kept closely in touch with the situation and his activities must be ceaseless in considering ways and means of overcoming difficulties and in formulating plans whereby his command will as often as possible be able to carry out its rôle of expediting coming to conclusions with the enemy while saving man power.

(*To be continued*).

Digitized by Google

A GALLANT FRENCH FEMALE HUSSAR.

TOWARDS the end of 1806, on a fine autumnal morning, Napoleon was reviewing his troops, decorated with the laurels of Egypt, Germany and Italy ; and he had already passed the front of several regiments, whose dangers and fatigues in the field of battle he had so often witnessed and shared, when he arrived at the 6th Hussars, so remarkable for its splendid appearance. His eagle eye soon perceiving a volunteer who was caracoling out of the ranks, he immediately exclaimed : "Why is this hussar not in his place ?" "Sir," added he, to the colonel, "how is it that in a regiment which I frequently quote as a model, such a want of discipline is permitted in my presence ? Let the soldier be put in arrest for eight days."

"Sire," replied the colonel, "permit me to appeal against this severe sentence, and to solicit your pardon for my volunteer ; you cannot refuse me if you would but interrogate him."

"Very well," said the Emperor ; "be it so ; let him approach."

The hussar came forward and the following dialogue ensued :— "Your name ?" "My Emperor, my name is Duconde Laborde ; but the regiment call me Breton Double." "For what reason did you presume to quit the ranks ?" "I have never entered into them, merely following the regiment as a volunteer, and not wishing to form part of it until your Majesty considered me worthy of that honour." "How long have you been attached to the regiment ?" "Eight years." "What has induced you to join the service ?" "Love of my country and of my husband, from whom I was desirous never to be separated." "What ! you are a woman ?" "Yes, sire ; and you have never had in the regiment an arm more devoted than mine." "What is the name of your husband ?" "Poncet." "From what country do you come ?" "Angouleme." "Your age ?" "Thirty-three years." "Have you any children ?" "Yes, sire, one son." "How is he employed ?" "As a trumpeter in

Digitized by Google

the 11th Dragoons." "Very well; do you understand the evolutions of the regiment?" "Yes, sire; and the sword exercise."

"I am very anxious to witness this," said the Emperor, who listened to Breton Double with increased interest. "Colonel, let a troop advance, and let this brave Breton join the ranks."

The colonel directed the movements, which were executed by Breton Double with so much ardour and precision that the Emperor was delighted and surprised at witnessing a woman manage her horse with the vigour and courage of an old campaigner.

"I am satisfied with your zeal and ability," said the Emperor, "and appoint you a Regimental Quartermaster; take this towards your dress"

Hussard de Lauzun (6e Regiment), 1787, which became 5th Regiment in 1792, owing to the emigration of the 4th (Saxe-Hussards). The 6th Hussards added by the Revolution were raised in 1792 and named Légion de Boyer. They were clothed in a scarlet dolman and "national" blue pelisse with yellow lace and white facings. From a painting by Philippoteaux, 1847.

—at the same time placing a napoleon in her hand and ordering twenty-five additional to be given to her. "Go and rejoin your squadron. We shall meet again."

Breton Double expressed her grateful thanks to the Emperor, and lost no time in taking the position to which, by her new rank, she became entitled, amidst the congratulations and cheers of the numerous witnesses of the scene. The 6th Hussars shortly afterwards joined the corps of the army in Prussia, and the Battle of Eylau afforded Breton Double

Digitized by Google

an opportunity of distinguishing herself. The action had continued more than two hours, when Breton Double, who had been sent to the right wing with an order, rejoined her corps; and, perceiving that the troop was surrounded by a large body of Russians, courageously dashed through the enemy, sword in hand, killed the commander, relieved her countrymen and returned to the camp, proudly displaying the sash of the vanquished officer.

The Emperor, having been informed of this gallant feat, directed a gold medal to be presented to her, which was received by her with grateful and religious respect. Subsequently, in Prussia, at the commencement of an action, she had the misfortune to be wounded by a musket-ball in the right hip; instead, however, of returning to the camp, she continued to assault the enemy with increased vigour, out of revenge for the pain she was enduring from the wound; but she was again struck by a bullet under the right arm; notwithstanding this, she refused to quit the field, bound up the wound with her handkerchief to stop the bleeding, hung her arm in a sling, passed the reins of her bridle over her neck, and changing her sabre from her right to her left hand, rushed like a furious panther into the enemy's ranks. After killing and disabling several men, she finally captured six Prussians, whom she immediately carried in triumph to the Emperor. Napoleon, recognizing Breton Double, was affected at such devotion and bravery; he took from his own breast the Cross of Honour and, placing it on hers, directed she should forthwith have her wounds examined and every attention paid her by the surgeons. From that period, until 1814, Breton Double did not quit her regiment, performing eminent services in the campaign, sometimes as a courageous soldier, and at other times entering into the enemy's lines in female attire, either as a huckster or peasant, in which latter capacity she often obtained information that was highly important and advantageous to the French troops. At Waterloo she paid her last tribute to the glory of France, in the military service of which she had passed seventeen years; during that engagement her left leg was broken by a musket-ball; and Poncet, her husband, then a captain, died at her side, enthusiastically believing the eagle was still victorious. Her leg was amputated on the scene of slaughter; and Breton Double, respected and admired by her late enemies, was conducted as a prisoner of war to Dublin, where she was obliged to undergo a second amputation above the knee. After passing six years in this country, everywhere honoured and hospitably treated, she returned to France on the death of Louis XVIII, furnished with certificates from the French Consul in Dublin and Ambassador in London. From her long absence it was concluded that she had been killed at Waterloo; and, in consequence, the name of this woman, so worthy of the Order of the Legion of Honour, was not retained in the list of members. She eventually obtained from Charles X a pension of 280 francs; but

Digitized by Google

the Revolution of July, so beneficial to others, did but add to the misfortunes of Breton Double, who was deprived of the means of subsistence granted to her by the King. Services such as hers could not, however, in justice be passed over unrewarded; in 1834, the widow Poncet was informed that the Minister of War was in expectation of being enabled to satisfy all the demands she had on her country for her long and faithful services, by readmitting her to the Order of the Cross of Honour and by bestowing on her the pension of a wounded Quartermaster, and also that of a widow of a captain. Her son rose to commissioned rank in the 11th Dragoons and accompanied the Emperor to Elba.

A.L.

Digitized by Google

SWORDSMANSHIP.

"CAVALRY TRAINING, 1921," volume I, states so clearly how to teach the untrained to become the trained and efficient swordsman, that it seems almost unnecessary to write further on the subject; and certainly nothing regarding the actual details of training, but a general brief review of the pre-war training and the training of the present day may be of interest to not only our serving soldiers, but to those who have already sheathed the sword, which now probably hangs up in the hall or smoking room as a memento of happy and bygone days.

Looking back more than a quarter of a century and having seen the system of training in those days, and having been in constant touch from then to now, to see the present system is to acknowledge at once the fact that it is far superior to the past one, and also that the general efficiency reached is far higher.

The pre-war training, especially before the present-day pointing sword was introduced, was more suited to soldiers of great physical strength than to the soldiers of ordinary physique; and it was only in exceptional cases that the latter became expert swordsmen or had the confidence to feel that they were bound to win in mortal combat, whereas with the present weapon and with the present system of training it is no travesty of fact to look on a hundred per cent. of those trained being good enough swordsmen to kill and save themselves from being killed, in most ordinary circumstances, and against any but the superlative trained and skilled champion at arms.

The principle of training in the use of all our weapons has been revolutionized during and since the War; and it is now recognized that until absolute confidence can be instilled into the student, the necessary interest and keenness cannot be brought about to make the efficient soldier and high-class man at arms, and, therefore, the first aim and object of all instructors at the present time is to first instil that confidence, so that the hundred per cent. of the pupils gradually get keen on the work and, consequently, gradually become efficient and expert.

Swordsmanship requires a training which brings about the following four great attributes:

(1) Confidence; (2) interest; (3) quick working brain; (4) trained eye to respond to the quick working brain.

Digitized by Google

A SCRIMMAGE.

Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google

The good swordsman, with practice, should be able to hit his mark when he lunges or points as easily as he touches the proper spot with his pen to start a letter, his parries should be made as easily as he would lift his pen to start a fresh word or to make a dash or comma. How many people realize what time and trouble they have taken from infancy to do this, and what perfection the eye working with the brain has reached to carry this out, until it has become natural, without any effort or seemingly any thought; and yet this instruction and training from infancy has been gradually training us to work our hand and eye from instructions sent from the brain, and also helps towards the making of the efficient swordsman as soon as the difference of weight and the length of the sword has been properly gauged, when points and parries should be as easily made as the dashes and commas with the pen.

In pre-war days recruits were taught the use of the sword in the regimental gymnasium. The number in a class was usually much too big, and little individual instruction was given; in fact, the instruction became more of a sharpening-up drill. If faults had to be corrected the instructor would often keep the whole class at the lunge or parry whilst he corrected the mistakes of individuals; the whole class meanwhile became cramped and hated the whole thing.

Was it to be wondered at that the percentage of those pupils who showed interest or keenness with the wish to advance their swordsmanship was a very small one? It was usually with a sigh of relief they left the gymnasium after being dismissed by the Commanding Officer, and few ever wished to return for the purpose of improving their swordsmanship.

Whereas in the present day the fewer men you have to the one instructor the better it is considered to be, and instead of working constantly by word of command, all the work is done by eye, the brain following the eye, and reacting as quickly as possible; as soon as any explanation is required the pupils at once form a semicircle round the instructor, who explains in simple language what he wishes carried out; then he demonstrates in close proximity to the pupils so that all can see. Explanation, demonstration and practice are the root of all successes.

Once the preliminary instruction has been carefully gone through the next object is to gain the student's confidence in himself, and this is done by making the student practise his points and lunges at the instructor, who allows the point and lunge to go home; the pupil will gradually lunge further and further, his aim will become better and better as the practices increase; then the instructor in his turn lunges and points against the pupil, but his lunges are slow and gentle until the pupil finds he can parry with ease. As these exercises increase the pupil becomes more confident in attack and defence, and almost unknown to himself that confidence takes root; the interest and keenness

Digitized by Google

follow, until eventually, far from sighing with relief, it is with a sigh of regret that he is dismissed.

The instruction on foot is the first stage of training, the second stage will not be commenced until the pupil has acquired a good firm seat and light hands on horseback.

The instruction should be such that every man becomes accustomed to ride with his weapon in his hands, and has confidence in his ability to use it with effect against single dummies at various heights and on both sides on good going, first at the walk, then the trot and gallop; and when proficient the third and last stage, namely, the final assault course, mounted, can be started.

The third stage is over rough ground and jumps, in which dummies should be placed at frequent intervals and in various positions, so that horsemanship as well as swordsmanship is required.

There have been many magnificent swordsmen in the British Army whose names are by-words and known to all.

One of the most magnificent swordsmen the writer has seen was a well-known British officer of the Indian Cavalry; he was of tremendous physique, a splendid natural horseman, and one afternoon in China, during the Boxer Riots, he killed seventeen Boxers with his sword, and was attacked at one time by three of them, two with lances and one with the sword; he killed them all.

Harking back to the Indian Mutiny days, when the cavalryman's sword did so much to save the British power at that time, Major Hodson, of Hodson's Horse, stood out as the ideal cavalry officer, and the following description of him, from Captain L. J. Trotters' "A Leader of Light Horse," gives one the state of efficiency we hope all our future young cavalry soldiers will try and attain:

"In a fight he was glorious. If there was only a good hard scrimmage he was as happy as a king. A beautiful swordsman, he never failed to kill his man, and the way he used to play with the most brave and furious of these rebels was perfect. I fancy I see him now, singing, laughing, parrying most fearful blows as calmly as if he was brushing off flies; calling out all the time: 'Why, try again now.' 'What's that?' 'Do you call yourself a swordsman now?'"

Digitized by Google

TRAINING IN THE USE OF THE BAYONET.

"Only by the rifle and bayonet of the infantryman can the decisive victory be won."—SIR D. HAIG, *Final Despatch.*

PRELIMINARY.

IT is not proposed in this short treatise on the bayonet to deal in detail and at length with the training of the soldier in this important side of his training, but rather to discuss certain questions connected with this training that have, during the last five years, been the subject of discussion and sometimes of controversy; and also to review certain essentials in the approved system of training.

Although not official, the views put forward here coincide in the main with the present official doctrine as regards this training.*

ORIGIN OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM.

Any discussion, however brief, dealing with the use of the bayonet would be incomplete without preliminary reference to the officer who, shortly after the commencement of the Great War, was mainly responsible for the conception, execution, and to a very large degree for the success of the system of training in the bayonet, which fostered the fighting spirit and efficiency of the British soldier throughout the various phases of the War.

As many are aware, this officer, Colonel R. B. Campbell, D.S.O., the present Inspector of Physical Training, helped by his complete knowledge of human nature and of the fundamentals of fighting, combined with an enthusiasm which no difficulty was capable of dulling, was the originator of the system of training which was in force during the War and which, with minor modifications, holds good to-day.

In summing up the countless factors that led to success and victory it would be difficult to exaggerate the gains, moral and physical, that accrued to our side as a result of the fighting spirit of our indomitable soldiers.

* The approved textbook on this subject, "Addendum No. 5 to M.R. Part I, Bayonet Training," has recently been amended and was published in February of this year.

Digitized by Google

Colonel Campbell's system of bayonet training added in no small degree to this fighting spirit.*

The Use of the Bayonet in Battle.

Is there any need for the bayonet in battle? Why use a knife, which can only be used at a range of five feet or under, when the soldier is armed with a rifle that can shoot up to 600 yards or further with accuracy? How many men have been killed or wounded in this war with the bayonet? Is not the number inconsiderable in comparison with those wounded or killed by shell or bullets fired from machine guns and rifles? Even in cases where casualties through the bayonet occurred, would not these casualties have been equally easily inflicted by means of the bullet in every case? Teach the soldier to shoot and there will be little or no need for the bayonet. The result of any fight, even one of close combat, will be decided long before the opponents reach a range of five feet.

Such and similar arguments and assertions, some of them seemingly true, are not too easy to answer off hand. They have been put forward sometimes by officers possessing considerable experience of battle. What should be the reply?

We must seek for our answer by a study of human nature. We must look into the heart and soul of the man fighting in the forefront of the battle before we decide this question. We must find out what is at the back of the soldier's mind throughout the various stages of the attack, amidst the distractions of the battlefield, in defence when heavily shelled, exhausted by hardship, dangers oft repeated, and fatigue. What passes through his mind when, after a successful attack, the enemy's counter-attacking troops approach his trench or position nearer and nearer, or when, after long periods of strain, he is nearing the enemy's position?

Surely at the back of every man's mind, whether he is fighting in Europe, Asia or Africa, against the Mahsud, Turk or Boche, must come the thought: "*What is going to happen when I come to close grips with my opponent?* What will be the issue of such a situation? Shall I be able to knock him out or will he knock me out?" Is not the fear of assault or close combat the final and fundamental cause of troops leaving a position or surrendering when the enemy is actually occupying or on the point of taking that position?

If it be agreed that close combat or the threat of the assault on the part of the infantry, or cavalry acting as infantry, is necessary before

* "The development of bayonet fighting and the high standard generally attained by the troops in the use of this essential weapon are due in great measure to the teaching and enthusiasm of Colonel R. B. Campbell, formerly Deputy Inspector of P. and B.T."—Sir D. Haig, *Final Despatch*.

Digitized by Google

decisive victory can be won, surely it would be most unwise not to fortify the heart of the soldier for the close combat fight; and the bayonet, in a greater or lesser degree depending on circumstances, is the necessary adjunct to the bullet for close combat. Therefore, we say, "Let us give the soldier confidence in the use of the bayonet."

He may never use it, he may not require to use it, but, on the other hand, he may have to use it, and in a hard fought fight he will always think that he is going to use it.

Confidence in the use of the bayonet forms the bayonet spirit. Thus, apart from its concrete value as a killing weapon, it is held that the bayonet's main claim to consideration as a weapon for battle is as a "spirit." It is a spirit which helps to lead men through the dangers, vicissitudes, and distractions of the attack to victory; it is one of the moral factors which helps to fortify them to cling to a position to the last. In the words of the textbook it is "The spirit which during moments of danger and exhaustion, under the varying circumstances of battle, will enable the soldier to confidently seek close combat with his opponent."

We should like to make it quite clear that nothing which is urged in favour of the necessity for training the soldier in the use of the bayonet is meant in any way to depreciate the value of the shooting side of the rifle. Indeed, the "bullet spirit"—if we may so define the confidence of a man in his military marksmanship—is of course an equally potent factor in fostering the fighting spirit of the soldier. It is, however, open to question whether sufficient weight was given before the War to the value of training for the close combat. By the term "close combat" we refer to that phase of fighting that takes place immediately before, during, and after a position has been occupied, where the bullet and bayonet will be employed according to the circumstances, conditions, and, consequently, the tactical requirements that may exist at the moment. The conditions and circumstances may be those of:

Daylight, fog or darkness.
Open or static warfare, in varying degree.
Small or great wars.
Against a civilized or a savage enemy.

Policy of Training.

Towards the end of the year 1918 responsibility for bayonet assault training passed out of the hands of the Physical Training Staff and was handed over to the Small Arms School, at that time called the School of Musketry. Students of all arms, whether officers, warrant officers or N.C.O.'s attending a rifle course at Hythe, are now trained as instructors in bayonet fighting. As regards units, it is intended that henceforth the rifle instructor who, except in the case of recruits, is the troop (or

Digitized by Google

platoon) officer, troop (or platoon) sergeant, and the section commander, shall instruct, practise and exercise his command in both sides of the rifle, i.e., shooting and knifing, bullet and bayonet. Thus the rifle and bayonet will in future be treated as one and the same weapon, taught and practised under the same instructor, this instructor being the normal leader in war.

This is surely a wise and necessary arrangement for the following reasons :

(*a*) It is correct, tactically and from a training point of view, that the leader of men armed with a weapon in war should be the instructor in that weapon in training, for in war the rifle—both sides of it—have been, and will be, used alternately. The bullet helps the bayonet forward, the bayonet or threat of it assists the bullet to pursue with fire, and enables it to repulse the counter-attack. One must assist the other; they are close comrades.

(*b*) The present arrangement is the only practicable one. The essence of bayonet fighting efficiency—indeed, of any weapon employed in close combat—is continuity of practice. Continuity of practice becomes a dead letter unless instruction and practice take place under the ordinary leader; for whenever instruction and practice is required, unless the ordinary leader is capable of giving it, a specialist has to be called in to give the necessary treatment. Numbers, establishment and, incidentally, finance, all forbid such a procedure in peace time, although it was carried out during the War. For we must remember that most of the training carried out during the War, at home, was mainly individual recruit training in reserve units. Specialist treatment in such a case is not only possible, but, if time presses during a war, advisable. The sausage machine is bad for instructors, is bad for discipline, and is bad for tactical training, but a painful necessity under such circumstances.

Again, in France, normally only a very small proportion of the Army was out of the fighting line for training at any one time. Thus the pooled Instructional Staff of the P. and B.T. was enabled to administer to the physical and bayonet training needs of that small proportion, and right well they did it. But had conditions been such that the whole army in France could have trained out of the line at one time, the establishment of the P. and B.T. would have been entirely insufficient to meet the needs of the Army in bayonet training, and the present system would have been perforce adopted.

Digitized by Google

Bayonet Fencing.

As regards bayonet fencing with the spring bayonet, responsibility for this training still remains in the hands of the Physical Training Staff, for bayonet fencing besides requiring special training paraphernalia differs in many ways from bayonet fighting, and is more akin to fencing.

Essential Points in Bayonet Fighting.

The technical points of bayonet fighting are few and simple. The essential qualities required in a good fighter with the bayonet are: good direction, strength and quickness. These are obtained by good grounding and continuity of practice. Continuity of practice leads to the use of the weapon by instinct. As with the boxer, so with the bayonet fighter, must there be mental and bodily alertness, the hand and eye working with lightning rapidity, the immediate response of the body to the will of the brain, whether this be called into action by the eye, sense of touch, or ear.

To demand from all men of different shapes and sizes exact similarity of poise, balance and style is neither necessary nor desirable—rather men should be encouraged as in boxing to develop the style best suited to their physique and peculiarity of build.

As in games, the soldier must play for his side and not only for himself, and must be accustomed to place himself under the control and leadership of his troop (or platoon) or section commander; for control and a degree of cohesion are essential to the success of an assault.

Some Points and Principles of Training.

(*a*) Teach the teachers first. These, in the case of the bayonet, are the rifle instructors, i.e., the normal leaders—troop (or platoon) and section commanders.

It is estimated by experienced instructors that it takes five times as long to train a leader to be a rifle instructor in the shooting side as it does in the bayonet side. Experience in training in the use of the bayonet improves the rifle instructor, especially should he be lacking in energy and vitality.

(*b*) As in all weapon training, not more than eight men (i.e., approximately a section) should work under one instructor, or the instruction will suffer.

(*c*) Nothing kills interest so effectively as monotony. A lesson should not last more than half an hour.

(*d*) Teaching should be mainly by demonstration followed by practice. All explanations should be simple; the "patterer" of detail should be knocked on the head.

Digitized by Google

Words of command should be reduced to a minimum. You cannot *drill* men into becoming good bayonet fighters any more than you can drill them into becoming good boxers.

(*e*) As early as possible in their training, men should be taught to work in pairs, acting on the principle of master and pupil. Thus individuality, confidence and leadership are developed.

(*f*) Competition is the salt of training. The introduction of the competitive element is essential if interest is to be maintained.

(*g*) In battle, especially close combat battle, a man is required to use his weapon by instinct. Continuity of practice alone leads to the use of a weapon by instinct—therefore lessons and practice should be continuous but short and vigorous.

Training in War and Peace.

We all remember the vigour with which bayonet assault training was carried out at home and abroad during the War. Backed by a good cause, helped by excellent instruction, and flavoured by the certainty of meeting the enemy in battle in the near future, the recruit and trained soldier carried out this part of his training with keenness, energy and enthusiasm. The training was popular; for it enabled the soldier to give expression to the determination, energy and fighting spirit that was in him. It cannot be expected that in days of peace, with no foe looming in the immediate picture, training will be carried out with quite the same degree of reality and, shall we say, ferocity. The sack during the War represented a known, righteously hated enemy. The sack now represents the necessary resistance to the point or butt, as does the punch ball to the boxer. The groan, the grunt, the wild cry are out of place in peace training, and so is what might be called the war ferocity. Indeed, if such expressions of feeling were required to be shown during peace training, such training would become a burlesque.

Although the training must be modified, the essentials hold; namely, style, strength, quickness, good direction, endurance, dash, and the most important of all, the necessity for control and leadership by the junior leaders.

Cavalry and the Bayonet.

The question has sometimes been raised as to whether cavalry should be armed with, and trained in the use of, the bayonet. Except from the point of view of lessening the load to be carried by the man, in our opinion this question hardly lends itself to discussion, for surely if the bayonet is a necessary adjunct to the armament of the soldier fighting on foot, it must necessarily form part of the cavalry soldier's armament; unless it be argued that cavalry will never be required to reach a decision

Digitized by Google

THE TIN RING COURSE



COMMENCING AT X, FINISHING AT Y.
DIRECTION OF ADVANCE SHEWN THUS - - - - →
DISTANCES SHEWN: - ····X····→
SANDBAG JUMPS MAY BE REPLACED BY HURDLES.

Digitized by Google

in war when acting as infantry. The experiences of this war hardly favour such an argument. Moreover, we would point out that the cavalry spirit, i.e., that ardent desire to close with the enemy at all costs, is surely the " spirit of the bayonet " under another name. Let us see to it that this spirit is ever fostered in our fighting men.

Training Paraphernalia.

Approved paraphernalia for bayonet training is simple.

The Bayonet Sack affords the necessary resistance for the punch and assists direction, it produces a feeling of reality, and it may be said to correspond to the punch ball used by the boxer.

THE TRAINING STICK



The Blob-stick or Training Stick, correctly manipulated, gives practice in judging your length, ensures accuracy of direction and quickness with both point and butt, and corresponds to the shadow fighting of the boxer.

The Tin Ring Course (mainly for recruits) leads to good direction, dash, and provides an elementary stage to the alternate use of bullet and bayonet.

The Intensive Bayonet Course or Mad Minute Course demands endurance, style, strength, direction and quickness, and as a test in bayonet fighting corresponds to the shooting " Mad Minute " test.

The Final Assault Course and the Royal Tournament Assault Course (recently introduced) provide, as far as is practicable, practice in close combat when the bullet and bayonet are alternatively used. These courses all lend themselves to competition.

Competition is the salt of training in peace time.

Digitized by Google

THE INTENSIVE TRAINING COURSE.
SMALL ARMS SCHOOL, HYTHE.

GENERAL ARRANGEMENT.



COMMENCING AT X, FINISHING AT Y.

COURSE LAID OUT ON ROUGH GROUND — LENGTH ROUND:— 90 PACES, AND KNOWN TO THE BAYONET FIGHTER AS:—

"THE MAD MINUTE"

ACCN. HYTHE 1021

T

Digitized by Google

THE F.A.N.Y.

THE First Aid Nursing Yeomanry, popularly known during the years 1914 to 1919 on the Western Front as the " Fannies," or more correctly FANYs, is a corps formed for field ambulance duties by women, and more particularly those of sporting proclivities. It has maintained an unbroken existence since 1909.

The founders of the organization foresaw that, in order to economize man-power and to release the male population for its legitimate duty of bearing arms in a war on the grand scale, it would become necessary for women to take the place of the army of non-combatants behind the fighting forces. This prediction was gradually brought home to less far-seeing minds as the immense task of winning the War was realized, and it is not too much to claim that, in the next war of civilized forces, that army will inevitably be victorious which not only has trained its manhood in the combined tactics of the war of impulsion, but has organized its womanhood for the complete service of mechanical transport behind the Divisional echelons, as well as for the signal communications, the medical, remount, ordnance, supply and postal services, which in the past emasculated the army and consumed the strength so sorely needed to take the man's part at the front.

The originators of this women's volunteer corps proceeded to organize themselves as a highly mobile corps, trained in first aid and most of the duties of an army medical unit, equipped with horse or motor ambulances, saddle horses and transport, capable of accompanying mounted troops, of riding across any country, of entering the firing zone and by their timely aid saving lives which would otherwise be lost. With these purposes in view the corps was trained on strictly military lines, with carefully planned instruction.

Before the War riding drills were conducted at Hounslow Barracks; classes were also held in first aid, home nursing, signalling and care of animals. A monthly gazette, entitled *Women and War*, recording the activities, training programmes and promotions in the corps, was sold on the bookstalls, and spread the principles and objects of the movement.

Digitized by Google



F.A.N.Y. ON THE WESTERN FRONT.

WITH THE BELGIANS, 1914.

Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google

Discussions arose in the Press as to whether women were physically capable of carrying out the duties they had imposed upon themselves, such as stretcher bearing and lorry driving, and the ladies triumphantly proved their case by the successful accomplishment of long distance marches and strenuous courses of training under canvas.

The FANYs received every possible encouragement from unofficial sources, and about three years before the War their nominal chief was Colonel F. C. Ricardo, C.V.O., and their patrons included the Duchess of Abercorn, the Marchioness of Londonderry, the Countess of Kilmorey, Lord Willoughby de Broke and Lord Charles Beresford.

It is noteworthy that at that time many applications for membership were received from German girls, a possible subterfuge to discover the system which had led to such remarkable efficiency without professionalism, officiousness or friction.

Camps were organized three times a year, at Easter, for several weeks in the summer, and in the autumn, in the vicinity of Aldershot and at Pirbright. At the termination of the training searching examinations were held.

Members were detailed for work at the Military Field Hospital at Bisley; the whole routine of the camps was conducted by the personnel without any outside help, including the exercising, grooming, watering and feeding of the horses. The lady troopers took part in mounted drill, jumping contests, crossing rivers, various field exercises, including night marches on which equipment and tents were taken to be pitched at a given spot as a dressing station.

A detachment often accompanied a cavalry regiment on field days for first aid duty with their ambulance wagons following in attendance.

The corps not only rivalled the regular army in efficiency, but must have completely eclipsed it in turn out. To give an example: the mess dress consisted of a scarlet mess jacket, with pale blue facings (scarlet and pale blue being the corps colours), worn over a white muslin dress, with crimson sash.

The service dress tunic, with Sam Browne belt, and the soft cap, rather of the mob shape, gathered into a stitched band, with badge and chin strap, were familiar to those who served in Northern France.

And now war clouds lowered on the horizon and an anxious situation arose with a possibility of civil war in Ireland. The corps' services were offered to Sir Edward Carson and readily accepted by him. The staff proceeded to Ireland to make the necessary arrangements which subsequent events made it unnecessary to put to the test.

About the same time negotiations were in progress with the War Office for the recognition of the corps and its affiliation to the R.A.M.C., and after an official inspection of the camp by Surgeon-General T. P. Woodhouse, in 1914, he strongly advocated the proposal. Up to that

Digitized by Google

date the corps had been semi-officially recognized, had been lent camp equipment from Army sources, its services were utilized at garrison field exercises, and it attended church parades of troops. Before the negotiations reached finality War was declared with Germany.

Within twenty-four hours of the outbreak of war the whole corps was ready for active service, fresh from the recent hard course of training of the summer camp, and there was a rush of applicants to join.



The War Office was not in a position to accept the offer of the corps' services and in the light of subsequent events it is of interest to note that an official expressed the opinion that women's corps, with the exception of nurses, could never be employed with success on active service.

The corps' services were offered to the Belgians, who immediately accepted them, and the commanding officer, Miss Ashley-Smith, left Dover in September and was soon making arrangements in Antwerp for the F.A.N.Y. to have a hospital of eighty beds. When the news came that that city had fallen the waiting lady troopers in England, under their lieutenant, feared that their C.O. had been taken prisoner or indeed killed. It was not till three weeks later that their anxiety was allayed and their leader reported at headquarters, having escaped from Ghent,

Digitized by Google

where she had been tending a wounded British officer, being regarded by the Germans as their prisoner.

On 27th October, 1914, a band of twelve FANYs left Charing Cross for Calais, where the Belgians were then based.

An old school-house was placed at their disposal as hospital. Patients fresh from the line were lying on heaps of straw with only two Belgian nuns, ignorant of the rudiments of hygiene, to tend them. The place was cleared and in a short time a successful hospital of 100 beds was in full working order, 50 for wounded cases and 50 for typhoid patients. These latter were suffering from such a virulent type of the disease that no other hospital would take them. Here the F.A.N.Y. troopers worked day and night, under the direction of trained nurses from England, paid for by the corps funds. The hospital was repeatedly bombed by Zeppelins, on one occasion escaping total destruction by a miracle.

A dressing station at Ramscapelle was worked by the corps, and the value of the members being horsewomen was demonstrated. At night parties of the FANYs guided doctors to the trenches on the Yser, where they dressed the wounded, distributed underclothing and transported casualties by motor cars to the hospital, often under heavy fire from the enemy's lines.

The corps showed its versatility by a variety of valuable enterprises. A convalescent home on a small scale was begun at St. Inglevert for typhoid patients, and later, on a much larger scale, at Ruchard. The drivers of a motor kitchen, attached to a Belgian battery at Ypres, when the first gas attack took place rendered invaluable assistance by improvizing gas masks for the men from the first field dressings.

A motor bath, capable of providing ten hot baths at once, did much service behind the lines and was greatly appreciated by various British units at a later date.

The members of the corps found time to exhibit a first-class concert party long before Lena Ashwell's performers made their appearance.

In June, 1915, a British hospital was established at Calais and found themselves in urgent need of transport. The A.D.M.S. requested the loan of the F.A.N.Y. drivers and ambulances, then numbering five, until his own transport was forthcoming. The efficiency of the F.A.N.Y. led to their being requested to take over the British Base Convoy, from the 1st January, 1916, an epoch in the history of the corps, for the FANYs were the first women to drive officially for the British Army.

There were two joint commandants of the corps. Miss Franklin, with twelve drivers, assumed command of the British Section, and Mrs. McDougal (Ashley-Smith), of the Belgian and French, for at this period a hospital was opened for the latter at Prieurie de Binson, with convoy attached.

Digitized by Google

Before the Armistice nine other convoys were formed on the lines of the Calais prototype.

Great hardships were cheerfully endured by the members. During the cold winter nights guards were detailed to sit up and crank the cars at intervals to prevent their being frozen up and to ensure their being fit for the road in the morning.

There were 197 air bombing raids on Calais alone and one bombardment from the sea. On one occasion a bomb, over six feet in length, buried itself in the very centre of the British convoy camp, but failed to explode, and now forms a treasured souvenir in the mess.

The units with the French particularly distinguished themselves on the Marne in the 1918 advance, and one member was awarded the Legion of Honour and the Croix de Guerre with palm for returning, though herself wounded, and rescuing some wounded *poilus*.

At the Armistice four new F.A.N.Y. convoys were brought into being, to assist in dealing with the altered conditions, owing to the rapid advance of the Allies, and these, with the original ten, remained in operation until April, 1919, when the units were successively recalled to England and not demobilized but disembodied.

The F.A.N.Y. roll book contains the names of those who have served and among their number those who have been awarded the following honours:

Sixteen Military Medals; two M.B.E.'s.

One Legion of Honour; thirty Croix de Guerre (including palm leaves, silver and bronze stars).

Eight Ordres de Leopold; one Medaille d'Honneur; two Chevaliers Ordre de la Couronne; twenty-nine Ordres de la Reine Elizabeth avec Croix Rouge; six Croix Civique, Ordre de Merite.

A total of ninety-five decorations.

Fifteen Mentions in Despatches.

The First Aid Nursing Yeomanry does not now appear in the Army List, and it is believed that like many other corps that rendered brilliant service in the Great War "there is no further need for its services" at the present time. The War Office has formed its own picture of the country's military necessities in the near future. In this picture there is no place into which the F.A.N.Y. will fit, although it may be that there is a space reserved for an unwieldy giantess, a stranger to their ideals and special attainments.

But the same spirit which enabled the FANYs to overcome difficulties, hardships and dangers in the dreadful and impassioned drama of the long years of war is alive to-day. British women are not easily discouraged when they have learned the value and felt the inspiration of the noblest word of our language, *Duty*. It was their

Digitized by Google

watchword at Lamarck, Calais, Ramscapelle, St. Omer, Epernay, Chalons and Bar-le-Duc. They set an example, their enthusiasm was infectious and compelled respectful admiration.

Each one of this *corps d'élite* is a horsewoman, a car driver and qualified in first aid and nursing duties.

The organization and training of the corps is maintained, with its own headquarters, at 192, Earl's Court Road, lecture rooms, gazette, equipment, a full membership and funds from private revenue. It is capable of remobilization within a few hours, and when the Defence Force was raised, in April of the present year, to face the crisis which confronted the nation, one of the first offers of whole-hearted service was from the First Aid Nursing Yeomanry.

Digitized by Google

A HUNTER'S OBSERVATIONS ON THE AFRICAN ELEPHANT.

By A. C. LEGGO, *late Royal Air Force.*

No living hunter is better qualified than the Author to describe the habits of the leviathan of the forests of South-East Africa. There are not many of the tough Africander and British hunters left who can count the big elephants they have shot by scores, but the Author is one of them and he endorses the legislation of civilized states which limits the destruction of big game at the present time.—EDITOR.

THE following remarks apply, save where otherwise stated, to that area of South-East Africa which is bounded on the north by the Zambesi, on the south by the 22nd parallel of S. latitude, on the east by the Indian Ocean, and on the west by the eastern frontier of Rhodesia. It is of importance to bear this geographical limitation in mind, since the habits of the elephant, more even than those of some other wild animals, are subject to considerable variation in different parts of so vast a continent as Africa, and a general life story of the African elephant would have to take account of conditions and environment in territories widely dissimilar.

One of the gravest economic problems confronting statesmen and sportsmen in those regions of Africa which still contain elephants is the threatened extinction of these animals, which, instead of being trained to do useful work, as in Asia to-day, and as in Northern Africa in the Ptolemaic era, have been mercilessly hunted for their ivory by white men, Arabs and negroes until, driven within a continually diminishing area, they bid fair to disappear altogether from the roll of living animals. In a single year as much as 100 tons weight of elephant ivory is often exported from North Africa alone, representing the deaths of 5,000 elephants or more. Yet the African elephant has many champions and, on sentimental as well as economic grounds, it is agreed that if anything is to be done, it must be done soon. The precise directions in which the African elephant could be utilized to-day, in the same way as its Indian cousin, have not been decided, but, to give one instance,

Digitized by Google



Digitized by Google



1. They get our wind.
2. The herd stampedes.
3. Shot through the heart.
5. In the Ivory Bazaar.

Digitized by Google

since these great animals climb to a considerable altitude in the foothills of Kenia and Kilimanjaro, they might conceivably be employed in hauling mahogany and other timber or in future railroad construction and clearing in British Equatorial Africa, where abundance of forest food would, as in Asia, simplify the economic problem of their maintenance.

As regards South-East Africa, the destruction of the elephant is, for a number of reasons that present no great difficulty, proceeding more rapidly in some districts than in others. As is only to be expected, the worst results are to be seen in those parts of the country nearest to the railroad, where elephants are being slaughtered not only by native hunters authorized by Government, from which they receive 25 per cent. of the value of the ivory, but also by an even greater number of unauthorized native poachers armed with rifles and with smuggled ammunition.

The position of affairs in the neighbouring districts of Gorongoza and Cheringoma is much the same; upwards of thirty elephants are probably killed every year in these forests.

As a liberal computation of wild elephants at present existing in these two districts together could not well exceed a total of 600, we may look for their extinction, at the present rate of destruction (which is not likely to diminish), making necessary allowance for natural increase and even for augmentation by new-comers from the Barue, in another fifteen years.

In the district of Portuguese Africa known as the Barue I understand from reliable native sources that elephants are still fairly plentiful, and if the authorities should contemplate setting apart an area as a Reserve, this has unquestionably the first claim, for the following reasons: Sparse native population; uninhabited by Europeans, save at two small military posts; no trade or commerce; comparatively inaccessible; unsuited to agriculture and (save on the extreme western frontier, where natives recover alluvial gold from the Luenha and its tributaries) without any known mineral resources.

My own personal observations do not, as has been already indicated, extend south of the 22nd parallel, but I think it may be taken that elephants exist no longer beyond that limit, with the exception of a very few in the districts of Gaza and Inhambane, and a remnant in the Transvaal Government Reserve. In the Addo Bush (Cape Province) and Knysna Forest it has been found necessary quite recently, it is believed, to exterminate the elephants.

Before coming to what appear to me the most effectual methods of protecting these animals, a word may be said on the reasons for which they would be worth preserving. The chief of these is perhaps a sentimental regard for a splendid species, and the same plea might be urged in favour of the rhinoceros, almost extinct south of the Zambesi, with the exception of possibly twenty that survive in the Barue, and not more than

Digitized by Google

half a dozen in Gorongoza and Cheringoma. Those who object that wild elephants are a menace to humanity and an obstacle in the path of development state what is not true. As a matter of fact, the elephant, on finding himself face to face with the advance of civilization, gives way and retreats to less occupied areas in which he will be free from disturbance. I have actually known cases in which the mere shifting of a native village a few miles along a river, nearer to the elephant's customary drinking place, has sufficed to make these animals desert the river altogether.

As a matter of fact, the degree in which elephants are actually dangerous to man depends on the extent to which they are hunted. Unless disturbed they rarely molest camps still inhabited by natives, though I have known them tear down and scatter fishing camps that had been abandoned long enough to lose the human taint, and I even remember seeing a bark canoe, that had been left in one of them, trampled perfectly flat. As a rule, however, they leave inhabited premises severely alone. I remember tracking a large single bull very early in the morning right up to one of these camps and afterwards finding from his spoor that he had put his head through the opening of the stockade which the natives erect to keep out the lions. He had evidently surveyed the interior, in which two natives were sleeping peacefully just inside the entrance, and then proceeded, and it was not until I woke them and pointed out the spoor that they had any suspicion of their nocturnal visitor.

It is true that, when never molested, elephants sometimes grow bold. I have known them visit a native village night after night to feed on the growing crops, but I am quite sure—and those acquainted with their habits will agree—that a few shots fired in the air near the herd would effectually have scattered the marauders. In 1902 elephants were declared a danger to the community in the Lomagundi district of Rhodesia, with the lamentable result that the Government authorized the wholesale slaughter of these animals. Yet I have never heard of a single elephant in that territory attacking natives unprovoked, and a few rounds of blank cartridge would certainly have caused them to stampede. What, in all probability, happens in some of these so-called cases of unprovoked attack is that the culprit has so often been fired at that any human being manœuvring in its vicinity is a legitimate object of suspicion. Thus the innocent suffer for the guilty, as I did on one occasion when viciously charged by a tuskless old cow when trying to photograph her with five of her friends.

Apart from sentimental grounds, the elephant is held worthy of protection for useful purposes, though the suggestion that its meat, much appreciated by Arabs and negroes, is among these, will not, I think, commend itself to Europeans who have eaten it. It is not to be denied

Digitized by Google

that a hungry European can eat the heart, trunk and flesh of the head near the temples, but the foot, which has a high reputation among native epicures, always suggested, at any rate whenever I cooked it, crude indiarubber in taste as well as in appearance. The rest of the carcase, though not disdained by natives, is too tough for the civilized palate.

The training of the African elephant for work, such as is performed by its Indian cousin, is a more attractive proposition, and I am a firm believer in it, hoping to make some experiments in the future.

I have at different times captured five, one of which died, possibly from indigestion after eating my coat. Shortage of milk supply compelled me reluctantly to set the others free. They were all youngsters of but a few months old, though strong and lusty infants, and they became tame *in a few hours*. I do not, however, regard the employment of these animals in making forest paths as a very practical suggestion.

As regards the best means of protecting elephants in the region of Africa under notice, the first and most important is the establishment of Government Reserves, not in the qualified sense, but with absolute prohibition of hunting, official or otherwise. The most suitable area for this purpose has been already suggested in the Barue district, which is not within the territories of the Companhia de Mocambique, but is administered by the Portuguese Republic from Tete. Equally suitable is the eastern portion of the district of Messurize, lying between the Save and Buzi rivers, and bounded on the east by Sofala. The remaining portions of the territory under the charter of the Mocambique Company (except the district of Alto Save and the hinterland of Gouvuro) will inevitably, within the next few years, become considerably settled by Europeans, and in these areas the elephant is certain to retreat before the march of civilization, a result assisted by the completion of the railroad which, running from Beira to the Zambesi and linking up with the line from Port Herald (Shire Highlands Railway), will cut through the best elephant country in Cheringoma.

While the establishment of a Reserve is the most important step, it is not in itself sufficient, and other measures would have to be simultaneously enforced. These include the abolition of native hunters in Government employ; more efficient police supervision to prevent illicit shooting by natives (Europeans are debarred from poaching because the movements of a white hunter in any district are immediately known to the natives and by them reported to the officials); increased restrictions on white hunters (each European, whether a resident or a visitor, should be limited to one elephant, and the weight-limit of tusks should be raised from eleven to thirty pounds); only one licence, moreover, should be granted to the same individual in any one year.

Digitized by Google

On the habits of elephants in this part of Africa much might be written, but a few notes on such matters as have come under my own observation may perhaps be of interest.

The elephant's day varies considerably, according to the time of year. In the hot season, from August to December, these animals never, unless disturbed by man, travel between the hours of 8 a.m. and 4 p.m., but lie up in the shade of some convenient patch of forest, at most moving a few yards and often, indeed, spending the whole day under one tree, round which they move so as to keep in its shade. This habit gives the experienced hunter an easy clue to the hour at which they were under the tree, since all he has to do is to note the position of the spoor and from it determine that of the sun at the same time. I have often surprised them thus standing under trees in groups of from two to six, according to the spread of the tree and the amount of shade afforded by its branches. In some cases they were undoubtedly asleep, but, though I have approached within ten or fifteen yards, I cannot definitely say whether their eyes were open or closed. In districts where they are hunted elephants are invariably silent through the day and usually so at night also, but in the Barue, where they are rarely disturbed, I have twice heard calves crying out in broad daylight and once heard two elephants bellowing in the darkness. When they are resting under trees nothing is heard but the occasional thumping noise made by their ears flapping against the body, whether to fan themselves or to brush off flies I cannot say. At such times they have a trick of swinging the right forefoot in an aimless manner, scooping out a furrow about a yard long, and a second small furrow is made by rubbing and blowing with the trunk, apparently to obtain the earth with which they are in the habit of dusting themselves. After a shower of rain they throw quantities of wet earth over their backs, so much of which lodges in the hollows on either side of the spinal ridge that during the rains that follow the hot season I have found enough to fill three ordinary wheel-barrows.

I have never, in this part of Africa, come across any evidence of elephants digging with their tusks, though edible roots abound in great variety.

Their food and migrations are inseparably associated, and a few notes on the subject may be of interest. From January to July, inclusive, they travel much more freely during the day than at other seasons of the year. This, no doubt, is due to both the cool weather and the cover afforded by the grass, which is long during those months. It is on account of their journeys in search of food that they seem to be so much more numerous between December and April than at other times, for, instead of being scattered, they assemble in certain spots to feed on two wild fruits which are then ripe. The natives call these fruits " Matondo " and " Madanga " or " Mafura." They are also very partial

Digitized by Google

to another fruit, the "Mkwakwa," which ripens in December, and in this and the following month they come down to the flats after two varieties of palm fruits: "Madekwa" (*Borassus*) and "Machao" (*Hyphœnæ*), as well as for the sake of the small plum known as "Matengene." Although, however, their gathering together in certain districts is usually to be accounted for by the search for wild fruits, I can remember at any rate one striking exception, and that was when, on 20th October, 1906 (a time of year when none of their favourite fruits are ripe) I encountered, on the Pompwi River, in Barue, a herd of not less than 500, the only herd of anything like this strength I ever saw during two years of hunting in the country. It consisted chiefly of cows and calves, with a few small bulls. Calves were particularly numerous. I counted one small group of sixteen cows, each with at least two calves, and one old tuskless cow with five, all of them, judging by their range in size, probably her own. Native reports of this great herd had reached me three years earlier, before I ever visited the district, and one old man, a Shangaan, who had been one of Gungunyana's soldiers in the Barue campaigns fifteen years earlier, told me that the herd was known to his people as "the herd of Nyamande," a famous Shangaan chief and father of Gungunyuna. The name had been bestowed on it because its numbers were like those of the impis he used to despatch in arms against his enemies. I was never in that district again at this particular season, but I have since learnt from native sources that the herd is still in existence.

In this part of Africa, at any rate, elephants eat grass only in minute quantities. Their staple diet consists of bark, branches and roots, which they do not dig for* but tear up. In the months of October and November they live almost exclusively on the bark of the "M'Vuti" tree, and at that season long strips of this are found in their droppings. Their way of stripping off the bark is first to make an incision with one of the tusks (the right tusk for choice, if they have two), and then to pull it off in lengths, often to a height of ten or even twenty feet. This work so wears down the right tusk that it commonly weighs from five to eight per cent. less than the other.

Wild elephants drink, as a rule, once only during the twenty-four hours, almost invariably at night. In dry regions, where there are no permanent streams, they dig with their feet deep down in the sand of dried up river beds and get water in this way. They always fill up these holes again, sufficiently at any rate to prevent other animals from obtaining water, but it is impossible to say whether such is their intention.

* In the Sudan and Nile Valley elephants are known to dig up bulbs, a foot or more in diameter, from a depth of a yard or less, and the Asiatic elephant uses his tusk to pick down earth at salt licks.

Digitized by Google

The water-finding instinct of elephants is extraordinary. I remember a spot in Barue where the only available water lay inside a large rock and could be got at only through a small hole in the rock, no more than five inches in diameter, yet elephants had been using the water for months, while a small troop of zebra stood by thirsty and disconsolate.

Touching the strange manner in which they sometimes get water in the heat of the day, I once saw a remarkable thing in Barue. It was a very hot day, and I had come on a herd and shot two moderate sized bulls. Most of the herd made off, but a cow, a half-grown bull and a calf, probably about a year old, came back after running a hundred yards or so and stood beside their dead. I had had a hard run and was resting in the shade of an antheap. The elephants had winded me, and for more than half an hour I watched them quietly from where I lay, but they showed no sign of leaving. I was amazed to see the calf insert his trunk inside his mouth every few minutes, to about half its length, and then withdraw it with a small quantity of water, which he promptly swung over his head and back. I distinctly saw him do this at least a dozen times, but neither of the others did the same. Eventually, anxious that they should go, I showed myself, but the only one of the three to take any notice was the calf, which gave an amusing imitation of a full-grown elephant, swinging his ears forward and making short, threatening rushes, though never more than a few yards, in my direction, after which display he would hurriedly retreat to his mother's side. Then I irritated him by throwing sticks, and he repeated the performance, but the others paid no heed, though I shouted and even sang to them. That ought to have scared them, but failed. As a shot fired in the air was equally ineffectual, there was nothing for it but to score the old cow across the rump with a bullet, which did at last have the desired effect, sending all three in headlong flight. I have never either heard or read of elephants drawing water from their own stomach in this fashion, and this was the only case that came under my notice. Incidentally, I may mention that these particular elephants had not been near water since an early hour on the previous evening. A native, who usually told the truth, informed me that he had once, from the safety of a tree, watched a cow elephant give birth to a calf. The rest of the herd brought water from the M'Sikofu River, more than a mile distant, and sprayed the youngster with it. The mother seemed very excited and stood on guard by her offspring for about three hours, at the end of which time it was able to walk and the herd then moved off. The native was careful to remain in the tree, as cows are said to be exceedingly dangerous on these occasions and are given to charging at sight.

The fact of elephants in this part of Africa never being taken, like the rhinoceros and other large animals, in the native pitfalls unless they

Digitized by Google

fall into them when pursued, is sometimes attributed to their high degree of intelligence, but I am personally more inclined to give the credit to their wonderful powers of scent, which, from their habit of carrying the trunk no more than a couple of inches from the ground, would almost certainly warn them of the lower temperature of air in the pitfall, and would prompt further investigation of the surroundings. That their powers of scent surpass those of any other animal I have hunted I am certain. Times again, after following the spoor from early morning, I have found them outwit me, coming on such evidences of their flight as the slightly deeper indentation made by the forward part of the foot, on which extra weight is thrown in running, and those splashes of watery dung along the spoor which are never seen except when elephants are in full flight. Now, as the crashing noise made by a herd of elephants dashing through the forest would be plainly heard a mile away by the hunter, who moves cautiously, halting at every few yards to listen, it follows that elephants can wind a human being at that distance, and this in the forest, where the wind is nearly always gusty and rarely blows long in one direction. I have even known elephants take flight from crossing their own spoor along which I had followed. Thus they had scented the human taint on the spoor, though in some places more than two hours old. Fortunately for the hunter this acuteness of scent sometimes fails, so that he will occasionally manage to shoot them when, by all the rules of the game, they should have winded him and got away. Such exceptions always occur about the middle of the day, at which time elephants are always more or less drowsy, and in any case these successes are far less frequent than the occasions on which the herd gets wind of the enemy and escapes untouched.

Their sight, on the other hand, is most defective. I have often had to manœuvre a long time round about a herd in the attempt to get position for a shot at a good tusker, treading only in their footprints so as to avoid the dry leaves elsewhere that would have crackled loud enough to give the alarm. In so doing I was frequently obliged to go close to cows and small bulls, and I found that even when no more than ten yards distant I had only to stand perfectly still whenever one of them looked suspicious and wait till the scrutiny was over, after which I could go on. Unless, however, the animal's suspicion is set at rest it will, at such short range, usually charge, or at any rate make a dash in the hunter's direction, possibly by way of setting all doubts at rest. I should say, as a general rule, speaking from actual experience, that elephants charge a man who is very close to them, whereas at any distance exceeding twenty yards they prefer, if possible, to get away. Females accompanied by calves are often vicious, and a tuskless elephant (which the natives call " Maleri ") charges, as often as not, without provocation. I attribute this habit to the fact that these tuskless animals are never

Digitized by Google

shot at, save in self-defence, and even then they are, if possible, allowed to escape. This immunity probably inspires a fearlessness of man that makes them the champions of the herd, and they often, in fact, make things lively while the rest are getting away. The native explanation of their bad temper is that they have no tusks, but it is difficult to see why this should make them morose, and I prefer my own theory. The fact remains that the " Maleri " is a continual source of danger, and these animals have been responsible for ninety per cent. of the accidents that have come under my notice. On one occasion, indeed, I was charged by two at once. One of them I dropped dead with a chest shot. The other I failed to drop, and, on being hit, it stopped at a fallen tree that lay between us and began tearing off the branches. On receiving a second shot, it made off. I have been told by native hunters that they had seen a wounded elephant helped away by two of its unwounded comrades, one on either side, but I never saw this myself.

The " Maleri " is an interesting animal, and there has been much discussion over its origin and persistence as a type. I think it should be fairly obvious that the want of tusks is not the result of natural selection. When we come to think of it, this view assumes that the elephant, knowing tuskless offspring to be safe from the hunter, has sense enough to select his mate with that object, and, as another, and even more conclusive, argument against such a theory, I have seen tuskless cows accompanied by calves with tusks. The vast majority of " Maleris " are cows. Personally, I never saw one of the male sex, but have heard from reliable native hunters of two separate cases of large single bull " Maleris," though tuskless males are exceedingly rare. Dutch hunters have been known to declare that it is possible to distinguish between the spoor of a tusker and a " Maleri," but this is untrue. As a contribution to the discussion, which I offer only for what it is worth, I have remarked that, in hilly districts where the *Hyphænæ* palm is not found, the tusks of large, old elephants are often disappointing, while similar animals in the flats, where this palm forms the elephant's staple food, would carry tusks at least one-third as long again. What correlation of facts there may be can only be determined by prolonged investigation, but I may say that other hunters have agreed with me that the connection is worth studying.

I have shot elephants with one tusk only, the other side being quite bare, and, to satisfy myself that there had been only the one tusk from birth, I cleaned two or three skulls of this type, with the result that the tuskless side was exactly the same as that of a " Maleri." The natives call these elephants with one tusk " N'Yarashonga," and they may be said to be fairly common.

Curved tusks crossing at the tips are met with sometimes in cow elephants, and cases are quoted by A. H. Neumann in his book on

Digitized by Google

hunting in Equatorial Africa.* The longest recorded tusk of modern times is nine feet five inches along the curve.

In some countries hunters say that tuskers are habitually sheltered by other members of the herd, but in this part of Africa I have never seen anything of the kind myself, nor have the natives any belief in it. The tusker is always an arrant coward, and, unless wounded, will invariably try to get away.

Some writers are under the impression that elephants are able to discriminate between white and black men, but I doubt it. It is true that I have generally, in the few cases in which they charge, been singled out as the object of their attack, but this was easily explained by the habit of my gun-bearers, who bolted on the least provocation.

The truth is that the habits of the elephant are not the same throughout its range, even in the same continent, while the differences between the African and Asiatic are very marked, due, no doubt, to environment and, more particularly, to the attitude of human beings towards them. I understand that in Siam they have been known to cover their dead with leaves and branches, but I never heard any mention of this in Africa. Rogue elephants in the East frequently display the marks of battle, including torn ears and tails bitten short. I never saw any such traces of fighting in the African elephant, or any natural malformation, save in the tusks. I did on one occasion shoot a big bull with a docked tail, but this was clearly the work of native axe-hunters, dating from the old days when it was the fashion to hamstring elephants with an axe. Another elephant of mine, that had lost the tip of its trunk, probably owed its plight to an accident.

Our knowledge of the two species, African and Asiatic, is neither similar nor equal. Most of our information about the former is derived from those who have hunted it in the wild state, whereas much of the written history of the latter is based on prolonged observation of these animals in captivity, and these are two very different standpoints from which to study the habits and instincts of any animal.

* "Elephant Hunting in East Equatorial Africa," by A. H. Neumann. Published by Rowland Ward, 1898.

Digitized by Google

THE MACHINE GUN CORPS (CAVALRY) IN FRANCE, 1916—1918 (continued).

By CAPTAIN T. PRESTON, M.C., *Yorkshire Hussars.*

VIII.—THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE.

LIKE the rest of the cavalry, the Machine Gun Squadrons did their full share in helping to stem the German onslaught during the critical days between 21st March and 7th April, 1918.

By the middle of March the three cavalry divisions were all in the Fifth Army area, because it had been correctly anticipated that this was the most threatened front; the 1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions were east and south-east of Péronne and the 2nd Cavalry Division farther south.

On the 11th March the 8th Machine Gun Squadron received orders to place eight guns at the disposal of the 66th Division. These guns and their personnel proceeded (dismounted) to Roisel, and next day battle positions were reconnoitred and prepared on the general line Templeux—Jeancourt, about a mile in rear of the front line. The guns were not placed in these positions, but were held in reserve at Roisel, and were only to go forward on the message "man battle positions" being received. The 8th Squadron was relieved on 14th March by the 2nd Squadron, which held these positions when the battle started a week later.

The doings of the Machine Gun Squadrons in this great battle will be easier to follow if the story is divided into stages, as under:

(*a*) Action of 1st Cavalry Division in XIX Corps area (Bernes, Hervilly, etc.), 21st-23rd March, and retreat behind the Somme.

(*b*) Actions of 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions in III Corps area on extreme right of British line, and retreat past Noyon towards Compiègne.

(*c*) Action of 1st Cavalry Division near Montauban, 25th March, and operations on the Somme near Bray, etc.

Digitized by Google

(*d*) The fight for Amiens—action of 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions around Hangard, 31st March-1st April.

(*e*) Action of 1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions at Villers-Bretonneux, 4th-7th April.

(*f*) Actions of the 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th and 14th Machine Gun Squadrons, which were not in the cavalry divisions.

When the cavalry were sent up to help the infantry at the commencement of the battle, the grave mistake was made of sending the led horses too far back and using the cavalry merely as extra infantry. The truth was that the rapid "break through" by the Germans and consequent retreat by our troops had not been foreseen; and when it did in fact happen, the cavalry simply had to retire on their "flat feet" with the infantry instead of fulfilling their proper rôle and *covering* the retreat, as they could have done if the horses had been close up.

The Machine Gun Squadrons were even more affected by this than the regiments, for they had heavier weights to carry. Many belt boxes and much other equipment had to be abandoned, as the men simply could not carry it all, and some Machine Gun Squadrons had guns out of action at critical times through lack of ammunition.

(*a*) We will first record the doings of the 1st, 2nd and 9th Squadrons in the XIX Corps area.

It has already been mentioned that the 2nd Squadron's dismounted party, with eight guns, had since 14th March been in reserve to the 66th Division at Roisel. At 5.35 a.m. on 21st March, the C.O. (Captain L. W. D. Wathen) got the order "man battle positions," which was done by 7.20 a.m. Owing to the thick fog the situation was very obscure, but shells were falling everywhere, and at 8.10 a.m. the squadron lost one gun by a direct hit, with one man killed and one wounded. Numerous gas shells were sent over, and the gun teams had to wear their respirators for six hours. By 10 p.m. it was reported that the enemy held Templeux-le-Guérard and Priel Wood.

22nd March dawned in another thick fog, under cover of which the Germans renewed their attacks. At 10 a.m. the four left hand guns of the squadron came into action south of Templeux, and got excellent targets on the advancing masses of the enemy. Two guns, under Sergeant L. Bull, broke up no fewer than five hostile attacks. At last, owing to the retirement of the infantry, the four guns found themselves practically surrounded, and had to fight their way back as best they could. Lance-Corporal Fisher saved his gun; Lance-Corporal Mousley was shot whilst carrying his; and the other guns had to be abandoned after being rendered useless. Sergeant Bull was awarded a D.C.M.; it was a case of history repeating itself, for on 22nd June, 1917, this same sergeant had

Digitized by Google

won a bar to his M.M. when showing the infantry how cavalry machine gunners could stick to their guns. (*See* page 498, No. 38.)

In the meantime, the four right hand guns of the squadron had also come into action and done great execution. Corporal Westley's gun caught a column of the enemy in a sunken road and inflicted very severe casualties upon them. As evening closed in these four guns also withdrew with the infantry to the "green line," under Lieutenant Johnson. The dismounted 2nd Squadron was relieved that night and rallied at Le Mesnil, whence it marched back on foot and joined the horses at Morchain (west of the Somme) on the morning of 23rd March.

Turning to the 1st Machine Gun Squadron, which was encamped at Meraucourt, their stables were shelled at 8 a.m., 21st, wounding one man and killing and wounding twenty-two horses. About 12 noon the order came to turn out, and the squadron, under Captain F. C. Lacaita, M.C., proceeded to reserve trenches at Vendelles, where it came under the 17th Brigade, 24th Division. About the same time the 9th Squadron (Captain C. G. Macandrew) had saddled up and ridden with its brigade to Bernes.

The 1st Squadron, after being in the Vendelles trenches all night, was ordered to retire at 11 a.m., 22nd, leaving two guns behind to cover the withdrawal of the brigade. One man was killed and eight wounded, but the squadron got no actual shooting, and moved back dismounted by Estrée and Mons-en-Chaussee, joining its horses at St. Christ early on 23rd March.

At 1 a.m., 22nd March, the 9th Squadron moved with its brigade to Montigny Farm, where a dismounted party was formed. The squadron wisely retained its pack horses, and was sent to Bois de la Croix at 3 a.m.

The Germans had gained possession of Hervilly, and at 9 a.m. the 9th Cavalry Brigade (dismounted) counter-attacked this village. One gun of the 9th Squadron commanded the high ground, so as to give covering fire, and the other guns followed the attacking troops to consolidate. The counter-attack was successful, but later in the day the brigade withdrew to the "green line" behind Hervilly and dug itself in. At 4 p.m. the infantry gave ground on both flanks of the 9th Cavalry Brigade, rendering a further withdrawal necessary, which was carried out under heavy fire, both from Germans on the ground and from hostile aeroplanes; it is satisfactory to record that one Boche aeroplane, venturing too low, was shot down in flames by rifle fire and the pilot captured.

In this action the 9th Machine Gun Squadron lost two guns, one being fought to the very end, in Hervilly Wood, by Private Herbert George Columbine. This gallant soldier, though in an isolated position with no wire in front of him, kept his gun firing from 9 a.m. till 1 p.m., so that wave after wave of Germans failed to get up to him. He was attacked by a low-flying aeroplane and at last the enemy secured a

Digitized by Google

foothold on both flanks of his position. Columbine ordered two men who were with him to make their escape, but he himself continued firing his gun and doing tremendous execution. Bombed from both sides, he was eventually killed by a bomb "which blew up him and his gun." He was posthumously awarded the V.C.* and the town of Walton-on-the-Naze (of which he was a native) erected a public memorial to him, besides providing for his widowed mother. His father had been killed in the South African War.

During the evening of 22nd March the 9th Squadron retreated with its brigade and got to its horses at Bouvincourt; it reached Athies by 11 p.m. and marched thence to Curchy on the 23rd. Lieutenant F. J. Bridges, M.C., and his subsection were missing at first but joined up later.

It will be seen that by the morning of 23rd March all three brigades of the 1st Cavalry Division were on or behind the line of the Somme, four to five miles south of Péronne. Here for the moment we will leave them, and turn to the desperate conflict south of St. Quentin, where the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions were heavily engaged.

(*b*) During 21st March the 3rd, 4th and 5th Machine Gun Squadrons (2nd Cavalry Division) were moved by bus to Faillouel, Viry-Noureuil and Jussy respectively, whilst the 6th, 8th and Canadian Squadrons (3rd Cavalry Division) rode with their brigades to the area about Cugny and Chauny. Both divisions now came under the orders of III Corps, which, it should be noted, was the extreme right Corps of the British Army.

The 4th Squadron (Captain E. W. Macarthur) kept four guns in reserve, whilst the remaining eight, under Lieutenants Brooks and Higgs, were disposed along the railway embankment between Quessy and Mennessis, reinforcing the 54th Brigade, 18th Division. This squadron had already experienced difficulty in getting its guns and belt boxes along, men having to be borrowed from the regiments as carriers.

Continuing the line to the north, the 3rd Squadron (under the second-in-command, Captain J. B. G. Hayter) was distributed as follows: Lieutenant Artis's subsection with the 4th Hussars, south of Mennessis; Lieutenant Day's with 16th Lancers, along the railway from Mennessis to Jussy; and Lieutenant Swann's with the 5th Lancers around Jussy; the remaining six guns being in reserve, under Captain Hayter and Lieutenant Mead.

The 5th Squadron (Captain E. S. D. Martin, M.C.) took up positions,

* Out of five V.C.'s won by the whole Machine Gun Corps in France, three went to the Infantry branch and two to the Cavalry branch. As there were more than twenty times as many infantry machine-gunners as cavalry, the latter may well be proud of this record.

Digitized by Google



— — — — Line morning of 21st March.
. . . . . Line evening of 21st March.
. — . — . Line evening of 22nd March.

MAP TO ILLUSTRATE OPERATIONS OF 1ST, 2ND AND 9TH M.G. SQUADRONS 21ST AND 22ND MARCH, 1918.



. — . — Approximate British line, evening 22nd March.
. . . . . " " " " 23rd March.
— — — " " " " 24th March.

MAP TO ILLUSTRATE OPERATIONS OF DISMOUNTED CAVALRY IN III CORPS AREA, 21ST-23RD MARCH, 1918.

(Showing positions of 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th and Canadian M.G. Squadrons at daybreak, 23rd March.)

Digitized by Google

at 8 p.m. on the 21st, along the railway embankment, just west of Montescourt-Lizerolles, with five guns farther forward towards Gibercourt. This position was, as will be seen from the map, east of the Crozat Canal, but during the night 21st-22nd March the 5th Cavalry Brigade was ordered to withdraw across the canal, and the squadron then held a line along the Jussy—Faillouel road.

On the morning of 22nd March the line occupied by the 2nd Cavalry Division was not the front line, but during the day the German attacks gradually forced our infantry back across the Crozat Canal and by 6 p.m. were attacking the line of the railway; at this hour Lieutenant Artis's guns (3rd Machine Gun Squadron) came into action with very good effect.

Meanwhile the 4th Squadron, to the south, had withdrawn, under orders from 54th Brigade, to a position across the south-east edge of Frières Wood. The war diary records that "the squadron and carriers were by now thoroughly exhausted, having been on the move for twenty-four hours." At every turn it became evident what a mistake had been made in sending the cavalry up without their horses.

Turning to the dismounted 3rd Cavalry Division, this was, on 22nd March, held in III Corps Reserve, behind the 2nd Cavalry Division. The 8th Machine Gun Squadron (Captain T. Preston) was, with the 7th Cavalry Brigade, in huts in Frières Wood. At 3.20 p.m. Captain Preston was hurriedly sent for by the G.O.C. 18th Division (Major-General Lee), who explained personally that he wished the squadron to fire indirect across the Crozat Canal, which the enemy was trying to cross. Captain Preston said this could not be done, as there were no squared maps, whereupon the G.O.C. told him to place his guns at certain points east and south-east of Frières Wood, and help to stop the enemy the best way he could. Here, again, appeared the evils of being dismounted, for it took the guns fully two hours to get into position, whereas if they had had their horses they could have been ready in half an hour or less.

Four guns, under Lieutenant W. G. Wakefield, were dug in in an orchard at the north-east corner of the wood, whilst four, under 2nd Lieutenant H. E. Powell, were sent forward to Hallet Wood, but withdrew an hour later as the Germans were said already to have gained a footing there. The four remaining guns, under 2nd Lieutenants R. G. Burton and W. Greenstreet, went to the south-east corner of Frières Wood to engage the enemy issuing from Tergnier; the 18th Division sent this section a squared map, enabling them to do some indirect fire during the night 22nd-23rd.

The 6th Machine Gun Squadron (Captain F. B. Ratcliffe) spent the night in reserve near Viry-Noureuil.

The third day of the battle, 23rd March, again opened in thick fog, and there was fierce fighting all along the III Corps front. To quote

Digitized by Google

the C.-in-C.'s despatch: "Infantry and cavalry offered a most resolute resistance to the enemy's advance and performed many gallant actions."

Early in the morning the Germans forced the passage of the Crozat Canal at several points, notably at Jussy and Mennessis. The 3rd Squadron guns (especially those with the 16th Lancers) did valuable service, as also did the Canadian Squadron (Captain J. W. Boulter), which had been sent up to stiffen the line near Mennessis. The Canadians lost two men killed, six wounded and two missing, but took a far heavier toll of the enemy. The 5th Squadron were also engaged near Faillouel and the Bois l'Abbé and had Lieutenant L. Williams wounded, with four men killed and twenty wounded.

All this time the various woods were being very heavily shelled, and different infantry units were continually retiring; by midday our whole line in this sector had been forced back, and the Germans were attacking the big wood of Frières. The left-hand guns of the 8th Squadron (which had been placed in an orchard east of the wood) found themselves at 8 a.m. in such a thick fog that they could not see to shoot and were in danger of being cut off; they were accordingly withdrawn to the eastern edge of the wood, where they were in line with the dismounted 7th Cavalry Brigade and various infantry battalions. During the retirement of these guns one subsection slightly lost its way and was borrowed by the 4th Squadron for the defence of Frières Faillouel. The 4th and 8th Squadrons, in fact, unwittingly exchanged some guns during the day, for at the south-east corner of Frières Wood several 4th Squadron guns which had got lost were taken charge of by 2nd Lieutenants Burton and Greenstreet, of the 8th Squadron. These two subalterns did excellent work throughout the day; for some time they had under them not only their own subsections, but some 4th Squadron guns and a party of infantry, including a major! They thoroughly deserved the M.C.'s which were awarded them later.

Farther south, near Viry-Noureuil, the 6th Squadron was heavily engaged and did magnificent work. As happened all too often in these critical days, the infantry fell back on both flanks and left the guns isolated. Lieutenant Wilkes was mortally wounded, two men were killed and one wounded, whilst one gun was put out of action. It became necessary to withdraw about a mile, and Captain Ratcliffe placed his guns in a sunken road, where he was in line with the dismounted 6th Cavalry Brigade.

All through the morning of the 23rd the attack was pressed on Frières Wood and Frières-Faillouel village. The 4th, 5th and 8th Squadrons inflicted severe punishment on the advancing waves of Germans; the 4th Squadron had two guns destroyed, besides losing seven men killed and six wounded. The 8th Squadron lost two killed and two wounded, the former including Corporal Annis (formerly Leicester Yeomanry), one of the best of the younger N.C.O.'s.

Digitized by Google

As the day wore on it became evident that Frières Wood was being surrounded. The dismounted 7th Cavalry Brigade, with the 8th Machine Gun Squadron less one section, held a line inside the wood till about 4 p.m., but their flanks were in the air, and at 6.30 p.m. a retirement was ordered. The brigade, with the 55th Infantry Brigade, made its way through Villequier-Aumont without mishap, though shells were crashing into the village and hostile aeroplanes were overhead.

When darkness fell our line in this sector was fully four miles further back than it had been in the morning; the various dismounted cavalry brigades spent the night in fields and villages, most of the 2nd Cavalry Division being at Caillouel, the 7th and Canadian Cavalry Brigades at Ugny-le-Gay, and the 6th Cavalry Brigade still in line north of Chauny.

On the morning of 24th March the 6th Squadron was again attacked and behaved most gallantly, killing many of the enemy and hanging on to their position till driven out at last by enfilade fire. Here the acting O.C., Captain F. B. Ratcliffe, was mortally wounded. The squadron withdrew in the evening of 24th March to Abbécourt, and thence across the Oise Canal to Quierzy, where Lieutenant G. H. Eaton was killed. No machine gun squadron suffered more severely in officers than the 6th.*

The remaining squadrons of the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions—and indeed the regiments also—got no actual fighting during 24th March. The whole of the dismounted cavalry in this area were ordered to continue their retreat from Caillouel to Dampcourt and Mondescourt, just north of the Oise.

The writer will never forget the scene during this retreat. The march, in the early hours of a beautiful spring morning, lay through a country of wooded hills and fields unscarred by trenches or wire. Long columns of blue-clad French cavalry and artillery could be seen moving up to the scene of action. Away to the east, a village had been set on fire by German shells, and a pillar of dense smoke was rising into the still air. It was "open warfare" with a vengeance, and the picturesque surroundings made a strange contrast to the seriousness of the situation.

It will be seen from the map that though the retirement of the III Corps had at first been westward, it had now become more southward. The result was that the III Corps got separated from the rest of the British Fifth Army and came under the orders of the French Third Army, hence the French reinforcements seen by our troops.

About 2 p.m. 24th the dismounted cavalry came under the orders of Brigadier-General Seely (commanding Canadian Cavalry Brigade), the

* They started the battle with seven officers, of whom six became casualties: Lieutenant Eaton, killed; Captain Ratcliffe and Lieutenant Wilkes, died of wounds; Lieutenants Cole, Windham and Hollis, wounded. The only surviving officer, Lieutenant Ellis, was fated to be killed in October.

Digitized by Google


SCALE
3 MILES
CHAUNY
NOYON
Camry
Babery
Carlepont
Pontoise
Cuts
Varesnes
Morlincourt
Ribecourt
Suzoy
Ageux
Lagny
Dives
Thiescourt
Crisolles
Cuy
Ourscamps
Chiry
Ourscamps
Machemont
Abbaye
Monchy
Quierzy
Appilly
Berlancourt
Grandru
Caillouel
Crapeaumesnil
Bethancourt
Bethancourt
Bethancourt

units being considerably mixed up. One subsection 3rd Machine Gun Squadron was placed under the O.C. Canadian Squadron which, with the 8th Squadron, was disposed around Estay Chateau just north-east of Appilly, where it was intended to hold on for the night. Beyond a certain amount of shelling, the night 24th-25th March passed quietly.

The intention of the Staff now was to get the dismounted cavalry back to their horses, which had been taken to the Carlepont-Cuts area for safety. A mounted brigade known as "Harman's Detachment" had already been formed from the "led horses" portion of the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions, but this had no machine guns with it, for they were all with the dismounted party.

On the morning of 25th March the 3rd and 4th Squadrons marched on foot to Pontoise and Cuts, where a proportion of both squadrons, and of the 5th Squadron, were provided with horses; a composite machine gun squadron (mounted) was thus formed, under command of Captain F. W. M. Cornwallis, O.C. 3rd Squadron.*

In the meantime, the Canadian and 8th Squadrons had been left, with their dismounted brigades, at Estay Chateau and Appilly to hold the bridgeheads over the Oise canal and river. The advancing Germans soon began to shell Appilly heavily, evidently trying to hit the bridges, in which they were fortunately unsuccessful. Patrols reported the enemy advancing on Abbécourt about 11 a.m. and driving the French out of it. The 8th Machine Gun Squadron, being short of belt boxes, only had four guns in the Appilly defences, and sent the rest to the rear with the transport, under Lieutenant Wakefield. This party withdrew through Baboeuf, and later in the morning they narrowly escaped capture, as the Germans shelled the bridge there, and the squadron's limbers only just got across the Varesnes bridge before that was destroyed too.

At 12 noon, just as it seemed certain that the 7th and Canadian Cavalry Brigades would have to meet an attack on Appilly, a French infantry division arrived and took over the village from them. The two dismounted brigades then crossed the Oise and marched southwards to Carlepont, where they at last reached their horses.

The dismounted cavalry in this area had, since 22nd March, retreated fifteen to eighteen miles on foot, the machine gunners carrying their guns and tripods. Well might the writer's Brigadier remark: "This is the wickedest show I've ever seen." By the evening of 25th March, practically all the machine gun squadrons in the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions were again mounted.

That night the Germans held Noyon, and actions developed on the morning of the 26th in which the 3rd, 4th and 5th Machine Gun Squadrons

* This officer met with a tragic death in Ireland on 15th May, 1921, being shot in cold blood when returning from a tennis party.

Digitized by Google

took a prominent part. We have seen that a composite mounted squadron had been formed under Captain Cornwallis; this squadron left Chiry with its brigade at 11 a.m. to attack the high ground east of Suzoy, which was held by the enemy. The brigade advanced through Cuy to the Bois des Essarts, so as to attack from the north-west. It was held up by hostile machine-gun fire at the north-west corner of the wood, and the Germans began in their turn to attack.

The dismounted 4th Cavalry Brigade held, by 9 a.m., a line along the north edge of the Bois des Essarts. Lieutenant Sarson, of the 4th Machine Gun Squadron, placed his two guns at the north-west corner of the wood, whilst Lieutenant Cotton was told to take up a position in a small copse to the left. Whilst going across the open to reconnoitre Lieutenant Cotton was shot through the lung by hostile machine-gun fire; the guns were got into the copse in question under very heavy fire, and five men were hit before the guns managed to silence the German machine guns, which were firing from behind trees on a ridge in front.

At 2 p.m. two guns of the 5th Squadron helped materially to check the enemy's advance near Lagny, one gun being north of the village and the other near the cemetery. An enemy machine gun was seen to be put out of action.

In spite of the gallant fighting of the cavalry the Germans had by 4.30 p.m. worked round both flanks, and a withdrawal was absolutely necessary. The mounted Machine Gun Squadron was ordered to get back to the ridge behind Cuy village, and the guns were therefore taken back to the horses. Whilst they were being put on the packs the Germans got their machine guns into action against the led horses, and it seemed as if a stampede was imminent; this was prevented chiefly by the coolness of Private F. Brown (attached from Oxfordshire Hussars) who kept the horses together, and enabled the sections to get safely away. The 4th Squadron section had to jump a small stream in line formation, owing to a bridge being broken, and this was done in excellent style.

In the meantime the two 5th Squadron guns in action at Lagny had been withdrawn under orders to a bridge just east of Dives; owing to shortage of ammunition only one gun could now shoot, which it did with extremely good effect and checked the enemy's advance. Lieutenant J. P. E. Walker was slightly wounded, but remained at duty.

The 3rd, 4th and 5th Machine Gun Squadrons were re-formed that night (mounted) at Morvillers, Compiègne and Canly respectively, with their brigades.

The 6th, 8th and Canadian Squadrons, with their brigades, concentrated similarly at Choisy-au-Bac, just north of Compiègne, on the night of the 26th; these squadrons had not been in action on that date, though one section of the 8th Squadron (mounted) had been on duty all day

Digitized by Google

with General Portal's mounted force at Les Cloyes, in the Carlepont Woods, watching the crossings of the Oise at Pontoise and Sempigny.

The 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions were now again complete mounted forces, and the Staff had learnt thoroughly the lesson of the past few days—never again to separate men and horses too far. The various deficiencies in guns and belt boxes in the machine gun squadrons were made good, and on 29th March the two divisions left the III Corps and marched northwards to the Fourth Army area near Amiens. Here we will leave them and return to the 1st Cavalry Division on the Somme.

(*To be continued.*)

BADGE OF THE MACHINE GUN CORPS.

Digitized by Google

HOTCHKISS GUNS.

By BREVET LIEUT.-COLONEL C. B. D. STRETTELL, *23rd Cavalry F.F.*
Brigade Major, 10th Cavalry Brigade, E.E.F.

> " The idea of a squadron going into action with its four Hotchkiss sections marching as a troop in rear of it would, I think, make any squadron leader or troop leader of experience shudder, as the value of the gun with the troop itself cannot be over-estimated."
>
> (*Extract from " Notes on the Hotchkiss Gun,"* CAVALRY JOURNAL, *January*, 1921.)

THE present organization of the Hotchkiss guns of a squadron of cavalry into a " four-gun troop " has received the sanction of the authorities, but there are many squadron leaders who will agree with the extract quoted above, which is taken from the very able article on Hotchkiss guns that appeared in the CAVALRY JOURNAL of January, 1921.

The organization of the Hotchkiss guns of a squadron is a subject on which great difference of opinion exists and, considering that at present the main fire power of a squadron lies in its Hotchkiss guns, their organization and tactical use are of great importance.

Before entering into a discussion on the subject it must be borne in mind that the first issue of these guns took place in war time, consequently an organization based on the necessities of rapid training in war need not necessarily be the most suitable organization when time for training is ample. When Hotchkiss guns were first issued to cavalry it was obvious that, to train specialists rapidly, it was essential to group the four guns of a squadron together under a select officer. Now that so many men are intimately acquainted with the gun the reasons that necessitated such grouping carry less weight, and it is well to consider if such grouping is suitable from a point of training, organization and tactical use.

Digitized by Google

The alternative system to the "four-gun troop" is for each troop to have its own gun.

A general argument against this organization is that it may fail to maintain a high standard of mechanical knowledge and of the tactics of massed guns.

It will be later shown that this argument is not of very great value, while it may also be very strongly put forward that, though specialist training is made easier by such grouping, yet it may equally truly be said that training in this method tends to make officers and men look on the Hotchkiss gun as a machine gun, instead of which it is an automatic rifle.

The tactics of the machine gun and Hotchkiss rifle, as it might far better be called, are entirely different, and any tendency to use the Hotchkiss gun as a machine gun is fundamentally wrong.

It is difficult to see that any other advantage can be claimed for the "four-gun troop" than that specialist training is simplified.

The disadvantages of the "four-gun troop" are as follow:

(*a*) When supplied with a farrier, signaller (in British units with a cook) and other necessary staff it becomes unwieldy.

(*b*) In practice the other troops in the squadron have to be sacrificed to keep it up to strength, as they of necessity are all deprived of their best men and horses.

(*c*) Casualties have to be replaced from other troops, which is very unpopular and inconvenient.

(*d*) To supply reserves of trained gunners, which are essential, men have to be attached from other troops for training, which increases the unwieldiness of the Hotchkiss gun troop. Unless this is done the training of the reserve men is very difficult to arrange.

(*e*) The leaders of the other troops lose all touch, both with the mechanical working of the gun and its tactical use. Consequently even if one or more guns are attached to their troop when it is engaged in any specific rôle they are unable to make the best use of them.

(*f*) The danger always exists that, if a troop is detached for a special mission, the attachment of a Hotchkiss gun may easily be overlooked and the troop proceed without one. This may be a serious omission.

(*g*) On the march with the regiment, when a halt is made, owing to there being no extra men to assist in unloading the pack horses, a great delay occurs, and a still greater delay when the regiment moves on.

Digitized by Google

The result is either an unnecessarily long halt, or the packs are not removed and consequent extra fatigue to the horses and resultant sore backs occur.

(*h*) When on operations the process of drawing rations for a Hotchkiss gun troop is very difficult. Owing to the larger proportion of horses and saddlery it is difficult to spare men for this purpose, and the result is the danger of horses and guns being neglected by men having to be detailed to draw rations.

As opposed to these disadvantages, the advantages of the one gun per troop organization are:

(*a*) The gun is used for its legitimate purpose as the main fire weapon of the troop.

(*b*) The four troops in the squadron are homogeneous, the handling of the squadron simplified, and it is better organized.

(*c*) Casualties in the gun team are replaced by men of the same troop, which is tactically sound, convenient and popular.

(*d*) The troops keep their best men and horses; it is only natural that this is popular.

(*e*) Reserves can easily be trained under troop arrangements, and as each troop takes a pride in its gun, volunteers are easily obtained.

(*f*) By constant contact with and interest in the gun, all the troop leaders learn the tactical use of it.

(*g*) A detached troop automatically has its gun with it.

(*h*) On the march no time is lost in loading and unloading when a halt takes place, as the other men of the troop assist.

(*i*) The other men of the troop draw rations while the Hotchkiss gun team, look after their extra horses, saddlery and guns.

(*j*) Guns can always be massed when necessary, and in practice, on service no difficulty in doing this was ever found in units who had this organization, e.g., units of the 7th Cavalry Brigade, M.E.F.

(*k*) By permitting the squadron Hotchkiss gun officer to hold special parades, when the remainder are otherwise employed, specialist training of the Hotchkiss gunners can easily be co-ordinated and supervised.

The above would appear to be strong arguments in favour of the one gun per troop organization. It may be said that the only tactical reason for massing guns is to cover a mounted attack; some critics even

Digitized by Google

argue that some of the guns should actually take part in a mounted attack, so as to be immediately ready to consolidate a captured position or destroy a flying enemy.

In any case mounted attacks are few and far between; in nearly every other situation the massing of guns is unsound.

It would appear that the adoption of a system whose *raison d'être* is likely to be of rare occurrence, cannot logically be advocated in preference to an organization which is adapted to nearly every other situation, and which does not interfere with the massing of guns if such is necessary.



Digitized by Google

INTERNATIONAL POLO.

SATURDAY, 18TH JUNE AND WEDNESDAY, 22ND JUNE, 1921.

WHY ENGLAND WAS BEATEN IN THE FIRST MATCH.

By LIEUT.-COLONEL E. D. MILLER, D.S.O.

AMERICA in the first period quickly demonstrated the superiority of the pace and handiness of their ponies, and in their powers of hitting the ball. We all but got a goal in the first minute; but then two goals were quickly scored by America, so that it was an uphill fight from the very start that England was forced to fight. They never quite drew level, though a desperate effort was made in the fourth period and England penned America all the time; they all but drew level at five all, but unfortunately a goal was disallowed at five to four which would have made them even. This goal was a marvellous save by Milburn and was only a matter of inches. This proved the turning point of the game, and during the last three periods the Americans had matters all their own way, and piled up six more goals. Had we taken our easy chances we would have been ahead by one or two goals at the end of the fourth period. The superiority of the Americans was due to the following causes:

First.—The ponies are much better—an American never sells a good pony out of his own country. On the other hand, they buy all the best they can find in England and America, and have been doing so for many years. Playing on Saturday were Royal Diamond, Harkaway and Selina, beautifully clean and fresh, although they were our own star ponies in the 1913 Team in America. Tenby played for us in 1914. Ragtime Queen played here in 1914, and went to America in 1916. Watson Webb has a wonderful grey Argentine, bought in this country many years ago. And these are not the best of them, for Stoddard rode Belle of All, a Californian thoroughbred, three periods; perhaps the best and fastest pony playing now. Every pony is a handy polo pony, every pony is fast, and there is not a young one among the lot carefully selected out of fifty they brought over, the whole fifty having been in one stable since last July.

The English ponies, on the other hand, have all, with the exception of Fairy and Snipe, been trained since the War, and

Digitized by Google

have not consequently the age, experience and necessary condition on them. This was very palpable when they came out the second time. The ponies could not stay it out, and the American ponies had it all their own way.

Second.—It was not all due to the ponies—the Americans are the better players. On the average I should think that they get twenty-five yards longer on their strokes.

Milburn is a magnificent player and can hit far harder than Lockett. He is, too, a far more powerful horseman, and he could do what he liked with Tomkinson; the latter was always in difficulties, as he was playing a losing game, and No. 1 under these circumstances is greatly handicapped.

Tomkinson is a better player than Stoddard, but the latter was comfortable, with that splendid striker Hitchcock to drive the ball up to him. Barrett played fairly well, but he is too slow, with the result that his forward drives were often too late for his No. 1 to take advantage of; Milburn being able to get into position by the time the ball arrived. Wodehouse played a great individual game, and I never saw him better. Lockett played better than I have seen him all the year, but he could not get about, and he could not pull his side together; and was beaten for pace and handiness by Stoddard and Hitchcock. The latter, though only twenty-one, has a head on him like a man of thirty-five, and an arm like Samson; he is one of the best strikers ever seen on a polo ground.

The star of the eight, and in my opinion the pivot of his team, was Watson Webb; with one exception I never saw him make a mistake. He is a perfect horseman, on very handy, fast ponies, and was able to retrieve and cover any tactical mistakes made by the others. He is a worthy successor to Harry Whitney and a much better individual player than his great predecessor.

It is no disgrace, after five years of war, to be beaten by such a team as this; and there is no reason why we should not do much better in the second game.

I do not want to make excuses, I am sure we had the best team available, and it is no one's fault. We have left many of our best players and best potential players on the battlefields of Europe and Asia, and our best ponies too; moreover, during five years no young players were trained. We have had to take on the job on ponies that have been shoved into polo far too quickly; we started polo directly after the War, and played hard on green ponies, with the result that five out of six ponies have been spoilt, and there are not in England the same class of polo

Digitized by Google

pony that we see in the American Team. Every pony in England has been offered generously, and we have done the best we can. If we are unfortunate enough to be beaten again we will take our luck like sportsmen, and take off our hats to a team of grand players, who have played the game in the very best spirit, and in the cleanest and most sportsmanlike manner.

The Second Match.

The second match resulted in a great contest, and a ding-dong fight to the finish. England, just as we did in the first match, in 1913, in America, lost their match in the first period; a clean miss in the centre of the ground resulted in a goal for America in about one minute, this was followed by another miss and another goal, and then another; three goals to nothing at the end of first period. The disappointment was painful, and it looked as if America would go through and through our men. But this was far from being the case. For the team pulled themselves together and played very well from the beginning of the second period till the end of the fight. It looked anybody's game, though America always kept just ahead.

The efforts of both sides were tremendous and some of the incidents brilliant. Tomkinson has never played better, Lockett put up a capital game with more sting in his strokes and length on his back hander than we have seen this season. Wodehouse was better than ever, for not only was his dash and driving powers as good as on Saturday, but his direction was far better and he benefited greatly from his Saturday's experience, for Barrett and Lockett played into his hands much better and gave him more opportunities. Barrett was much better too, and distinctly quicker; considering that he was playing first class polo before Tommy Hitchcock was born, and that he has been playing No. 3 or back all his life, I think he did marvellously well; and I am quite sure that the Selection Committee (of which body I am not a member) were perfectly right in playing him, and that he is better than anyone else they could have found.

In the last half of the fifth period, and right through the sixth, America were fairly penned; and again, for the second time, victory was missed by bad goal shooting. There were at least five, if not six, fairly easy goals missed in a few minutes, and the crucial moment passed, the opportunity was lost, for America extricated themselves, at the beginning of the last period, from the hole they were in and went down to the far end of the ground and added another goal to the score and the match was practically over.

The Americans put up a great and clean and good-tempered game, and richly deserve their victory.

Digitized by Google

Milburn is not only the finest back player living, and by far the best player in front of his own goal that I have ever seen, but he also proved himself a good captain and tactician, playing for safety as soon as he was three goals ahead.

Watson Webb and Young Hitchcock were good as ever, the former pivoting the team as he always does. Stoddard proved himself a certain hitter and a deadly shot at goal.

As regards ponies there was not so much difference apparent as on Saturday, but in the English team there were one or two very weak spots.

The Americans were able to rely on trustworthy old ponies, as they had plenty of spare ones, and when it comes to a battle of this kind the pony of many years' experience, even without the extra turn of speed, always beats the young pony.

What we must now do is to look round for young players and train them properly, for when we challenge, in 1926, none of the present players, with the exception of Wodehouse, will be young enough to take on the job. In any case, we owe a great debt of gratitude to Lockett, Barrett and Tomkinson, who again pulled out and represented the country after having helped to bring the cup back in 1914; Wodehouse, moreover, was spare man in America in 1913. The show they put up and the fine struggle they made is really wonderful, especially considering that since they last competed, instead of practising and playing polo, they have all gone through five years of war, in which Wodehouse and Tomkinson were badly wounded and Lockett broke his leg.

E. D. MILLER.



Digitized by Google

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

"Orders, Decorations and Insignia," by Colonel Robert E. Wyllie, General Staff, U.S.A. Army, announced for publication by Messrs. Putnam, is a collection of some of the chief distinctions, both civil and military, awarded in the different countries allied in the World War. A history of the origin and a full description of each medal is given, together with over 350 illustrations—200 of them being in colour. The whole work is completely up to date.

"Naval, Military and Air Force Medals and Ribbons, issued to the British Forces from 1793 to the Present Day." Published by Gale and Polden, London, Aldershot and Portsmouth. Price 3s. Eighty-four decorations are portrayed, about the actual size, together with short historical notices. The obverse and reverse of medals are shown. The whole is in chart form, attached to a suitable cover. We recommend it for display in regimental institutes.

At the Side-Shows.

"The Diary of a Yeomanry M.O." By Captain O. Teichman, D.S.O., M.C. With illustrations and maps. Fisher Unwin. 12s. 6d. net.

The author of this interesting and instructive chronicle served in Egypt, Gallipoli, Palestine and Italy, where he was present at the capture of the Island of Papadopoli (Piave) in the last phase of the War. He was mobilized and served with the 1/1st Worcestershire Yeomanry (which unit was brigaded with the Gloucestershire and Warwickshire Yeomanries) from August, 1914, to July, 1918, and subsequently with the 22nd Field Ambulance (7th Division).

The first two chapters are devoted to dismounted warfare; Captain Teichman describes the part played by the mounted troops at Romani, 4th August, 1916 (page 63), and on the following day at Katia, where a frontal attack by the mounted units on a strongly entrenched enemy rear-guard resulted in large numbers of the enemy being able to escape with their heavy guns (page 75). "We could not understand why the infantry had not been brought up for this frontal attack, as there was at least one division behind us. We thought that

Digitized by Google

if they had been in our position and the cavalry division had deployed on either side of, and in rear of, Katia the enemy's retreat would have been cut off, and a large number of guns and prisoners would have been taken."

When his regiment was on patrol in the Bayud District (half way between the Canal and El Arish) he mentions the very heavy nature of the going in sand and says that thirty miles a day was very hard work for the horses (page 82).

Spies were frequent, and it was evidently easy for one dressed as an Australian to patrol the country between the scattered Yeomanry posts.

The author, who describes the Battle of Rafa (page 99) in some detail, tells how, owing to conflicting orders (pages 97 and 98) the field ambulance of his brigade was the first unit to come into action. The successful issue of the battle he maintains was due to the mobility of the cavalry, moving out thirty miles from El Arish, fighting a strenuous battle all day, and returning to the above-mentioned place within thirty-six hours. It is evident, however, from the mounted charges described later in the book, that the Rafa position might have been galloped in the early morning, instead of the action developing into an all day methodical dismounted attack.

During the night ride (page 119) which preceded the first Battle of Gaza, the author tells how his brigade described a complete circle—" and so we struggled on, alternately walking, trotting and galloping, until certain landmarks became quite familiar." The sudden transition from rocky and precipitous country to that consisting of grassy downs intercepted by English-looking brooks is described as the author approaches the eastern confines of Gaza. Amongst the incidents during the battle, we read how the Regimental Post Corporal, taking a particular liking to a German officer's sword, gallops the owner down and eventually possesses himself of it. The difficult country crossed by the cavalry in the dark during the subsequent retreat is drawn attention to (page 123).

Two days before the second Battle of Gaza (page 132) we read of how two officers, each accompanied by five picked and well mounted men, galloped through the Turkish lines before dawn and managed to cut the Beersheba—Gaza telegraph line. During the battle the author describes how, when his regiment was *in extremis*, owing to losing touch with the mounted brigade on its left, the Berks and Bucks Yeomanries galloped some miles across the open plain and saved the situation (page 138).

The " pot holes," constructed by the Turks in front of their trench system in lieu of wire, in order to hold up advancing cavalry, are described, and these would appear to be formidable obstacles for mounted units to negotiate (page 143).

During the summer of 1917 the Diary is mainly confined to small cavalry actions on the Gaza — Beersheba outpost line, in which the Turkish cavalry, mounted on sturdy ponies and armed with lance, sword and rifle, seemed to have shown considerable initiative; a captured Turkish photograph shows a detachment of these troops in action against our cavalry (page 158).

The author describes a thirty-three mile ride before attacking Beersheba from the east, which was rendered possible by the R.E. developing sufficient water at

Digitized by Google

Asluj to water two mounted divisions, and also the brilliant manner in which the 4th Australian Light Horse finally galloped the trenches outside the former town (page 172).

At Ras el Nag, overlooking the Hebron Road, his brigade had to gallop two miles across the enemy's front, and then to operate in some very difficult mountainous country.

The charge at Huj (page 183) is described, when two squadrons of Worcesters and one of Warwicks (the whole only ten troops strong) successfully charged twelve guns, which were supported by some two thousand infantry. The author remarks that all the casualties inflicted by the Yeomen were caused by their sword thrusts, and contrasts the resulting wounds with those inflicted by the Turks with their high explosive shells and saw bayonets.

At Balin (page 188) the brigade appears to have " bumped " into a very strong enemy counter-attack, and on this occasion as on many others, notably at Es Salt, Romani and Ras el Nag, " we profited from the many practices and competitions we had had in carrying wounded on horseback."

Attention is often drawn to the shortage of water for men and horses; during the operations in the Sinai Desert, in August, 1916, men were not allowed to touch their water bottles between dawn and sunset. In one instance (page 192) many of the horses went sixty hours without water, with the result that many succumbed and had to be shot. On other occasions horses were frequently thirty-six to forty-eight hours without water, and were sometimes saddled up for thirty-six hours on end.

When the brigade was digging trenches near Weli Sheikh Nuran, twenty-four miles had to be covered daily in order to water the horses morning and evening.

The mounted troops appeared generally to have been at the mercy of " Fritz" when watering, especially on the Gaza—Beersheba outpost line; the author relates (page 140) how our aeroplanes discovered a Turkish cavalry brigade massing for attack in a narrow wadi with precipitous banks, and the result which followed. On one occasion (page 204) the 3rd Australian Light Horse had eighty horses killed, while watering near Ludd, by an enemy aeroplane.

The cavalry stretcher carried on the horse attached to the sword appears to have been most useful, and took the place of the horse blanket in the later stages of the campaign; the regulation stretcher could not, of course, be carried by mounted troops.

Attention is drawn to the difficulty of wearing cavalry equipment in one's shirtsleeves, and how, at the Battle of Romani in the month of August, men preferred to fight in their tunics.

A vivid picture is given of the difficulties caused by the Palestine floods in 1918 (page 210), when the led horses of the brigade attempted to reach Yebna; each man was leading four horses and many had to swim.

Very difficult country was negotiated when the brigade ascended from the Dead Sea level to Es Salt, and the final *sauve qui peut* by the cavalry down steep declivities is described.

Digitized by Google

The author missed the final advance through Syria in the autumn of 1918, as he was at that time attached to the 7th Division, and witnessed the capture of the Island of Papadopoli in the Piave.

Captain Teichman lets the irony of circumstance speak for itself—as, when he tells us (page 37) how eagerly a large packet of maps was received at his Brigade Headquarters in Suvla Bay; the maps contained were of the Cromer, Sheringham and King's Lynn districts, where he and his friends had been stationed in 1914! Very occasionally, indeed, he indulges his bent for the very dryest kind of humour, as, for example, when, in Palestine, he relates the difficulties resulting from a conscientious and combined effort to obey an order from the D.D.M.S. of the XXth Corps to kill snakes for producing an anti-venene without injuring the brain or spinal cord. It is not easy to review such a chronicle, but the members of mounted units and medical officers who went over any part of his ground with the author and can, if necessary, read between the lines, will find his soldierly chronicle, which never wastes a word, of peculiar and personal interest.

The work is admirably illustrated with maps, original and captured photographs.

We strongly recommend this eminently readable book as a substitute for some of the insipid works of post-War fiction.

NOTES.

Back numbers of the CAVALRY JOURNAL, from 1906 to 1914, are on sale at 3s. post free.

Annual volumes, bound in white cloth, and covers ready for binding are available on application to the CAVALRY JOURNAL, Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W.1.

Officers on the active list writing for the JOURNAL may be under no anxiety as to their responsibility. Such articles, previous to publication, will be revised by recognised authority.

At the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Cavalry Association, held in the Princess Louise Dragoon Guards' Headquarters, Ottawa, Major-General J. H. MacBrien, C.B., C.M.G., Chief of General Staff, who is one of Canada's thirteen cavalry officers who rose to high commands in the late War, in addressing the meeting said:

He wished to assure his hearers that cavalry must be continued in a country of such vast extent as Canada, and any movement of the Association to re-create efficiency in its branch of the service was most commendable.

He felt that cavalry should be kept rural in establishment and was opposed to city organization. What was wanted was the young farmer with his horse. Australia would not allow city cavalry or artillery units.

He suggested affiliation with cadet corps to stimulate recruiting and also advocated affiliation with British cavalry regiments.

The Convention closed with the National Anthem.

Many of the cavalry regiments, both east and west of the Great Lakes, will be in local camps this month.

Digitized by Google

We regret to record the death, on the 20th ultimo, at the age of ninety-two, of Honorary General Sir William H. Seymour, K.C.B., a veteran leader of the Crimea and Indian Mutiny, and Colonel of the Queen's Bays, at the head of which regiment he was awarded the C.B. at the age of twenty-five. In a dismounted engagement in the Mutiny he killed six assailants in close succession with his revolver, a seventh cut at his head with a tulwar, but his life was saved by the thick puggaree round his forage cap, and the rebel was laid low by the sword point of one of two orderlies, each of whom was awarded the Victoria Cross during the campaign.

Sir William Seymour, who formerly was well known with Midland and Irish packs, hunted regularly from Hove in his later years. He is the last colonel of a cavalry regiment in receipt of pay as such of £1,000 per annum. He was an ardent supporter of the CAVALRY JOURNAL.

Brigadier-General George Francis Milner, C.M.G., D.S.O., 5th Lancers, has recently died, regretted by a wide circle of friends. Born in 1862, he was educated at Eton, joined the 17th Lancers in 1883, promoted to the 1st Life Guards and commanded the 5th Lancers in 1909. In the South African War he was Brigade Major to the late Lieut.-General Sir R. G. Broadwood, 12th Lancers.

The establishment of Mounted Rifles in New Zealand remains at present the same as before the War. Each of the military districts has its brigade of mounted rifles. Upon the formation of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force, in 1914, each regiment furnished a squadron, thus forming one regiment named after its district, such as the Auckland, Wellington and Canterbury Regiments. The Otago Regiment remained an independent unit, fighting in Gallipoli and afterwards going to the Western Front as divisional cavalry.

THE 5TH ROYAL IRISH LANCERS.

On the 23rd March, 1921, the Lord Rathcreedon asked in the House of Lords whether:

> " an error had not been made in selecting the 5th Lancers instead of the 18th Hussars for disbandment; the 5th Lancers having been raised in 1689, disbanded in 1799, and re-embodied on the 3rd February, 1858; whereas the 18th Hussars was raised in 1762, disbanded in 1822, and re-raised 23rd February, 1858; whether the 5th Lancers has not always taken its place accordingly in precedence and seniority, and whether the position is not clear from the Adjutant-General's letter of the 9th January, 1858, which says: ' . . . . the Queen's command *to cancel* the Adjutant-General's letter dated the 8th of April, 1799, announcing the Royal determination of His late Majesty George the Third *to disband* the 5th Royal Irish Dragoons; *that letter is cancelled accordingly*. The Queen *commands* that the 5th Royal Irish Dragoons *be restored* to its place among the cavalry regiments of the line. . . . .' "

Digitized by Google

To this Viscount Peel, Under-Secretary to the War Office, replied: "It had been decided that the number of cavalry regiments must be reduced by four. It would be generally agreed that the dominant principle on the question of such disbandment must turn on the length of service; but only service which was continuous up to the present day should be recognized in considering the relative claims of regiments, and therefore in the case of a regiment which had been disbanded and re-raised, such service only counted since the date on which it was re-raised. That was the principle on which the War Office had founded its action for some time past, and that principle had been adopted in the Yeomanry. That being so, the first regiment to be selected for disbandment was the 21st Lancers, and it would naturally follow that, to avoid the very great administrative difficulties which would occur if there was not an even balance of Hussars and Lancers, another Lancer regiment would have to be selected for disbandment, and the 5th Lancers had been accordingly selected. Further, if the 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st were disbanded, four English regiments would be disbanded; whereas, if the 19th, 20th and 21st Regiments and the 5th Lancers were disbanded, a more even balance would be preserved, because one Irish and three English regiments would then be disbanded."

Lord Pentland, as an old officer of the regiment, suggested that the War Office might consider the reduction of men of cavalry regiments and save the destruction of a regiment with a history like the 5th Lancers.

The Egyptian Camel Corps, known in Arabic as *El Hagana*, formed part of the reconstructed Egyptian Army under the first British Sirdar, the late Field-Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood, V.C., and was present at the Battle of Kirbekan and in most of the decisive general engagements in the Soudan from 1884 till the present time.

Under Lord Kitchener it numbered a thousand camelmen; to-day it comprises three camel companies with two machine guns each, a mule mounted infantry company and a strong infantry company with machine guns. The two latter companies went last year on patrol to Mongalla and the Nuba Mountains, from the headquarters at El Obeid, the capital of Kordofan Province.

We do not share the opinion so prevalent on the Continent that the tank will completely disappear before the gun and the armour-piercing bullet. It is incapable of supplanting cavalry but should be regarded as an ally. When improved it should make cavalry action more varied, powerful, extended and decisive, but the machines must be developed so as not to lose the dominant factors in war of speed, manœuvre and mobility. They must be made capable of accompanying or following cavalry at all paces across any country, with the obvious exception of marshes, woods or ravines.

The mechanical auxiliaries to cavalry must include shielded artillery on wheels or caterpillars, fast tanks, a service of cross-country automobiles to transport infantry supports and to ensure supply.

Digitized by Google

In this connection there is one feature in armoured car construction which it is claimed proved of value in rough ground and that is the drive on all four wheels instead of on the rear wheels only.

Major P. Temple, Central India Horse, writes as follows: "The cars which were first extensively used in India, before the Rolls-Royce, Austin and Peerless made their appearance, were the Geoffry Quod cars; these were made in America specially for the work. They were designed with a view to crossing country, their clearance being about eighteen inches; they had powerful engines, one very low emergency gear, and, most important of all, perhaps, they drove on all four wheels at the same time. To fully appreciate this last advantage it is necessary to consider the case of an ordinary car in soft ground. The front wheels reach the soft patch first and sink in, thus inclining the car forward and throwing more weight on the front wheels, causing them to sink deeper still; after this, every fresh impulse from the engine, directed as it is from behind, tends to drive the front wheels yet deeper into the ground. The same thing occurs in crossing irrigation channels and the raised boundaries of cultivated fields; the front wheels will only rise over these if the car is travelling fairly fast, which, of course, throws dangerous strains on the axles and wheels. On the other hand, the front wheel drive on the Geoffry Quods tended to raise the wheels over, instead of forcing them through, obstacles."

There were objections to the drive on the front wheels, but the principle is worth revision in view of the mechanical difficulties experienced with fast-moving tanks.

IMPORTANT.

The Staff of the JOURNAL is very limited, and it is therefore necessary for all who obtain the JOURNAL direct from the Managing Editor to report any alteration of rank or address immediately, as it is impossible at the present time to follow up the Stations of Units or of individuals. Such changes of address must be received at least fourteen days before publication.

Digitized by Google

SPORTING NOTES.

RACING.

RACING has been sadly interfered with owing to the coal strike, and at one time it looked as if there would be no racing at all. Several most important meetings were abandoned and the first of the classic races nearly met the same fate. Luckily the Government allowed the Jockey Club to hold one day's racing at Newmarket, and for the first time on record the Two Thousand Guineas and One Thousand Guineas were run on the same day. No railway facilities were allowed and horses and spectators had to get to Newmarket by road. The day's racing was a great success and showed that racing could be carried on without an extra train service, and since then it has been allowed. The revolution in Ireland has not stopped the sport over there, so why should a strike stop it in England. The breeding of thoroughbreds is one of our most important industries and cannot be carried on unless the horses are tested on the race-course.

H.R.H. The Prince of Wales won his first steeplechase at the Household Brigade Meeting at Hawthorn Hill, and so his colours were successful on their first appearance on a race-course.

The Welsh Guards' Challenge Cup, £50, with £50 added; 2½ miles: H.R.H. The Prince of Wales's ch. g. Pet Dog, aged, 11.9 (Owner), 1; Major R. Auld's Maid of the House, aged, 11.9 (Owner), 0; Capt. R. Wyndham Lewis's Lodger II., aged, 11.9 (Owner), 0. Started at 3.1. Winner trained privately.

Starting prices: 9 to 4 on Pet Dog, 4 to 1 each against Lodger II. and Maid of the House. Pet Dog went away at score from the fall of the flag, followed by Maid of the House, until the first fence in the straight, when the latter fell. This left Pet Dog a long distance in front of Lodger II., who fell a mile from home. Pet Dog went on by himself and finished alone amid enthusiastic cheering.

The hard luck of the French officers in the Allies' Steeplechase at the Grand Military Meeting did not end with the race, and we much regret that Lieut. Cosse died from his injuries a few days after.

Westward Ho, the colt Lord Glanely gave 11,500 guineas for at Doncaster, in 1919, made his first appearance on a race-course a few days ago and won a race of the value of £188 at Lingfield. His half brother, who cost the same owner 14,500 guineas last year, has been turned out of training.

Digitized by Google

The Derby.

A surprisingly large number of horse-drawn vehicles were on the Epsom road, but the procession of motor cars, three abreast, was timed passing a house at the rate of 173 a minute. The Royal Family, who received an enthusiastic ovation, witnessed Humorist's victory.

The Oaks was won by Mr. Joseph Watson's Love in Idleness, who, like Craig an Eran in the Derby, which he so nearly won, drew the extreme outside position in the field of twenty-two runners. She led at Tattenham Corner and in the straight her victory was assured. She was bred in Ireland and is by Bachelor's Double out of Cornfield.

HUNTING.

The price of hounds is nearly as high as it was last year. In 1920, at Tattersalls' first sale at Rugby, 87½ couples fetched £10,072, or an average of £115. This year 118½ couples were disposed of for £11,573, making an average of £97 per hound.

To a great extent distemper is responsible for these high prices. It has been very prevalent lately, and carried off many puppies, and Masters who thought they had plenty of hounds have found themselves short, and hence the great competition.

That other fell disease, rabies, is still with us, and likely to continue, under the present regulations. To a question asked in the House of Commons, the Ministry admitted that in the first three months of 1920 there were four cases; in the same period this year fourteen cases, an increase of ten.

When there is a case of rabies the regulations are that all dogs must be muzzled for a radius of twenty miles, and is continued until the district has been clear for six months. The Ministry also admitted that dogs with rabies had been caught fifty miles from their homes, and had been known to travel seventy miles; also that one suspected case developed the disease seven and a half months after being placed in confinement.

The Ministry also said they were quite satisfied with the regulations, but if a dog can travel fifty to seventy miles what is the good of a twenty mile radius? If he can develop the disease seven and a half months after being bitten, is six months muzzling long enough to make it certain that there are no infected dogs in the area? Some people shut their eyes and hope for luck, and we are afraid our Ministry do the same. The disease could have been wiped out a long time ago if more stringent regulations had been enforced.

POLO.

Owing to the calls of duty, serving soldiers have not been playing much near London, and the season, so far, has been almost entirely given up to practice matches for the American and English teams. The latter team was not decided on till the end of May, Major Barrett being included as No. 2. This was rather late in the day, and we wish the team had been definitely settled some time before and so enabled our men to have more practice as a team, which is everything at polo.

Digitized by Google

That well-known authority on the game, Colonel E. D. Miller, promised to write an article on the test matches, which will appear in this number of the JOURNAL, so we will leave the matter in his able hands. The Americans were very lucky when H.M. The King allowed them the use of the Royal Stables at Hampton Court for their ponies. It is handy to London and real good accommodation. We can remember when the thoroughbred reigned supreme at Hampton Court, and the late Queen Victoria's stud turned out many high class winners on the turf. King Edward had his own stud at Sandringham, where Persimmon and Diamond Jubilee, his two Derby winners, were bred, and so the Royal Stud at Hampton Court was done away with. Royalty is taking a lead in London polo this summer, and H.M. The King of Spain, The Prince of Wales and Prince Henry are all playing.

THE ROYAL TOURNAMENT AT OLYMPIA.

It is worthy of note that this is the second year in succession in which Capt. T. Horn has won the sword, lance and revolver championship, a feat on which he received, and fully deserved, hearty congratulation. The gallant officer, who is splendidly mounted on a beautiful mare called Violet, is an instructor at the Cavalry School at Netheravon.

Sword, Lance and Revolver Championship.—Capt. T. Horn, M.C., 16th Lancers, 1; R.S.M. L. F. Barratt, 4th Dragoon Guards, 2.

Dummy Thrusting Championship.—Capt. T. Horn, M.C., 16th Lancers, 1; Staff-Sergt. W. Pearson, R.A.S.C., 2; Squad.-Sergt.-Major A. B. Inglis, Royal Scots Greys, 3.

Officers' Jumping Competition.—Final: Lieut. H. G. Morrison, M.C., Riding Establishment, R.H.A., 1; Lieut.-Col. G. H. F. Brooke, D.S.O., 16th Lancers, 2; Lieut.-Col. M. Graham, D.S.O., 16th Lancers, 3; Lieut. F. E. Garland, R.H.A., 4.

Champion-at-Arms, Mounted.—Capt. T. Horn, M.C., 16th Lancers.

We hear the Army Sports Committee at the War Office, under the direction of Lieut.-Gen. Sir P. W. Chetwode, have been doing good work. Many of the grounds for football and other sports were used during the war as camping grounds or for other purposes. These had all to be renovated at great cost. Luckily the Committee had the means and from canteen profits made in wartime something like £90,000 has been expended. This sounds a large sum, but if people will think of the benefit to the soldier and also to the Army, by keeping the men fit, no one will grudge this expenditure.

CRICKET.

By a notice in the papers of the death of Arthur Mold, the Lancashire fast bowler, we are reminded of a rather disastrous day's cricket many years ago wheu the regiment was quartered at Manchester. We arranged a match with the local club and were very disgusted at being disposed of for about thirty runs.

Our opponents produced a bowler who, to most of us, seemed positively dangerous. We returned to barracks much crestfallen. A few months after we saw that Arthur Mold was playing for his county and treating his opponents in much the

Digitized by Google

same way as he had treated us. At one period in one match he got seven wickets without a run being made off him.

DOCKING OF HORSES.

With reference to the Private Bill to prohibit the Docking of Horses, the Hunters Improvement and National Light Horse Breeding Society has decided to associate itself with the action taken by the Shire Horse Society in protesting against the Bill on the grounds of "interference with the liberties of the breeder and owner in the conduct of his business." The plea of cruelty due to the operation, advanced by the promoters, is met by the Animals (Anæsthetics) Act.

INDIA.

The Jubilee Meeting of the Kadir Cup.

This year was the fiftieth anniversary of the Kadir Cup, which was run off at the old venue of Sherpur. There were sixty-six competitors, the class of horse being very good.

Capt. West, the honorary secretary, assisted by Major Paynter, Major Pilcher and Major-General Wardrop, were responsible for the very efficient organization. Capt. Davison, D.S.O., 2nd Lancers, who won, is an Instructor at the Cavalry School, Saugor, and also runs their Tent Club.

Though spectators are a subordinate consideration at the Kadir, it was good to see the premier sport encouraged by the presence of H.E. the Viceroy, H.E. the Commander-in-Chief and the Life President of the M.T.C., Sir John Hewett.

Third Day.

Semi-Final.—Heat 1: Capt. Wallington, R. Sussex, Priceless; Capt. Howes, 21st Lancers, Tucker; Mr. Ritchie, R.F.A., Tid'apa. Umpire, Major Walker. Shortly after starting a pig considerately got up on the open maidan between the coolies and the heat and proceeded at a leisurely pace towards the latter, who, after giving him the necessary law, were released as from a starting gate. Howes at first looked like running into him in the open, but lost on the jink, and after a short run, in which it was anyone's pig, Ritchie obtained a good spear.

Heat 2: Capt. Wallington, R. Sussex, Peter; Mr. Phipps, R.H.A., The Lion; Capt. Davison, 2nd Lancers, Doleful. Umpire, Mr. C. M. Collett. Heat let go after a fair boar. Davison cut out the work. Phipps almost got him on the jink, but Davison recovered his position on the left and speared.

Final Heat: Mr. Ritchie, R.F.A., Tid'apa; Capt. Davison, 2nd Lancers, Doleful. Umpire, Major Paynter. After half an hour's halt the line beat a piece of nice grass one mile south of Mukarampur. A real good thirty-two inch boar was soon afoot, and, going back through the elephants, the final heat was slipped to a galloping start. Both raced abreast for the boar, Davison on the left getting on as he jinked sharp left-handed. Davison took three jinks until he turned sharp back across a watery nullah. Getting on again, the boar, after another jink, turned

Digitized by Google

sharp back and squatted. Davison, turning quickly, rode over and missed him in the grass. Ritchie, always close up, prodded twice without showing blood, the boar going on again. Davison never left him and speared well at next attempt, with Ritchie close alongside, the handier horse lasting throughout and gaining a well-deserved victory for a more experienced man.

The Hog Hunters' Cup.

In the afternoon the following started for the Hog Hunters' Cup: Major Henry's, 12th Cavalry, Brigadier (Owner), 1; Capt. Hornsby's, 5th Cavalry, Ecarabaz (Capt. Freer), 2; Major Pilcher's, 21st Cavalry, Hermit (Owner), 3. Also ran: Mr. Dalby, R.F.A., Kerr; Mr. Hodgson Wilson, R.H.A., Hero; Capt. Nadin, 12th Cavalry, Ctesiphon; Capt. Harris, 2nd Lancers, Maureen; Mr. Steele, 37th Cavalry, Black Diamond; Mr. Cazalet, Silkcut; Mr. Bates, R.F.A., Chutney; Capt. Parbury, 17th Lancers, B.D. Won by half a street, five or six lengths between second and third.

Pony Hog Hunters' Cup.—The Pony Hog Hunters were fewer in number, viz.: Capt. Wallington's Priceless (Capt. Hutchison), 1; Mr. Stevenson's Little Wonder (Owner), 2. Also ran: Capt. Marriott, 2nd Lancers, Comet; Capt. Maxwell, 27th Cavalry, Buster; Mr. Marsh, I.C.S., Red Man; Major Pilcher, 21st Lancers, Mary Anne; Mr. Steele, 37th Cavalry, Black Pearl; General Gregory, Vincent. A close finish.

Muttra Cup.

A Successful Revival.—The competition for the Muttra Cup, which was contested last in January, 1914, was restarted this year by the 19th Royal Hussars. Lack of supervision during the War had allowed the country to become very thick and unrideable in many parts and pig had been poached very considerably. As the 19th Royal Hussars only arrived in Muttra in December, 1919, it was quite impossible to hold the competition last year; indeed the regiment, and the honorary secretary in particular, are to be congratulated on their efforts to restart it, and on the success with which they carried out their first attempt. The competition is for teams of three from regiments and tent clubs, and has for its object the death of the pig, the team securing the greatest number of kills in a given number of runs being the winner. There were eleven entries, but the I.C.S. and the 14th Jat Lancers were unfortunately prevented from competing at the last moment, leaving only nine teams for the honorary secretary to contend with; a quite large enough number for his first effort.

The teams were as follows: "D" Battery, R.H.A.: Capt. Hutchinson, Mr. Neville, Mr. Hyde Smith. 21st E. of I. Lancers: Major Pilcher, Capt. Godfree, Mr. Harford. 7th Hussars: Major Thornton, Capt. Weatherall, Capt. Chandos Pole. "C" Battery, R.H.A.: Capt. Freer, Mr. Phipps, Mr. Thompson. Kharwa: Ganpati Singh and two others. Bharatpur: H.H. the Maharaja of Bharatpur and two others. 19th Hussars "A": Capt. Bowden Smith, Mr. Scott Cockburn, Mr. Sheppard. 19th Hussars "B": Capt. Tremayne, Capt. Selby Lowndes, Mr. Heber Percy. 19th Hussars "C": Mr. Byass, Mr. Low, Mr. Powell.

Digitized by Google

The results of the competition for the first two days were :

"D" Battery R.H.A.	Nil	Pig	Pig	Nil
21st (E. of I.) Lancers	Nil	Nil	Pig	Pig
7th Hussars	Pig	Pig	Nil	Pig
"C" Battery R.H.A.	Nil	Pig	Pig	Pig
Kharwa Tent Club	Nil	Nil	Pig	Pig
19th Hussars "A"	Nil	Nil	Pig	Pig
19th Hussars "B"	Pig	Nil	Pig	Pig
19th Hussars "C"	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
Bharatpur	Nil	Nil	Nil	Pig

A total of seventeen pigs in two days. It was decided to give the "C" Battery R.H.A., 7th Hussars and the 19th Hussars "B" three more runs.

Third Day.—The third day's contests took place on the 31st March. It was decided that the cup should be given to the winner of the best of three runs; in the case of a tie, teams would continue running until all but one had failed to kill their pig.

The 7th Hussars and 19th Hussars tied with two pig each, but the former had only had two out of their three hunts. After tiffin some grass within 400 yards of the tiffin bagh was beaten and a good boar jumped up almost at once in front of the 7th Hussars, who killed him after a very fine hunt through difficult country, and so secured the cup, a well earned victory.

The supply of pig was all that could be desired and the country, considering the circumstances, in good order. It is to be hoped that this event will continue to be an annual fixture in the Indian sporting world, encouraging as it does all that is best in pig-sticking. As in all sport the element of luck is present, yet there is no doubt that the three best teams were left in for the final day, and that the 7th Hussars well deserved their win.

Bag for the day: boars 5 and 1 sow; a total of 23 pig was the bag for the three days.

The Mhow Tent Club.

On arrival in Mhow, December, 1920, the 7th Hussars took over the management of the Tent Club. The country hunted by the Mhow Tent Club is of a very peculiar nature and is entirely different from any other in which the regiment has hunted. For the most part the country consists of an undulating plain of black cotton soil, covered with rocks and stones of all sizes, also with thorn bushes of every variety, scrub jungle and trees; it is cut up by nullahs, with here and there large hills of irregular shape, covered with scrub jungle; hence panthers and hyenas have been speared in former years.

The pig mostly inhabit the hills, over which it is impossible to ride, and it is therefore necessary to beat them off and ride them when they break. The best hill is "Rala Mandil," near Indore, which is about 2,500 feet high and one mile long. As many as 200 pig can be seen on it during a beat.

Digitized by Google

The first problem with which the hog hunter is faced is to induce the pig to leave his mountain stronghold, which he is always very reluctant to do, and many are the disappointments when he breaks back.

The second problem is to get on to your pig after he has left the hill; this may sound easy enough, but in reality it is by no means so, for at the bottom of the hills scrub jungle, dead ground and nullahs greatly obscure the view.

The third problem, after having once got on to the pig is to "blow" him in the shortest possible time, and thus enable the rider to spear quickly. The rider's progress is seriously impeded by the thorn trees and bushes, through which the pig travels easily enough, while the rider must go round a large proportion of them or be prepared to accept the fate of Absolom. It is very necessary to blow the pig quickly, as he may at any moment get into a place where it is impossible to ride. Also the pig seem faster than those of the "Shire countries" of Meerut and Muttra, this increase of pace and stamina being possibly due to their mountaineering habits.

The fourth problem is to deliver a good spear. No mere prick on the "hinder parts," in order to get first spear, but something that will stop him. The chance of spearing, owing to the nature of the country, is limited, therefore every spear must be a "deathly prod" or the pig will escape.

The fifth problem is to kill your pig quickly, after once having speared him, before he can escape into some nullah or on to a hill. It is usually impossible to kill a pig single handed in this country, and all heats should be at least three strong, and, in parts of the country, even four. Every member of a heat must co-operate, the death of the pig being the one object aimed at; selfish riding and spearing cannot be too strongly condemned and a spear who slips away without a "halloa" or whistle deserves to lose his pig, which he most certainly will do.

In conclusion, we see that a would-be slayer of "sus ferox" in Mhow must be a "red hot" enthusiast, and horses must be of the very best. It is hoped that the previous record of forty-two pig for a season will be exceeded this year. In Wardrop's book on pig sticking it is said "that if you can kill a pig at Mhow you can kill one anywhere."

In March the regiment entered a team for the Muttra Cup, and although consisting of old hands at the game it was possibly owing to their recent practice in a most difficult country that their success in winning the cup was due.

Polo.

The Inter-Regimental Polo Tournament played at Meerut was won by the 17th Cavalry, who beat the 21st Lancers in the final by 5 goals to 4. These two regiments were also in the final of the Subalterns' Cup, but the result was reversed, the 21st Lancers winning by 6 goals to 1.

EGYPT.

As there is a Bill now in Parliament to prohibit the shooting of pigeons and other birds from traps it may be of interest to mention how pigeon shooting is worked in Egypt on the Indian plan.

Digitized by Google

In Cairo and Alexandria a pit is dug, about 15 feet or 16 feet long, 10 feet deep and 6 feet wide, sufficient to hold one or two " throwers " and the crates of pigeons. The shooters stand at distances varying from about twelve to twenty yards from the near edge of the pit, according to their handicap. On reaching their mark they prepare to shoot and give the sign by lifting a hand. An electric bell is then rung from behind them, and a bird is thrown up from the pit. The bird is so held and thrown away that it is usually some fifteen yards in the air the other side of the pit and in full flight before it is possible to fire. Only the very quickest shots can ever kill a bird within ten or fifteen yards of the pit. The boundary is about eighty yards from the twelve-yards mark, and is formed by a fence about ten feet high. The majority of the birds that are killed fall nearer to the fence than to the pit, and many fall stone dead just outside it.

This seems to be an improvement on the English method of letting the birds out of traps.

Polo.

The polo season, 1920-21, has probably been the most successful from every point of view that Cairo has ever known. As regards players, Cairo no doubt has seen one or two better individual players than have been playing this year, and perhaps there has been no team to equal the Egyptian " Big Four," Lieut.-Col. C. MacG. Dunbar, Yousry Pasha, K. H. Marsham and Capt. B. A. P. Schreibner; but the standard throughout the present season has undoubtedly been higher than any previous year.

The best individual players of this season have been Capt. Scott-Robson and Capt. Pigot-Moodie, of the Royal Scots Greys; Lieut.-Col. W. J. Lockett, Major F. H. Sutton and Capt. G. E. Younghusband of the 11th Hussars; Major Pease-Watkin, R.H.A.; and Lieut.-Col. C. W. Ritson, Egyptian Army.

Polo has been played three days a week at Ghezireh, two grounds being played on each day; one used entirely for matches and the other for members' games. The average number of players each day at Ghezireh during the height of the season was about fifty. In addition to Ghezireh, the Heliopolis Polo Club was restarted owing to the energy of Major-Gen. Sir G. F. Gorringe, where members' games have also been played three days a week, with an attendance of usually twenty players each day. So it can be readily seen that, for its size, Cairo has a very large proportion of polo players.

What has contributed to the improvement of polo in Cairo more than anything else has been the importation of English ponies. An Arab is now quite rarely seen on the polo ground, whereas a few years ago there were very few English ponies playing.

Another point which has added largely to the keenness of competition has been the very sporting way in which the 5th Dragoon Guards and Royal Scots Greys have played polo three days a week in Cairo in spite of the fact that the 5th Dragoon Guards had a train journey, of over fifty miles each day, from Tel-el-Kebir to Cairo before playing and fifty miles back again in the evening, and the Royal Scots Grey,

Digitized by Google

had a motor journey of thirty-five miles over Egyptian roads before they reached the ground.

Altogether there are eleven tournaments during the season. The main tournaments of the year are the "Open Cup" and its junior rival "The Junior Championship" (limited to players of handicap four and under), "The Inter-Regimental" and the "Subalterns." The Open Cup and Inter-Regimental were both easily won by the 11th Hussars, consisting of Capt. G. E. Younghusband (1), Major F. H. Sutton (2), Lieut.-Col. W. J. Lockett (3), and Capt. L. H. Jefferson (back). In the final of the "Open Cup" they beat Ghezireh Sporting Club by 12 goals to 2, and in the final of the Inter-Regimental they beat the Royal Scots Greys by 8 goals to 2. In the latter match the Royal Scots Greys were particularly unlucky in being without their best player, Capt. Scott-Robson, who had a nasty accident in the first round.

The Junior Championship, for teams of individual players of handicap four or under, was won by the 11th Hussars Second Team, consisting of G. Eustace-Smith (1), H. A. Jaffray (2), Capt. C. W. M. Norrie (3), and R. W. Verelst (back); beating the R.H.A. in the final by 8 goals to 1.

The Subalterns' Cup was won by the R.H.A., consisting of H. E. Russell (1), A. L. Cameron (2), S. C. Browning (3), and E. Mockly-Ferryman (back); beating the Royal Scots Greys in the final by 6 goals to 1.

Of the remaining tournaments, the Gordon Cup (handicap) was won by the R.A.S.C. The Inniskilling Cup was won by H.Q. Squadron, 11th Hussars. The Visitors' Cup was won by Wellington.

The Lady Maxwell Open Cup, at the end of April, provided many reversals of form, as the 11th Hussars were beaten, for the first time during the whole season, by G.H.Q., and the Royal Scots Greys, at full strength, were also beaten in the first round by a team called "The Jays." The final was played between G.H.Q. and Ghezireh Sporting Club, and was won by the latter by 5 goals to 2; the team consisting of H. Mason (1), R. Wellesley (2), Capt. D. J. Mitchell (3) (who was unable to play in the final and was replaced by Major Thomson), and Lieut.-Col. C. W. Ritson (back).

The best team during the season has undoubtedly been the 11th Hussars, and this regiment also has two other teams playing, who in a year or two should make into more than useful teams. Of the other teams, the best were the Royal Scots Greys, consisting of Capt. Scott-Robson, Capt. Pigot-Moodie, Capt. G. F. R. Cooper and Capt. J. H. Dudgeon; Ghezireh Sporting Club, who have already been mentioned, and G.H.Q., consisting of Lieut.-Colonel W. J. Ainsworth (1), Lieut.-Col. B. J. Curling (2), Lieut.-Col. T. Nisbet (3), and Capt. P. Fitzgerald (back).

The R.H.A. have produced many keen polo players, and under the able tuition of Major Pease-Watkin, several young players have shown great promise.

Hunting.

At Kantara the A.P.M., Major Waddington, owns and hunts a mixed pack of hounds, mostly Persian greyhounds. He shows good sport and one day last May killed two wolves, which provided two very good hunts.

Digitized by Google

A HUNTING TRIP WITH ARABS IN THE EGYPTIAN DESERT, MAY, 1921.

By MAJOR F. H. SUTTON, M.C., *11th Hussars.*

WE left Cairo by the 6.15 p.m. train on Friday evening, 29th April, for Tel-el-Kebir (two hours run), where the mess car of 5th Dragoon Guards met the train; stayed the night in their camp.

At 6 a.m. the next morning, Captain M———, Lieutenant C——— of the 5th Dragoon Guards and self started out to meet the Arabs (as arranged) on the northern edge of the desert, at 7 a.m., they having previously sent two camels to the camp for our kit. We took no servants or syces and " did " our own horses.

Rode past the famous duck shoot, where the 5th Dragoon Guards have entertained large parties most hospitably every week during the winter, now as dry as a bone, without the sign of a duck or snipe.

Arriving at the rendezvous, on the edge of the desert, we met our party, and a most picturesque scene it was.

The head of the tribe, Sheikh Mahomed Bey Megelly, a sportsman and a gentleman to the backbone, riding the picture of a two-year old Arab racing pony, which must make a name for himself on the Egyptian turf, where so many of his predecessors, bred by the sheikh, have distinguished themselves. Three of his brothers, two riding young Arab ponies and one a magnificent camel, three or four sporting grandsons on camels and a most delightful grandson, aged about ten, on a donkey, on which he pursued both days with the aid of plenty of stick, and thoroughly enjoyed himself and never seemed to tire.

A few retainers on horses, three dismounted trackers and three boys leading six selougis or white native greyhounds completed the party. I should have said that one of the mounted retainers had a hawk; not being a judge of hawks I cannot say of what species, but a useful looking bird about the size of the native kite out here.

After the most profuse greetings both sides we started off.

The *raison d'être* of the hunt was to catch gazelle with a combination of hawk and hound, but it was explained to us that it was of little use " taking on " gazelle except in the early morning, chiefly owing to the rising wind for the hawks and the heat for the dogs.

The plan that day was to work our way to the Arabs' camp, some fifteen miles to the south, coursing, hawking or shooting hares or sand grouse as we went. I should here say that two of the sheikhs had hammerless 12-bore guns of the best make.

We extended over the desert in line, dogs on the flanks and hawk in the middle; almost at once we found a covey of sand grouse, everyone halted, and one sheikh on his camel proceeded to ring them in ever narrowing circles; the birds, intent on watching us, never seemed to mind the approaching camel, and when he obtained the best range the sheikh gave them " one on the ground and one as they rose." Total hits, five, and unanimously voted a great achievement.

Digitized by Google

Next we moved a hare from some camel grass, with which this desert is in many places covered; all the dogs were slipped and, after a rare good chase, they added him to the bag. These hares are lighter in colour and build than ours at home, and I should think would not weigh more than four pounds at most, but are stout and none too easy to kill.

The hunt then progressed with varying fortune, adding a few sand grouse and a wild pigeon to the bag, when the young sheikhs on the camels sighted three gazelles, but Sheikh Megelly would not "take them on," saying in that heat and with only one hawk it was hopeless; we, of course, were much disappointed, but subsequent events proved how right he was.

We then had a chase with the hawk after a rather weak leveret, which he accounted for with ease after a dodging sort of flight from one bunch of grass to another, of its sort no doubt good, but we preferred the selougis.

We then repaired to the Arab camp to water and feed horses and selves and rest during the hottest part of the day.

Started again about 4 p.m. and found several hares, had some good courses and killed one; also killed a few more sand grouse, and so back to camp.

The sheikh had pitched a tent on purpose for us, and was most hospitable, and wanted us to feed with him, but we thought it more convenient to both parties to run our own show, so we fed the best on "bully," bread and butter and cheese and tea.

About 8 p.m., fearing to be thought unsociable, we went over to the Arabs, and found them sitting in a circle round a fire on their saddles; the most picturesque scene I have ever seen, and would love to be able to draw it. To make a long story short, we sat and "bucked" about the chase until 10.30 p.m., drinking the most perfect coffee in between whiles.

Captain M——— and Lieutenant C——— knew no Arabic, and myself only a very little—remembered from twenty years ago, when my regiment was here before and we had a pack of hounds and fraternized a lot with native landowners, etc., in the interests of sport. But I think one finds in any country, when keen sportsmen of whatever breed meet, one makes oneself more or less understood one to the other.

Sunday, 1st May. Started at 4.30 a.m., which made one think of the soldier, who has to water, feed and saddle his horse and be "on time"—clean we certainly were not, far from it.

An hour before this the trackers had been out and we met them about 5 a.m. on the track of a gazelle; followed for one and a quarter hours, a priceless bit of work of its sort, and got up to a herd of four, which we could not separate, so, according to one of their "unwritten laws," no slip.

I should have said before, to-day we had three hawks, no guns and four best dogs with the party, three selougis and an English greyhound bitch, sent out to me by a brother officer, and which I had given the sheikh three months before to breed from—having killed almost all the game in our home country with her.

Digitized by Google

We then got on the track of three and soon got to within 500 yards of them; the Arabs don't like slipping at more than two, but it was getting hot and, fearing we would have no chance, we persuaded them to have a try.

The three hawks were slipped and flew slowly towards the gazelle, and we thought all was well, but apparently they had not seen them, and the dog boys, slipping the selougis too soon, the hawks flew at the dogs, and then sat and sulked. To make matters easier for the sheikhs, M——— and I disappeared in a cloud of dust after the gazelle, followed by my bitch and two selougis. We galloped hard for about three miles, but made no impression on the gazelle, dogs or men; and when the dogs were beat we pulled up.

They then told us that dogs, however good, are quite useless without the help of the hawks, which we quite saw.

The trackers then did some splendid work over a very hard bit of desert; but as it was very hot, and the gazelle evidently on the travel, we were compelled to give them best.

After the midday rest and food the sheikh and his supporters took us nearly all the way back to the edge of the desert, killing three sand grouse and a quail *en route*.

Just as we were about to say our farewells a hare got up wide, and we had a priceless chase for about two and a half miles—more a hunt than a chase—dogs never sighted the hare for a mile, but raced in front of me in the most approved style for the galloping cast possible until I could give them the view; then after a good pursuit the hare had them beat, when we saw a wild hawk stoop at something a quarter of a mile ahead; galloping to the place we fresh found our hare, and racing her back turned her over in style in front of the whole cavalcade. "Poor is the triumph o'er the timid hare," but it was a good finish to one of the most sporting two days I ever had in my life.

I had known Sheikh Magelly slightly for two years, but after this expedition the great thing that struck me was what a thorough sportsman and an out-and-out gentleman the best class Arab is.

Of course, we were disappointed not to get a gazelle, but we saw *la chasse* conducted as it should be, and it is quite evident that it requires a great deal of luck, as well as good management, to catch one.

I think one of the things that struck me most was sitting round that fire that night; their faces might have stepped straight out of pictures of our ancestors, and as sportsmen in the truest sense of the word some might equal them but none beat them.

PALESTINE.

Lieut.-Col. Strettell, Brigade Major of the 10th Cavalry Brigade, quartered at Jenin, Palestine, sends me the following account of sport in Palestine. We wish our railway companies could run race specials.

"For some weeks the 10th Cavalry Brigade has been under sentence of abolition due to the necessity of reducing the cost of the Army in Palestine. On the very eve

Digitized by Google

of the departure of the units, however, orders were received that the movement of the units was indefinitely postponed.

" On 26th March the brigade held a point-to-point meeting, the first held in Northern Palestine, which was a great success.

" The only regret was that the race open to artillery and infantry officers did not fill.

" The Lancer Cup, the heavy-weight race open to officers of the brigade, brought out twelve runners, of which the first three belonged to Major Hamilton, O.B.E., of the 8th Cavalry, his b.a.m. Geraldine, ridden by Mr. Palmer, of the 8th Cavalry, being first, and the owner, on his b.e.g. Dick, being second.

" The light-weight race was won by Mr. A. K. Crowther, A.D.C. to the Colonel Commandant, on his b.e.m. Betty, a wonderful performance for the mare, who was bred by the owner's father and is twenty-two years old. Both were excellent races and the heavy-weight race especially was a very fast run race.

" The 8th Cavalry won the Indian Officers' and also the Sowars' Race.

" A large number of spectators came in from the out-stations, a ' race special ' train being run from Haifa.

" The 8th Cavalry Regimental Sports were held on the 16th April and were followed on the 18th and 19th by the Brigade Horse Show and Sports.

" The events were keenly contested and performances of a good average level.

" Jumping by half-sections was won by the 4th Cavalry, section tent-pegging by the 31st Lancers. British and Indian officers' jumping by Mr. Bean, 4th Cavalry, British and Indian officers' tent-pegging by Jemadar Mahan Singh, 31st Lancers, after a tie with Risaldar Mir Badshah, 8th Cavalry, who showed the most finished style.

" The cup presented by Colonel Commandant Green, C.M.G., D.S.O., for the ' best officer's charger,' was won by the Brigade Major, Brev. Lieut.-Col. Strettell's Mavourneen.

" The whole meeting was most successful and the ground arrangements made by Capt. Young, M.C., 8th Cavalry, were excellent

" The old 4th Cavalry Division pack of foxhounds are now in Jenin and had one or two good runs before the crops got too high. The pack is suffering from Anno Domini, but the prospect of two litters of pups is encouraging.

" At the Military Display at Jerusalem in aid of Earl Haig's Fund the cavalry gave notable displays.

" The tent-pegging by the 8th Cavalry was somewhat spoilt by the high wind, which made accuracy impossible; however, the pace and dash shown were exhilarating. The 4th Cavalry gave a most creditable jumping display, while a musical ride by the 31st Lancers was the feature of the afternoon.

" The 31st Lancers repeated their ride at the torchlight tattoo that night and ' brought the house down.'

" All ranks were very gratified by a message of appreciation from the Commander-in-Chief, who said that ' the standard shown in the events was up to pre-war standard.'

Digitized by Google

"Quail shooting has been excellent, especially at Beisan, which is a paradise for a good shot, though the bags in North Palestine cannot compare with those in the South.

"The cavalry lately have been all over the country keeping order among the inhabitants, who have been very excited by the late regrettable disturbances."

The 5th Dragoon Guards finished a most successful season's duck shooting last March. The bag for the last two days was 980 duck.

MESOPOTAMIA.

Polo in Mespot is flourishing. We have received a list of 106 players with their handicap for Mesopotamia only. In March there was a polo week at Baghdad, which included an American handicap and matches for the Bonham-Carter Challenge Cup presented by Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, K.C.M.G., C.I.E. The ground at Hinaidi is in excellent condition, and the public, including many ladies, turn out in large numbers to watch the matches. Capt. Chrystall, M.C., 13th Hussars, is the honorary secretary of the Baghdad Polo Club.

The Advanced Remount Depot have also got a good polo ground, where some of the tournaments are played. The following have teams which compete in most of the tournaments: 5th Cavalry, 17th Division, The Rovers, The Wads, The Bats, 7th Cavalry Brigade H.Q., 7th Dragoon Guards (two teams), the Mechanics and the Casuals.

BIG GAME SHOOTING.

In spite of the game drive in Zululand, which has been already mentioned in the JOURNAL, the Resident at Empangeni has great difficulty in keeping game off the farms of the Returned Soldiers' Settlement. With this object he has erected a wire fence over thirty miles long. The Government have also sent an entomologist and a veterinary research officer to combat horse and cattle diseases introduced by the game. It may be mentioned that the explorer Livingstone recorded that Kudu died of the African horse sickness.

We also hear that good coal seams have been discovered in the former game reserve, a fact which will assist in driving the game farther north.

Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google



BLENHEIM, 13th AUGUST, 1704.

From the painting by Charles Breydel.

THE

CAVALRY JOURNAL

OCTOBER, 1921.

BLENHEIM, 13th AUGUST, 1704.

THE British cavalry has shared in three of the most decisive battles of the world—Blenheim, Waterloo, and the Marne, 1914.

Marlborough conceived a bold scheme and executed it with remarkable determination when he took his army from the Meuse to the Danube in 1704.

Marshal Tallard stood on the defensive with his right resting on the Danube, south of Blenheim, his left flank three miles north-west, held by the Bavarians. On the same field the French and Bavarian arms had defeated the Austrians in the preceding year.

The Franco-Bavarian force, according to Homspech, had a superiority over that of Marlborough and Prince Eugene of 4,220 men and 30 guns.

The English and Dutch formed the left wing, under Marlborough. Eugene on the right led the Imperial, North German and Danish troops.

General Kane relates that in the early morning the English advance was led by three squadrons, formed respectively of Carabiniers, of Wood's Horse (now 3rd Dragoon Guards), and of Schomburgh's regiment (now the 7th Dragoon Guards). These opened the battle by an affray with five hostile squadrons, and the result was glorious to the British arms.

The battle became general at one o'clock, but the issue remained doubtful till soon after five, when, ordering his batteries to cease firing, Marlborough sounded the charge, and 8,000 sabres swept up the slope against the enemy's centre.

The defending squadrons discharged their carbines and retired, but the heroic French infantry stood their ground and, though their deadly fire was effective, they were cut to pieces. The line was pierced, the conquering squadrons wheeled to the left and thundered down upon the broken array of the Marshal, which was driven into the Danube or compelled to surrender.

This is the scene represented in the picture by Breydel, which we reproduce. The spectator faces south, Blenheim is in the centre, the village Greinheim on the left.

Digitized by Google

Columns of the enemy attempting to retreat from Blenheim were headed back by Scots Greys and Royal Dragoons of Ireland (now 5th Lancers).

Dumont, in his history, published in 1736, declared that the Emperor recognized that but for this victory he would have lost Vienna.

Sir Edward Creasy wrote, " Like Hannibal, Marlborough relied principally on his cavalry for achieving his decisive successes and it was by his cavalry that Blenheim the greatest of his victories, was won."

The following British cavalry fought in the battle: 1st, 3rd, 5th and 7th Dragoon Guards; the Carabiniers; Royal Scots Greys; and 5th Lancers.

The picture is from the original oil painting by Charles Breydel, the Flemish painter of battles, who was born at Antwerp in 1677, a pupil of Rysbrack, the great master of landscape. He died in 1744.

The German Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire caused a pillar to be erected on the field of Blenheim, with a latin inscription which concludes with the words:

Exercitui Victori, cum immortali gloria, imperavit
JOHANNES, Dux de MARLBOROUGH, ANGLUS.



Digitized by Google

OPERATIONS OF THE MOUNTED TROOPS OF THE EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

CHAPTER XVI. PHASE III.*

By LIEUT.-COLONEL REX OSBORNE, D.S.O., M.C., *20th Hussars.*

IN July, 1917, when General Allenby arrived in Palestine, the Turkish Army in Southern Palestine held a strong position extending from the sea at Gaza, roughly along the main Gaza—Beersheba road to Beersheba (*see* Plate VI).

Gaza had been made into a strong modern fortress, heavily entrenched and wired, offering every facility for protracted defence. The remainder of the enemy's line consisted of a series of strong localities, viz.: the Sihan group of works, the Atawineh group, the Baha group, the Abu Hareira—Kauwukah trench system and, finally, the works covering Beersheba. These groups of works were generally from 1,500 to 2,000 yards apart, except that the distance from the Kauwukah group to Beersheba was about 4½ miles.

During the period from July to October, the enemy's force on the front had been increased. It was evident, from the arrival of these reinforcements and the construction of railway extensions from Et Tine, on the Ramleh—Beersheba railway to Deir Sineid and Beit Hanun, north of Gaza, and from Deir Sineid to Huj, and from the reports of the transport of large supplies of ammunition and other stores to the Palestine front, that the enemy was determined to make every effort to maintain his position on the Gaza—Beersheba line (*see* Plate VI). He had considerably strengthened his defences on this line, and the series of strong localities mentioned above had, by the end of October, been joined up to form a practically continuous line from the sea to Kauwukah,

* This narrative is mainly based upon the official reports compiled by the G.O.C. Desert Mounted Corps. The writer is greatly indebted to Lieut.-Colonel G. Browne, C.M.G., D.S.O., 14th Hussars, for complete information as to the operations of the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division; also to Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. R. M. P. Preston, D.S.O., for Map A, taken from his most valuable and readable book, "The Desert Mounted Corps."

Digitized by Google

south of Sharia, except for a gap just east of Gaza. The defensive works round Beersheba remained a detached system, but had been improved and extended.

The Turkish communications were efficient. The Jerusalem—Beersheba and Jerusalem—Gaza roads were metalled and capable of carrying heavy mechanical transport.* The Gaza—Beersheba road, connecting up all his defended localities, was hard, and the open country north of it generally was passable for horsed transport. His front was served by the Junction Station—Beersheba railway (3 ft. 6 in. gauge), with its branch line, Et Tine—Deir Sineid.

The Turkish forces consisted of XXth and XXIInd Corps and the 3rd Cavalry Division, in all nine Divisions; about 50,000 rifles, 1,500 sabres and 300 guns.

XXIInd Corps had its Headquarters about Gaza and held the western groups of works.

XXth Corps had its Headquarters at Sharia and held the centre groups of works, with the 27th Division and 3rd Cavalry Division about Beersheba (*see* Plate VI).

Army Headquarters and the main reserve centre was near Huj.

British Forces.

The E.E.F. in October, 1917, consisted approximately as follows (the fighting strengths given for each Corps total 100,000, and only include infantry and mounted regiments):

XXth Corps (Lieut.-General Sir Philip Chetwode, Bt.); (fighting strength, 45,500), consisting of:

10th Division.
53rd Division.
60th Division.
74th Division.
23 Batteries R.G.A. (Mountain, Heavy and Siege).

XXIst Corps (Lieut.-General Sir Edward Bulfin); (fighting strength, 36,000), consisting of:

52nd Division.
54th Division.
75th Division.
18 Batteries R.G.A. (Mountain, Heavy and Siege).

Royal Flying Corps:

3 Squadrons and 1 Balloon Wing.

* Map A fails to show the metalled road from Junction Station north-east to Latron.

Digitized by Google

Army Cavalry ;

Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade (Jodhpur, Mysore and Hyderabad Lancers).

Desert Mounted Corps (Lieut.-General Sir Harry Chauvel, A.I.F.) ; (fighting strength, 18,700), consisting of :

(a) *Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division* (Maj.-General Sir E. W. C. Chaytor, N.Z.I.F.) :

1st Australian Light Horse Brigade.
2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade.
New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade.
18th Brigade R.H.A. (Inverness, Ayr and Somerset Batts.).

(b) *Australian Mounted Division* (Maj.-General Sir H. W. Hodgson) :

3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade.
4th Australian Light Horse Brigade.
5th Mounted Brigade (Yeomanry).
19th Brigade R.H.A. ("A" and "B" Batteries H.A.C. ; 1/1st Notts. Battery).

(c) *Yeomanry Mounted Division* (Maj.-General Sir G. de S. Barrow) :

6th Mounted Brigade (Yeomanry).
8th Mounted Brigade (Yeomanry).
22nd Mounted Brigade (Yeomanry).
20th Brigade R.H.A. (Berks., Hants and Leicester Batts).

(d) *7th Mounted Brigade* (Yeomanry, and including Essex Batt. R.H.A.).

(e) *Imperial Camel Corps Brigade* (three Battalions and one Mountain Batt. R.G.A.).

NOTE.—(1) Of the above nine brigades, only the five Mounted Brigades (Yeomanry) were armed with the sword, as well as the rifle and bayonet, and were trained in accordance with the manual, "Cavalry Training." The four A.L.H. Brigades and the N.Z.M.R. Brigade relied solely upon the rifle and bayonet, and had been trained in accordance with the manual, "Yeomanry and Mounted Rifle Training."

(2) With the above exception the Mounted Divisions were almost identical in every way with the Cavalry Divisions in France in 1917-1918. They each had, however, a Divisional Train ; and the M.T. was retained under control of Desert Mounted Corps.

Digitized by Google

In October, 1917, the British situation was approximately as follows:

XXIst Corps was strongly entrenched in front of Gaza, from the sea to a distance of about six miles inland. In this sector months had been spent in perfecting the defensive arrangements, and the conditions were practically those of fortress warfare.

The right flank was open, and in this area Desert Mounted Corps operated. One Mounted Division, with its camps on the Wadi Ghuzze at Fara, sent out one Mounted Brigade daily to the high ground El Buggar—Pt. 720—Pt. 630—Bir in *Bir* el Girheir (Map A) to overlook the Wadys about Bir Imleih and Bir el Girheir and keep the hostile cavalry patrols at a distance. Each night this outpost Mounted Brigade withdrew and took up a night outpost line behind the barbed wire which protected the Wadi Ghuzze to as far south as Gamli. The remainder of Desert Mounted Corps and XXth Corps were echeloned back to the coast, resting.

Topography.

The line Gaza—Beersheba is practically the southern edge of the Plain of Philistia. From this line, for eighty miles northwards, the topographical conditions are remarkably constant. Along the sea coast there is a belt of sand dunes, varying from two to four miles in width. The Plain of Philistia running as far north as Jaffa, and the Plain of Sharon which continues to Mt. Carmel, lie between the sand dunes and the foothills of the Judæan Mountains. The average breadth of the plain is twenty miles, reaching its maximum breadth of thirty miles on the line Gaza—Beersheba, at which last named place a deep re-entrant runs into the mountains. The Plain of Philistia is for the most part rolling downland. It is wonderful barley country, under crops from April to June. It is sparsely populated, partly by tent-living Arabs with their flocks and partly by the Fellahin, who live in the mud villages. The inhabitants find ample water for their needs in the deep village wells, and there is a regular rainfall from November to March.

The winter rains descending from the Judæan Mountains have cut deep wadis across the plain. These wadis are the only serious obstacle to movement in the plain. In general it might be said that the Plain of Philistia is perfect "cavalry country"; while there is freedom of movement everywhere, the country is not flat; on the contrary, for mile upon mile gentle hills and valleys give promise of covered approach to large cavalry forces. Even the wadis are comparatively easily crossed by cavalry, and give refuge from artillery fire or attack by hostile aircraft.

The Judæan Mountains run from Beersheba northwards. The watershed is marked approximately by the metalled road Beersheba—Hebron—Jerusalem—Nablus. From Hebron northwards the mountains rise to a height of 3,000 ft.

Digitized by Google

The western slopes are much more gradual than the eastern, and the western foothills extend westwards to within about two miles of the Beersheba—Sharia—Junction Station—Ramleh railway. The eastern slopes of the Judæan Mountains are very steep and in places precipitous.

Between Beersheba at the south end of the mountains, and the Plain of Esdraelon, 100 miles to the north, several valleys descend westwards from the summit to the plain, up which modern troops without wheels might reach the summit. The spurs run from east to west, descending comparatively gently to the west, and it is up these spurs, rather than up the valleys, that infantry could most easily force their way. Any advance into the mountains, however, from the west, in the face of opposition, would be a most difficult operation.

An advance from Beersheba northwards along the backbone of the mountains would be met by position after position of great natural strength; later experience showed that an advance of five miles in one day, in face of determined opposition, was the most that could be expected.

It is clear, therefore, that a commander seeking a decision will always avoid the mountains, if he can.

Lord Allenby has described his plan in his despatch dated December 16th, 1917. "I had decided to strike the main blow against the left flank of the Turkish position, Hareira and Sharia. The capture of Beersheba was a necessary preliminary to this operation, in order to secure the water supplies at that place, and to give room for the deployment of the attacking force on the high ground to the north and north-west of Beersheba, from which direction I intended to attack the Hareira—Sharia line.

This front of attack was chosen for the following reasons. The enemy's works in this sector were less formidable than elsewhere, and they were easier of approach than other parts of the enemy's defences.

When Beersheba was in our hands we should have an open flank against which to operate, and I could make full use of our superiority in mounted troops; and a success here offered prospects of pursuing our advantage and forcing the enemy to abandon the rest of his fortified positions, which no other line of attack would afford.

It was important, in order to keep the enemy in doubt up to the last moment as to the real point of attack, that an attack should also be made on the enemy's right at Gaza, in conjunction with the main operations."

Lord Allenby discloses the fact that he had his mounted troops in mind. He intended them to exert a decisive influence. He selected for his main attack that area in which the mounted troops would find the conditions most favourable; the hostile positions in the east were less formidable than to the west; the hostile reserves were mainly behind Gaza; the enemy's main L. of C. ran from Gaza northwards to Junction Station; the ground about Sharia and to the north of it was suitable

Digitized by Google

for the rapid movement of large mounted forces. Exploitation by cavalry, in its initial phases at least, requires ground giving freedom of movement and a minimum of hostile opposition. Lord Allenby's plan, therefore, was designed to give his cavalry every chance.

It is certain that Lord Allenby looked far ahead. Success in the main attack at Hareira—Sharia might lead to the rolling up of the whole line, to pursuit to Junction Station, and even to the capture of Jerusalem.

Battle of Beersheba.

The strategical plan depended upon an initial tactical success, the capture of Beersheba, for which the C.-in-C. formed the following plan. The XXth Corps (60th, 74th, 53rd and 10th Divisions and Imperial Camel Corps Brigade) was to move out from Esani and Fara and capture the enemy's main works, south-west of Beersheba, between the Beersheba —Khalasa road and the Wady Saba (*see* Map A).

The Desert Mounted Corps, less detachments, was to concentrate far to the south, at Bir Asluj and Khalasa, and moving through the rough country to the east, to attack the enemy's defences on the east and north-east of Beersheba and the town of Beersheba itself.

Narrative.

Preparatory Measures.

The situation of Descorps* prior to the operations was as follows (Map A):

Corps Headquarters ..	South of El Fukhari.
Ausdiv†	Tel el Fara, with one Mounted Brigade on outpost on the ridge El Buggar—Pt. 720—Pt. 630.
Anzac Div.‡..	Abasan el Kebir.
Yeodiv§	On the beach near Khan Yunus.
7th Mtd. Bde. (Corps Troops)	El Fukhari.
I.C.C. Bde.‖ (Corps Troops)	South of El Fukhari.

The preparatory measures of Descorps aimed at placing Anzac Div. at Bir Asluj, Ausdiv at Khalasa and 7th Mtd. Bde. at Esani. Yeodiv and I.C.C. Bde. were to be detached from Descorps before the operations began, as there was no hope of finding water to the south and east of Beersheba for more than two Mtd. Divs. and one Mtd. Bde.

* Abbreviation for Desert Mounted Corps.
† Abbreviation for Australian Mounted Division.
‡ Abbreviation for Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division.
§ Abbreviation for Yeomanry Mounted Division.
‖ Abbreviation for Imperial Camel Corps Brigade.

Digitized by Google

PLATE VI.


PALESTINE – THE SECOND OFFENSIVE
CAPTURE OF BEERSHEBA
SITUATION AT 1800 HRS. 29th OCTOBER 1917.
Judean Hills
To Jerusalem 42 Miles
3318
Hebron
3040
Mountainous very broken country
Tel el Nejile
VIII th ARMY
Beit Jibrin
Sheperdeh
Ed Dhaheriyeh
2150
Yatta
3141
Scale of Miles
Ascalon
Gaza
Sihan
Sheria
Khirbet Khuweilfeh
Tel el Sakaty
Tel el Khuweilfeh
Hill 1070
Tel el Jemmi
Tel el Saba
Beersheba
Asluj
Wadi Ghuzzee
Low Sand Hills
Cultivation
Heavy Sand
Northern Limit of
FRONTIER LINE
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Sand Dunes
Wadi Hesi
Wadi Sheria
Wadi Saba
Wadi Khalasa
Wadi Asluj
Hadj Mosque
Hadj Wells
Khan Yunus
Rafa
Yeomanry M.D.
XX Corps
XXI Corps
XXIII Corps
XXII Corps
XIX Corps
XX Corps
XXI Corps
Desert Mounted Corps
Australian Mounted Div.
British Yeomanry
3 Cavalry Div.
Camel Corps
Camel Transport
Camel Field Ambulance
Camel Machine Gun Corps
Camel Brigade
Camel Battalion
Camel Regiment
Camel Company
Camel Section
Camel Unit
Camel Detachment
Camel Squadron
Camel Troop
Camel Platoon
Camel Patrol
Camel Escort
Camel Convoy
Camel Train
Camel Supply Column
Camel Ammunition Column
Camel Water Carrying Column
Camel Field Artillery
Camel Machine Gun Battery
Camel Machine Gun Section
Camel Machine Gun Company
Camel Machine Gun Squadron
Camel Machine Gun Troop
Camel Machine Gun Platoon
Camel Machine Gun Patrol
Camel Machine Gun Escort
Camel Machine Gun Convoy
Camel Machine Gun Train
Camel Machine Gun Supply Column
Camel Machine Gun Ammunition Column
Camel Machine Gun Water Carrying Column
Camel Machine Gun

Descorps was also required to protect the advance of XXth Corps to their preliminary positions on the line Ma El Mallaka—El Buggar.

October 31st was the date fixed for the capture of Beersheba, but it was necessary to start the moves some days earlier, in order to re-establish the wells at Asluj and Khalasa, which had been destroyed by the enemy, and to store at each place sufficient water, about 100,000 gallons, for a Mtd. Div. for one day.

At Esani also, water had to be collected into reservoirs to supply one Mtd. Div. in its march to Khalasa.

Preliminary Moves.

The preliminary moves, therefore, consisted of:

(*a*) An advance of the line of cavalry observation eastwards as far as the line from a point two miles east of Esani—El Buggar—Pt. 720—Pt. 630—Bir in *Bir* el Girheir—nearly to junction of the big Wadys Ghuzze and Sharia.

(*b*) A gradual extension of our line southwards as far as Bir Asluj.

Advance of Line of Observation.

The line of observation, which was under the command of the G.O.C. Ausdiv, was established on October 24th, on the general line, Esani—El Buggar—Pt. 720—Pt. 630—Bir in *Bir* el Girheir—thence W.N.W.

This line was fifteen miles long, and one Mtd. Bde. was detailed daily as outpost Bde. for a tour of duty of 24 hours.

The main object was to deny to the enemy, from 17.00 hours on October 24th onwards, positions from which he could bring observed artillery fire on to the railway construction parties, who were extending the railway from Shellal to Karm.

Previous to October 24th the Mtd. Bde. on outpost duty had withdrawn each night behind the wire on the Wady Ghuzze, re-occupying the position each morning. The position El Buggar—Pt. 720—Pt. 630—Bir in *Bir* el Girheir is a ridge from which observation can be obtained to El Gamli and Shellal. It was decided, therefore, that this ridge must, from October 24th onwards, be permanently occupied both by day and night by the outpost Mtd. Bde. This decision meant that the Mtd. Bde., besides merely "observing" from Esani to El Buggar and from Bir in *Bir* el Girheir for four miles W.N.W. of it, a total distance of seven miles, must entrench itself in an outpost line of resistance from El Buggar, through Pts. 720 and 630, to Bir in *Bir* el Girheir, a distance of eight miles.

It was thoroughly realized that only about one regiment and the Machine Gun Squadron and two batteries of artillery, would be available to hold the entrenched position, that little more could be done than to

Digitized by Google

hold fortified localities at Pt. 720, Pt. 630 and Bir in *Bir* el Girheir, and that the troops actually dug in could easily be overpowered and that their safety must depend upon other troops coming quickly to their rescue when attacked. From before dawn on October 26th one Inf. Bde. of 53rd Div. was to be east of the Wady Ghuzze, encamped six miles west of Pt. 630. This Inf. Bde. was to stand to arms daily at dawn, and be prepared to move at short notice, if necessary, to the support of the outpost Mtd. Bde.

The Mtd. Bde. next for duty of Ausdiv, encamped at Tel el Fara, nine miles from Pt. 630, was also to be ready to march at three-quarters of an hour's notice to the support of the outpost Mtd. Bde.

These two brigades were so far away that quick support could not be expected ; there was no water east of the Wady Ghuzze, so they could not be maintained further forward.

Further, the enemy's entrenched positions south of Kauwukah and Hareira were only four miles from Pt. 630, and were occupied by large Turkish forces.

The orders received could only be interpreted in one way. The ridge, in particular the most important localities, Pts. 720 and 630, must be denied to the Turks. The garrisons of these localities must resist to the last, giving time for supports and reserves to intervene ; these localities were therefore entrenched, but there was no time to erect wire.

This line, partly of observation and partly of resistance, was occupied successively by 3rd and 4th A.L.H. Bdes. and 5th Mtd. Bde. of Ausdiv, during the period October 23rd to 26th.

At 17.00 hours on October 26th, the 8th Mtd. Bde., temporarily detached from Yeodiv, was put into the outpost line by Ausdiv, but came under command of G.O.C. 53rd Div., at midnight, October 26th-27th.

The distribution of the outpost Mtd. Bde. to carry out its task on the fifteen mile front had been worked out by the Div. Staff of Ausdiv, with the Mtd. Bde. commanders.

8th Mtd. Bde. occupied the line as follows :

(*a*) Middlesex Yeo. (two sub-sects. 21st M.G. Sqdn. attached), El Buggar to Pt. 630 (incl.).

(*b*) 3rd County of London Yeo. (one sub-sect. 21st M.G. Sqn. attached), Pt. 630 (excl.), to eight miles W.N.W. of it.

(*c*) City of London Yeo. and 21st M.G. Sqn. (less three sub-sects.), were in Mtd. Bde. reserve about Karm.

Hants Batt. R.H.A. was in action near Karm, one sect. covering Pt. 720 and one sect. covering Pt. 630.

The dispositions of the Middlesex Yeo. are given, as they show how weakly the line of resistance was held.

Digitized by Google

"*B*" *Sqn.* (Maj. Lafone).

(*a*) 1 Troop as standing patrol at El Buggar.

(*b*) Sqn. Headquarters and 2 Troops and 1 sub-sect. 21st M.G. Sqn., dug in on the crest of Pt. 720.

(*c*) 1 Troop a mile in rear of Pt. 720 in reserve.

"*C*" *Sqn.* (Capt. A. McDougall).

(*a*) 1 Troop dug in half mile south of Pt. 630.

(*b*) Remainder of Sqn. and 1 sub-sect. M.G.'s dug in at Pt. 630; all the led horses were sent one and a half miles to the rear of Pt. 630.

Regtl. Headquarters and "A" Sqn., near Karm.

As it was realized that the enemy could develop greatly superior Art. and M.G. fire against these isolated posts, it was decided to dig cruciform posts, about seventy yards behind the crest, so that the enemy could not see and direct artillery fire on to them; further, the distance of seventy yards was chosen so as to be out of bombing range from the crest.

The troops were to hold the crest until driven off, when they were to retire down into the cruciform posts.

These posts would, without doubt, be surrounded, but as effective artillery fire or bombing could not well be developed against them they could only be taken by assault.

The Bde. Comdr. ordered the posts to be held at all costs.

The decision to dig troops in behind a crest, whence they could only see seventy yards ahead of them was a desperate decision. But the localities had to be held; only three squadrons were available for fixed defence from Pt. 720, through Pt. 630 to Bir in *Bir* el Girheir, a distance of five miles; the enemy could attack with almost unlimited numbers, and it was impossible to maintain effective reserves close at hand. The commanders who drew up the plan realized that they were making tremendous demands on the troops; the problem as set from above was an extraordinarily difficult one, and it will well repay thinking out.

Early on October 27th, Pts. 720 and 630 were attacked by a force of about six battalions, 2 regts. of cav. and 2 batts. No praise can be too high for the magnificent defence put up by the Middlesex Yeo. and 21st M.G. Sqn.

The following accounts of events at Pt. 720 and Pt. 630 are taken from the official reports of officers who took part.

"*B*" *Sqn. Middlesex Yeo., at Pt. 720.*

"We relieved the Australians about 17.00 hours, October 26th. Major Lafone, with Lieuts. Van den Bergh and Edmondson, 2 troops of "B" Sqn. and 2 M.G.'s, took up his position in some trenches near the crest

Digitized by Google

of Hill 720. His right flank was protected by a troop under Lieut. Jehu (Note.—Presumably the standing patrol at El Buggar). The horses were sent a mile or so back. Some time before dawn we saw green lights go up on our left, presumably from Pt. 630, and heard rifle fire which rapidly increased in volume. Shortly after this we were surprised to hear the neighing of horses and a deal of uncouth jabbering to our right, and to see about six horsemen appear over the crest about 300 yards away. It was not sufficiently light to see plainly who they were, but their speech betrayed them, and a few rounds dispersed them. There must have been a gully in front of the hill, for we could hear the Turks talking not more than thirty yards away. The force opposed to us has been variously estimated, but perhaps it is best described as 'a little army.' At dawn the enemy opened accurate fire on us with shrapnel and M.G.'s. They kept this up for about two hours, by which time a half of our small force were casualties, and we were nearly surrounded. The enemy then made a strong attack on our left flank, which was held by a Hotchkiss and a few men. All the Hotchkiss team were killed or wounded, but when the enemy got to within fifty yards the few surviving rifles, reinforced by Major Lafone, who took up a rifle and shot down the Turks one by one, counting them as he did so, beat off the attack. This was immediately followed by a cavalry attack on our right flank. We had scarcely changed flanks to meet it when the enemy swept across our front, but he was routed by our machine gun, which took heavy toll. In the meantime a small body of enemy cavalry had managed to creep round our flank and attack our led horses, which had come up earlier in the day. The horse-holders had suffered casualties in the shelling and the survivors had about ten horses each, but a Hotchkiss was quickly got into action and the enemy fled. All this time Major Lafone was directing the fire, and encouraging the men regardless of personal danger. The shelling became more intense. Major Lafone and Lieut. Van den Bergh were killed, Lieut. Edmondson was wounded, and the remaining force did not exceed half a dozen men, but when the Turks made another dismounted attack they were beaten by one machine gun, worked by a single man, and two rifles. About 1,000 hours, the Turks were seen to be preparing another cavalry charge, so realizing the impossibility of holding out any longer, the four unwounded men and a few of the slightly wounded withdrew as the enemy swarmed over the position. Several were hit as they ran back, and it was impossible to remove those who were too badly wounded to help themselves."

"B" Sqn. obeyed its orders to the letter and fought to the bitter end.* It is certain that the siting of the cruciform posts did not prevent the enemy from directing artillery and M.G. fire, as had been hoped.

The trenches, however, were originally attacked at 05.15 hours, and

*The gallant squadron leader, Major Lafone, was awarded the Victoria Cross after death.

Digitized by Google

were not taken until the final assault which took place at 11.15 hours; two troops and two M.G.'s therefore maintained their position for six hours, and this part of the plan can hardly, therefore, be called a failure. The failure lay in the fact that in six hours no effective reinforcements arrived to save the situation.

" C " Sqn. Middlesex Yeo. at Pt. 630. *Report by Capt. McDougall, D.S.O.*

" It was at Shellal on October 26th, 1917, about 08.00 hours, that we first heard that the regiment was for the outpost line that night. Our orders were: The regiment will take over from the Light Horse at dusk to-day, on the line, 720-630, both inclusive. " B " Squadron will hold the right, from 720; " C " Squadron the left, from 630; Headquarters and support (" A " Squadron), near Karm; two guns of the 21st Machine Gun Squadron will accompany each squadron; one section of Hants R.H.A. will support 720, and one, 630; signalling will be by visual; alarm signals signifying the need of artillery support and reinforcements, red flares from 720, green and white flares from 630. During the morning the officers moved out across the Wadi Ghuzzi to reconnoitre the ground, and the regiment followed later in the day. Two of us visited the Australians on 630 in the afternoon. It was already an unhealthy locality, for the Turk had two guns beautifully trained on the crest, and we soon found by experience that he let drive at the slightest sign of movement. Between 720 and 630 is a gap of three and half miles, and with our weak squadrons it was not possible for either " B " or " C " to hold any intervening points, so it was left to " A " Squadron in reserve to watch this ground by means of patrols. " C " Squadron and two guns of the 21st M.G.S., under Lieut. Gardham, relieved a similar force of A.L.H. at dusk. The position consisted of three partially dug cruciform trenches on the reverse slope thirty yards apart and about seventy yards from the crest. There were also two machine gun emplacements close by. Just beyond the right and left shoulders of the hill, on the forward slope, were two small trenches, each large enough for four men. Eight hundred yards to the south-east was a smaller hill, overlooking the Wadi Hannafish, up which an enemy patrol or attack was to be expected. On this hill there was one partially finished cruciform trench on the reverse slope, and a smaller trench on the forward slope. It was held by No. 4 Troop, under Lieut. Abraham, M.C. This troop was given an extra Hotchkiss rifle for the defence of the right flank. Sixty yards south of Lieut. Abraham's position was a small trench, from which the right flank could be protected. Here it was that Corpl. Stott, M.M., and his gallant Hotchkiss section fought all day and saved the flank. Three times the enemy attacked them. Twice the Hotchkiss drove them back, and the third time they did it with two rifles and two revolvers, their Hotchkiss having jammed. The remainder

Digitized by Google

of the dismounted men was divided between the two trenches on 630, under the command of Capt. A. McDougall, D.S.O. and Lieut. (now Capt.) G. H. Matthews, M.C., respectively. The led horses were sent back one and a half miles, under Capt. Carus-Wilson, M.C. Each of the small forward trenches was at once occupied by a corporal and three men. Their orders were (1) to fire on any small parties of enemy; (2) not to fire if the enemy came on in force, but to get back to the main trenches on the other side of the crest and warn us so that we should all be ready the moment the enemy topped the crest. For the remainder, the order was: "Dig until the moon goes down." We were all to realize soon that this irksome labour had really been a blessing in disguise. An artillery wire was found on 630, about 200 yards south of the trenches. This was used throughout the night of the 26th, and up to half an hour after the attack had commenced, when the line was cut by the enemy's fire. Pte. Finlay, M.M., brought a message up to the trenches and went back with the reply. This he did under very heavy fire, and later carried a message back to Headquarters, thereby winning the Military Medal. Even if this wire had not been cut, it would not have been possible to have used it throughout the day, owing to the two hundred yards of fire-swept ground between the telephone and the trenches. At 04.00, in the darkest hour, just before dawn, the right hand forward post on 630 opened rapid rifle fire. This soon stopped and the corporal in charge came back to report that he had driven back a party of cavalry. So far so good, and all was quiet again. At about 04.15 the whole section came back, this time without firing, and the corporal reported: "There's an army coming, sir." Well, then we waited and watched that crest, and waited and watched. There was nothing to be heard or seen. The left hand forward section was still out and had reported nothing, so after about five minutes the corporal and his section were again sent to occupy their trench. But the Turk was there first, and they came back under a hail of bullets. Our left hand forward post also now came in at the double, and reported large numbers of the enemy advancing up the other side of the hill. We fired our green lights, and white lights were going up from Lieut. Abraham's hill. Unfortunately, the lights failed to bring the much desired reply—shells from our two guns. Our friends behind mistook our flares for those of the enemy, which had been going off at intervals ever since the moon went down. It is a pity, as there must have been a wonderful target just behind that hill. (An aeroplane later in the day reported two thousand Turks there). It was now quarter light, and at last the enemy appeared on the crest. We let him have it full blast from two Hotchkiss rifles, twenty-five rifles and the two Vickers guns. It stopped him, and throughout the whole day he never appeared on the top again. When it was light, from the right hand trench on 630 a Hotchkiss did good execution with flanking fire against the Turks advancing up the forward slope of

Digitized by Google

Lieut. Abraham's hill. Twice they fell back, and then that particular Hotchkiss jammed and had to be taken to pieces. As a result, the enemy established a machine gun there, and was quickly dropping bullets into us. By now the enemy had established several machine guns on either shoulder of 630, and between them they quickly put out of action our own two Vickers guns, but not before the latter had taken a goodly toll of Turks, and their officers and the whole of both crews had become casualties. When the fight was hottest, Capt. Carus-Wilson appeared suddenly in our trench, carrying several bandoliers of spare ammunition, having on his way delivered a similar quantity at Lieut. Matthew's trench. To do this he had had to cross 200 yards of open, under very heavy machine gun and rifle fire. There being no telephone, he at once volunteered to go back and report on the situation to the colonel. This he did. Later on he again appeared carrying two boxes of Hotchkiss ammunition. One of these he safely delivered to Lieut. Matthew's trench, and finally fell into our trench, shot through the thigh at point blank range. For the most gallant efforts made by our own " A " Squadron, and by two squadrons of the City of London Yeomanry to come to our aid, those on 630 who could see it all quite clearly have only one word—magnificent ! We had seen the Turks registering their machine guns on the ridges to which our fellows were advancing, and it was awful to watch them approaching the fatal ridge. With our supports driven back and the Turks practically all round us, things looked black. A volunteer was called for to run back to Headquarters with a message. It was then that Sergt. Randall won his D.C.M. He ran the same gauntlet that Capt. Carus-Wilson had done three times previously, and got back safely. As a result, our guns opened on the crest and did some beautiful shooting. Lieut. Abraham, from his position on the right, could see the shells mowing down the enemy. Thanks to these guns which kept on firing at intervals during the afternoon, the enemy's machine guns and snipers were very much less active. To the writer, the extraordinary thing was that the enemy had neither shelled us nor tried to rush us with bomb and bayonet. It seemed certain that he was only waiting for the cover of darkness to do the latter. About 17.00, what at the time seemed like a miracle happened, so unexpected was it. We were relieved. The enemy's fire suddenly ceased. After a little while we made good our crest, and there below us across the wadi went the enemy in a long cloud of dust, legging it back as quickly as he could. Then on our left we saw from the crest what we could not see from our trenches, the reason why. The 53rd Division was advancing on the hill in attack formation and the sight of it was enough for the Turk. Soon our horses were sent up for us, and then it was that our intense joy at being relieved was so greatly damped by the news of the sad fate which had befallen so many of our friends in gallant " B " Squadron. It was a red letter day for the Middlesex Yeomanry when,

Digitized by Google

on October 30th, on the eve of the attack on Beersheba, the Commander-in-Chief himself found time to motor over to Shellal to congratulate the regiment in person."

The plan for holding Pt. 630 was therefore made a complete success by the great gallantry of " C " Sqn. Middlesex Yeo. The Turks, in hugely superior numbers, failed in thirteen hours to establish themselves on the hill; 53rd Div., according to programme, took over the ridge about 17.00 hours, and the Turks retired to their defensive positions. The railway construction and other arrangements for the coming offensive continued practically undisturbed.

There are many lessons to be learned from this operation.

Extension Southwards (Plate VI).

The extension southwards began on October 22nd, with Anzac Div. leading, 2nd A.L.H. Bde. moved to Esani and I.C.C. Bde. to near Mà el Mallaka. Thenceforward the work of water development was carried on at high pressure by night and day. Tracks were improved and marked. The bulk of the work, which was very heavy, fell on the two brigades mentioned above, and upon the 1st and 2nd Field Sqns. Australian Engineers.

Anzac Div. and Ausdiv reached Asluj and Khalasa respectively by night marches. During the movement, the left flank was picketed by day and night to afford protection from the direction of Beersheba, but the enemy took no steps to interfere. A hostile detachment was reported eighteen miles south-east of Asluj on October 23rd, but a regiment of 2nd A.L.H. Bde., sent after them, learnt that they had retired.

The leading of a night march in such country is most difficult. The country was sandy and broken up by small watercourses made by the last year's rains. Colonel Preston gives two photographs of the country traversed, in his book, " The Desert Mounted Corps," facing page 20. The maps gave no indication whatever of the ground; at night no tracks could be seen, and the marches were conducted by compass and the stars.

Preparatory Dispositions.

By the evening of October 30th, all arrangements were complete and Descorps was disposed as follows:

Asluj	.. ..	Anzac Div. and Descorps Headquarters.
Khalasa	.. ..	Ausdiv.
Esani .	.. ..	7th Mtd. Bde.
Shellal.	.. ..	Yeodiv (in G.H.Q. reserve).
North of Shellal	..	I.C.C. Bde (under G.O.C. XXth Corps).

The operations of Descorps were to be of a decisive nature, and the C.-in-C. would doubtless have employed all his available mounted troops

Digitized by Google

in the attack from the east had it been possible; but on the edge of the desert it was impossible to water the whole corps; under these circumstances it was wise to remove Yeodiv and the I.C.C. Bde. completely from Descorps, as it permitted the Corps Commander and his staff to devote their entire energies to their main task.

Capture of Beersheba.

Task of the Corps.

The task of Descorps was to attack the town of Beersheba from the north-east and east, while XXth Corps attacked the main trenches protecting it on the south-west and west.

The objects of Descorps attack were:

(*a*) To assist XXth Corps by threatening the enemy's rear, pinning down his reserves and, generally, by throwing him off his balance.

(*b*) To prevent the enemy retreating deliberately and destroying the water supply.

Comments on G.H.Q. Plan.

The attack of Descorps was intended to embarrass the enemy before the infantry attack, which was expected to take place about 09.00 hours on October 31st.

The main feature of the C.-in-C.'s plan was the co-operation of the Cavalry Corps with the attacking corps. To each was assigned the rôle most suited to its characteristics. The cavalry objective was well chosen, as the east and north-east of Beersheba was the enemy's weakest point; his main entrenched system did not extend farther east than Ras Ghannam; the few fortified localities to the east of Beersheba were known to be isolated from each other, and it was thought that they were not wired; the eastern flank was open and it was practically certain that little opposition would be met in the turning movement.

The approach march consisted in a night march by Anzac Div. and Ausdiv from Asluj and Khalasa respectively, commencing at 17.00 hours October 30th, at dusk. The track was most difficult to find and it had been considered unwise to reconnoitre it thoroughly. Only one track was available along the Wady el Shreikiye and Ausdiv followed on the tail of Anzac Div. The column was twenty miles long and the hills on each flank of the march were so rough that it was impossible to employ a moving flank guard.

The distance to be traversed, under these difficult conditions, by about 06.00 hours, October 31st (i.e., in a space of thirteen hours of darkness and moonlight), worked out at twenty-four miles for Anzac Div., thirty miles for Ausdiv.

Digitized by Google

As no effective flank guard could be detailed, and the march led across the front of the enemy, the transport could not be divisionalized, but had to march with brigades for safety, each brigade being made entirely responsible for its own flank protection. The presence of so much transport sandwiched between the columns of mounted troops delayed the latter very considerably.

Under the peculiarly difficult circumstances, the demand made on these two Cavalry Divisions by the C.-in-C. was a stupendous one; it is considered that such a march had never previously been attempted; the fact that it was carried out successfully proved how thoroughly the C.-in-C. understood the capacity of the arm.

On October 30th, the corps moved off from the preliminary position as follows:

(*a*) Anzac Div. from Asluj at 17.00 hours, via Wady el Shreikiye —Thaffa—Iswaiwin, with 2nd A.L.H. Bde., moving via Arara.

Objectives:

(i) Bir el Hamam—Bir Salim Abu Irgeig.

(ii) Bir el Sakati—Tel el Saba.

(iii) A position astride and across the Hebron road, facing north-west, with left flank on north side of Beersheba.

(*b*) Ausdiv from Khalasa, at 17.00 hours, following Anzac Div. as far as Iswaiwin, where the division was to halt and be prepared to act, either northwards in support of Anzac Div., or westwards towards Beersheba.

(*c*) 7th Mtd. Bde. from Esani, at 21.30 hours, to move by a circular route to the south, and reach the neighbourhood of Bir Ibn Turka. Its task, to observe the enemy's defences at Ras Ghannam, and be ready to follow up the enemy if he retired, or to co-operate with the left of Descorps or right of XXth Corps.

Narrative of Anzac Div.

The head of Anzac Div. reached Thaffa at midnight, where the 2nd A.L.H. Bde. continued straight on Arara, with objective Tel el Sakati. The remainder of Anzac Div., with N.Z.M.R. Bde. leading, turned north from Thaffa on Khasm Zanna. Turkish flares sent up from Beersheba assisted the maintenance of direction; but it was a very fine performance on the part of the General Staff and leading troops of Anzac Div. that no error of direction was made.

Digitized by Google

PLATE VII.



Digitized by Google

At 06.45 hours, October 31st, the New Zealanders had the first encounter with Turks about Iswaiwin. These were driven off, and the brigade concentrated about Khasm Zanna and sent reconnaissances forward. Advanced troops of 2nd A.L.H. Bde. could be seen well on, moving towards Tel el Sakaty.

The view from Khasm Zanna towards Beersheba was perfect. South of the Wady Saba, which ran through Bir el Hamman and past Tel el Saba to Beersheba, a flat open plain stretched from Beersheba for six miles to the south-east, towards Khasm Zanna. The plain was six miles long, from north-west to south-east, and about four miles broad, from north to south. This plain was surrounded on all sides by hills of various sizes (*see* Plate VII).

Only small groups of the enemy could be seen; but, soon after the attack by XXth Corps was seen to have begun, transport and men could be seen leaving the town by the north side.

Orders were issued to N.Z.M.R. Bde. to occupy Tel el Saba, which was now known to be strongly held, and to 2nd A.L.H. Bde. to take Tel el Sakaty as soon as possible.

One regiment of Ausdiv had meanwhile been despatched from Iswaiwin, to take up a position of observation about one mile west of Khasm Zanna, looking towards Beersheba.

At 10.00 hours, the N.Z.M.R. Bde. attacked Tel el Saba, supported by Somerset Batt. R.H.A. They moved against the position, partly along the Wady Saba and partly north of it. There was no cover except in the wady, and the place was defended by well-concealed machine guns, both on the Tel el Saba and to the north of it. The Turkish artillery nearer Beersheba fired on the attacking troops and on the Corps and Div. Headquarters and reserve brigades at Khasm Zanna, and Turkish aeroplanes also attacked the last named with bombs and machine gun fire.

The New Zealanders were reinforced on their left by one, and later by another, regiment of 1st A.L.H. Bde.; finally, 3rd A.L.H. Bde. and two H.A. Batteries from Ausdiv were sent to assist in the capture of Tel el Saba.

In the meantime, 2nd A.L.H. Bde. had taken Tel el Sakaty at 12.30 hours, and had cut the Hebron road. They met fairly heavy shell fire in their advance and took fifty prisoners and some transport. They had moved rapidly over the open ground in column of sections, at wide and irregular intervals, and suffered very little.

The attack on Tel el Saba was making way slowly, the machine guns north of the hill giving most trouble. Finally, a section of Somerset Batt. was pushed to within 800 yards of the hill, and opened on these machine guns at 1,900 yards range; the Inverness Batt. was also brought forward

Digitized by Google

to 2,300 yards from the hill, and at 13.05 hours the New Zealanders rushed the hill.

After the capture of Tel el Sakaty and Tel el Saba, all attempts to push on, on the part of the 2nd A.L.H. Bde. and N.Z.M.R. Bde., were frustrated by machine gun fire.

Narrative of Ausdiv.

Ausdiv reached Iswaiwin about 10.00 hours, on October 31st, and moved forward into reserve at Khasm Zanna, with observation posts out towards Beersheba and in touch with 7th Mtd. Bde. in the vicinity of Ras Ghannam.

At 13.30 hours, news was received that XXth Corps had taken nearly all their objectives and orders were issued by Descorps Headquarters, for 3rd A.L.H. Bde. and two Batts. R.H.A. to be placed by Ausdiv at the disposal of G.O.C. Anzac Div., who was ordered to press home the attack on Tel el Saba after thorough artillery preparation. 5th Mtd. Bde. was in Corps Reserve, and the G.O.C. Ausdiv had only the 4th A.L.H. Bde. remaining at his disposal.

By 16.00 hours, Descorps had been fighting for nine hours, and while its operations had undoubtedly weakened the enemy's hold on the main defences, west and south-west of Beersheba, and had thereby assisted XXth Corps, yet the main objective of Descorps, Beersheba, had not been taken, and Anzac Div. was unable to get on north of the Wady Saba.

Only one hour remained before dusk, and whatever could be done must be done quickly. Descorps therefore gave Ausdiv an order to take Beersheba by dusk. The G.O.C. Ausdiv had no option but to pass the order on to General Grant, Commanding 4th A.L.H. Bde.; at the same time 7th Mtd. Bde. were ordered to turn the defences of Ras Ghannam and co-operate with the attack of the 4th A.L.H. Bde.

Attack of 4th A.L.H. Brigade.

It will be remembered that Anzac Div. consisted of three brigades of mounted rifles. They had no swords. Ausdiv consisted of the 3rd and 4th A.L.H. Bdes. and 5th Mounted Bde. The last-named brigade had swords, but the two A.L.H. Bdes. had not. The Anzac Div. was content to remain a mounted rifle division, as it had proved itself of magnificent quality at mounted rifle work, and the Divisional Commander was by no means certain that it would gain anything by adopting the sword.

General Hodgson, commanding Ausdiv, did not agree. He considered that the 3rd and 4th A.L.H. Bdes. of his division were seriously handicapped for want of a sword or lance; further, he considered that the great physical strength and dash and other wonderful military qualities

Digitized by Google

of the men of the A.L.H. singled them out amongst all mounted troops as swordsmen par excellence.

Prior to the Beersheba operation, he had applied to be allowed to arm his two A.L.H. Bdes. with a sword. The Australian military authorities, quite naturally, having no experience of the weapon, were doubtful as to the wisdom of this step, and it was not sanctioned.

The two Australian Brigadiers in Ausdiv were, however, quite open-minded on the subject, and on October 26th, five days prior to the Beersheba battle, the G.O.C. Ausdiv issued the following instructions :

" (i) It is to be noticed that the country is built for mounted action, whereas any dismounted attack is handicapped for want of cover. The Divisional Commander hopes that all brigades will endeavour to profit by their knowledge of these facts.

" (ii) To manœuvre an attack mounted an *arme-blanche* weapon is necessary. The Divisional Commander suggests that the bayonet is equally as good as the sword, if used as a sword for pointing only ; it has the same moral effect as a sword, as it glitters in the sun and the difference could not be detected by the enemy.

" (iii) If used in this manner, the point only should be sharpened, to ensure that the men point instead of striking.

" (iv) The Divisional Commander suggests that the bayonet, used thus, will be more effective as an *arme-blanche* weapon than the rifle with bayonet fixed, as he fears that the latter method would render the control of the horse difficult in manœuvre, and would leave the right arm too tired to give the final thrust.

" (v) The G.O.C. directs that steps be taken at once to have the points of all bayonets sharpened by the armourers."

The value of the bayonet is perhaps over-stated, but the arms and bodies of the A.L.H. are very long indeed, and give them a tremendous reach.

At 1600 hours, when General Grant, commanding 4th A.L.H. Bde., received the order, his brigade was six miles east-south-east of Beersheba, and it would be dusk in one hour. The open plain stretched before him, magnificent galloping ground ; the enemy had been attacked from front and rear and was weakening ; success must come now and quickly, or never. All the conditions suitable for a mounted attack were present, and no other kind of attack could promise equal results.

The action taken by General Grant is described below in his official report (Ref. Plate VII) :

Digitized by Google

"At 16.00 hours on October 31st, 1917, Anzac Div. was operating to the east and north-east of Beersheba, and was pushing back the enemy down the Wadi El Saba. This division was operating dismounted, but, owing to the stiff opposition, the progress was slow and it appeared as if the town would not be taken from that direction before dark. It was essential that the place be taken quickly, as the horses had not been watered since the previous day and had made a night march of over thirty miles.

"At 16.15 hours orders were received from the G.O.C. Australian Mounted Division, and also direct instructions from the Corps Commander, for the 4th A.L.H. Brigade to attack direct on Beersheba, moving on the left of the Anzac Mounted Division, and to take the place before dark.

"The brigade was then in reserve in a valley about six miles east of Beersheba, and the horses were being fed. It was realized by the Brigadier that he would have to act quickly, as only a little over an hour of daylight remained in which to carry out the operation.

"The brigade was assembled in a valley near Hill 1280, with the exception of the 11th L.H. Regiment, which was on detached duty about two miles south-west of that position.

"Orders were sent to the 11th A.L.H. Regiment to concentrate and follow the brigade, and the brigade was ordered to saddle up and move when ready, under the Seconds in Command of Regiments, the senior to command. The Brigadier and Brigade Major, accompanied by the C.O.'s 4th and 12th Regiments, galloped forward to reconnoitre a covered way of approach for the brigade to the point of deployment, and for the direction of the attack. This was necessary, as the 3rd A.L.H. Brigade had just previously been heavily shelled in attempting to cross exposed ground.

"The brigade started about 16.30 hours and moved at the trot. Shortly afterwards two enemy planes passed over and dropped bombs and, on return, one flew low and machine-gunned Brigade Headquarters' personnel and Signal Troop, which was moving in rear of the brigade. No material damage was done beyond one horse wounded, but it somewhat delayed the establishment of communications.

"The route taken was along the wadi about quarter of a mile south of W. road, and the brigade deployed where the road crossed the 1100 contour.

"The 4th L.H. Regiment was ordered to advance on the sector from the left of A., and N.Z. Mounted Division to W. road. The 12th A.L.H. Regiment was ordered to advance on the left of the 4th L.H. Regiment; these two regiments were ordered to attack mounted, each in three successive lines, of a squadron each line. The files were at about four yards interval and 300 yards distance between squadrons. They were

Digitized by Google

ordered to charge with drawn bayonets held in the hand, as no swords were issued to these troops.

" The 11th A.L.H. Regiment was ordered to follow on in rear and act as a reserve.

" One sub-section of 4th A.M.G. Squadron was sent with each of 4th and 12th A.L.H. Regiments, and the Machine Gun Squadron, less one section, was ordered to move down the wadi and co-operate with the reserve squadron of the 12th A.L.H. Regiment, in protecting the left rear of the line from attack by the enemy, who were seen in trenches on Hill 1180.

" Both the 4th and 12th L.H. Regiments went forward at a gallop and took successive lines of trenches until reaching the wadi at Beersheba. The left flank of the 12th Regiment came under heavy machine gun fire from trenches on Hill 1180. The Machine Gun Squadron immediately opened fire on this redoubt and the Brigadier ordered Major Harrison, O.C. Notts. Battery R.H.A., which had then come up to the point of deployment, to open fire on these trenches. It was then practically dark and impossible to take distances with the range finder, but Major Harrison opened fire and found the range with his second shot, and quickly drove the Turks off the ridge.

" On it being reported that the trenches in front of the town had been taken, the 4th and 12th L.H. Regiments were ordered to push right through the town and capture as many prisoners as possible.

" This movement was carried out in a very able manner and resulted in the capture of 9 field guns, 7 ammunition limbers, 4 machine guns and about 700 prisoners.

" The 11th A.L.H. Regiment, which had arrived at the point of deployment after the battery had come into action, was moved forward together with the Notts. Battery and ' A ' Battery H.A.C. to Beersheba. On reaching that place the C.O.'s 4th and 12th Regiments reported that they had captured the place. The 11th Regiment was accordingly ordered to push through the town and hold it against any counter attack from the north-west and south-west. This was carried out and the 11th Regiment captured about 400 prisoners who were retreating from the south-west.

" The 4th and 12th Regiments were ordered to withdraw from their line and re-organize. When this was done, the 4th L.H. Regiment took up an outpost line from the Wadi El Saba to the Mosque, and the 11th Regiment from the Mosque to the Khalasa road, the 12th Regiment being held in reserve near the railway viaduct.

" The two batteries were placed in position on the bank of the wadi, south of the town, so as to co-operate in driving back any counter attack by the Turks.

Digitized by Google

" The brigade remained disposed as above until relieved by the 5th Mounted Brigade and the infantry the following morning.

" The rapidity of the mounted attack seemed to demoralize the enemy, as they mostly fired high, and it was afterwards found that the sights of their rifles were never lowered below 800 metres. The enemy artillery was also unable to estimate the pace, and the shells all went over the heads of the advancing troops.

" From the location of the enemy's trenches as shown on the accompanying sketch (i.e., Plate VII) it would appear that they were prepared for any advance down the Wadi Shaai, which would have offered a certain amount of cover while in the wadi bed, but they did not anticipate a mounted attack across the plain.

" If a dismounted attack had been made from the Wadi Shaai, it is certain that we would have suffered heavy casualties, as the trenches were very strong, and in the bends machine guns were placed to enfilade the wadi bed.

" On April 19th, 1917, at the second battle of Gaza, this brigade made a long advance on foot, with two regiments (11th and 12th) and the Machine Gun Squadron, and had 187 casualties without any satisfactory result being obtained. Here the casualties were 32 killed and 32 wounded, total 64, which is about one-third of the number sustained in the second Gaza battle, and resulted in the capture of 59 officers and 1,090 other ranks, besides 10 field guns, 5 machine guns, and a large number of vehicles, stores and animals. In addition, the enemy did not have time to destroy the water supply, which was the most important factor in the situation.

" The high percentage of killed to wounded was due to the hand-to-hand fighting against superior numbers at the trenches. The majority of the wounded fell before the trenches were reached."

The dash of this exploit was magnificent; it thoroughly confirmed the G.O.C. Ausdiv in his opinion that his two A.L.H. Bdes. were seriously handicapped for want of a sword, and he determined to continue to press this question the moment operations came to a halt. He knew that his opinion was fully shared by the C.-in-C. himself.

The writer feels sure that he is correct in saying that, from that day, the G.O.C. and all ranks of 4th A.L.H. Bde. wished to be armed with a sword. It is not known what, at this date, was the view of the G.O.C. and regimental commanders of 3rd A.L.H. Bde.

Anyhow, by this brilliant exploit with a comparatively inferior *arme blanche* weapon in hand, the 4th A.L.H. Bde. set an example of cavalry dash which raised the morale of Descorps very high, and set many brigades thinking how they could eclipse it.

Narrative of 7th Mtd. Bde.

7th Mtd. Bde. reached its appointed position north of Bir Ibn Turka

Digitized by Google

at 07.15 hours October 31st without encountering opposition, and throughout the morning maintained contact with the enemy in his works at Ras Ghannam. At 15.30 hours the brigade was ordered to turn the defences of Ras Ghannam and co-operate with 4th A.L.H. Bde. in the attack on Beersheba. Its move was somewhat delayed by flanking fire from Ras Ghannam, but it arrived at Beersheba at 18.30 hours.

General.

Until Beersheba was captured there appeared little prospect of watering more than two brigades in the area. Close to the town, however, there were found pools of surface water, caused by two thunderstorms a few days previously; these enabled the whole of the horses to be watered during the night, after being without for thirty-six hours. In Beersheba the Turks had partially destroyed five out of seven wells; the engineers worked night and day at restoring them, but the water problem gradually became more and more serious.

CHAPTER XVII.

OPERATIONS NORTH-EAST OF BEERSHEBA (Map A and Plate VI).

The capture of Beersheba laid open the left flank of the main Turkish position, the Kauwukah and Sharia works, for a decisive blow. During the next few days the rôle of Descorps was to protect the right flank of XXth Corps, while the latter corps was assembling for the main attack on Sharia and Kauwukah; water and transport difficulties were found to be greater than anticipated, and the preparations of XXth Corps were delayed.

During this period Gaza was heavily bombarded; several heavy infantry attacks, with limited objectives, were made by XXIst Corps, and Turkish reserves were drawn westwards.

The protective rôle of Descorps involved it in hard fighting in the hills north-east of Beersheba, as the enemy brought up his general reserve against the line Ras El Nukb—Tel Khuweilfeh.

Water became a great difficulty. Surface water dried up; the wells in Beersheba were not equal to the demands made upon them by both Descorps and XXth Corps, and the Turks prevented us from obtaining possession of the water supply at Khuweilfeh. For this reason it became necessary to relieve mounted brigades every twenty-four hours. The country is mountainous and so stony as to be in many places impassable for horses.

November 1st.—On November 1st Ausdiv was withdrawn into reserve, and Anzac Div. was ordered to occupy the line Bir El Makrune—Toweil Abu Jerwal. This line was reached after considerable opposition, 179 prisoners and four machine guns being captured. The I.C.C. Bde. and 53rd Div. came up to the line Toweil Abu Jerwal—Kh. El Muweileh.

Digitized by Google

November 2nd.—On November 2nd the 2nd A.L.H. Bde. and 7th Mtd. Bde. were ordered to occupy El Dhahariyeh and the area Tel Khuweilfeh—Ain Kohleh respectively. They were unable to do so, but by nightfall had reached the line Bir El Nettar—Deir El Hawa—Ras El Nukb—thence a straight line south-west to within one mile of Toweil Abu Jerwal, where the I.C.C. Bde., now under Descorps, joined with 53rd Division; the salient at Ras El Nukb was taken by 7th Mtd. Bde.

Succeeding Days.—During the succeeding four days, November 3rd to 6th, little or no change occurred in the line held by the mounted troops.

The Bir Makrune area was occupied continuously by 2nd A.L.H. Bde., who were unable to find sufficient water in pools in the wadis south of Dhahariyeh. The enemy were found to be firmly entrenched in front of Dhahariyeh. Patrols were able to work round his left flank, but attempts to force him to withdraw were not successful. One patrol reached a point near the Hebron road two miles north-east of Dhahariyeh, whence three lorry loads of enemy troops were seen moving into the village.

The Ras El Nukb line was held successively by 7th Mtd., 1st A.L.H., 5th Mtd., New Zealand, and I.C.C. Bdes., all operating under G.O.C. Anzac Div. The enemy launched counter attacks against 5th Mtd., New Zealand, and I.C.C. Bdes., which were repulsed with considerable loss. The severe fighting and great difficulties in getting water, were having a serious effect upon the mounted troops, especially in view of the coming operations. Anzac Div. suffered 250 casualties in personnel and 345 in horses, but captured 330 prisoners and five machine guns.

53rd Division came under orders of G.O.C. Descorps and succeeded after hard fighting in taking Tel Khuweilfeh on November 6th. The enemy delivered several determined counter attacks with strong forces against this division, which behaved with great gallantry and caused the enemy very heavy losses.

On November 4th Ausdiv was sent back to Karm on account of water difficulties andrelieved Yeodiv in the rôle of protecting the Karm—Shellal railway by filling the gap between the left of XXth Corps at Bir El Girheir and the right of XXIst Corps which was thrown back to near the junction of the Wadis Ghuzze and Sharia (due south of Gaza).

On November 6th Yeodiv arrived in the forward area and took over from the right of 74th Division, the right division of XXth Corps, two miles south-west of Ain Kohleh, in order to free the latter to move into its position of deployment facing west. The horses of Yeodiv were sent back to Beersheba to water.

On the evening of November 6th, as a result of the successful attack by XXth Corps on the Kauwukah works, Descorps was required to take up the pursuit and to occupy Bir Jemameh and Huj. A detachment for the defence of the right flank of the Army was therefore formed under Major-General Barrow, G.O.C. Yeodiv, consisting of I.C.C. Bde., 53rd

Digitized by Google

Div., Yeodiv, N.Z.M.R. Bde. and two squadrons and eight machine guns of 2nd A.L.H. Bde.

By the night of November 7th-8th, in spite of several counter attacks, Yeodiv had forced its way to one and a half miles north-east of Kh. Mujeidilat, and remained in occupation there, waiting for 53rd Div. to drive the enemy north of Tel Khuweilfeh, but owing to Yeodiv being required to rejoin Descorps in the main pursuit up the Philistine Plain, the operation was broken off and Yeodiv marched to Tel El Sharia.

The Main Attack of XXth Corps on the Sharia—Kauwukah—Hareira Works.

On November 6th, 74th, 60th and 10th Divs., from the south-east, attacked the system of trenches and redoubts covering Sharia and Kh. Kauwukah. Stubborn resistance was encountered, but our artillery bombardment was overwhelming and the wire was well cut. 74th Div. stormed all positions east of the railway by 15.15 hours, and moved to the high ground near Tel El Sharia (near the railway bridge over the big Wadi Sharia).

60th Div. attacked the Kauwukah system and broke through after two hours' sharp fighting and, about 15.15 hours, occupied Sharia station where the railway crosses the Wadi Sharia; but Tel El Sharia still held out.

The main stroke of the C.-in-C.'s operations had been a complete success. The moment for cavalry exploitation had arrived; if the entire Descorps had been assembled behind 74th and 60th Divs. at 16.00 hours on November 6th, it is considered that the enemy could not have prevented them pushing north along the railway from Tel El Sharia to Tel El Nejila on the Wady Hesi.

But the cavalry were not there. Descorps commander and staff were at Beersheba, preparing to hand over command of the operations in the hills about Tel Khuweilfeh; Yeodiv was in action dismounted about Ain Kohleh and, operating during November 7th and 8th in the mountains north of Tel Khuweilfeh, did not become available for pursuit in the Philistine Plain until November 8th, and by then had a long way to catch up. Anzac Div. was endeavouring to disengage its brigades from the fighting in the mountains, and at 13.00 hours on November 6th received orders to march, relieve Yeodiv on the right of XXth Corps, and be prepared to pursue next day. Anazc Div. did not complete the relief until 03.15 hours on November 7th.

Ausdiv was stretched from Bir El Girheir to nine miles W.N.W. of it, covering the Karm—Shellal railway.

Digitized by Google

During the afternoon, as soon as the main attack had succeeded, Descorps was ordered to take up the pursuit and occupy Bir Jemameh and Huj.

Ausdiv received orders at 16.00 hours to march to Bir Imleih and bovouac there, leaving 3rd A.L.H. Bde. to cover the Karm—Shellal railway. During the night at Bir Imleih, orders were received for Ausdiv to march at 02.00 hours on November 7th via Abu Irgeig to just south-west of Tel El Sharia. By 07.30 hours the whole division was concentrated in this position of readiness close to Descorps Headquarters.

Descorps was therefore in a position at 07.30 hours on November 7th, about fifteen hours after the moment of XXth Corps success, to take up the pursuit. Ausdiv was complete, but much tired after an eighteen mile night march. Anzac Div. was not complete. The whole of the N.Z.M.R. Bde., two squadrons and eight machine guns of 2nd A.L.H. Bde. and Somerset Batt. R.H.A. were still absent. This Div., like Ausdiv, had been on the move all night and was also tired. 7th Mtd. Bde. arrived after a night march from Karm.

Out of eleven brigades of Descorps, only six were present for the exploitation, and these toed the mark twelve hours late, and were not fresh.

To all concerned this result brought bitter disappointment. After years of disappointment in France, it really looked as if, at last, a real smashing example of cavalry exploitation was to be given to the world. The ideal to be attained would require that Descorps, entire, rested and in the best possible condition, should be assembled close behind the "softest" spot at the moment of success of the main infantry attack. All that they could then ask was that the direction in which they were launched and the objectives given to them should be the most suitable.

The C.-in-C. was, and is to-day, the greatest believer in the power of mounted troops to exploit the success of the other arms. His mounted troops comprised a quarter of his force. His original plan was deliberately framed to include cavalry exploitation as its final decisive act. He knew, better than anyone else in the force, that cavalry exploitation, to attain its best, demanded perfect timing, maximum numbers, and that the troops should be fresh. None of these conditions were attained. It is clear that at least one factor which affected the situation was insuperable; owing to shortage of water, it was impossible to assemble the whole cavalry corps fit and rested at the correct place and time. Further, his decision to continue with his decisive attack from the south-east against Sharia and Kauwukah, when the Karm—Shellal railway was so exposed to counter-offensive, and while the heavy counter-attacks were threatening Beersheba from the north-east, was a most daring decision; and it is only to be greatly regretted that the mounted troops could not, apparently, be relieved earlier than they were from their protective rôles on both flanks of XXth Corps.

Digitized by Google

Pursuit from Sharia.

Descorps on November 7th consisted of Ausdiv, Anzac Div., and 60th Div. The orders to the corps for November 7th were to push as rapidly as possible to the line Bir Jemameh—Huj, with a view to cutting off or pursuing the Gaza garrison. The enemy, however, succeeded in organizing a rearguard which resisted strongly.

(*a*) 60th Div. drove them from Tel El Sharia about 06.00 hours and advanced to a maximum distance of two miles to the north of the big Wady Sharia.

(*b*) Anzac Div. was detailed as advanced guard to Descorps, and given as first objective Kh. Umm Ameidat to a point two miles west of it, and ordered to send reconnaissances on Tel El Nejile and Bir Jemameh.

Anzac Div. marched at 06.25 hours, in the dark, and moved at a fast pace on Ameidat Station. Hostile shell fire came from both flanks, persistent though not heavy.

Ameidat Station was taken at 11.00 hours, with 400 prisoners, a very large ammunition dump and a hospital.

1st A.L.H. Bde. pushed out patrols to the east, to Tel El Nejile and towards Jemameh. The Turks, however, were holding Tel Abu Dilakh strongly, and shell fire was directed on the brigade from that place, as well as from east and west.

At 12.30 hours came news of the evacuation of Gaza, and orders to push on to Jemameh. At this time the 1st A.L.H. Bde. were fighting heavily close to Tel Abu Dilakh, and were held up just east of it. They were also engaged in the direction of Tel El Nejile, and a small right flank guard was opposed to Turks about El Henu. The Brigadier had only two squadrons in hand. The 2nd A.L.H. Bde. (less two squadrons and eight machine guns) alone remained as a reserve for the Divisional Commander. There was no sign of Ausdiv on the left or of any troops coming up in support. However, in view of the report that columns of all arms were retreating north from Gaza, the G.O.C. ordered forward the 2nd A.L.H. Bde. to attack Tel Abu Dilakh, shortly after 15.00 hours. The brigade advanced, with regiments in line of troop columns, covered by the fire of Ayrshire and Inverness Batts., and galloped straight at the hill. They met a very hot shell fire, and for part of the way rifle fire as well; but the casualties were slight. As the brigade came on, the Turks holding the hill went hurriedly back, and the lower slopes were taken. The hill was cut up by small wadys. The brigade left their horses under cover, and pushed on and, by 16.40 hours, took the hill. The Turks held the ridges behind in strength, and the brigade could not get farther forward.

The two reserve squadrons of 1st A.L.H. Bde. were the only troops remaining in Anzac Div. available for any further action. The Div. was

Digitized by Google

quite out of touch with the rest of Descorps and it was growing dark, so the Divisional Commander decided to hold his position during the night and push for Jemameh at dawn. The Div. had been almost continuously engaged since October 31st; there had been practically no sleep the previous night; and there was a limit even to the endurance of the Australians and New Zealanders of Anzac Div.

2nd A.L.H. Bde. pushed on 1,000 yards beyond Tel Abu Dilakh after dark, but were then stopped by Turks in sangars and rifle pits.

After dark touch was gained with Ausdiv south-west of Tel Abu Dilakh.

(*c*) Ausdiv had concentrated at 07.30 hours in a valley three miles S.S.W. of Tel El Sharia. When it was seen that 60th Div. were unable to drive the enemy from the long ridge on the north side of the Wady Sharia at Tel El Sharia, Descorps ordered Ausdiv to clear the enemy from the front of 60th Div., in order to enable the infantry to concentrate for a further advance. The line of advance of Ausdiv should probably have been directed further north than it was; as it turned out, instead of turning the left flank of the enemy, the 4th A.L.H. and 5th Mtd. Bdes. of Ausdiv struck the enemy's front, and met with no greater success than 60th Div. It was not until nearly dusk that Ausdiv was disengaged, when rapid progress was made past the enemy's left flank. 5th Mtd. Bde. drew swords and cantered out into the open, but darkness fell before they were able to close with the enemy.

Descorps bivouacked for the night behind battle outposts on the general line Railway north of Tel El Muleiha—Tel Abu Dilakh—Tel El Sharia. On this day very few troops of the corps obtained water.

November 8th.

The object of the operations on November 8th was to cut off the enemy who had now evacuated Gaza; El Atawineh redoubt, well to the south, still held out and it was thought that they, at least, could not escape us. XXIst Corps was pursuing north along the coast from Gaza with the Imperial Service Cavalry Bde. and 52nd and 75th Divs. The XXth Corps halted.

The objectives of Descorps were:

(*a*) Anzac Div., with 7th Mtd. Bde. attached—Bir Jemameh, thence towards Bureir.

(*b*) Ausdiv—Huj and to the east of it.

(*c*) 60th Div.—Huj.

Anzac Div. was to endeavour to keep in advance of Ausdiv, so as to outflank opposition.

Digitized by Google

Anzac Div.

1st A.L.H. Bde. occupied Tel El Nejile shortly after dawn, and reported that considerable bodies of Turks could be seen moving north. 2nd A.L.H. Bde. became hotly engaged west of Tel Abu Dilakh with a hostile flank-guard. Both these A.L.H. Bdes. advanced on Bir Jemaineh, and by 08.45 hours were strongly opposed. 7th Mtd. Bde. was put in between them and some progress was made. At 13.00 hours the Turks were apparently reinforced and counter-attacked heavily against the left of 7th Mtd. Bde. The 1st A.L.H. Bde. came up on the west, and drove back the Turks. Jemameh was captured about 15.45 hours, but fighting continued until dark. The Div. established a night outpost line covering Tel El Nejile and Bir Jemameh. Nearly all the horses were watered during the night; some had been fifty-six hours without a drink. During this day Anzac Div. took 240 prisoners, four guns and much material, and the Turks lost heavily in their attacks; but the Turks held their own, and progress at this pace certainly did not hold out much promise of big results.

60th Div. advanced rapidly, and, after driving the enemy with great dash from three successive rearguard positions, were finally strongly held up and heavily shelled, with 2,500 yards of open slopes to cross to reach the enemy's last rearguard position covering Huj.

Ausdiv advanced at 04.00 hours, with 3rd A.L.H. Bde. on the right, and 5th Mtd. Bde. on the left. 4th A.L.H. Bde. were not available, being held in corps reserve ready to march at 07.30 hours.

3rd A.L.H. Bde. met opposition throughout the day. They carried out the tactics of mounted riflemen most excellently, and met with great success, taking many prisoners and fifteen guns.

5th Mtd. Bde. advanced between 3rd A.L.H. Bde. and 60th Div. They were in comparatively close touch with 60th Div. throughout the day. After midday it became apparent that the 60th Div. were pushing the Turk rearguard quicker than they liked, and their resistance began to stiffen, while a considerably increased gunfire was now hampering the advance. The following account is written from the report of a senior officer present at the time:

"About 14.00 hours, the enemy were holding a ridge near Huj in considerable strength in front of 60th Div., whose leading lines were 2,000-3,000 distant, with absolutely bare ground in between. The enemy were also putting over a lot of shrapnel, and an infantry attack on this position would probably have been a slow and costly proposition. General Shea, commanding 60th Div., and himself a cavalry soldier, rode to a small hill on the flank of his division to make a personal reconnaissance and there met Lieut.-Colonel Cheape, commanding the Warwickshire Yeo., to whom he suggested that the cavalry might endeavour to turn the hostile position and silence the guns which were inflicting casualties on the infantry.

Digitized by Google

" Lieut.-Colonel Cheape had one and a half squadrons Warwickshire Yeo. with him and at once decided to make a mounted attack; and Major Wiggin, who was in command of one and a half squadrons of the Worcester Yeo., close at hand, agreed to co-operate. . . . A messenger was immediately despatched to inform the G.O.C. 5th Mtd. Bde. of what was happening, but did not arrive in time to enable the Gloucestershire Yeo. to be moved up soon enough to be of any assistance. Unfortunately the attack could not hope for support either from machine guns or Hotchkiss rifles. The previous night, when 5th Mtd. Bde. had cantered out in the dusk to try and make a mounted attack, the Brigade Commander had considered that the situation promised no scope for fire support, and therefore ordered the Machine Gun Squadron and all the pack horses, including the Hotchkiss rifles, to remain behind and find water. They failed to find water during the night, whereas the brigade did so. After dawn they were sent with guides to the place where the rest of the brigade had watered, with orders to rejoin as soon as possible. They had not rejoined at 14.00 hours, when they were most urgently required.

" (*See* Plate VIII). From the south-west end of Ridge A, position marked (1), the hostile guns could not be seen, but were apparently firing from about 1,200-1,500 yards away, behind a small crest. Ridge A appeared to offer a covered approach for a flank attack, and accordingly the Warwickshire and Worcestershire Yeo. moved round in line of troop columns under its shelter to position (2), from where it was seen that a hostile battery was in action at position (3), about 900-1,000 yards distant, with open ground in between.

" The dust raised by this movement had drawn the attention of the enemy, and he swung two guns round to counter the attack. Fortunately he was rather rattled and his shooting was erratic and little harm was done. A halt was made for a moment at position (2), but the force came immediately under a heavy rifle fire from hostile infantry on ridge C, about 600 yards away.

" The leading squadron of Worcestershire Yeo., under Major Albright, was at once ordered to form ' half squadrons ' and to charge this position; the order was rapidly carried out, the enemy ceasing fire and retreating, leaving a good many men on the ground, killed by the sword. This squadron had been told not to pursue, as the guns were their real objective. The half-squadron formation was adopted because the frontage to be attacked was small, and numbers were very limited.

" Captain Valintine's squadron of Warwickshire Yeo. now formed column of half-squadrons, extended and went straight for the guns, coming under a hail of shell fire, rifle and machine gun bullets immediately they topped the ridge A. They were closely supported, slightly in echelon, by the remaining two troops of Worcestershire Yeo., under Lieut. Edwards.

Digitized by Google

" The distance was about 800-1,000 yards down a steep slope and up the other side, with the last 100-150 yards very steep indeed. Major Albright had quickly and gallantly rallied and reformed his squadron

PLATE VIII.



Digitized by Google

and came on in echelon a moment later, the combined attack being completely successful, sweeping over the guns and reaching the top of the ridge in rear of them. The enemy, however, continued firing his guns, machine guns and rifles and casualties were heavy. Most of the officers were casualties and it was impossible to organize a pursuit, so that many escaped who should have been captured, had any body of organized supporting troops been available.

" Just before position (2) had been reached, Turkish guns were seen retreating along the road to the north ; Lieut.-Colonel Cheape took the remaining two troops of Warwickshire Yeo. with him in order to intercept them ; this he successfully accomplished, taking a complete battery of 5.9 in. howitzers.

" A large number of Turks were killed with the sword, and the captures amounted to one battery of 5.9 in. howitzers ; one Austrian F.A. Batt., served by Austrian gunners, who fought to the last ; one Mountain Batt., abandoned by its personnel on Ridge C ; four machine guns, which did much damage ; and about seventy prisoners."

Colonel Preston gives two battalions of infantry as composing the Turkish rear guard, besides the guns and machine guns.

Our casualties were very heavy, partly owing to the unavoidable lack of any fire support. Out of 170 horses which took part in the charge, 100 were killed, i.e., 60 per cent. of horses. Out of about 12 officers, the 3 leaders, Albright, Valintine and Edwards were all killed ; 6 other officers were wounded ; casualties in officers, 75 per cent. Out of 158 men, 26 were killed, 40 wounded ; casualties in men 42 per cent.

The operation was complete in a few minutes, and the 60th Div. marched into Huj without further casualties ; if the infantry had had to continue the attack across such open ground, their casualties would almost certainly have been very heavy indeed.

This operation by a small force is a wonderful example of the power of the mounted attack to gain a rapid decision ; and in a pursuit of this nature " time " is the one thing which must be denied to the retreating enemy.

Comments on the Pursuit of November 7th and 8th.

By the evening of November 8th it was apparent that the indirect pursuit of Descorps had in great part failed ; the Gaza garrison and some of the garrisons of the works east of Gaza had made good their escape. Henceforward the pursuit by Descorps would be direct and consequently only limited success could now be expected.

There were various factors which appear to have affected the result :

(*a*) During the two vital days, November 7th and 8th, Descorps was comparatively weak ; Yeodiv, the N.Z.M.R. Bde. of Anzac Div. and the

Digitized by Google

I.C.C. Bde. were absent from the main operation, forming part of the right flank guard in the hills about Tel Khuweilfeh.

(*b*) The direction in which Descorps was launched, i.e., on Bir Jemameh—Huj, did not result in the pursuit being of a very "indirect" nature. Rearguards and flank guards, put out by the Turkish forces retiring from Sharia, Hareira, etc., were met at every mile. It is probable that nearly all this resistance might have been avoided if the whole of Descorps had been directed north along the railway to Tel El Nejile and thence across towards the sea near El Mejdel.

It is quite certain that the C.-in-C. realized better than anyone else that, within reason, the more "indirect" the pursuit, the greater would be the results; in fact, the instructions originally issued to Descorps, before the capture of Beersheba, enjoined that men and horses were to be kept as fresh as possible for the second and principal stage of their operations, in which their rôle would be to pass round the enemy's left and establish the corps about Tel El Nejile—Wady Hesi. It is presumed, therefore, that it was considered, in the light of later knowledge, that an advance by such a large force via Tel El Nejile was rendered impossible by the impracticability of supplying it; further, it is presumed that the Intelligence Branch of the G.S. at G.H.Q. considered that sufficient water could not be found east of Bir Jemameh and Huj.

(*c*) It is questionable as to whether the inclusion of a division of all arms in a Cavalry Corps is liable to interfere with the activity of the cavalry. 60th Div. could not hope to move fast enough to make an indirect pursuit, and necessarily had to be directed straight on Huj. Assuming that it was possible for the two mounted divisions of Descorps to pursue "indirectly" via Tel El Nejile, the Corps Commander would have had considerable difficulty in controlling them and, at the same time, the 60th Div. advancing in quite a different direction.

(*d*) Lastly, the writer considers that the corps was severely handicapped by the fact that four out of the six pursuing mounted brigades were mounted riflemen and not cavalrymen. The 5th and 7th. Mtd. Bdes. had swords, and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th A.L.H. Bdes. had not. The writer is firmly of opinion that the Australian Light Horse and New Zealand Mounted Rifles have no superiors in the world as offensive fighters, but in such an operation as this pursuit they were severely handicapped for want of an *arme blanche* weapon. The tactics of mounted rifles in pursuit necessitate turning movements, which are comparatively slow. The sword permits a far more direct line of attack and brings quick decisions.

With the conditions as they were on November 7th and 8th, the writer considers that, if all six pursuing brigades had had swords, the whole mounted portion of the corps could have been directed in depth

Digitized by Google

on a narrow front, and the results would have been very different. If each of the six brigades had been able to bring off a mounted attack, as the 5th Mtd. Bde. were able, the Turkish retreat would have been converted into complete rout.

It has been stated previously that General Grant, commanding 4th A.L.H. Bde., became a confirmed believer in the power of the sword at the time of his brilliant mounted attack at Beersheba.

The events of November 8th, on which day the 3rd A.L.H. Bde. fought all day with great success, converted General Wilson, commanding 3rd A.L.H. Bde, to the same opinion.

He wrote the following over a year later, just after his own brigade had at last been armed with the sword.

"From my subsequent experience of the use of the sword, I consider it would have been invaluable here (*Note*, i.e., on November 8th, 1917). If we had had swords, I am sure we could have ridden on and captured thousands; as it was, we stood off and shot hundreds only."

And again he writes:—

"One of the chief values of the sword is the spirit of progress that it inculcates in the carrier. He does not allow himself to be bluffed by slight opposition. He rides on feeling that he has a weapon in his hand, and in nineteen times out of twenty, finds the opposition only a bluff. With mounted riflemen, on the other hand, his only course is to make wide turning movements to induce the opposition to retire, or to dismount and try and shift it by fire action. This all means time, or uncertainty, which is exactly what the enemy wants. . . . Dealing with a pursuing foe, as we were in the Beersheba—Jerusalem operations, in November, 1917. . . . There are numerous cases in these operations where the sword would have been . . . invaluable. Take the operations about Huj, in November, 1917. With my late experience I can see what we could have done with the sword there. We were in touch with large bodies of the enemy, somewhat disorganized, retreating, but still armed. We had no swords and could only deal with them by fire action. Their line was too broad to outflank. The regiments engaged them at a distance and, when practicable, raced in and cut out guns and transport. They inflicted casualties and took prisoners, but did nothing really big. If they had had swords I am now confidant from my late experiences that they would have made wholesale captures. It is not reasonable to expect mounted riflemen to charge positions mounted, it is only bluff, and if the enemy stood to it the charge could end in failure only. Such bluffs, I know, have come off, but we cannot always expect to be lucky."

CHAPTER XVIII.

November 9th.—Orders were now issued for direct pursuit by as many troops as could be supplied in front of railhead.

Digitized by Google

Descorps, with Anzac Div., Ausdiv, Yeodiv and I.C.C. Bde. (the two last-named formations having rejoined from the Eastern flank), took up the pursuit, supported by the 52nd and 75th Divs. of XXIst Corps. The objective was Junction Station.

It was obvious from the reports of the R.F.C., who throughout the 7th and 8th attacked the retreating columns with bombs and machine gun fire, that the enemy was retiring in considerable disorganization, and could offer no very serious resistance if pressed with determination.

Anzac Div., which had watered during the night November 8th-9th, alone made any progress. Ausdiv, of which the largest proportion had not watered since 18.00 hours, November 6th, struggled all through the night November 8th-9th, and during the 9th, trying to find water between Huj and Jemameh. Men and horses were rapidly growing exhausted. Yeodiv reached Huj, but was unable to proceed further, owing to water and supply difficulties.

Anzac Div. (with 7th. Mtd. Bde. attached in place of N.Z.M.R. Bde., which had not rejoined from the eastern flank), pushed on through Bureir and Simsin to El Mejdel. Meeting shell-fire at first, the pursuit became more rapid as the day went on, the Turks being greatly demoralized by their rapid retreat and for want of water.

At Kaukaba, just north of El Huleikat, a large number of prisoners were taken. In the village was a great mass of transport, the animals still in the shafts, either dead or dying from thirst and fatigue. By nightfall the 1st and 2nd A.L.H. Bdes. reached Esdud and Suafir el Sharkiye respectively. The Turks in their retreat had left material, rifles and ammunition scattered all over the country; the Arabs and villagers were looting everything, and there was not time to deal with them. Prisoners were in a bad way, suffering from exhaustion, want of water and dysentery.

The brigades of Anzac Div. were also badly in want of both water and forage. The wells in the villages were deep (100 to 200 feet deep) and of small capacity; the Turks in passing had cut all the well ropes, and thrown them and the buckets into the wells. The watering was much hampered by the inhabitants, who, mad with thirst themselves, rushed the nose bags as they were drawn to the surface. The horses were almost unmanageable; when they saw water they threw themselves on their knees, and upset as much as they drank.

November 10th and 11th.—Anzac Div. most cleverly seized the bridge at Jisr Esdud and formed a bridge head there. The water question had now become so acute, that the division was compelled to halt. During these two days, November 9th and 10th, Anzac Div. had done splendid work and captured 1,000 prisoners and 16 guns.

Digitized by Google

52nd and 75th Divs. of XXIst Corps arrived on the line Suafir el Sharkiye—Esdud on the evening of November 10th, and took over the defence of those places.

On November 11th, 1st A.L.H. Bde. drove the enemy from the banks of the Wady Sukerier and occupied Tel el Murre.

Ausdiv marched from Huj on the evening of November 9th, and found good water at Tel el Hesi; reaching Arak el Menshiye, they gained contact with Anzac Div. to the west. Well organized opposition was encountered on the line Zeita—Summeil. After considerable fighting the division, on the evening of November 11th, were in possession of the line Zeita—Berkusie—El Jeladiyah; they connected with the right of 75th Div. at the last-named place.

Yeodiv left Huj early on November 10th, and followed Ausdiv. On November 11th they moved across to El Mejdel.

Operations on the 10th and 11th showed a stiffening of the enemy's resistance on the general line of the Wady Sukerier, with centre about El Kustine; the original Hebron group prolonged the enemy's line to about Beit Jibrin; this group appears to have been reinforced from the north, and consisted of IIIrd and XVth Turkish Corps. It was obvious to G.H.Q. that the hostile forces opposed to us on this line were no longer only rearguards, but that all the remainder of the Turkish Army which could be induced to fight was making a last effort to arrest our pursuit south of the important Junction Station.

November 12th was spent in preparations for the attack which was ordered for November 13th. Yeodiv relieved Anzac Div., and co-operated in a preliminary attack made on Burka by 52nd Div.

Ausdiv made preparations for its rôle of the following day, which was to protect the right of the attack, and draw the enemy's attention upon itself. The division was extended on a front of eleven miles, from Arak el Menshiye, through Balin to El Jeladiyeh. About 13.00 hours, the enemy suddenly flung a force of about 5,000 men against this line. These troops came by train and march route from the direction of Junction Station, and attacked through Balin on Summeil. The attack fell chiefly on 5th Mtd. Bde., which suffered heavily and, at one time, was almost surrounded. They were extricated, however, and the attack was held, and finally died away. There is reason to believe that this counter-attack was directed by Marshal von Falkenhayn in person. Ausdiv bivouacked for the night on the line Arak el Menshiye—Summeil—El Jeladiyeh, and this heavy Turkish counter-attack had no effect whatever on the situation.

November 13th.—The situation on the morning of November 13th was that the enemy had strung out his force (amounting probably to no more than 20,000 rifles), on a front of twenty miles, on the line Beit Jibrin—. Berkusie—Tel El Turmus—Katrah—El Mughar—Zernuka—El Kubeibe,

Digitized by Google

The attack was to be made with the primary object of cutting the Jerusalem—Jaffa railway. XXIst Corps (75th and 52nd Divs.) advanced with its right on the Gaza—Junction Station road, protected on that flank by Ausdiv, and with its left on the line Beshshit—Sidun.

Descorps (less Ausdiv) was to operate on the left of XXIst Corps, with objective the railway from a point due west of Sidun to Naane. Yeodiv led with I.C.C. Bde. attached. Anzac Div. was to follow Yeodiv closely, either to support them or to move through them to the final objective.

Narrative of the Battle.

75th Div. had a good deal of trouble with the Turks about El Mesmiye. The place was finally stormed from the south, and the division took 292 prisoners and seven machine guns. It also captured Yasur and pushed back Turkish rearguards towards Junction Station.

52nd Div. had launched several assaults the previous day, before Burka was taken late in the afternoon. On 13th the enemy continued to fight stubbornly and severe opposition was met on the Katrah—El Mughar line. The attack against the south end of El Mughar (*see* Plate IX.) had to cross over 4,000 yards of open ground swept by heavy shell and machine gun fire, and was held up, with its left in the Wady Jamus at Y.12 central. The Divisional Commander thereupon requested Yeodiv to assist on the left.

Yeodiv.—The following account is extracted from the official report on the action of Yeodiv (Ref. Plate IX.):

"By 12.30 p.m. 8th Mounted Brigade were in possession of Yebnah. 6th Mounted Brigade Hd. Qrs. and the Brigade, less the Bucks Hussars and Berks Battery R.H.A., assembled between Yebnah and Tel El Murre. The Bucks Hussars, less one squadron, and supported by the Berks R.H.A., were advancing via Beshshit into the Wady Jamus. One squadron had entered Yebnah from the east, co-operating with the 8th Mounted Brigade.

"Brigadier-General Godwin commanding 6th Mtd. Bde. was called to the telephone and told verbally that the infantry attack was held up, and that the 6th Mounted Brigade were to advance and take El Mughar.

"At 12.45 p.m., just as the brigade was moving off, and the Brigadier moving forward to reconnoitre a line of approach, this verbal message was confirmed by the following telegram:

"'I.C.C. Brigade will move on El Kubeibeh and Zernuka with the object of covering the left of our further advance on Akir, leaving half battalion in Yebnah until relieved by infantry. This half battalion will then become Divisional Reserve. When Zernuka is occupied I.C.C. Brigade will co-operate with the attack on Akir. 6th Mounted Brigade to move on El Mughar. 22nd Mounted Brigade to move east to a point midway between El Mughar and Zernuka and after the occupation of these places

Digitized by Google

PLAN OF POSITION AT EL MUGHAR.

Scale. 2 inches to 1 mile.
— 1000 yard Squares —



PLATE IX.

Digitized by Google

by us will advance to the attack on Akir. 8th Mounted Brigade will form up one mile east of Yebnah and come into Divisional Reserve.'

" *Reconnaissance.*

" Advancing through Squares W. 32-33, 6th Mtd. Brigade Headquarters joined the Headquarters of the Bucks Hussars in the Wady Jamus W.34. The Berks Battery was in position in Y.4.d., shelling El Mughar and the ridge beyond.

" Lieut.-Colonel Hon. F. Cripps, commanding the Bucks Hussars, had been in communication with the C.O. of the infantry battalion of 52nd Div. on the right, who were also in the wady further to the east, their left being about Y.12 central. The Bucks Hussars were employed in pushing mounted patrols forward towards the position.

" The Dorset Yeomanry, Berks Yeomanry and the 6th Mounted Brigade Field Ambulance were halted in a depression, out of sight, about Square W.33.d and Y.3.d.

" The Brigadier reconnoitred the position, and Lieut. Perkins, Bucks Hussars, was sent forward to the Wady Shellal el Ghor to ascertain the cover there. He carried out a very good reconnaissance under very dangerous circumstances, as he became the focus of every description of fire from the ridge.

" Captain Patron, commanding the 17th Machine Gun Squadron, did the same, with a view to getting a position for covering the advance of the Brigade with concentrated machine gun fire.

" *Preliminary Movements and Orders.*

" (*a*) It was decided to bring the Dorset Yeomanry at once into the Wady Jamus and they trickled by squadrons into the wady in Squares W.34.b. and d.

" The wady is a narrow ravine, difficult to enter and emerge from, and broad enough to take a single rank of horses and men only. It afforded, however, excellent cover. The Dorsets came under rifle and shell fire while entering the wady.

" (*b*) Commanding officers were assembled and verbal orders issued to the effect that :

" ' The Bucks Hussars would attack the ridge just north of El Mughar village, and the Dorset Yeomanry the hill on the left of the Bucks. Both attacks to start simultaneously at 3 p.m. and to be carried out mounted. Regiments were ordered to advance in column of squadrons extended to about five paces. The artillery to open intense covering fire from their position in Y.4.d.

Digitized by Google

"'Each regiment had two machine guns attached; the remainder, under Captain Patron, were to cover the advance from positions he had reconnoitred in the Wady Jamus and in advance of it from the right flank in the Shellal el Ghor, near Khurbet Hebra.

"'The conformation of the ground aided this plan, as fire could be brought to bear for the longest time possible before being masked by the advancing troops.

"'The Berks Yeomanry were to be kept in support, but were to push forward into the Wady Jamus directly the Bucks Hussars had vacated it.'

"(*c*) While these orders were being given out a message was received from the 52nd Division suggesting that a flanking movement by the cavalry to the north of El Mughar would enable the infantry to advance. A reply was sent to the effect that the brigade would advance at 3 p.m.

"(*d*) The orders were issued at 2.30 p.m., which left half an hour for the battery to register certain points, and the Commanding Officers to issue their own orders.

"*The Mounted Attack.*

"(*a*) Punctually at 3 p.m. the Bucks Hussars, in column of squadrons extended to four yards interval, advanced at a trot directed on the ridge immediately north-east of El Mughar village.

"The distance was 3,000 yards, swept by rifle and machine gun fire, and sprinkled with shells. The pace at the commencement was the trot, the last 1,000 yards being covered at a hard gallop.

"At the foot of the hills Captain Bulteel, M.C. (B Squadron) leading, drew swords and charged. Captain the Hon. Neil Primrose, M.C. (C Squadron) came up on his right.

"On reaching the summit the Turks in some instances threw down their arms, but a number retired, and finding the weakness of the cavalry, came back and got into the knolls on the flanks, and a fire fight ensued at close range. This prevented the succeeding squadrons from moving straight on, and Captain Primrose's squadron was attacked on his left flank. Captain Bulteel was now across the ridge and down on the eastern side, and putting a machine gun and Hotchkiss barrage on to the rear of the village. Captured Turkish machine guns were used for this purpose.

Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google

← Brig.-General
C. A. C. GODWIN,
C.M.G., D.S.O

MUGHAR,
th November,
1917.

Royal Buck-
amshire Hussars
ing the Wadi
harge the Ridge.

From the painting by T. C. Dugdale in the possession of Lord Parmoor, P.C., K.C.V.O.

Digitized by Google

" Captain Lawson (A Squadron) arrived from Yebnah and consolidated the position, and with his support the remainder of the ridge was finally taken.

" (*b*) The Dorset Yeomanry advanced on the left of the Bucks according to plan. They had 4,000 yards to go and arrived at the foot of the hills with their horses much exhausted. Captain Dammers (A Squadron) dismounted (*see* plan) and fought his way on to the crest on foot. His led horses suffered heavy losses, whilst those of the other two squadrons, which remained mounted, were much less.

" The remaining two squadrons, Major Gordon, M.C. (C Squadron) on the right and Major Wingfield-Digby (B Squadron) in the centre, led by Lieut.-Colonel Sir R. Baker, Bart., formed line on the left of the Bucks, and galloped their objective.

" *Action of Reserves.*

" The Dorsets and Bucks having gained their objectives, the Berks Yeomanry, headed by Brigade Hd. Qrs., crossed the Wady Jamus and reached the Wady Shellal el Ghor in W.36.b., where they came under machine gun fire from the village and cactus hedges west of it. Before proceeding further it was necessary to clear the village, which was carried out successfully by two squadrons of the Berks dismounted.

" The remaining squadron pursued the enemy into the plain beyond, rounding up stragglers.

" *Machine Guns and R.H.A.*

" The machine guns attached to regiments moved with them. They arrived on the crest very shortly after the charge and quickly came into action against the retreating stragglers. The six guns furnishing the covering fire under Captain Patron were most effective. They pushed forward as soon as the troops advanced, and fired on distant targets from the summit of the ridge.

" The Berks Battery R.H.A. supported with excellent and accurate fire, shooting 200 rounds at ranges from 3,200-3,500 yards during the charge.

" *Subsequent Action.*

" At 4 p.m. the following message was received from Divisional Hd. Qrs. :

" ' 52nd Division unable to make progress. Co-operate and turn Mughar from the north.'

Digitized by Google

" This message was timed 2.45 p.m. and the operation ordered had been carried out by the time of receipt.

" Mughar village was not completely cleared until 5.30 p.m., the enemy hiding in the houses and hedges.

" In the meantime 22nd Mounted Brigade had advanced on the left of 6th Mounted Brigade, and commenced an attack on Akir, which did not develop owing to a Turkish counter-attack on their left.

" The position was consolidated and patrols pushed forward and the Brigade bivouacked on the position for the night.

" *Results.*

" The total number of prisoners handed over to the A.P.M. were: 18 officers, 1,078 other ranks; 14 machine guns and 2 field guns were also captured.

" Undoubtedly a larger number of prisoners could have been taken had not the finishing gallop up the hill completely exhausted the horses, added to which, the steep descent on the eastern side was most difficult.

" The casualties in the 6th Mounted Brigade were as under:

	Officers.		Other Ranks.		Missing.
	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	
Brigade Hd. Qrs. ..	–	–	–	1	–
Bucks Hussars ..	–	3	6	44	1
Dorset Yeomanry ..	–	3	8	42	–
Berks Yeomanry ..	1	–	–	7	–
17th M.G. Squadron .	–	–	1	10	–
Field Ambulance ..	–	–	–	3	–
Berks R.H.A. ..	–	–	–	–	–
	1	6	15	107	1

" Animals: Horses 265, mules 2, killed and wounded.

" *Remarks.*

" (*a*) This action is a good example of what can be effected by mounted troops, moving rapidly in extended formation.

" (*b*) The value of personal reconnaissance on the part of all commanders, from the Brigadier downwards, is clearly shown. The objectives were pointed out on the ground.

" (*c*) The skill and enterprise shown by the officer commanding Bucks Hussars, in pushing forward into the Wady Jamus

Digitized by Google

and in initiating reconnaissances from there, prepared the way most efficiently for the subsequent attack.

" (*d*) Machine guns played a large part, as is narrated above. The use of the captured Turkish machine guns is worthy of special notice. They prevented the enemy from escaping from El Mughar village and from launching a counter-attack against the right of our position.

" Their action also contributed to the subsequent capture of the village with small losses, since they took in reverse the hostile positions in the cactus hedges on the north and north-west faces."

To the north of El Mughar the enemy was strongly posted at Zernuka and El Kubeibe, which places were not occupied till early on November 14th.

On the 14th, 22nd Mtd. Bde. drove the enemy from Akir and Naane and the railway was destroyed as ordered. A railway guard of three officers, sixty-nine other ranks and one machine gun were captured. Touch was established with 52nd Div. on the right and with Anzac Div. on the left.

Anzac Div., which had two brigades only, reached by midday November 14th the outskirts of Ramleh, in touch with Yeodiv, and the ridges about Khurbet Surafend. The N.Z.M.R. Bde. on the left were heavily counter-attacked, the enemy approaching within bombing distance. The New Zealanders completely repulsed him with a bayonet charge and he retired in disorder and with heavy loss. Unfortunately no mobile reserve was at hand to pursue.

On November 15th.

(*a*) Ausdiv, on the right of XXIst Corps, advanced three and a half miles east of Junction Station towards Latron.

(*b*) Yeodiv, with I.C.C. Bde. attached, found the enemy strongly posted at Abu Shusheh, a high rocky hill covered with boulders. After a stout resistance, including a determined counter-attack against our right, the enemy was driven from the hills by 6th and 22nd Mtd. Bdes. and retired on Latron in disorder, leaving 360 prisoners in our hands; 400 dead were counted on the field. The main feature of this operation was once again a mounted attack by the 6th Mtd. Bde. This mounted attack at Abu Shusheh is considered by some authorities to have been a more brilliant exploit even than the charge of the same brigade at El Mughar, owing to the fact that the rocky hills up which the charge was made appear impassable for horses except at a walk.

Digitized by Google

(*c*) 1st A.L.H. Bde. of Anzac Div. seized Ramleh and afterwards Ludd, taking 360 prisoners, and carried out railway demolition north of the town, as ordered.

November 16th.

On November 16th the line was pushed forward to Latron (the mouth of the pass being still in the enemy's hands)—El Kubab—Ludd—El Yahudie—Jaffa. Jaffa was occupied by the New Zealanders at noon without opposition.

The Turks had by now broken into two distinct masses, widely separated by the physical formation of the country. The Eighth Army (XXth and XXIInd Corps), consisting of four damaged and one fresh division, retired into the Plain of Sharon behind the Nahr El Auja, a river about thirty yards broad. This Army was based on the railway running down from the north. The remnants of the Seventh Army (IIIrd and XVth Corps), consisting of six shattered divisions and the 3rd Cav. Div., were based on Jerusalem and the road running north from there. The Junction Station—Jerusalem railway was of no value to them, as it ended in a cul-de-sac at the last-named place.

The only means of effective lateral communications between these two Armies was by road to the north, a circuitous route of seventy-five miles.

The C.-in-C. decided to contain the Eighth Turkish Army, to attack the Seventh Turkish Army and occupy Jerusalem.

The decision to march into the mountains marks the conclusion of the great pursuit. Our mounted troops had been marching and fighting continuously since October 31st, and had advanced a distance of seventy-five miles in a straight line from Asluj to Jaffa.

Descorps had captured 5,720 prisoners, more than sixty guns and about fifty machine guns. The enemy had lost altogether about 11,000 prisoners and 100 guns, approximately one quarter of his force; he had been thoroughly defeated and was in a very broken condition. He had, however, managed to avoid complete annihilation, and had now reached comparative safety; our advance through the mountains to Jerusalem must necessarily be slow, for these narrow passes have seldom been forced and have proved fatal to many invaders. The winter rains had set in, and our troops were forty miles in front of railhead.

All ranks of Descorps were disappointed that they had failed to annihilate the enemy. The suitability of the country and the demoralized condition of the enemy gave promise of such a result. Various factors, however, combined to defeat our object. If it had been possible to direct the whole corps on one suitable line of advance, and employ its whole weight in depth in a series of mounted attacks, it is considered that the enemy's rearguards could have been overwhelmed and that the corps

Digitized by Google



Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google

could have reached vital points on the enemy's line of retreat. The extraordinary success of the various mounted attacks made during the pursuit by the Yeomanry showed clearly the value of this form of attack, and the writer, as stated earlier, considers that the corps was severely handicapped by the fact that half the mounted troops were not armed with the sword or lance.

The main handicap, however, was the lack of water in very hot weather. It was necessary to split up the formations on wide fronts, so that each unit could have a village well to itself and arrange its own watering. Lieut.-Colonel Preston ("The Desert Mounted Corps") tells of one occasion where large numbers of horses were eighty-four hours without water, and brigades frequently went without for forty-eight hours. Under these conditions it was impossible to assemble a really large force of cavalry for a decisive blow; and the enemy's rearguards had only to deal with cavalry spread right across the plain, and comparatively weak everywhere.

(*To be continued.*)

Digitized by Google

THE CO-OPERATION OF ARMOURED CARS WITH CAVALRY

By MAJOR A. J. CLIFTON, O.B.E., *The Durham Light Infantry.*

(*Continued.*)

CO-OPERATION WITH CAVALRY.

The value of close association between different arms which have to work together is so well appreciated that it appears to be superfluous to refer to it here. So important is it, however, that it is felt attention must again be drawn to it. Although the general functions of cavalry and of armoured cars resemble each other, the methods employed by both to obtain the same ends vary considerably. They have, therefore, much to learn from each other, consequently every facility should be afforded them to gain the requisite knowledge of their respective characteristics and functions. Considerable benefit would accrue if the two arms were always quartered together, but even if this cannot be done in peace time, it is essential, before combined operations are undertaken, that they should be given ample opportunity to train together. One of the chief points on which cavalry need to be clear is the kind of ground over which they can expect armoured cars to accompany them. Nothing definite can be laid down about this, as much depends on the particular type of car and the varying conditions of ground in different places. This information can best be gained by demonstrations carried out with the actual cars attached to the force over typical ground likely to be met with in the theatre of operations. These demonstrations are also useful to enable the cavalry to report reliably on the suitability of localities for the employment of armoured cars.

Armoured cars working with cavalry have two main rôles: (1) By working in close co-operation, to enable the cavalry to retain their mobility as long as possible, and when they are forced to dismount to enable them to regain their mobility in the shortest possible time; (2) When possible, to relieve cavalry of tasks which entail extensive movement, thus economizing in personnel and saving horse flesh.

With regard to (2), such operations may consist of wide flanking movements, long distance reconnaissances, patrols, raids, etc., when

Digitized by Google

circumstances render armoured cars suitable for undertaking these missions alone. In these cases the cavalry commander would issue orders to the armoured cars, arrange for communications between the cars and the main force during the operation, and take such steps as may be necessary to secure vulnerable points in the rear of the cars or establish supporting points on to which the cars could fall back. The carrying out of the mission would then be left to the commander of the armoured cars. Therefore it is not proposed to make any further reference to these operations.

With regard to (1), the general principle of the action of armoured cars should be, during an advance, to locate and push back slight opposition before the cavalry approach, or should the opposition be too serious for the cars themselves to deal with, to locate and transmit definite information regarding the enemy's dispositions and to seize and hold favourable ground while the cavalry are deploying.

The cars assisting in an attack should endeavour to get astride, penetrate, or outflank the enemy's position, or to precede the attacking troops as long as possible, thus closely harassing the enemy to enable the attacking troops to gain close quarters in the shortest possible time. The cars must be prepared to take immediate advantage of a success or should the attack be unsuccessful they must make every effort to enable the cavalry to fall back unharassed. In rear-guard actions the armoured cars should be the last troops to retire. These different operations will be discussed in more detail later.

As soon as orders are received for operations in which cavalry and armoured cars are co-operating, and, whenever possible, at the commencement of different phases of an operation, it is important that the commanders of the units concerned should fully discuss the situation and all contingencies which can be foreseen, as in operations of this nature situations arise rapidly and opportunities are often fleeting. Arrangements for constant intercommunication are of first importance and must be carefully provided for, also the distance the cars are to work ahead of the cavalry. If the cars work too far ahead the cavalry may be robbed of their support should the enemy allow the cars to pass without disclosing their dispositions, or they may be unable to exploit situations created by the cars. On the other hand, if the cars work too close they will not be able to carry out their functions properly. This distance must be regulated according to the nature of the country, the character and armament of the enemy and the general situation.

In an advance the object should be to have armoured cars sufficiently ahead of the cavalry to enable the former to examine all ground within distant rifle range of the leading cavalry, or, where the cars cannot completely cover the front, they should form a point for the centre of the advance, and be in a position to assist with fire patrols working on

Digitized by Google

the flanks. The cars should move by bounds at their own pace, halting at the completion of each bound to avoid gaining too much distance from the troops they are covering. The bounds should be from one well defined feature to another, or to other points from which observation and field of fire can be obtained.

A central signal station should be established at the head of the cavalry, with which the cars should gain touch at each halt. This can be done either by signal or by despatch rider. The cars must also keep touch with patrols working on their flanks within the range of their machine guns, and be prepared to assist them with fire if necessary.

It is the duty of the armoured car commander to keep the cavalry commander fully informed of the progress of events, and the latter must take steps to assist in the rapid transmission of information, both from and to the cars.

It may frequently happen, however, particularly when the enemy's main forces are approached, that the armoured cars may find themselves confronted with situations which must be dealt with without hesitation, and when time will not permit of any detailed information being sent back. To ensure that no opportunities are lost, in these cases, a simple code should be decided upon and the cavalry commander must make arrangements to ensure that he is in a position to act, guided only by the slight indications of the situation he receives from the code signals and the action of the cars. It might be remarked in passing that, owing to the difficulty of sending any signals from an enclosed car of the present type when in close contact with the enemy, and to the tight corners in which boldly handled cars may, at a moment's notice, find themselves, there is a great tendency for the armoured car commander to omit to pass on any information at such times. So important is it that this should be done that special stress should be laid on this point at the preliminary conference.

Should an advance take place over difficult ground, which it has not been possible to reconnoitre beforehand, the advance may be delayed, or the cars may be unable to carry out their protective functions effectively, while they find routes for themselves.

In these cases, if the circumstances are such that the assistance of the cars at the head of the column is likely to be required, the cars should advance as far as they can without difficulty, when a portion should take up a suitable covering position while the remainder seek for passable ground ahead. The cavalry patrols would then make a bound forward through the cars, covered by the guns of those in position, the cars advancing and regaining their forward positions as soon as possible. Assistance in crossing heavy ground should be given by the cavalry if required. If a succession of obstacles present themselves, when the advance will necessarily be slowed up, it should consist of a series of

Digitized by Google

bounds alternately led by the armoured cars and the cavalry patrols' each in turn occupying covering and observation positions.

Reconnaissance.

In combined reconnaissance the armoured cars may be used (*a*) to assist in gaining information; (*b*) with the supporting troops; (*c*) to act as a pivot of operation for other patrols; (*d*) to assist in the transmission of information.

With regard to (*a*), the cars may be given a definite sector to reconnoitre, or such tasks as examining villages, roads or close country where ordinary patrols work at a disadvantage, or they may work in close co-operation with other patrols.

In the latter case the general procedure would be as described above, the cars examining as many points as possible and covering other patrols while they examine places the cars cannot actually reach. The cars will be of special value in circumstances where ordinary patrols would be liable to be hung up continually by the enemy's patrol or screen.

In some cases it may be desirable for the cars to observe the usual reconnaissance maxim of seeing without being seen, when they would exercise caution in movement, utilizing ground to cover their advance, move slowly to avoid raising dust, and halt under cover to observe. Unless, however, secrecy is essential, the gaining of information will be speeded up if they push on to doubtful places without hesitation, attacking at once should these points be occupied. The cavalry should be informed before the cars push forward if such moves are likely to be productive of important results, to enable the other patrols to dispose themselves suitably for gaining information during the diversion so caused. In the close tactical reconnaissance the cars should endeavour to penetrate the enemy's line or, by making vigorous thrusts at different points, force him to reveal more of his dispositions than the action of ordinary patrols would necessitate. The cavalry patrols should take advantage of these demonstrations to cover their own movements or work round the enemy's flank or rear; or the cavalry may demonstrate in front while the cars work round the flank. The position of the enemy's artillery may sometimes be located by cavalry patrols first establishing themselves in suitable observation points, after which the cars would show themselves and endeavour to draw fire.

With regard to (*b*), the cars may be used with the supporting troops when the general conditions render them unsuitable for assisting in gaining information, as, for example, when it is desired to obtain information without disclosing the presence of our own troops and the country will not permit of the cars moving secretly. In these cases supporting troops are required to form rallying points should our patrols

Digitized by Google

be pushed back, but it is necessary that the supports are kept well to the rear, to avoid their attracting attention. As the cars can move more rapidly than cavalry they can be kept farther to the rear than cavalry supports, but to ensure that they can be brought up immediately they are required arrangements must be made to keep in constant touch with the patrols.

Armoured cars may be used as in (*c*) to economize in other troops when a reconnaissance operation involves the seizing of a vulnerable point, such as a bridge, which would have to be held throughout the operation. They may be used as in (*d*), when information has to be sent a considerable distance by a route which would be liable to interference by the enemy.

Advanced Guards.

Armoured cars will, as a rule, be most usefully employed with the vanguard. Acting by similar methods to those described in the paragraph on reconnaissance, an advance will be subject to fewer checks, and early and accurate information of the enemy's dispositions when he is met in force will be gained. When it becomes necessary to deploy the main guard, the cars will be of the greatest value in assisting to seize favourable ground, holding ground already gained and in forcing the enemy to disclose his dispositions. When the advance guard has deployed, all or a portion of the armoured cars should be collected and directed against the enemy's flank or rear.

Should it be wished to avoid a decisive encounter the armoured cars will be a valuable adjunct to the cavalry in harassing and delaying the enemy, and obtaining information of his dispositions without getting involved in an engagement which cannot be broken off when desired.

Rear Guards.

It is in rear-guard actions, perhaps, that armoured cars are most valuable. Normally it will be possible, by previous reconnaissance, to guard against the possibilities of obstructed roads and damaged bridges and doubts as to cars being able to cross ground over which the operation will take place, these factors constituting the main disadvantages to their use on other occasions.

The armoured cars will usually form the rear party of the rear-guard. When the force is marching, not actually in touch with the enemy, the cars would follow the column in bounds, taking care that the distance between them and the rear of the column is not great enough to allow the enemy to interpose himself. They should keep in touch with any cavalry patrols which may be working on their flank and be ready to support them if required or assist to clear up anything suspicious which may be observed.

Digitized by Google

When in touch with the enemy the cars must, when practicable, be the last troops to retire, and every effort should be made to ensure that they are able to give maximum support to the rear portions of the mounted troops at the moment it is necessary for them to get back to their horses. Their action at this juncture should consist of a local counter-attack, using "moving fire" with the object of diverting the enemy's attention from the retiring cavalry. As the cars can break off an action with comparative ease, and retire rapidly, while still being able to maintain fairly effective fire, they must endeavour to remain closely in touch with the enemy and delay his advance for the maximum time.

Should it be found that the enemy concentrates his efforts on putting the cars out of action, as would probably happen if the armoured cars were constantly in evidence, it may be advisable to keep them well to the rear, while the successive positions are being held by the other troops, only pushing them forward when the time arrives to withdraw the mounted troops. The cars would then be pushed forward through the rearmost troops, and, having executed a diversion to facilitate the withdrawal of the latter, they would again move to a covered position in the rear.

An important duty of the armoured cars, in a rear-guard action, would be to assist to note the movements of the enemy's troops, and, as they normally will be the last troops to retire, their information is likely to be of the utmost value, so arrangements must be made to ensure the information so gained being passed on without delay.

Demolitions may be carried out by the armoured cars' personnel or the cars may be detailed to cover demolition parties.

The Battle.

As regards cavalry, a battle may consist of an encounter between our independent cavalry and the enemy's independent cavalry, or it may be a general engagement in which all arms participate. In both cases the preliminary phase will necessitate close tactical reconnaissance, and the co-operation of armoured cars will greatly assist in obtaining accurate information speedily. In the former case, opportunities for shock action are more likely to present themselves than later on. Therefore, as the armoured cars are able to assist materially to create opportunities for this form of attack, it is essential, once the opposing forces get into touch, that the closest co-operation should be maintained between the two arms, to ensure that, should suitable occasions arise, full advantage can be taken of them.

To support the mounted attack the armoured cars should operate, if the ground permits, on the opposite flank to the horse artillery and machine guns, and move forward, employing "moving fire" with the

Digitized by Google

cavalry, care being taken that they do not interfere with the movements of our cavalry, either by their fire or by the cars themselves. If the ground is not suitable for the cars to accompany the charge, they should be pushed out as far to the flank and forward as possible, to enable them to bring enfilade fire to bear on the opposing forces till the actual moment of impact.

Should the enemy refuse the attack, or be driven back, the cars must endeavour to head the enemy off from his most favourable line of retreat. During the mêlée the armoured cars must keep a sharp look out for the approach of enemy reinforcements and be prepared to cover our own troops should the attack fail.

Even if the fight opens with dismounted action the cars must make every effort to close with the enemy immediately, with the object of causing such confusion in his line that a mounted attack by our cavalry will be feasible.

When opposed to dismounted cavalry the armoured cars must endeavour, either by penetrating the enemy's line or outflanking him, to reach the enemy's horses. When possible, a section or sections should be specially detailed to do this. They should also endeavour to embarrass the enemy's horse artillery to the utmost.

In the preliminary phases of the general engagement of all arms the duties of the protective cavalry will be greatly facilitated by the co-operation of armoured cars. The screen will be strengthened and, if sufficient cars are available, it may be possible to reduce considerably the number of cavalry employed on this duty.

In any case the mobility of the cars will enable the screen to be extended, thus increasing the difficulty of the enemy in locating the actual dispositions of our own forces.

The close tactical reconnaissance, as before remarked, will be speeded up to a great extent.

On the approach of the main opposing forces, when the mounted troops will have to clear the front, ample scope will present itself for the cars attached to them, in assisting to watch flanks and operate against the enemy's flank. Armoured cars will also be of assistance to the cavalry detailed to the reserve to keep them in touch with the general progress of the fight.

In the pursuit, in conjunction with cavalry, the main duties of the armoured cars are to overcome machine-gun fire, continually to harass all efforts on the enemy's part to form a rear-guard, endeavour by rapid pursuit to prevent the enemy carrying out demolitions intended to impede progress and to keep in close touch with the enemy, so that our cavalry may be constantly informed of his movements.

In the defence the armoured cars will usefully augment the cavalry detailed for reconnaissance, holding temporary points in front of the

Digitized by Google

1. Rear Guard consisting of two Squadrons 30th Lancers with Rolls-Royce Cars of 1st Armoured Motor Brigade covering retirement after the destruction of Khwaja Banda, Indian Frontier, September, 1916.



2. The mobile portion of a frontier post garrison.

Digitized by Google

A Suggested Design for British Shrapnel Helmet by R. Caton Woodville.

Digitized by Google

main position, the formation of the screen or operations intended to harass the enemy and deceive him as to the actual location of our line. In these duties considerable saving in horseflesh can be effected if the armoured cars undertake those tasks which involve covering the greatest distances.



Digitized by Google

HELMETS.



A FORMER officer of the Royal North Devon Hussars, the famous battle painter Richard Caton Woodville, was the designer from historical data of the becoming and serviceable uniforms of the Egyptian Army at the time of its reconstitution in 1882. He has contributed our illustrations of modern and antique helmets and has created an artistic design as a suggestion for an improved British shrapnel helmet which is based upon mediæval and Seventeenth Century models.

In the pattern suggested it will be seen that the ridge on the crown of the helm, which is a feature in the *bascinet* (A.D. 1200—1430) is developed into the comb similar to that of the Fifteenth Century



closed helmet (*armet*) and open helmet (*salade* or safety helm) which latter was forged from one piece of iron. Similarly the modern helmet would be pressed out in one piece and thus the comb would entail no extra work while increasing resistance to falling splinters and blows. It has been found in practice that no brazed or jointed steel will stand the impact of projectiles. Charles I. at Naseby wore a helmet shaped like a Cavalier's hat and provided with a *nazal* or nose guard; such a form with its rectangular joints is fundamentally weak.

In the suggested pattern the pointed *umbril* or peak is similar to that of the *burgonet* of 1550, typical of Cromwell's Ironsides, also of

Digitized by Google

Soldiers Headpieces or "War Hats"

Modern



German 1916.- 1921.



French 1916 1921.



British 1916. - 1921.

Ancient.

Italian Cabasset French 1580-1620.



British Pikeman's 1620 - 1650.

British 1300-1400 War-Hat or Chapeau de Fer.



Casquetel Italian 1250-1350.



Swiss Casque 1500-1580



Morion 1550-1600



German Salade 1450.

R. Caton Woodville. 1920.

Digitized by Google

the closed helmet (*armet*) of that period and of some casques of earlier date. The side is cut away to give the eye a clear field and at the same time the cheek is protected as also the neck without causing inconvenience in the prone firing position. The rivets are to hold the lining in place and it is desirable that the helmet should shift on its lining when struck by a projectile because if there is no "give" a frequent result is fracture of bone.



Chapel-de-fer 1516, resembling our Shrapnel Helmet of 1916.

The British shrapnel helmet of 1916 resembles the *chapel-de-fer* or *war hat* (to use the early Anglo-Saxon name) of Morion form, of the Sixteenth Century, but misses its best features, including the ridge on the crown; it is made of tougher metal than Continental helmets and, being a war expedient, was shaped without regard to artistic effect. It is easily dented by accidental pressure, which necessitates renewal.

The shrapnel helmet has come to stay and we would therefore urge that its shape should be improved both for practical and ornamental purposes.

Digitized by Google

THE CAVALRY COCKED HAT.

By EDWARD FRASER.*

THE British Regular Army has been in existence for just two hundred and sixty-one years—since 1660, the Restoration of Charles II. For a hundred and forty years of that time the cocked hat was the cavalry regulation head-dress for all ranks of the heavy cavalry establishment—from 1670 to 1811. For the first ninety years, from 1670 to 1760, it was worn by every cavalry regiment in the service, heavy and light, except, between 1706 and 1760, the Scots Greys, and, from 1680, the Horse



No. 1.

Grenadier troops attached to the Life Guards, whose parade head-dress was the conical cloth grenadier cap. But, even with these corps, cocked hats were worn in place of the grenadier cap at certain drills and exercises, and for "walking out" off duty; each trooper having a cocked hat supplied periodically as well as his grenadier cap. From 1760 to 1811 only the Life Guards and the heavy cavalry, i.e., dragoon regiments, wore cocked hats. Horse Grenadiers ceased to exist in 1788,

* Author of "The War Drama of the Eagles."

Digitized by Google

and about the same time cocked hats ceased apparently to be supplied to the Scots Greys, making them exclusively a grenadier-capped corps. The light dragoon regiments, which came in about 1760 and were added to in number within the next twenty years by the conversion to "light" of several dragoon regiments, never wore cocked hats. A special light dragoon helmet was their distinctive head-dress from the first. The cocked hat ceased to be worn by the Household Cavalry and "heavies" after 1811. It remained the head-dress of General and Staff Officers and certain departmental officers to the present time, and of Household Cavalry and Dragoon Guards officers, for levées and ceremonial functions, till comparatively recently.

The cocked hat originally appeared as a felt, or beaver, broad-brimmed round hat, with one side caught up and attached to the crown. That was about 1770, soon after Monmouth, Charles II's natural son, became Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief of the Army, in succession to the Duke of Albemarle. From its originator the loop up of soldiers' hats at one side was commonly known as "the Monmouth cock."

Before 1670, for the first ten years after the Restoration, the cavalry all wore a broad, flat-brimmed, low-crowned beaver, felt, or leather round hat, which replaced the high-crowned leather hat worn by troopers of the "New Model Army" during the later Commonwealth period. A close-fitting metal skull cap was usually worn, on active service, fixed inside the crown of the Monmouth pattern of hat. Officers' hats were decorated with an ostrich plume round the crown. The men's hats had ribbons round the crown with a bow in front, of the colour of the facings,



No. 2.

or coat linings, according to regiments and the preference of the colonels of the various corps. To add to the decorative effect the brim of the hat was in most regiments bound or trimmed round with gold or silver braid for officers and yellow or white tape for other ranks.

The hat, cocked on one side, continued the universal wear throughout the army for about twenty years, until a few months after the Revolution of 1688. As a rule, after 1684, the heavy cavalry regiments—

Digitized by Google

the Life Guards and regiments of "Horse" (represented nowadays by the Dragoon Guards)—wore plumes, both officers and troopers. Officers and men of the line cavalry, the dragoon regiments, had no feathers in their hats, but wore distinctive ribbons of the colour of the regimental facings. All hats were laced or braided round the edge of the brims as before.

On the accession of William III the Dutch cavalry fashion of cocking the hat on two sides came in. That style held for some ten or twelve years, until, early in Queen Anne's reign, at the period of Marlborough's first campaigns, the regular three-cornered form of cocked hat was adopted all through the service for all arms. All that had to be done was to turn up the rear flap and fasten it back to the crown, folding the other two flaps to meet in front. The edges of the brims of officers' hats had a narrow feather border along them in most cases.

The three sides, as turned up, were of equal width, or depth, at first, until after 1706, when the fashion of indenting the front corner or angle of the hat into a spout-like shallow curve was adopted. It came into vogue just after the Battle of Ramillies, and was called from that event the "Ramillies cock." The "Ramillies cock" had a vogue of some thirty



No. 3.

years. Our association with the foreigners of the German Imperial Army, under Prince Eugene, during Marlborough's campaigns brought about a fashion of an enlarged cocked hat, during the latter part of Anne's reign, especially in the cavalry. The big hat was known everywhere by the name of its first wearer, as the "Khevenhuller hat," from the celebrated

Digitized by Google

Austrian General of the time, Count Ludwig Khevenhuller. He is commemorated in an old verse thus :

" When Anna ruled and Khevenhuller fought,
The hat its title from the hero caught."

With the arrival of George I, Hanoverian and Prussian tailoring modes were introduced into the British service. Among other changes, the cocked hat was reduced somewhat in size, after the Prussian model, though its outline shape remained much as before. At the same time the black leather Hanoverian cockade replaced the former ribbon bow. The cockade was worn on the left side flap of the hat. It became usual also, under George II, after 1730, to wear the hat tilted, sometimes forwards over the brows, sometimes on the back of the head, that largely depended on the colonel's fancy in individual regiments. Feathers and feather trimming round the edge had ceased to be worn after Marlborough's time, the Household Cavalry being the last to wear these adornments.

The comparatively small George I style of cocked hat was the usual wear to about 1751. During this period the " Ramillies cock " got smaller and its curve more and more shallow, until it practically disappeared. It was revived in much the same form as originally, however, after 1743, after the Battle of Dettingen, being known then as the " Dettingen cock." Most regiments had the curve or dip—or " spout," as it was



No. 4.

commonly called—in front, but some wore it at one side, with the black Hanoverian cockade on the side flap, the turn-up opposite. Colonels were allowed mostly to follow their own devices in such matters in those days.

About 1755 the old " Khevenhuller " came back for another ten or twelve years of life, as the cavalry hat for Horse and Dragoons. It had

Digitized by Google

six inches of brim, turned up steeply and quite concealing the crown of the hat. The new "light dragoon" regiments, then first raised, wore a quaintly shaped helmet. Light dragoons never wore cocked hats. One or two regiments serving in Germany between 1760 and 1763, it would seem, adopted a sort of two-cock hat, worn cross-wise to the front, the front turn-up being bulged, or doubled outwards, as it were, or folded forward, in the centre. Probably the fashion did not last long, however, after their return to England, at the end of the Seven Years' War.

Next, French cocked hat fashions had a run in England. The visit of a special Ambassador, the Comte de Nivernois, in 1766, with a military suite, all wearing very small cocked hats, recently adopted in France, gave the cue over here it would appear. The name "Nivernois" indeed was given to the hat in the service, though not officially. The flaps were



No. 5.

fastened back to a shallow crown and stiffened with wire. The "Dettingen cock" in front now disappeared finally and the front corner aperture, where the two side flaps met, was practically entirely closed up. In some regiments, the colonels who in those days provided the clothing annually from a special Government grant, adopted a hat smaller than the regulation size; this was doubtless, in some cases, for the sake of smartness of effect, though perhaps other motives had to do with it, colonels being permitted to put in their own pockets what cash profit they could make out of their clothing contracts.

General Inspection Returns, preserved at the Public Record Office, contain entries calling the attention of the authorities to the irregularity in size of the hats. Gold or silver lace round edges of the hat brims for

Digitized by Google

officers, and yellow or white braid for the men's hats, was regulation during the earlier part of George III's reign, to about 1785.

In that year, following again the lead of the French Army tricks, a two-sided species of cocked hat was adopted for the heavy cavalry of the Household Troops and dragoon regiments. There was some idea of adopting a four-cornered hat, which some French regiments wore between 1775 and 1778, but it did not materialize. The two-cornered hat was worn cross-wise, the near side being turned straight up, set on the head in line with the shoulders. At first without lace edging or braid, in 1787, gold or silver lace for officers and yellow or white tape for the men, of a narrow width, was added. In 1790 a tall red and white upright feather, or plume, fastened on the front face of the hat with a metal socket or clip, followed. Tassels of gold or silver gimp decorated the tips of the cocked hat at the ends. The 1787 hat also was worn with the front side bulged out in the centre over the wearer's forehead, as in the cocked hats of thirty years before, and tilted to one side over the left eyebrow. The bulge disappeared before 1796, when the hat became plain and flat-sided front and back. That form it kept to the end of 1812, when the cocked hat ceased to appear on the heads of our cavalry men.

The illustrations are drawn from specimens in the R.U.S.I. Museum.

No. 1. Officer's Head-dress. King's Dragoon Guards, 1687.

No. 2. Officer's Hat (the "Dettingen Cock.") Universal pattern 1740—1760.

No. 3. Trooper's Cocked Hats. Royal Horse Guards, 1785—1810.

No. 4. Officer's Cocked Hat. 1st Life Guards, 1800.

No. 5. Officer's Cocked Hat. Levée Dress. The Carabiniers, 1830.

IMPORTANT.

The Staff of the JOURNAL is very limited, and it is therefore necessary for all who obtain the JOURNAL direct from the Managing Editor to report any alteration of rank or address immediately, as it is impossible at the present time to follow up the Stations of Units or of individuals. Such changes of address must be received at least fourteen days before publication.

Digitized by Google

THE DOOR AJAR.

THE situation since the German offensive in March, 1918, when the British line had again become stable, had been that of a defensive offensive as far as the latter was concerned, and no troops had better carried out this rôle than the Australian Corps in front of Amiens, and particularly so around Villers Bretonneux, where, by their energetic attacks and numerous raids, the general opinion was that the morale of the enemy in that part of the line was being gradually sapped; but the idea of a big offensive never entered into the thoughts of the junior ranks, and the majority certainly imagined that it could not take place until the American troops had come over in their full strength and also had had some time to train in France; in fact, the general opinion was that 1919 would see the big forward movement of troops set in motion and the consequent defeat of the Germans.

The British 3rd Cavalry Division had been out of the line for some weeks and its 7th Cavalry Brigade was encamped on the banks of the river Nievres near the small town of St. Ouen, when on 1st August, 1918, it was noticed that an abnormal number of empty buses and motor lorries were passing up northwards, which pointed to an early movement of troops with a view to an attack on the German lines.

On 4th August the Divisional Commanders and the Brigadiers of the three Cavalry Divisions were ordered to attend an Army Conference at Auxi-le-Chateau, and it was only on this date that the latter were informed or had the slightest knowledge of the possibility of their brigades being used at such an early date.

The Commander of the Fourth Army presided, and, as soon as maps had been issued to those attending, opened the proceedings by quickly running through his plans for the coming offensive. These had already been fully discussed with Corps and Divisional Commanders at a previous conference; then, turning to the G.O.C. 3rd Cavalry Division, he said, "I have decided that, if the bridges at Ignaucourt are reported intact by your patrols, you will cross there and move south of the River Luce, otherwise you will move north of the River Luce, round Caix on to your final objective."

Digitized by Google



Digitized by Google

At 9.30 p.m. on 5th August the 7th Cavalry Brigade moved to the Bourdon area, and the following morning the G.O.C. Division had his conference.

The general plan for the Army attack was as follows:

At zero hour, zero day, the German first and second lines of defence (as marked on the skeleton map) were to be attacked.

The Australian Corps, with one British Cavalry Division, were to attack north of the Bois-de-Hangard; the Canadian Corps, with the 2nd and 3rd British Cavalry Divisions, were to attack from the Bois-de-Hangard inclusive to the Domart—le Quesnel Road inclusive; the cavalry rôle being to further exploit the successes of the infantry. A French Corps was to attack south of this line and on the right of the Canadian Corps.

The French Corps, after taking the German lines, intended to put a heavy bombardment on all the villages in rear of their area and in consequence the British cavalry were ordered not to cross south of the Domart—le Quesnel Road.

Our infantry went forward under a creeping barrage, whereas the French had a preliminary bombardment before their infantry attack and were in consequence one hour and twenty minutes behind our infantry, which made our right flank very difficult and left little room for any cavalry movement on that flank.

The 3rd Cavalry Division, with the 2nd Cavalry Division in support, were to move north of the Bois-de-Hangard to the northern edge of the Bois-de-Morgemont and from there to seize their opportunity for a forward advance, this decision being left entirely to the G.O.C. 3rd Cavalry Division without having to await orders from Infantry Corps or Divisional Headquarters, as had so often happened in previous engagements, the consequence having been that the fleeting opportunity had nearly always been lost.

The G.O.C. went carefully into the alternative plans:

(*a*) If the bridges at Ignaucourt were found to be intact and the proposed movement could be made south of the River Luce.

(*b*) If the bridges were destroyed and the movement north of the River Luce to Caix was necessary.

An Officers' Patrol from the Fort Garry Horse was told off to follow closely behind the infantry line with instructions to slip through at the earliest opportunity and report on the state of the bridges at Ignaucourt direct to the G.O.C. 3rd Cavalry Division, and it was greatly on the initiative of the patrol leader and success of his mission that the future success of the Division depended.

Digitized by Google

As (*a*) plan was the one eventually carried out the procedure was to be as follows :

On satisfactory information being received from the Fort Garry Patrol, and on the orders of the G.O.C., the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, followed by the 7th British Cavalry Brigade, would make their first bound to the southern bank of the River Luce, crossing over the bridges at Ignaucourt and form up below the crest line on a two brigade front ; the 6th Cavalry Brigade would be in support.

After the concentration of the two leading brigades was completed on the south bank the further advance had to be made without further orders from the G.O.C. until the final objective was reached, namely, the old Amiens outer defence line marked on the accompanying skeleton map.

The Canadian Cavalry Brigade to move, if possible, south of the Bois-de-Beaucourt ; the 7th Cavalry Brigade, north of it. Divisional Headquarters would follow in a central line of advance with the 6th Cavalry Brigade ready to support the brigade which might find or make the open door.

During the night of 6th August, the 7th Cavalry Brigade moved to Montieres on the western outskirts of Amiens ; men and horses were billeted in the factories. The strictest orders were given that as few men or horses as possible were to move about during the day.

On the morning of the 7th August the Brigadiers of the 7th and Canadian Cavalry Brigades made a personal reconnaissance of the line, and, although little could be seen, they got a general knowledge of the country they were to work over, and for further information called on a Canadian Infantry Brigadier's Headquarters whose troops were already in the line preparatory to taking part in the attack on the following day.

The Brigadier told them they had been in the line a couple of days, and were greatly surprised at having been brought south, as apparently they had expected to go north.

It appears that, some ten days before, the rumour was well spread that the Canadian Corps were to move up north, one brigade being actually sent to take over part of a line and make the necessary preparations for the arrival of the actual corps. The whole Canadian Corps were then taken out of the line, embussed towards evening, and moved in a northerly direction ; then, when dark, the buses turned south and, much to the surprise of the occupants when they woke up, they found themselves at Amiens, and were put into the line the same evening.

How well the secret of the whole movements of the troops was kept right up to the last moment !

After his personal reconnaissance the Brigadier 7th Cavalry Brigade had his conference with his unit commanders, including the whippet

Digitized by Google

tank commander who was in charge of twelve tanks which were to act with the brigade.

The general plan of attack was explained and the units told off as follows :

The brigade to move on a two regiment front, the third regiment in support. Each regiment to have two squadrons in front line, one squadron in support. Inniskilling Dragoons right regiment and to act as the directing regiment of the brigade ; 7th Dragoon Guards left regiment, and to keep general direction with the Inniskillings. 17th Lancers, R.H.A., one section of Maxims, and whippet tanks in support.

Inniskillings to move north of Bois-de-Beaucourt.

First bound after moving from southern bank of the River Luce, a line from south-western edge of Bois-de-Cayeux to north-western edge of Bois-de-Beaucourt.

Second bound, final objective.

The Brigadier explained that, owing to the great secrecy of the movement of the troops, the intended attack was expected to fall on the enemy as a complete surprise, and consequently they were certain to be greatly shaken, also that if the cavalry could be launched with great rapidity the enemy would have little time to take up any stable positions, and therefore the brigade could reckon on striking a position held by some supporting troops which the shock of the attack had not already fallen upon, and here the door would probably be closed for a forward advance in that direction ; again some part of the country might be held by the retreating troops who had already suffered from the infantry attack, would therefore be somewhat demoralized, and here the door might be found ajar and only waiting to be pushed open ; or yet again some part of the country might be undefended and the open door awaiting the advance of the mounted troops. However, all had to be tried ; any unit coming up against the closed door had to picquet the front lightly and side-slip the remainder to the unit which had been lucky enough to have found the door ajar and pushed it open, or which had found the door already open.

At 9.30 p.m. 7th August the brigade marched through Amiens to the point of assembly about two and a half miles north of Boves, which was reached at midnight, when all ranks lay in the open billets.

5.40 a.m. the 8th August, on a thick misty morning the brigade moved along the prepared cavalry track just north-west of Cachy and took up a position south of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade which had moved ahead of them.

This cavalry track was started at 8 p.m. on the 7th August and was made under the supervision of our R.E. by 500 American soldiers who had never been under fire before. The track was made over most difficult and much cut up country and was so well made that wheeled traffic and armoured cars followed behind the cavalry ; the cavalry troopers

Digitized by Google



Digitized by Google

were quick to realize the good work which had been done, and many units showed their appreciation by giving the working parties cheers and thanks as they rode past them.

7.45 a.m., the two leading brigades moved to the north of the Bois-de-Hangard, and it is interesting to note that these brigades had followed so closely behind the infantry attacking line that the latter were still fighting for the possession of the southern end of the wood as the cavalry arrived at the northern end.

8.30 a.m., the Bois-de-Morgemont was reported clear of the enemy and the two leading brigades advanced just east of it.

9.15 a.m., a report received from the Fort Garry Patrol that the two bridges at Ignaucourt were intact, that the infantry attack had been a complete success and the enemy were retreating.

9.20 a.m., the G.O.C., who had been well forward with the leading troops, at once gave the order to advance.

The Canadian Cavalry Brigade, followed by the Inniskillings and 7th Cavalry Brigade, moved forward at the trot to Aubercourt and on to the bridges at Ignaucourt, the advanced squadron of Lord Strathcona's Horse capturing fifty prisoners and a gun *en route*. 17th Lancers and " K " Battery, R.H.A. took up a position for action on the northern bank to cover the crossing of the leading troops.

On the first appearance of the mounted troops on the southern bank of the River Luce the supporting troops moved forward and joined the remainder of the brigade, which were forming up just under the crest of the southern bank of the River Luce; Canadian Cavalry Brigade formed up on the right, 7th Cavalry Brigade on the left.

11 a.m., both brigades moved forward to their first bound and almost immediately came under artillery and long-range Maxim gun fire; the Inniskillings increased their pace and reached the small copse just north of the Bois-de-Beaucourt, but could not advance further owing to the heavy fire from Bois-de-Beaucourt and the door being firmly closed to them.

The 7th Dragoon Guards, owing to the heavy fire being poured on the Inniskillings, were ordered to change direction half left, which brought them facing eastwards and moving in the direction of the open ground between Bois-de-Beaucourt and Bois-de-Cayeux.

But before describing the doings of this regiment and the remainder of the brigade it is necessary that a short description of the ground should be given from the point they turned eastwards.

The ground was a series of deep undulations and steep rises with small narrow crests on the top of each, and as the troops passed over these crests they could be easily seen from the enemy's position at Bois-de-Cayeux, and the crest line as far as the Bois-de-Beaucourt. As the troops topped these crests a burst of artillery and maxim fire was poured on them,

Digitized by Google

but owing to the pace, and consequently the few seconds they were visible, little damage was done.

Looking over the last crest, in front of the enemy's position, one saw Bois-de-Cayeux running south from Cayeux for a mile, then half a mile of open ground, then a small copse of an acre in extent, the whole running on the slopes of the hill, and nearly on the crest line ; a most formidable looking position and which some few months before, with the morale of the enemy as it was then, would have required from one to two infantry divisions with a strong artillery preparation to have brought about its successful capture.

The two leading squadrons of the 7th Dragoon Guards, during the change of direction, had become echeloned, the leading squadron some 150 yards in front of the second squadron, and on rising over the last crest its squadron leader grasping that the small copse south of Bois-de-Cayeux was the key of the position, without a moment's hesitation gave the order to charge, and with one loud yell the squadron were down the hill, across the open space, up the rise and into the copse, capturing the key to the position, some dozen maxims, a couple of guns and some fifty prisoners.

O.C. 7th Dragoon Guards almost simultaneously directed the second squadron on to the open crest line between the copse already captured and the Bois-de-Cayeux, and they in the same gallant manner as the first squadron, charged straight for the position, which they successfully captured, and had at one time a large number of maxims and close on a hundred prisoners ; they, however, owing to the heavy cross fire from Bois-de-Beaucourt, had to retire below the crest line and many of the prisoners escaped.

The 3rd Squadron was now directed by the O.C. Regiment on to the south-western edge of the Bois-de-Cayeux, which they occupied in spite of the heavy fire of the enemy, and captured a battery of guns, some half-dozen maxims, and a number of prisoners, and also found the complete equipment of some two hundred men, who had evidently bolted when they saw the rapid movement of the horse soldiers.

The 17th Lancers, who had been in support, were now galloped up, squadrons in echelon from the right ; and one after the other charged at and occupied the remainder of the Bois-de-Cayeux, and the door which had been found ajar was for the moment successfully opened.

The Inniskilling galloper was now sent to his C.O. to explain the situation and with orders to picquet his front lightly and bring the remainder of the regiment to the opened door, but after some time and no appearance of the Inniskillings, another officer was sent with similar instructions, and eventually as the regiment still did not arrive the Brigade Major was sent to find out the situation. No message had reached

Digitized by Google

the Inniskillings. The first officer had his horse shot under him and was knocked senseless, the second officer was killed, also his orderly.

The O.C. Inniskillings explained that he had been unable to side slip according to the original plan, as the Canadian Cavalry Brigade had been fighting hard in the village of Beaucourt, and the Canadian Brigadier had asked him to cover his left flank, but as the situation was now more satisfactory he did not require them any longer; the position was picqueted and the regiment moved according to orders.

Meanwhile, owing to the non-arrival of the Inniskillings, the 7th Dragoon Guards were ordered to picquet their position and to prepare to advance to the final objective. "K" Battery R.H.A. had by this time taken up a position some seven hundred yards in rear of the position occupied by the 7th Dragoon Guards, the latter regiment were again mounted and preparing to move forward when a strong German counter attack was launched from the Bois-de-Beaucourt and they were again ordered to occupy the position, the reserve maxims were put into the line, and with the help of "K" Battery the counter attack was successfully beaten back.

O.C. 17th Lancers about this time reported that the whole of the Bois-de-Cayeux was clear of the enemy and he was ordered to picquet the north-eastern edge of the wood lightly and advance with the remainder of his regiment instead of the 7th Dragoon Guards, who had suffered severe casualties in men and horses.

The 17th Lancers re-formed in rear of the centre of Bois-de-Cayeux and as soon as they were ready the leading troop advanced as far as the small copse half a mile beyond it, but came under heavy maxim gun fire from the Caix—Cayeux Road and also heavy gun fire from the direction of Caix; both the troop officers were killed, the troop was practically wiped out, and the Brigadier, who had moved forward to make his personal reconnaissance, had his own and his orderly's horse killed.

As no further advance was possible until the maxims were silenced on the Caix—Cayeux Road, a squadron of the 17th Lancers was ordered to turn their position from the north of Bois-de-Cayeux, and this they successfully did, which enabled the remainder of the regiment to move to and occupy the final objective. During the latter advance they captured a number of prisoners, two guns, war material, two hospitals, and a large amount of stores. Meanwhile the Inniskillings had joined up and the remainder of the brigade moved to the final objective, which they held until relieved by the 6th Cavalry Brigade and a Canadian Infantry Brigade.

The total casualties in the brigade were just on 280, including twenty officers.

Each squadron as it attacked did so at the fastest pace and the majority of casualties took place on each occasion some fifty to sixty

Digitized by Google

yards from the positions held by the enemy; lines of horses lay dead as though they had been pulled out, dressed in line, and shot with a revolver, as one often saw in the rest camps in South Africa, and although the enemy from the commencement played freely with their maxims the majority of the bullets went overhead. The pace was too rapid for them to change their elevation and it seemed that their last bursts only were successful; once the men were on top of the enemy they put up no fight and appeared completely demoralized.

"K" Battery R.H.A. was of the greatest use both in the advance and in the counter attack and its C.O. seemed to thoroughly realize the situation on each occasion.

The whippet tanks, owing to the rapid advance from Bois-de-Morgemont and the difficulties of the bad going and steep undulations, never appeared in the picture.

A German officer, when asked why he and his men had surrendered, said, "Look, look," pointing round the country, "and wherever you look you see British cavalry."

The Officer Commanding one of the Canadian Infantry Battalions who came up with his regiment in the afternoon, said that after they had taken the enemy's front line they had never seen a Boche and thought they must have all gone back to Berlin, and it was only as they advanced further into the enemy's former area and saw the lines of dead horses in front of the various positions attacked, that they concluded that such had not been the case.

E. P.

Digitized by Google

AN INDIAN CAVALRY ACTION IN MESOPOTAMIA.

Situation.—The 55th Brigade Column on their way to relieve Kufah, which had been closely invested since 17th July, 1920, had bivouacked on the night 16th-17th October at Abu Fushaiqah, seven miles from Kufah.

Country.—The banks of the Euphrates were cultivated and densely covered with date groves, in the case of the right bank to a distance of about a mile only. The rest of the country was hard, sandy desert, excellent going, which invited rapid movement. The most noticeable features were the old ruined canals which were formidable obstacles when held.

The day was very hot for the time of the year.

Objectives.—The 55th Brigade Column was to march down the road to Kufah, parallel to the right bank of the Euphrates, and to relieve the garrison. The cavalry were indicated the Charisadah Canal, where it crosses the tram line Kufah to Najaf. This tram line was a possible line of retreat of the enemy. By operating on the right flank of the 55th Brigade advance they would stop any interference from Najaf.

Operations.—The ground to within two and a half miles of Kufah had been reconnoitred the day previously by a squadron of 37th Lancers, who met with little opposition, but saw considerable groups of the enemy in the immediate vicinity of Kufah.

The group cavalry, consisting of two squadrons and Machine Gun Section, 35th Scinde Horse (Major Connop), and two squadrons and Machine Gun Section, 37th Lancers (Major Stewart), had received orders to operate on the right flank of the infantry, to prevent any hostile demonstrations from Najaf, and to seize the objective referred to above.

The cavalry advanced with "B" Squadron, 35th Scinde Horse (Lieutenant Marten), as advance guard, and "D" Squadron, 37th Lancers as a right flank guard; "D" Squadron and Machine Gun Section, 35th Scinde Horse, "C" Squadron and Machine Gun Section, 37th Lancers as main body.

On reaching the line of the Nahr Alqanat the enemy were seen in position, their left flank on the Charisadah and their right flank towards the River Euphrates.

Digitized by Google



Digitized by Google

The advance guard pushed on at a trot to an under feature, consisting of mounds surrounding an old lime kiln, and in doing so came under fire from the Charisadah and the mounds 5 R and 3 R to the immediate west of it. The advance was continued at a trot and fire was opened on the advance guard from the right flank, Nahr Alqanat, at about 5 R.

On reaching a point level with the Imam Sahlah six machine guns were dropped to silence the enemy's fire from the Charisadah.

The advance guard advanced at a gallop, and on approaching the tram line a few enemy were seen and attacked with the sword and sabred. On reaching the tram line about one hundred enemy were seen in small groups, these were charged, sabred and ridden through. The advance guard rallied at a line of ruined huts and made good the position, which afforded a certain amount of cover from enemy's fire from the Charisadah. The enemy was apparently holding the Charisadah in some strength. An Indian officer, 35th Scinde Horse, with quick appreciation had taken his troop and one Hotchkiss rifle at a gallop for the Charisadah and had made good a position on it from which he was able to find an excellent target on the surprised enemy.

" D " Squadron (Lieutenant Geddes), was, on reaching the tram line, directed by Major Connop on to further groups of the enemy in a south-west direction. The squadron formed line and charged, rallying to the south-west of the line of ruined huts, they sabred some twenty-five of the enemy. The squadron commander saw the tactical value of the Charisadah Canal, and covered by machine gun fire from the line of ruined huts, galloped the canal, made good his position on it and brought fire at decisive range on the disorganized enemy on it. The enemy who had been holding the Charisadah Canal previous to "D" Squadron's advance had come out into the open, a party of about sixty being mounted, but " D " Squadron's advance and the Indian officer's action with his Hotchkiss rifle had effectively stopped any counter attack.

" D " Squadron then advanced on to some mounds to the east of the Charisadah, in order to obtain better targets. " B " Squadron followed " D " Squadron when the latter galloped the canal, and extended the line to " D " Squadron's right. They made good their position and brought fire to bear on the enemy now retreating in a south-east direction, into the date palms. Four Vickers guns, 35th Scinde Horse, followed " B " Squadron, and came into action on the canal. Some very fancy shooting was done by a Hotchkiss rifle, casualties being inflicted at 1,800 yards.

" C " Squadron, 37th Lancers (Major Forster), followed " D " Squadron, 35th Scinde Horse as they reached the tram line. Small parties of the enemy were crossing their front and making for Najaf. They were either lanced or killed by rifle fire.

Digitized by Google

On making good the tram line and block house, "B" Squadron dismounted and came under fairly heavy fire from the Charisadah; a few shots also coming from their right flank; the latter were easily disposed of by "D" Squadron (Lieutenant Boileau), 37th Lancers, who made good and held the cutting and block house B. "C" Squadron, 37th Lancers, in the meantime mounted and galloped the Charisadah Canal, followed by two Vickers guns. On reaching the canal the enemy were seen retreating in scattered groups along the tram line. Machine gun, Hotchkiss rifles and dismounted rifle fire was poured on them at 600 yards range. The enemy was holding a shallow cutting on the tram line at a range of 1,200 yards, this position was enfiladed and the main body of the enemy retired into Kufah Town, where they were shelled and attacked by the infantry.

The going was perfect and suited rapid movement.

It was exceptionally hot for the time of the year, but as the horses were in very hard condition they were not greatly distressed.

LESSONS.

(*a*) Rapid movement secured practical immunity from enemy fire; the casualties were one man and six horses wounded.

(*b*) Surprise. The pace of the advance surprised the enemy and paralysed any initiative on his part.

(*c*) Boldness. The enemy seemed unable to alter his plan, which was evidently retirement to successive positions into Kufah itself; the bold push of the cavalry on to his flanks and rear unsettled him. It must be remembered the terrain was very suitable for the handling of cavalry.

(*d*) The sword and lance had a great moral effect and the straight sword more than justified itself.

(*e*) Hotchkiss rifles proved of great value as pivots, and their fire in one case stopped a counter attack.

The horses were on the fine side, but very fit and stood the rapid and long advance (two and a half miles trot and four miles gallop) very well.

"CAPEVI."

Digitized by Google

THE MACHINE GUN CORPS (CAVALRY) IN FRANCE, 1916–1918.

By CAPTAIN T. PRESTON, M.C., *Yorkshire Hussars.*

VIII.—THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE (*continued*).

(*c*) *Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division on the Somme.*

The 1st, 2nd and 9th Machine Gun Squadrons were, as we have seen, (page 291 July number) rallied with their brigades on the morning of March 23rd just west of the Somme at Marchelepot and Morchain, four to five miles south of Péronne. The dismounted parties had rejoined their horses and all three squadrons were ready for mounted action. The 20th and 8th Divisions were holding the line of the Upper Somme, but the squadrons did not come into action there, though the 1st and 2nd Squadrons were shelled, the former losing two men and ten horses killed and six men wounded. That evening (23rd) the 1st, 2nd and 9th Cavalry Brigades moved south-west to Curchy, between Chaulnes and Nesle. The 1st Machine Gun Squadron was bombed during the night, losing three men killed and twelve wounded, with six horses.

The following day, March 24th, the Germans made serious progress north of the Somme, and the 1st Cavalry Division was hurried up to help the VII Corps. The 1st Machine Gun Squadron marched at 4.30 a.m. to Cappy, whence a dismounted party was sent to Carnoy. The 2nd Squadron sent a similar party to the same place.

On the 25th, most of the 1st Cavalry Division (dismounted) were in trenches at Montauban and Bernafay Wood, reinforcing the VII Corps. Two of the 2nd Squadron's guns, under Lieut. E. Roberts, M.C., came into action at 8 a.m. and got many targets throughout the day. The shooting on this occasion was extremely good; three German machine guns were seen to be knocked out by our fire, and numerous casualties were inflicted. The enemy made two determined attacks, both of which were beaten off.

The guns of the 9th Machine Gun Squadron were also engaged, two of them in forward positions, under Lieut. Eade, helping materially in repelling enemy attacks. These guns were heavily shelled and had seven casualties.

Digitized by Google



MAP SHOWING SCENE OF OPERATIONS OF 1ST, 2ND AND 9TH M.G. SQUADRONS (1ST CAV. DIV.), MARCH 24—APRIL 2, 1918.

British line, evening, March 23
" " " March 24
" " " March 25
" " " March 26
" " " March 27
" " " March 28
" " " **April 2**

Digitized by Google

On this date a former commander of the 9th Squadron met his death in action. Major R. H. N. Settle, M.C. (19th Hussars), who had commanded the squadron from its formation, had gone on December 6th, 1917, as second-in-command to the 10th K.O.Y.L.I. He was killed fighting against overwhelming odds near Cléry-sur-Somme, only four miles from where his old squadron was engaged. "Reggie Settle" will ever be remembered by a host of friends, both as a keen cavalry officer and as a delightful companion.

The dismounted cavalry were withdrawn from the Montauban trenches on the night 25th-26th, and on March 26th a mounted force, under General Beale-Brown, was sent to hold the Somme crossings about Bray. It must be explained that, owing to a misunderstanding, the right flank of the Third Army (north of the Somme) had retreated about five miles further back than the left flank of the Fifth Army, south of the Somme. To quote the C.-in-C.'s dispatch: "The left flank of the Fifth Army, therefore, was dangerously uncovered, being protected merely by the natural obstacle of the river and an improvised force . . . which had been sent up to hold the crossings."

The 1st Machine Gun Squadron sent two guns under Captain C. H. Reid, and the 2nd Squadron four guns, with General Beale-Brown's column; these guns did not, however, get into action on that day (26th) and rejoined their squadrons next morning.

At 9 p.m. 26th the remaining guns of the 1st Squadron, under Captain F. C. Lacaita, helped to hold the line of the Ancre between Heilly and Bonnay, to which line the 2nd and 9th Squadrons also sent guns later. General Beale-Brown's force was, by nightfall on the 26th, holding the line Méricourt—Sailly-le-Sec. The various sub-sections of the three squadrons were considerably mixed up; for instance, Captain Dent, with two 2nd Squadron guns, was in the 9th Cavalry Brigade sector.

On the morning of March 27th the 4th Dragoon Guards, with Lieut. Cheadle's sub-section 2nd Machine Gun Squadron, advanced mounted along the north bank of the Somme towards Chipilly, to ascertain the situation. The enemy was encountered in force, and one of Lieut. Cheadle's guns came into action on the Sailly-Laurette—Morlancourt road, against Germans in a wood. The 4th Dragoon Guards then took up a line by Sailly-Laurette cemetery, and the same machine gun got a good target when the enemy retired from the village after a counter-attack by the 11th Hussars.

Masses of the enemy were now seen across the Somme, west of Cérisy, and they were successfully engaged at long range.

Meanwhile, three more guns of the 2nd Squadron were with Brigade H.Q. at Sailly-le-Sec; of these, two, under Captain Dent and Lieut. Johnson, moved up in support of the 4th Dragoon Guards' left flank,

Digitized by Google

firing on small bodies of Germans with excellent effect. The third gun, under Lieut. Roberts, covered the bridge at Sailly-le-Sec.

On the night of the 27th the 1st Cavalry Division bivouacked round Corbie and Hamel, having played an important part in preventing the Germans from breaking through between the British Third and Fifth Armies.

The Division was not in action on the morning of March 28th, but in the evening the 2nd Machine Gun Squadron was ordered to send four guns (dismounted) into the front-line trenches. These guns, under Lieuts. Johnson and Cheadle, were supporting certain American engineer troops attached to the 61st Division. The rest of the squadron remained at Bois de Vaire, south-east of Corbie. Meanwhile, the 1st Squadron's guns took up barrage positions near Hamel, which they occupied during the next three days.

On the 29th, one of the 2nd Squadron guns, under Corporal Eales, in the trenches at Warfusée-Abancourt, fired on small bodies of advancing Germans and on a field battery. The latter was engaged at a range of 1,800 yards; horses were seen to fall, and the survivors retired at a gallop. Four guns of the 2nd Squadron were relieved on the evening of March 30th by the 9th Machine Gun Squadron, and a fresh sub-section of the 2nd Squadron, under Second Lieut. Davenall, was also sent to the trenches.

On this day (30th) the Germans made two strong attacks north of Hamel, which were driven back, the guns of the 1st Squadron co-operating most effectively with barrage fire. This squadron lost during the operations two men killed, three wounded and one missing.

The 9th Squadron kept three sub-sections in the Warfusée-Abancourt trenches till April 2nd, under Lieuts. Mount, Millard and Clifford. The 1st and 2nd Squadrons also stayed in the line, although their respective brigades were relieved.

On April 2nd the guns of these three squadrons were grouped together under a Divisional Machine Gun Officer, this duty being undertaken by Captain F. C. Lacaita, M.C. (O.C. 1st Machine Gun Squadron); his H.Q. were at Fouilloy.

(d) The Fight for Amiens: Operations round Hangard.

It is now necessary to describe the fighting in which the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions took part on March 30th—April 1st, when they helped to stem the German thrust south-east of Amiens.

These two divisions, it will be remembered, had left the French area and marched from Compiègne on March 29th. The Germans were attacking strongly on the line Démuin—Moreuil—Montdidier, and units of the 66th, 20th, 50th, and 3rd Australian Divisions were endeavouring to hold them. The 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions were in bivouac around

Digitized by Google

Boves and Cottenchy, and the Canadian Cavalry Brigade was the first sent to help the infantry. Moreuil Wood had fallen into the enemy's hands, and Brigadier-General Seely decided to try and retake it.

This was done on the morning of the 30th by combined mounted and dismounted attack, the Canadian Machine Gun Squadron (Captain J. H. Boulter) co-operating and sending guns forward after the attack to consolidate; they were relieved by infantry at 9 p.m., having lost two men killed and eight wounded.

Later in the day the 3rd Cavalry Brigade was sent to help the Canadians; the 4th Hussars, with two guns 3rd Machine Gun Squadron, taking up a position on the ridge between Moreuil town and wood, whilst the 16th Lancers, with Lieut. Mead's sub-section, went to reinforce the Canadians' line in Moreuil Wood itself. The 4th Hussars' guns had subsequently to be withdrawn to the north-west corner of the wood, and came into action at about 2,000 yards on Germans digging in, east of Moreuil. The 4th Hussars then re-occupied the position, and except for heavy shelling the fighting died down, the 3rd and Canadian Cavalry Brigades being relieved that night by the 8th Division.

In the meantime the 5th Cavalry Brigade was engaged about three miles away, two sub-sections 5th Machine Gun Squadron going with the 12th Lancers to help an Australian battalion which was attacking Aubercourt. The cavalry (dismounted) held the edge of a wood north of the village to cover the Australians' advance, which was done successfully. Another sub-section of the 5th Squadron went with the Scots Greys to reinforce infantry in Hangard Wood.

At 11 a.m. on Easter Sunday, March 31st, the 3rd Cavalry Brigade was again in action between Thennes and Moreuil, the 3rd Machine Gun Squadron's guns getting many good targets from their positions on the Thennes—Moreuil road. The line was under heavy machine gun and shell fire, the squadron having Lieuts. P. G. Swann and C. B. Ainslie wounded, with three men killed and twenty-five wounded. This was largely due to the Germans having worked round our left flank and enfiladed our position.

The following day the 2nd Cavalry Division and Canadian Cavalry Brigade counter-attacked and took "Rifle Wood," south-east of Hourges. This was a purely dismounted affair, in which several Machine Gun Squadrons were heavily engaged and did excellent service.

The plan of attack was explained to the various commanders at Domart in the early morning of April 1st, zero hour being fixed for 9 a.m.

The 5th Squadron (Captain E. S. D. Martin, M.C.) was organized in two six-gun batteries, which at the hour of attack opened rapid fire for ten minutes on the first objective, the ground allowing of direct overhead fire.

Digitized by Google



Digitized by Google

The Canadian Machine Gun Squadron (Captain J. H. Boulter) supported the attack most effectively by barrage fire; this was delivered from a flank, and was switched from point to point across the wood in front of the attackers. "This difficult operation," wrote Brigadier-General Seely in his report, "was performed most successfully." (This squadron during the action lost Lieut. F. Hart killed, who had previously been a sergeant in the squadron and had won the D.C.M. at Cambrai. Six men were also wounded).

In the 4th Machine Gun Squadron (Captain E. W. Macarthur) certain sub-sections were detailed to accompany the attacking troops; Lieuts. Higgs and Lucas with their guns went with the 3rd Hussars and Oxfordshire Hussars, who attacked from the River Luce towards the north end of Rifle Wood; whilst Lieut. Brooks was to accompany the Carabiniers, who were to advance on the wood from the west and make good the eastern edge.

When the attack started, Lieut. Higgs' sub-section moved off with the third wave, the men being on foot but the guns on pack-horses led by hand. Within a few minutes the left-hand team was knocked out by rifle and shell fire; Second Lieut. Lucas and Sergeant Upton fell wounded. The remaining three guns got safely on to the first objective, Lieut. Higgs being now in sole charge of them. Heavy hostile machine gun fire was coming from the north-west corner of Rifle Wood, and causing casualties; Lieut. Higgs accordingly got his guns into action against this point, each firing one belt, which reduced the enemy's fire very considerably. The final objective was reached, and here Higgs was wounded, but his men soon had their guns firing again, and got good targets on parties of Germans retiring through the wood.

Meanwhile, Lieut. Brooks with his sub-section had accompanied the Carabiniers in their advance through the wood from the west. This was successful, the guns putting in some most effective shooting; on reaching the eastern edge of the wood, the teams set to work to dig their guns in, and it was whilst inspecting his gun positions that Lieut. Brooks was unfortunately killed; he was awarded the M.C.

Rifle Wood was now in our hands, but the Germans soon began to attack in their turn, and it was necessary to apply for help to hold the line we had won. Accordingly the 7th Cavalry Brigade was called upon (being in readiness in Gentelles Wood), and it sent up the Inniskillings and 7th Dragoon Guards, with four sub-sections 8th Machine Gun Squadron.

The section with the Inniskillings, under Lieuts. B. B. Griffin and W. G. Wakefield, went up mounted as far as Hourges, and thence on foot to the front line. Here their guns were soon in action at ranges of 700 to 800 yards, this being about the distance between the opposing forces. With the 7th Dragoon Guards went Lieut. R. G. Faithfull and

Digitized by Google



Digitized by Google

Lieut. F. B. Taylor, whose sub-sections came under rather heavy fire before they reached the dismounting point. Corporal E. Curry was wounded by a shell and thrown from his horse, but although his officer told him to go to the dressing station, he insisted on coming on. Later when Sergeant J. C. Sparrow was killed, Corporal Curry took over the duties of section-sergeant till the end of the day, when his wounds at last forced him to leave duty. He was awarded the D.C.M.

With the assistance of the 7th Cavalry Brigade and 8th Machine Gun Squadron, the line was maintained throughout the day, and on the night April 1st-2nd the whole of the cavalry in and around Rifle Wood were relieved by the 14th Division.*

The successful attack and subsequent defence at Rifle Wood on April 1st, 1918, were due in no small degree to the efforts of the 4th, 5th, 8th and Canadian Machine Gun Squadrons. It is hard to know which to admire most—the coolness and courage of all ranks, or the tactical skill in handling their guns, especially on the part of the junior subalterns.

(e) Action at Villers-Bretonneux, April 4th-7th.

At 7 a.m. on April 4th, 1918, to quote the C.-in-C.'s dispatch, "the enemy made a final effort to prevent the French and British line from becoming stable." Certain of the machine gun squadrons were again engaged, with their brigades, in repelling this fresh attack, which so nearly succeeded in breaking through to Amiens.

The 2nd Squadron was already in the line (under the Second-in-Command, Captain G. Dent), reinforcing the 14th Division, when the attack started at 7 a.m. One gun, under Lance-Corporal Fisher, was on the Warfusée—Fouilloy road, north-west of the former village; this N.C.O. helped to stop two attacks, and then, having fired away all his ammunition, withdrew his gun under orders from his sub-section officer, Lieut. J. G. J. Christie.

The other gun of the same sub-section, under Sergeant Hopkins, was probably destroyed by the bombardment, for neither he nor the five men with him were ever seen again. Three more guns were not attacked on their immediate front, but seeing bodies of the enemy on their right and right rear, opened fire and inflicted heavy losses. They were then ordered to withdraw by the local infantry commander.

A sixth gun, under Sergeant Eldridge, was put out of action by shell fire without getting a target, and the team were ordered to retire. The enemy had got behind them, and they had to fight their way out with rifles.

So far we have only dealt with the forward guns of the 2nd Squadron; the other six were further back, and had opened indirect fire on barrage

* A few days later, however, our line had to be withdrawn from Rifle Wood, which remained in German hands till August 8th.

Digitized by Google

lines when the attack started. Half-an-hour later they were ordered to "man battle positions," which was done; the guns came into action at 9 a.m. against the advancing Germans, causing heavy casualties in their ranks. One gun was blown up, and was replaced by Lance-Corporal Fisher's gun which, as we have seen, had withdrawn from its first position.

The reserve guns remained in action until the enemy had gained a wood to their rear, when they were ordered to retire by H.Q. 41st Brigade, and took up a line west of Vaire Wood. Owing to lack of belts, and being also clogged with mud, two guns were sent back to Fouilloy, leaving two under Captain Dent, who took up a position to cover the right flank of the infantry. They opened fire on the enemy advancing over the high ground south of Vaire Wood. Both guns were withdrawn about 7 p.m., there being by now practically no ammunition left in the belts.

The 2nd Squadron lost on this day, Lieut. E. E. Roberts, M.C., wounded; two men killed; ten wounded; four missing; and two wounded and missing. Captain Dent received the M.C., Sergeant L. Bull got a bar to his D.C.M. (he already held the M.M.), whilst another D.C.M went to Private A. Atterbury. Lance-Corporal S. Fisher was awarded a bar to his M.M., and further M.M.'s were won by Lance-Corporal J. McFeat and Private N. Palmer.

In the meantime the 1st Machine Gun Squadron was in action also. It will be remembered that this squadron had its guns in barrage positions in the Hamel line, and it was to have been relieved by infantry on the night April 4th-5th. After Hamel had been heavily shelled by the enemy, the squadron was, after firing for one and a half hours on its barrage lines, ordered to withdraw to conform with the infantry line, and took up positions on a sunken road running through Vaire village.

The situation at 8 a.m., April 4th, was extremely critical. The 14th Division, wearied by days of continuous fighting, was compelled to give ground, and the fate of Amiens trembled in the balance. Fortunately the 6th and 7th Cavalry Brigades were in reserve about three miles behind, and the former was soon ordered up to help.

The 6th Machine Gun Squadron (now commanded by Captain J. C. Humfrey, late O.C. 11th Squadron), had been shelled out of their bivouac in the Bois l'Abbé, just before they were ordered up into action. On the brigade moving forward (mounted), the squadron sent four guns with each regiment, the 10th Hussars riding to a position between Vaire village and wood, and the 3rd Dragoon Guards and Royals more to the right, between Vaire Wood and Villers-Bretonneux. The regiments and machine guns dismounted for action and sent their horses back out of the way; they had reached the firing line in the nick of time, and the oncoming masses of Germans were checked.

Digitized by Google

The 8th Machine Gun Squadron (7th Cavalry Brigade) had been ordered up also to reinforce the 14th Division, and the O.C. Squadron (Captain T. Preston) reported at Divisional H.Q., Fouilloy, at 10 a.m.; at 10.30 a.m., however, the whole 7th Cavalry Brigade was hurriedly sent for, and the 8th Squadron went into action with it.

The 17th Lancers, in line of troop columns, rode up to support the Royals, accompanied by two sub-sections 8th Machine Gun Squadron under Second Lieuts. Burton and Greenstreet; the machine guns at once got to work obtaining numerous targets at 800-1,000 yards' range. (It will be remembered that these two subalterns had already distinguished themselves in the fighting near Tergnier.)

The 8th Squadron sent four more guns (Second Lieuts. Faithfull and Taylor) with the 7th Dragoon Guards, who went to stiffen the line held by the 10th Hussars, and by 2.30 p.m. the enemy's advance was definitely held.

About midday, Captain Frank C. Lacaita, M.C., commanding 1st Machine Gun Squadron, was unfortunately killed by a shell whilst riding round to reconnoitre. The writer recalls with sorrow how he met and talked to Captain Lacaita (who was an old Eton friend) just before this happened. The 1st Squadron also lost four men killed, ten wounded, and fifteen missing; but these losses were rather minimized because, the day before, four guns and fourteen men of the 12th Squadron had joined up under Second Lieut. W. H. G. Weller, who had lost touch with his own unit.

During the night April 4-5th, part of the cavalry line was taken over by an Australian Division, the 2nd Machine Gun Squadron being relieved.

The next day, April 5th, our line was heavily shelled, the enemy making a few spasmodic attacks; the guns of the 1st, 6th and 8th Machine Gun Squadrons got a certain amount of shooting, though at long range. Private D. W. L. Warren, of the 8th Machine Gun Squadron, won the M.M. for voluntarily taking messages and fetching rations over a long stretch of exposed ground, until he was wounded in doing so.

The cavalry regiments still in the line on April 5th were relieved by the Australians that night, but the Machine Gun Squadrons were not relieved till the night 6-7th.

It is interesting to note that, during this fighting, the front line consisted of short lengths of narrow trench, often some distance apart; these narrow "slits" gave excellent protection from shell fire, and casualties were comparatively few.

One important lesson learnt was that, when an O.C. regiment gets an order to move, he *must* communicate that order to any machine gun officer who is attached to his regiment. When a certain regiment was relieved on the night April 4-5th, it omitted to tell the machine gun

Digitized by Google

officer, with the result that the machine guns remained in the line. The horses of the sub-section suffered unnecessary casualties from shelling, through waiting too long in an exposed position, thinking the trench party would come out.

By the morning of April 7th all three cavalry divisions, with their nine machine gun squadrons, were back in rest billets, though still ready to move up at short notice if wanted. Here they got their first batch of reinforcements to make up losses, including a number of men who had been on leave when the battle started. Some of these men had been temporarily posted to other units.

(*To be continued.*)

Digitized by Google

NOTES ON THE INOCULATION OF HORSES AGAINST AFRICAN HORSE SICKNESS.

By MAJOR-GENERAL SIR ALFRED H. M. EDWARDS, K.B.E., C.B., M.V.O.,
Commandant General, Rhodesia.

THAT many readers of this JOURNAL have served in South Africa, Rhodesia, East Africa, or the Sudan, south of Khartum, is certain, consequently the subject of horse sickness and how its prevention in Rhodesia by inoculation has been introduced and carried out with considerable success, will be of interest to them, especially those who served in mounted corps.

The sickness in old days was ascribed to many and varied causes. The preventive measures and so-called cures were in their turn multifarious. Nothing was really known about the disease, its cause, prevention or cure; so-called salted horses, that is, animals which had survived where others succumbed when the disease was virulent, are still advertised and continue to fetch high prices in the market for their owners. But that a horse which survives in one district will be able to do so in another is very doubtful, and hence the remark ascribed to Dr. Theiler, that "there is no such thing as a 'salted' horse."

The chief methods of prevention were, and in many places still are, stabling, keeping a nose-bag on all night, not allowing horses to graze in vleis and low-lying ground, or be out after certain hours; smearing their coats with kerosine, dipping and fumigation. As far as the B.S.A. Police were concerned, one and all of these were tried, but with an unappreciable degree of success, the mortality continued.

By the courtesy of the Government Veterinary Bacteriologist, L. E. W. Bevan, Esq., M.R.C.V.S., I am able to give you extracts from an article appearing under his name in the *Rhodesia Agricultural Journal*. The article reads as follows:

"The inoculation of horses for the British South Africa Police, which has been carried out during the past few years, having been watched with interest by the farming community and those desirous of establishing the horse-breeding industry in this country, the following extracts from a report recently compiled are published for general information:

Digitized by Google

" The inoculation of Police horses was commenced in 1915, upon an experimental basis, as the result of the enthusiastic support of the Commandant General, who, recognizing the value of immune horses to the force, placed at my disposal remounts with which to carry on my inoculation experiments, which I had been conducting in a desultory manner since 1905. The arrangement made was that horses lost during experiment should be charged against the Laboratory Vote, while those recovering should be returned to the police for patrol duties. These preliminary experiments being successful, it was decided that the cost of animals lost during treatment should be debited against the Police Vote, and this arrangement proving satisfactory from a financial point of view, all police horses were brought in batches to Salisbury, where, under my control, with the assistance of the farrier-sergeant-major and staff they were inoculated irrespective of age, condition, district from which they were collected, or time of year at which treatment could be applied.

" Of 405 horses thus inoculated, 47 succumbed under treatment—that is an average of 11·6 per centum. If the average price of a police remount is taken as £30, this represents a loss of £1,410, but if, as against this, the increased market value of an inoculated horse is taken as £10, a figure which local salesmen consider a fair valuation, the enhanced value of the survivors represents the sum of £14,320, or a profit of £2,170. If, in order to place the transaction upon a basis beyond dispute, the increased value of an inoculated horse is regarded as only £5, the work has still been performed at a profit of £380. But it is not so much upon the immediate increase in the market value of the immune horse that the benefit of the inoculation depends, as upon the subsequent usefulness of the animals for police purposes. In previous years, before the inoculation was applied, patrols were almost impossible during the wet season of the year, and the policeman was compelled to perform his journeys on foot or mounted upon a donkey or an immunized mule, and to travel in a somewhat tedious or undignified manner, to the amusement of the public and to his own discomfort and disgust; thus the working capacity and usefulness of a police officer during a large part of the year was seriously reduced.

" On the other hand, inoculated horses, while requiring no special care, such as mosquito-proof stabling, smoke clouds at night, dipping and other measures hitherto applied ineffectively against horse sickness, have been free to travel at all times of the year in safety in almost any district in the country. In this way the efficiency of the police has been greatly increased, and it may be claimed that during the period of the War, when the force was seriously depleted, the shortage of men was to a great extent compensated by the facility and rapidity with which patrol duties could be accomplished.

Digitized by Google

" The death rate among police horses exposed during the five years prior to the commencement of inoculation was 12·98 per centum per annum, and for the nine years, from 1906 to 1915, the average yearly death rate from horse sickness amounted to 13·33 per centum per annum. This death rate, it must be remembered, occurred among horses protected in every possible way against the disease. On the other hand, the mortality of inoculated horses from horse sickness, although exposed with impunity to the risk of infection, during a period covering four horse sickness seasons, has been reduced to 2·33 per centum per annum Moreover, this figure probably includes some animals which died from other causes.

" Not only has it been possible to maintain a full complement of horses throughout the year in those stations hitherto regarded as veritable death traps, but these animals have maintained their condition and vigour to an extent which has been commented upon by all inspecting officers travelling throughout the Territory. In the early days of inoculation, the fear was expressed that the process might seriously damage the animal's constitution and impair its usefulness. This has not proved to be the case, and indeed several notable performances on the turf stand to the credit of inoculated horses.

" There is an old saying that a horse which has ' salted ' or become immune in one district will contract horse sickness in another, and this practical experience has been confirmed by scientific observation. Thus, it has been found that while the immunity conveyed by the inoculation holds good in most parts of the country, it is less protective in others, notably in a small area extending from Fort Rixon to Gwanda, where the greatest number of deaths have occurred. This difficulty may perhaps be rectified by fortifying animals after inoculation with the virus of the district to which they are to be distributed.

" Owners of inoculated horses must continually be on the look out for thermal reactions, which may be due to relapse or to a reinfection of the animal when exposed to a virus against which it is not completely immune ; for this reason the greatest care has been taken by the members of the police force to record daily, night and morning, the temperature of each horse, and this has proved a very valuable measure, inasmuch as it has enabled them to detect any relapse or reinfection at its early stages, so that the horse may be rested until recovery.

" These reactions most commonly occur when an animal is transferred from one district to another ; thus, the removal of a horse from Hartley to Gatooma, only twenty miles, has been followed by reaction, and *vice versa*, the transfer of a horse from Gatooma to Hartley has resulted in a so-called ' relapse,' during the following horse sickness season. However, when these reactions have been detected by the thermometer and the horse has been put by and kept at perfect rest, recovery has taken

Digitized by Google

place without treatment, and no losses have occurred from relapses, except when horses have been worked at the time.

"It has been stated that the horses were submitted to treatment without regard to age. It is impossible to compute the average age of animals, but it is probably about eight years. It has been found that the younger the horse the greater its resistance, and, in practice, the inoculation of foals and young horses has been undertaken during the past three years with considerable success. Conversely, the older the horse the greater the risk, and the advanced age of many of the subjects treated has considerably added to the death rate. The purchase and inoculation of younger animals which can be acclimatized and trained before being put to police work appears to be a scheme worthy of consideration.

"It has been found the more pampered the horse the greater the risk under inoculation, and it is a remarkable and unfortunate fact that a very high proportion of the deaths have been among officers' chargers or horses which have been kept stabled for any length of time without sufficient exercise. Those horses coming from regular work have proved the best subjects.

"It must be fully recognized that the present system of inoculation, while successful as far as it goes, is by no means perfect. The inoculation of the police horses was in the first place undertaken only upon an experimental basis, in order to encourage research. These experiments proving the value of the method, imperfect as it was, led to its general application; but this has not resulted in any very marked improvement in the method, for the reason that the cost of the horses prohibited those experiments, involving considerable risk, which are necessary in the investigation of the many problems associated with this mysterious disease. These problems must be solved before the method of inoculation can be improved, and I should prefer in future to devote my energies to purely experimental work, rather than to the application of an imperfect method of inoculation.

"It is pleasing to note, however, that the confidence of the Commandant General has proved justified, and to find in his Annual Report for the year 1918 the following recognition of the work in the subjoined paragraph:

> "Police horses which had been inoculated kept in good health and condition. Only six deaths of inoculated horses from horse sickness occurred during an abnormally wet season, out of a total of 136 inoculated horses distributed in all parts of the Territory. These results tend to prove the immense value of inoculation.

"The opinion of an officer of the B.S.A. Police, of long service in South Africa, as to the value and usefulness of inoculated horses during

Digitized by Google

the pre-inoculation period, is as follows:

"1.—The market value of an inoculated horse as compared with an uninoculated one has increased from 30 to 40 per cent.

"2.—The losses from horse sickness are practically nil.

"3.—Since the advent of inoculation the men are mounted on animals whose usefulness and reliability cannot be disputed.

"4.—Riding mules have in most cases been replaced by inoculated horses, and the efficiency of the corps has been greatly increased thereby.

"5.—An inoculated horse invariably keeps its condition better than an uninoculated one, and naturally can do more hard work.

"6.—Stations such as Bindura, Shamva and Mazoe, where the men were practically dismounted every year during the horse sickness season, have not lost a horse since the inoculated horses were sent there.

"7.—Better horse management is noticeable, the men taking more interest in an animal which they know is going to live and which they may have the use of for a long period.

"8.—Better efficiency for the purposes of mobilization. Inoculated horses can be kept in any part of the Territory, in all weather, at any time of the year."

SUMMARY OF POLICE HORSES INOCULATED AND RESULTS.

Season.	Number treated.	Died under treatment.	Number Inoculated horses exposed.	Died on Exposure.	Died from other causes.	Sold.
1915 ..	6	1	5	—	—	—
1915–1916	32	2	35	—	–	–
1916–1917	115	17	133	8	6	3
1917–1918	29	6	139	7	3	–
1918–1919	38	7	160	4	1	–
1919–1920	137	6	286	3	2	7
1920–1921	48	8	314	3	12	2
	405	47 =11·60%	1,072	25 =2·33%	24	12

Digitized by Google

SHOWING NUMBER OF SEASONS SURVIVED BY INOCULATED HORSES.

Date Inoculated	Number Inoculated.	Died under Inoculation.	Leaving	Seasons survived.					
				6	5	4	3	2	1
Prior to 1915 ..	6	1	5	2	3	4	4	4	5
1915–1916 ..	32	2	30	19	23	25	25	27	30
1916–1917 ..	115	17	98		76	76	77	77	86
1917–1918 ..	29	6	23			21	21	21	21
1918–1919 ..	38	7	31				29	30	31
1919–1920 ..	137	6	131					112	131
1920–1921 ..	48	8	40						40

21 horses out of 35 exposed have survived 6 seasons

102	,,	,,	133	,,	,,	,,	5	,,
126	,,	,,	156	,,	,,	,,	4	,,
156	,,	,,	187	,,	,,	,,	3	,,
271	,,	,,	318	,,	,,	,,	2	,,
344	,,	,,	358	,,	,,	,,	1	,,

Digitized by Google

TAIL DOCKING.

THE opponents of legislation against the docking of horses profess objection on the grounds of interference with the liberties of the breeder and owner. We have received a number of protests against "interference with the horse," and a well-known authority represents views held in the Western Hemisphere, as follows:

Most Englishmen who have lived any length of time in the Oversea Dominions become broad minded. I hope I am one of these. Horse lovers generally in Canada and America were sorry to see the action taken by some of the English horse societies against the Anti-Docking Bill. Many of the horse and farm papers over here were surprised to see the attitude taken by those who were always looked upon as being above criticism in the management of the horse.



1.

The Hunters' Society appears to be in favour of docking if the operation can be painlessly performed. The statement that "the cruelty is obviated by the Anæsthetics Bill" is a most regrettable one. Even if it were true, the operation is negligible compared with the deprivation for life of the fly defence over the regions not protected by the fly-muscle (*Panniculus Carnosus*).

Digitized by Google

Docking has become practically extinct in Canada in the past ten years, due to the strong public opinion that the practice was only a fashion.

Field-Marshal H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught, when presiding at the meeting of the Ottawa Humane Society, with reference to the docking of horses' tails, said:

> "I think the docking of horses' tails is a relic of barbarism. The dealers may not agree with me—the horses sell better when they are docked. I think it is a shame to deprive this dumb animal of the tail which God has given it."

The following remarks on tail docking, from the pen of the late Sir Walter Gilbey, were published in the CAVALRY JOURNAL in 1911:

In early English times agricultural work was chiefly done by oxen, yoked or brow-hitched.

In mid-English times much of agricultural harnessing was by hitching to the horse tail. Arthur Young (1776) found the practice existing in Ireland. The tail would, of course, get lacerated, diseased, sometimes even pulled off. Thus docking (that is, shortening) may first have come into vogue as beneficent surgery.

These docked horses could not then be harnessed to the plough in the primitive way. They could still be used for pack work, baronial war, knights' service, chivalry, etc. Hence short tails may have come to be looked upon as more courtly and less agricultural.

Again, as the country in the Middle Ages was unfenced and in a state of open common, the habit of borrowing and stealing the use of horses was easier than now; but knights' horses would have to be protected from agricultural misuse. An odd way to protect them may have been to remove the tails of such as had not already lost them by ill-usage.

Thus the faster horses might come to be indicated by and associated with mutilation. So persistent is association that the writer remembers having a few years ago to make a mental endeavour to prefer whole tails, like that on King George's horse, to the stunted, useless, indecent, inartistic things like that on the German Emperor's horse.

The adjective "smart" is akin to the German *Schmerz*, pain. It means the good appearance consequent on painstaking.

The word is now affectedly used in cases where no pains have been taken. Yet in some vicarious sense "smart" may certainly be used of docked horses likely to suffer fly persecution in stable and paddock for their life period of thirty-five years following the initial pain. Think of thirty-five years of pin-pricks! The initial pain would in comparison be very small.

We have now in the Twentieth Century entered on a curiously reversed phase.

Digitized by Google

The best *riding* horses, the racehorses, the troop horses, the "riding horses and ponies suitable for hacking or park work" are unmutilated in the tail.

It is the hackney and fast *traction horses* that wear a stumpy badge to advertise their undoubted merits. Clearly the reason for this change is that tail-hitching has been relegated to savagery; that land is nowadays fenced; that horses for the most part are found to do their work and keep their health best when unmulitated; but there is a real danger of accidents to life and property where the tails of fast traction horses get entangled with the reins.



2.

3.

It is the rein danger, then, that is robbing horses of their "first aid," their "first line of defence" against winged vermin, parasites, cold wind and rain.

The illustrations show the tails of three horses that took part in the funeral procession of our late King.

(1) King Edward's charger. The "banging" is suggestive of conformity to army discipline.

(2) Our present King's horse, the best civilian model.

(3) The German Emperor's horse, a favourite which was taken on the pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and might fitly have been dedicated to Baal-ze-bub, the sometime "god of flies." Notice that the knife docking is deliberately emphasized by up-to-date scissor work!

A fallacy—still rampant, I believe, in Essex—that short traces mean much easier work probably contributes to the mischief. The rise of a

Digitized by Google

kindred fallacy is explained by Sir Walter Gilbey's "Early Carriages and Roads" (Vinton), pp. 86 and 87. Major Dwyer, in "Seats and Saddles," 4th edition, p. 231 (Whittingham), well said: "If one or two feet more in a carriage trace could possibly make such a difference against the horse, as is pretended, what must the last waggon of a train that is one hundred yards long do to an engine?"

And let us not forget that the horse-dealer achieves selling you your optical illusion (strong hind-quarters) at an enhanced price for a damaged article!

A former principal veterinary surgeon to the Army wrote on the subject of bob-tails:

"The disadvantages of having horses so mutilated, were always present, and sometimes very seriously felt. For instance, Hartmann, in *Traité des Haras*, asserts that, during the Eighteenth Century, the English cavalry were several times rendered almost useless from the losses amongst the horses caused by the attacks of flies, from which they could not protect themselves. This happened more particularly in 1743, near Dettingen, and also at Fritzlar, Hochkirch and Willensthal. The same authority also specially notes that in the Seven Years' War, which commenced in 1756, the flies caused such disorder among t British cavalry horses at Minden that the battle was nearly lost.

As to the inconvenience in harness of the natural tail, horses have been driven for years in England, and are now worked all over the world in harness, and their natural tails have never been found an obstacle to satisfactory utilization; on the contrary, they have been found an advantage.

Why is it that the owners of wantonly mutilated animals are not specially taxed? It is strange that the ingenuity of the Chancellor of the Exchequer has not found out this means of obtaining financial assistance; for the tax would bring in a handsome sum, if only a very small amount had to be paid by horse-proprietors for each docked animal in their stables.

Digitized by Google

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

" The Desert Mounted Corps." An Account of the Cavalry Operations in Palestine and Syria, 1917-1918. By Lieut.-Colonel the Hon R. M. P. Preston, D.S.O. With an Introduction by Lieut.-General Sir H. G. Chauvel, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. Constable. 21s. net.

The idea is still current among inexperienced critics that cavalry merely exists to-day to " give tone to the proceedings," but this book shows that it is more valuable in modern warfare than in the past. The whole of the operations in Palestine and Syria, under General Allenby, were " text-book illustrations of the perfect combination of all arms, both in attack and defence," according to Lieut.-General Sir H. G. Chauvel, and the last operations in this theatre which led to the total destruction of the Turkish Army, and the elimination of Germany's Allies from the War, could not have been undertaken without large masses of cavalry, which General Allenby used to the most brilliant advantage. Other characteristics of the Commander-in-Chief's genius are well brought out in this book. He had a surprising capacity for gauging the enemy's fighting qualities at any moment; he seemed to know, as by instinct, the minimum force necessary to hold any counter-thrust that might possibly be launched.

There were many hardships—intense heat in the summer, with dust and insect pests inconceivable to those who did not go through the campaign, and cold and heavy rains in winter. The fortitude and endurance of the troops was beyond all praise. But they will never forget the summer of 1918, spent by the corps in the Jordan Valley, at about 1,200 feet below sea-level, with a temperature varying from 110 to 125 degrees. Just before leaving the valley, Lieut.-Colonel Preston heard an Australian trooper sum up the all-pervading horror of the place in a characteristic sentence. After gazing for some time at the hideous expanse of white dust and blistering rocks at his feet, he drawled out: " Well, I reckon God made the Jordan Valley, and when He seen what He done, He threw stones at it."

" Army Veterinary Service in War." By Major-General Sir J. Moore, K.C.M.G., C.B., late Director of Veterinary Services, British Expeditionary Force, France, and Director of Veterinary Services, India. With a Foreword by General Sir Charles Monro, late Commander-in-Chief in India. Printed and published by Messrs. H. & W. Brown, 20, Fulham Road, London. Price 21s. post free.

This is a reprint of the articles which recently appeared in the ***Journal of the United Service Institution, India,*** the subjects dealt with being: Organization and Function of Army Veterinary Service in War; Wastage of Animals in War; Army

Digitized by Google

Veterinary Service as an Instructional Agency; The Merits and Demerits of the various breeds of Animals used in War; Economy to be effected in the Disposal of Animals Wasted by War; Extracts from Despatches relating to Army Veterinary Service.

It is intended to devote the proceeds of sale, after the cost of publication, to start a Benevolent Fund in connection with the Army Veterinary Corps, India, which recently has been formed.

The author's style is lucid and arresting, and this eminently readable and reliable work of reference will hold the interest both of the horseman and the general reader.

"The 13th Hussars in the Great War." By the Right Hon. Sir H. Mortimer Durand, G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E. Blackwood, 1921. 42s.

The author's name is familiar to senior officers as having been political secretary to Sir Frederick Roberts, V.C.,, in the Afghan War of 1879, as the head of the Mission to Afghanistan in 1893, as the biographer of Field-Marshal Sir George White, V.C., and as our Ambassador successively at Madrid and Washington.

The volume will be of general interest owing to the breadth of treatment, while the personal note is continually struck; the whole sequence of operations being taken from descriptions by members of the regiment. There are 390 pages of letterpress and 105 pages of illustrations, mostly from "snapshots," chapters on the scope of cavalry and on the earlier history of "the 13th."

The concluding lines are as follows: "The cavalry spirit, please God, will never die in our people so long as war endures in the world, nor is there any reason to fear that we shall soon see the last of the famous squadrons in which that spirit is so gloriously embodied."

"The History of King Edward's Horse" (The King's Oversea Dominion Regiment). Edited by Lieut.-Colonel Lionel James, D.S.O. Published by Sifton, Praed & Co., 67, St. James's Street. 1921. 25s.

This is a picturesque work, compiled by one whose pen is as powerful as his sword, whose name is familiar in literature and as Reuter's Correspondent with the Chitral Relief Force, when General Townshend, then a captain seconded from the Central India Horse, was of the relieved garrison. Our author was present, officially or otherwise, at nearly every clash of arms in the Old World until his retirement from journalism in 1913. He commanded King Edward's Horse with distinction in the late War.

The stirring story of this regiment is given from its inception, in 1901, owing to the insistence of a few individuals whose perseverance was warmly approved by His Majesty, to the battlefields of the Western Front and Italy, and only terminates with the demobilization and dispersal in August, 1919. The headquarters still exist at Chelsea, though recruiting has not yet been re-opened.

Digitized by Google

But as to the book, it is replete with portraits, coloured maps and two essential items, a full index and appendices.

Perhaps the pages which are most moving are those which describe the German Offensive and the Battle on the Lys, in April, 1918, when our Portuguese Allies were forced back and King Edward's Horse and the 11th Corps Cyclists stood in the breach and gave time for British reinforcements to be formed up.

"The Last Lap" describes the several parts which the patrols, troops and squadrons took in the advance past Lille, 17th October, and across the Scheldt to Ath, attacking the enemy in the operations of among others, the 74th, 47th, 57th and 59th Divisions. In the operations between 20th October, 1918, when the Scheldt was first crossed and four bridge-heads formed at Pont-à-chin and Esquelmes by the 59th Division, till the Armistice the narratives are necessarily disjointed.

The map superscribed Passchendaele, 1917, only includes the approaches to that position. Space does not allow the author to quote complimentary orders such as those of the 11th Corps on the 23rd October, 1918. There is nothing tedious or irrelevant in this intensely graphic and interesting history.

The *Canadian Military Gazette* chronicles the death of the late Senator Domville, a son of Lieut.-General James W. Domville, Royal Regiment of Artillery, his heart was in Military life, and for twenty years he commanded the 8th Princess Louise New Brunswick Hussars, with conspicuous success.

In 1884 his regiment, of course at his suggestion, volunteered for service in the Soudan, and repeated the offer again in 1896.

Although the Imperial Government had little use for "colonial" troops at that time, it tendered thanks for the service offered, as did that great British soldier, Lord Wolseley.

Senator Domville was simply living before his time. It was but a short time after his latter offer that Canadian soldiers participated in the South African War, where they so well established their worth that there was no demur about accepting them when the German War came.

In appearance and character, Colonel Domville was the dashing cavalry leader, an hussar from the spurs up. When in uniform no man looked more soldierly than he, and he had that aristocratic bearing which we associate with the light cavalry officer of the Imperial Army.

Frank Maxwell, Brigadier-General, V.C., C.S.I., D.S.O.; a Memoir and some Letters. Edited by his Wife. John Murray, London, 1921. 12s.

This is a book full of human feeling. The bright spirit of the young cavalry officer illumines every page. He was one of a family of four daughters and seven sons; Frank being the fourth son. The three elder sons all went into the Indian Cavalry and the remaining three, though civilians by profession, served both in South Africa

Digitized by Google

and in the European War. The eldest died commanding the 10th Lancers in Baluchistan. Lawrence commanded a cavalry brigade in France; Frank and Eustace were both killed fighting there; Pat died of pneumonia contracted in the War; and the remaining two were wounded. We will quote his views on bravery. There was never anything of bravado in his conduct: "As a matter of fact, I don't believe in running from shells, unless quite certain that they are being fired at one—which is seldom—particularly with big stuff. Nor does bobbing appeal to me as being useful, while it certainly is quite undignified. If men are about, a pipe and upright posture show a better example." Many side-lights are thrown upon great characters, such as our Field-Marshals and not the least his Mussulman Indian orderly.

Like other books largely compiled from letters, instead of from the reminiscences of others, much humour is unrecorded, and Maxwell's wit does not shine and appear as all-pervading as it actually was in his life.

The descriptions of exciting scenes are graphic and brief, such as the account of Sanna's Post, the attempt upon the Viceroy of India in 1912, and the tiger hunt in which the shooting elephant slipped up, rolled over, wrestled with and killed the tiger.



Digitized by Google

NOTES.

CAVALRY WAR MEMORIAL.

THE allotment to the Committee for the above Memorial of a site in the vicinity of the Horse Guards Parade still holds good, subject to the approval of His Majesty the King, the War Memorial Committee and H.M. Office of Works. The amount subscribed so far just exceeds £8,000, but the Committee are unable to make any definite arrangements until they are assured that the necessary minimum of £10,000 will be reached. It is therefore hoped that regiments and individuals who intend to subscribe will do so as early as possible to

THE HONORARY SECRETARY,
CAVALRY WAR MEMORIAL,
CAVALRY CLUB,
PICCADILLY, W.1.

THE following moves of cavalry regiments will probably take place this trooping season :

4th Dragoon Guards from Home to Secunderabad.
9th Lancers from Home to Cairo.
11th Hussars from Egypt to Meerut.
3rd Hussars from Home to Palestine and Black Sea.
4th Hussars from Home to Muttra.
7th Dragoon Guards from Egypt to Home.
5th Lancers from Risalpur to Tidworth.
21st Lancers from Meerut to Tidworth.
19th Hussars from Muttra to Tidworth.
20th Hussars from Black Sea to Tidworth.

During the visit of their Majesties the King and Queen of the Belgians to England in July, King Albert was pleased to convey a gracious expression of his great interest in the details in the CAVALRY JOURNAL concerning the 5th Dragoon Guards, of which regiment King Albert is Colonel-in-Chief.

Major-General Sir Andrew Russell, of Mounted Rifles fame, is now President of the National Defence League of New Zealand, an organization which fosters patriotism, insures adequate military preparation and keeps alive public interest in the Permanent Forces of the Dominion.

Digitized by Google

The oldest living recipient of the Victoria Cross is a cavalry officer, General the Right Hon. Sir Dighton Probyn, [illegible]., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.V.O., I.S.O., Eq., formerly of the Punjab Cavalry, who received the [illegible].C., in the Indian Mutiny, the notification being dated 18th June, 1858.

The cavalry recipients next in succession are Private John Doogan, late King's Dragoon Guards, South Africa, 1882; Brigadier-General Sir Percival Scrope Marling, Bart., C.B., late Mounted Infantry, K.R.R.C., and 18th Hussars, Soudan, 1884; Quartermaster Lieut.-Colonel W. T. Marshall, late 19th Hussars, Soudan, 1884; Trooper H. S. Henderson, Buluwayo Field Force, Rhodesia, 1897; Captain R. C. Nesbitt, late Mashonaland Mounted Police, Rhodesia, 1897; Major the Earl of Dunmore, D.S.O., M.V.O., late 16th Lancers, India, N.W. Frontier, 1897; Private Thomas Byrne, late 21st Lancers, Khartoum, 1898.

Back numbers of the CAVALRY JOURNAL, from 1906 to 1914, are on sale at 3s. post free.

Annual volumes, bound in white cloth, and covers ready for binding are available on application to the CAVALRY JOURNAL, Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W.1.

Officers on the active list writing for the JOURNAL may be under no anxiety as to their responsibility. Such articles, previous to publication, will be revised by recognized authority.



Digitized by Google

SPORTING NOTES.

RACING.

THE Turf has suffered a great loss in the untimely death of Humorist, the Derby winner. In a race at Ascot he broke a blood vessel. Richard Marsh, the King's trainer, who was near at the time, gave it as his opinion that he would never run again—an accurate forecast as the horse died a short time after. Lemonora, a horse that is supposed to " make a noise," won the Paris Grand Prix. This is the third consecutive year an English horse has won this race, Comrade, 1920, and Galloper Light, 1919.

It is a great pity that Lemonora has had to be scratched for the St. Ledger at Doncaster. This, on form, leaves the race a " one-horse one," and most people expect to see Craig-an-Eran win.

Westward Ho, the 11,500 guinea yearling, is at last coming into form, and won his second race at York. He has now run three times, winning two and running forward in the Derby when half trained.

What will interest Indian sportsmen is that the Aga Khan is going in for racing, both in England and France, and has been giving big prices for yearlings.

The National Stud, thanks to the able management of Captain Greer, is doing well. So far this year eleven yearlings have been sold, bringing in 26,520 guineas, or an average of 2,410 guineas. The tax payer ought to be pleased to know that at least one Government concern is being run successfully. One of the yearlings, a brown colt by Tracery—Countess Zia, brought in 8,000 guineas. Another, by The Tetrach—Albia, 5,200 guineas. The former was bought by Sir H. Cunliffe-Owen and the latter by Captain Boyd Rochfort.

We regret to hear that the Prince of Wales' Australian bred steeplechase horse, Kinlark, met with an accident a short time ago. He was running in a paddock and managed to get into a bog. It required two cart horses to get him out, but we are glad to hear that his injuries are not severe.

Racing in Ireland is about the only sport that has been allowed to carry on. We hope peace will be established and other sports come into their own again.

In the old days owners were quite keen on matches, but latterly very few have been run. A very sporting race took place at Derby, when a match was run between Sir George Beaumont's Husky and Mr. Galstaun's King Sol, owners up.

Digitized by Google



" We give him a start, just to make his line clear, and then—hell for leather—we ride for first spear."
Drawn by Gen. Sir R. Baden-Powell, Bt.

Digitized by Google

Odds were laid on the latter, but Husky won easily. We wish more of these sporting events could be arranged. We remember a match, two miles on the flat, at Cork Park, between the late Lord Fermoy and Sir Timothy O'Brien, the Middlesex cricketer. They were both mounted on their best hunters. We do not remember the weights, but as each of the riders walked over 15 stone it must have been decidedly a welter race. Tim O'Brien won easily.

In 1862, George Fordham, the jockey, who could ride well under 8 stone, matched his horse Levity against Mr. Jackson's Neptunus, owners up, catch weights. The match took place at Newmarket. Mr. Jackson was a bookmaker and a stalwart, upstanding Yorkshireman, so the difference in weight must have been considerable. Fordham won easily.

We hear that a special Cavalry Tank has been invented, with a pace of 17 to 20 miles. Shortly we expect to see a race at the Grand Military Meeting, at Sandown for tanks driven by cavalry officers over the course, or possibly they might be allowed to enter for the Gold Cup.

The St. Ledger.

The favourite, Craig-an-Eran, who started at 4 to 1, was beaten into fourth place. Polemarch, who was looked on as a non-stayer and started at 100 to 2, won the race for his owner, Lord Londonderry, late of the Royal Horse Guards.

HUNTING.

Cubbing has begun much earlier than usual this year, owing to the dry season and the early harvest. Rain is wanted badly in many parts, and owing to the hard ground and want of scent, cubbing will be interfered with. Good accounts of cubs are received from most Hunts. Hounds in many packs are short, owing to so many puppies dying from distemper, which has been unusually prevalent this year in a very virulent form.

The price for hounds is bound to remain very high, and we hear of several packs in India that have not been started again since the War, owing to the prohibitive price of hounds.

POLO.

We have just been reading the prices that polo ponies have fetched at Tattersalls' this year. When the 13th Hussars first won the Regimental Tournament at Hurlingham they were quartered at Ballincollig in Ireland. That season, before going to Hurlingham, they had never played anything but Regimental Polo—no matches of any kind. Sixteen ponies were sent over and the average price of these ponies worked out at £40. We believe there was only one pony in the lot that was looked on, as prices went then, as an expensive pony. This was "Micky," who, I believe, cost General Pedder, as he is now, £160, which was looked on as a very high price. What a blessing it would be if teams could be mounted at the same price in these days.

Digitized by Google

Of the original 13th Hussar team only one is left in full health. Mr. Robertson Aikman died a few months ago, Mr. Wise met a tragic end during the War, Captain McLaren broke down through overwork in France and is now a hopeless case, and General Pedder is the sole survivor.

In that match Mr. Aikman played a pony that was the only one brought back from America by Mr. John Watson, when his team first won the Amercia Cup. All the others were sold to Americans, but this one, we forget his name, was too small for the American market, and so returned to England. He was a small, very wiry, fast pony, and was eventually given to the mess sergeant to drive in his trap.

Lately the following prices have been obtained for polo ponies:

June 27th.

Property of Lieut.-Col. Gerald Ritson: Polly, br, 240 gs.

Property of the Earl of Rocksavage: Scotty, b., 250 gs.; Robin, b., 400 gs.; Dark Lady, br., 500 gs.; Bovita, b., 230 gs.

July 4th.

Property of Lieut.-Col. C. MacG. Dunbar: Mirage, ch., 240 gs.

Property of the Hurlingham American Cup Defence Committee: Luck at Last, ch. (1914), by Machakos, dam by Astrologer, 630 gs.; Vic, b. (Argentine), 510 gs.; Beatrice, b., 820 gs.; Lady Margaret, ch., 390 gs.; The Hind, ch. (Argentine), 280 gs.; Darling, gr., 155 gs.; Social, gr., 130 gs.; Coal, bl., 74 gs.; Proxy, ch., 52 gs.; Maggie, ch., 74 gs.

Property of Lieut.-Col. Tomkinson: Lorna, br., 105 gs.

Property of Lieut.-Col. Spencer: Syren, ch., 550 gs.; Marcia, ch., 470 gs.

Property of Major Porter: Piccaninny, br., 180 gs.

Property of Lord Wodehouse: Snippet, br., 150 gs.

Property of Lieut.-Col. Joicey: Stephanie, b., 125 gs.; Felicity, b., 110 gs.

Property of Lieut.-Col. Richardson: Starlight, ch., 150 gs.

Property of Mr. John Combe, 11th Hussars: Teddy, b., 500 gs.

Property of Major Phipps Hornby: Elm Lily, b., 400 gs.

Property of Lord Dalmeny: Night Wave (1914), b., by Wavelet's Pride out of Late to Bed by Proclamation, 400 gs.; Panama II., ch., 200 gs.; Nyria, b., 190 gs.

July 18th.

Property of Mr. Philip Magor: Discovery, ch., 300 gs.

Property of Major Godfrey Heseltine: Lightfoot, gr., 145 gs.; Rufus, b., 300 gs.; Mouse, b., 160 gs.; Succoth, b., 175 gs.

Property of Capt. K. R. Palmer, 2nd Life Guards: Serviette, ch. p., 160 gs.

Property of Major G. Miller-Mundy: Demon, sk., 250 gs.

Property of Mr. James Montagu: Sheila, 800 gs.

To hark back to the International Matches, on the Monday following the second match H.M. the King received at Buckingham Palace the American team and presented the Cup to them. While congratulating the Americans on their victory,

Digitized by Google

His Majesty expressed a hope that on a future occasion the verdict might be reversed.

Hurlingham and Ranelagh Clubs gave dinners to the two teams.

The Prince of Wales has been a member of several teams that have won tournaments this season, including the team that won the Villavieya Century Cup.

Polo players will be interested to hear that Lieut.-Col. T. P. Melvill, 17th Lancers, the reserve player of our International team, has been appointed Military Attaché in Madrid. Polo players in Spain will welcome the appointment of so fine a player where, thanks to the enthusiastic personal encouragement of the King of Spain, the game is making excellent progress.

Polo in the American Army is receiving encouragement from the authorities and the following memorandum was recently circulated. The text is as follows: "Organisations desiring to take up polo are empowered to use regulation mounts of their authorised quota for this purpose. Regulation mounts of the necessary speed and handiness will be furnished *such organisations as part of their quota* on requisition made to the remount officer. It is necessary to call attention to the fact that existing law forbids the purchase of polo ponies as such. The War Department authorises, however, the use of horses for polo that are habitually used as regulation service mounts, and which form a part of the regular quota of animals prescribed by the Tables of Organisation. As regulation mounts, having speed and handiness, are procured, remount officers are instructed to furnish them to units whose requisitions for such animals have been approved, and who can draw them as part of their authorised quotas. Department, division, brigade, and regimental commanders, each in his own sphere, are empowered to allot these animals so as to meet the needs of the service, and so as to foster and develop polo.

"Speedy and handy animals are not being procured in large numbers, and it will be impracticable for a considerable time to fill all requisitions. At present such animals are being sent to units so situated that, with small additional help, an active polo centre may quickly be developed. As more animals of the class desired become available, they will be sent to fill up the quotas of units evidently interested in developing polo, and having a mounted strength of sufficient size to make polo practicable. In general, animals will not be issued except where the needs of the service demand that the units or the officers concerned should be mounted in order to perform their proper military duties."

Impending Regulations.

Under Appendix "B" the following regulations are now in process of issue in the American Army, in order to enable the foregoing instructions to be executed: (*a*) Chargers supplied at public expense may be used by officers for polo or hunting on payment of £10 per annum for horses and £7 per annum for cobs, and of insurance, which is compulsory. *Note.*—This carries out the pre-war arrangement, but is more beneficial to officers, in that, before the war, the value of the horse was less. (*b*) The Cavalry boarding-out scheme and the Territorial boarding-out scheme are modified in the case of officers, so that if ordered abroad or to a new station, horses may

Digitized by Google

be returned at a week's notice and within three months otherwise, instead of at the end of the year, as in the case of ordinary allottees. (*c*) Issue of forage on repayment is extended to all officers, instead of as before the war—(i.) Only to officers on consolidated pay, and (ii.) only in respect of a single horse required for military duty. (*d*) The issue of stable necessaries is extended to all officers instead of being restricted, as before the war, only to officers on consolidated pay, and in respect of a horse required for military duties. (*e*) All the provisions (*b*) to (*d*) are extended to unit hunt, polo or horse clubs composed of serving officers formed with the written sanction of the Unit Commander. Before the war these clubs could not get stable necessaries or forage on repayment, or have horses boarded out. All this goes to show that the American Army authorities are viewing the development of sport in a practical spirit, and it is to be hoped that our own authorities will not be left behind in this direction.

At Hurlingham the Champion Cup was won by the Freebooters, who beat Meadow Brook, U.S.A., by 6 goals to 4.

It is of interest to note that this is the eleventh occasion on which Mr. Buckmaster has played in the winning team for the Champion Cup.

	Freebooters		*Meadow Brook, U.S.A.*
Pos.		Pos.	
1	Duke of Penaranda.	1	Mr. L. E. Stoddard.
2	Mr. T. Hitchcock.	2	Mr. J. Watson Webb.
3	Mr. W. S. Buckmaster.	3	Mr. R. E. Strawbridge.
Bk.	Lord Wodehouse.	Bk.	Mr. D. Milburn.

Inter-Regimental Tournament.

Thanks to the exigencies of the Service this tournament was rather a fiasco this year, and we think it a pity that it was not abandoned altogether. Eleven regiments entered but only four matches in all were played.

	2nd Life Guards	beat	*Coldstream Guards.*
Pos.		Pos.	
1.	Capt. D. E. Wallace.	1.	Hon. R. C. Cubitt.
2.	Lt.-Col. H. C. S. Ashton.	2.	Maj. L. M. Gibbs.
3.	Maj. F. R. Penn.	3.	Capt. H. de Trafford.
Bk.	Capt. K. R. Palmer.	Bk.	Lt.-Col. J. E. Gibbs.
	10 *goals.*		1 *goal.*

This match was played at Ranelagh on June 24th. The Coldstream Guards were no match for the 2nd Life Guards. Captain de Trafford scored for the Coldstream Guards in the first period, but this proved to be their solitary success, and in the end the 2nd Life Guards gained a runaway victory.

Digitized by Google

3rd Hussars		beat	*4th Hussars.*	
Pos.			Pos.	
1.	Maj. R. R. de C. Grubb.		1.	Capt. G. H. Hayhurst-France.
2.	Capt. L. F. H. Whiston.		2.	Maj. N. O. Laing.
3.	Maj. W. R. Tylden-Wright.		3.	Lt.-Col. W. Neilson.
Bk.	Capt. C. F. Clarke.		Bk.	Capt. W. A. C. Heyman.
10 *goals.*			4 *goals.*	

Meeting at Aldershot in the first round of the Inter-Regimental Tournament, the 3rd Hussars defeated the 4th Hussars by a margin of six goals. On the winning side Major Grubb was in form, while Colonel Neilson worked very hard for the 4th Hussars. In the second round the 3rd Hussars were drawn against the 13th Hussars, who had a bye in the first round.

SEMI-FINAL.

2nd Life Guards	beat	*1st Life Guards.*
	Pos.	
	1.	Mr. W. Filmer Sankey.
	2.	Lt.-Col. the Hon. E. H. Wyndham.
	3.	Hon. A. Baillie.
	Bk.	Maj. L. H. Hardy.
10 *goals.*		2 *goals.*

Played at Hurlingham on July 4th. Making an unexpectedly good start, the 1st Life Guards were leading at the end of the opening period by 2—1, but this proved to be the extent of their scoring, and in the end the 2nd Life Guards, who were much the stronger side, won by 10 goals to 2. As the 3rd Hussars had scratched this was the only semi-final, and the 2nd Life Guards therefore met the 17th Lancers in the final.

FINAL.

17th Lancers	beat	*2nd Life Guards.*
10 *goals.*		3 *goals.*

The 17th Lancers, who got into the final without having played a match, defeated the 2nd Life Guards easily. The £1 charged by Hurlingham for entrance to see this match was rather an exorbitant price, in fact as we have already said, it was a mistake not to abandon the tournament. It cannot be much satisfaction to a regiment to get into a final without playing a match, when one thinks of all the exciting ties we have seen in previous Regimental Tournaments.

Digitized by Google

The Subaltern's Cup.

This Cup, played for at Ranelagh, received an entry of seven teams. In the first round the 12th Lancers beat the Royal Horse Guards by 10 goals to 5; Royal Artillery, Woolwich beat the King's Dragoon Guards by 5 goals to 4; the 1st Life Guards beat the Coldstream Guards by 14 goals to 1.

In the semi-final round the 12th Lancers beat the Royal Artillery by 2 goals to 1 and the 1st Life Guards beat the 3rd Hussars by 3 goals to 1.

In the final, played on July 23rd, it was rather a surprise to see the 1st Life Guards beat the 12th Lancers by 7 goals to 3. The Lancers were expected to win easily. Mr. Browne, the Lancer No. 1, broke a leg in the semi-final and was replaced by Mr. M. Donaldson-Hudson. Teams:

	1st Life Guards.		*12th Lancers.*
Pos.		Pos.	
1.	Mr. W. Filmer-Sankey.	1.	Mr. A. S. C. Browne.
2.	Mr. R. C. Jenkinson.	2.	Mr. R. L. McCreery.
3.	Mr. J. A. Emmet.	3.	Mr. W. S. McCreery.
Bk.	Marquess of Blandford.	Bk.	Mr. R. Straker.

The authorities in France are encouraging polo in cavalry regiments in the same way as football. Leave is to be granted to supply a certain number of remounts suitable for polo, and arrangements are to be made for some good polo teams to play matches against cavalry regiments and so teach them the game.

This is a most sporting move, and we are sure French cavalry officers will appreciate it. We should like to see a Cup given to be competed for at Hurlingham every year, open to teams from the Allied armies, on the same lines as the Prince of Wales' Cup at the Horse Show for jumping.

We would not, however, insist on the teams playing in uniform. It would be rather too hot a job.

It is said General de Maudhuy has proposed a scheme to deprive infantry captains of their mounts. Infantry officers will not like this.

The Antwerp polo season has been a great success and several interesting tournaments decided. The 14th Hussars sent a good team from Cologne, greatly strengthened by the inclusion of Major Hurndall, late of the 20th Hussars. This team put up a good fight for the Junior International Challenge Cup, but were beaten by the odd goal, after playing three minutes over time, by Ermonville, mainly owing to the latter team being so much better mounted. In the Open Cup the 14th Hussars defeated Eastcott by 8 goals to 6, a very good performance as the Eastcott team had the American player, Mr. Earl Hopping as No. 3 and Colonel Melvill, the reserve player of the English team in the International matches and a member of the 17th Lancer team, as No. 2.

Digitized by Google

14th Hussars Team.

Pos.		Pos.	
1.	Capt. de Wend-Fenton.	3.	Maj. Hurndall.
2.	Capt. Miller.	4.	Capt. Fooks.

CAVALRY SCHOOL POLO TOURNAMENT.

A most successful Polo Tournament was carried out on the Cavalry School Polo Ground, Netheravon, from August 2nd to 6th.

Seven teams entered for the Cavalry School Polo Tournament and six teams for the Handicap Tournament.

The following teams entered for the first event: 4th R.I. Dragoon Guards, Cavalry School, Dunstall, Remnants, 1st Life Guards, 3rd King's Own Hussars, 9th Lancers.

1st Round.

Cavalry School *v.* 4th R.I. Dragoon Guards.

After a hard-fought game the Cavalry School won by 3 goals to 2.

Dunstall *v.* Remnants.

This was an excellent hard-fought game throughout; Dunstall, however, were too well ponied and won by 4 goals to 3.

1st Life Guards *v.* 3rd King's Own Hussars.

A great galloping game, the Life Guards scoring 2 goals during the last chukka and won by 3 goals to nil.

2nd Round.

Cavalry School *v.* 9th Lancers.

A fast game throughout; the School, however, showed rather better combination, the final score being 5 goals to 2.

1st Life Guards *v.* Dunstall.

This game was the best of the Tournament, three members of the Dunstall team belonging to the 1st Life Guards. A ding-dong game throughout, the 1st Life Guards winning by 6 goals to 5.

3rd Round.

1st Life Guards (7 goals) *v.* Cavalry School (2).

The game throughout was a splendid one to watch; a real good galloping game, but the superiority of the Life Guards' ponies was clearly seen towards the final chukkas. The winners well deserve their victory and no doubt were the best balanced team entered in the Tournament.

Seven teams entered for the Cavalry School Handicap Tournament, which was contested in the final by 3rd King's Own Hussars *v.* 4th R.I. Dragoon Guards.

Owing to Capt. Dennis Darley having met with a severe accident the day before, a substitute had to be found to replace him, which somewhat disorganized the combination; the 3rd Hussars winning by 3 goals to 0 and thus won the Handicap Tournament.

Digitized by Google

SHOW JUMPING.

At Olympia last June English officers won the Prince of Wales's Cup and Col. Brooke, on Combined Training, won in the jumping contest, in which the armies of seven nations were represented.

At the Aldershot Show Col. Malise Graham was successful in the jumping and several horses from the Cavalry School took prizes.

A Show Jumping Association has been formed to make rules and keep records; it was initiated by that well-known soldier rider, Major C. T. Walwyn, R.H.A.

BOXING.

British Beat French Services.

The annual boxing fixture, British Navy, Army, and Royal Air Force *v.* the French forces, was held in Paris at the Cirque de Paris. The British team was successful in retaining Lord Desborough's Cup, winning 6 events to 3.

In the Officers' Light-weights, Flight-Lieut. Smith (R.A.F.) knocked out Lieut. Maillot (France) in the second round.

ENDURANCE OF ARAB HORSES.

The five days' endurance test under the auspices of the Arab Horse Society was held on the Sussex Downs in September. Last year's test (an initial venture) showed what these horses can do over long distances under heavy weights, thirteen stone being the minimum They were then called upon to do a journey of fifty miles a day for five days, with two compulsory halts; and they were examined by a veterinary surgeon during these daily halts and before and after each day's test, so as to eliminate all possibility of cruelty. Last year Capt. L. Edmunds' Shahzada, the winner, an eight-year-old grey stallion, standing 14.3½, accomplished the journey in thirty-one hours thirty-nine and a half minutes.

With reference to the above it is of interest to mention that in the Nile Campaign of 1885 the 19th Hussars, mounted on Arabs, covered long distances on small rations and very little water. The weight carried was reduced as much as possible, but averaged well over fourteen stone. Between November, 1884, and July, 1885, the summary was:

Killed in action	20
Destroyed	37
Drowned	1
Missing	1
Died	12
Total	71

On many occasions they averaged thirty-one miles a day on a ration of five to six pounds of grain and two gallons of water. During nine months of hard campaign out of 350 horses only twelve died from disease.

Digitized by Google

INDIA.

Owing to the hot weather there is not much to report in the way of sport from India.

Lord Rawlinson, the Commander-in-Chief, has issued an order that no staff officers are to go to their offices after 4.30 p.m. and points out that unless a staff officer keeps himself fit he is no good on active service. This is one of the most useful Army Orders ever published. A man, if he spends most of his time on an office chair, cannot possibly keep himself fit. Lord Rawlinson has set a good example and we see he has been a member of several polo teams that have been successful in polo tournaments. There is time to work and time to play, except during the stress of a big war, when often the twenty-four hours of the day were not long enough to get through the necessary work. However, a man who is fit can get through far more work than a man suffering from dyspepsia from lack of exercise.

In the Viceroy's Staff Cup, played at Simla last May, Lord Rawlinson played in the winning team :

Snowdon.

1	Maj. O. M. Lund.	3	H.E. Lord Rawlinson.
2	Maj. P. M. Macartney.	Bk.	Maj. J. C. R. Gannon.

The Cavalry School won the Coronation Challenge Cup, played at Pachmarhi, beating six teams.

Cavalry School "A."

Pos.		H'cap.	Pos.		H'cap
1	Capt. C. E. Wakeham ..	.. 1	3	Lieut.-Col. D. Robertson ..	.. 2
2	Mr. C. Radcliffe ..	.. 3	Bk.	Capt. E. L. Gilpin ..	.. 3

EGYPT.

In 1920 an Association was founded and is called " Egypt, Sudan and Palestine Polo Association." Major-General Sir G. F. Gorringe is the President. Most matches are of four periods and three ponies will usually be enough for a player.

The Indian Cavalry regiments have returned to India, but the Royal Scots Greys and the 5th Dragoon Guards, both very keen polo regiments, have replaced them.

EXTRACT FROM REGIMENTAL GAME BOOK—THE ROYAL SCOTS GREYS, BELBEIS, EGYPT.

Bags for Winter, November 25th, 1920 to April, 1921.

Duck.	Snipe.	Quail.	Pigeons and Doves.	Various.	Total.
421	2,035	474	1,959	250	5,139

Digitized by Google

Best Days.	Pigeons and Doves.	Quail.	Duck.	Snipe.	Total.	Guns.
December 29th	—	—	80	—	80	5
January 15th-16th ..	—	—	28	266	294	4
January 22nd-23rd and morning of 24th ..	—	—	3	449	452	4
February 6th	—	—	19	284	303	6
March 5th (1½ hrs. in the evening)	—	—	43	—	43	4
March 6th	229	—	—	—	—	5
March 27th	—	118	—	—	—	-

MESOPOTAMIA.

Lovers of horses received a great shock when Mr. Winston Churchill, Colonial Secretary, announced in the House of Commons that 30,000 army horses were to be destroyed in Mesopotamia, owing to the expense of bringing them home. This caused a great outcry and several offers to buy the lot were received. We believe one of the offers has been accepted and so the wholesale slaughter of valuable horses prevented. One wonders why the statement was ever made. Is that much-abused body of public servants (Members of the House of Commons) to be thanked for drawing attention to this serious blunder ?

PALESTINE.

There has been practically no sport during this quarter, beyond sporting efforts against raiders from Trans-Jordania, who periodically provide a little excitement in what would otherwise be a very dull season.

Shooting commences on the 1st September, and there are promises of good shooting if one cares to shoot in what, for Palestine, is a fairly hot summer.

The eventual changes in the Garrison, which will bring the Greys and 5th Dragoon Guards to North Palestine, will, it is hoped, be more or less permanent.

To date, the stay of units has been too indefinite to allow for the making of good polo and football grounds.

Permanent cantonments are being constructed at Jenin and Surafend. When these are completed, Palestine should be a fairly popular station.

To those in North Palestine, the Jordan Valley with its shooting (both at birds and raiding parties) offers perhaps some of the best rough shooting in the world, while to those in South Palestine, although denied any excitement in operations against raiders, there is excellent shooting and a topping riding country.

INTERNATIONAL POLO.

The total cost of polo ponies purchased by the Hurlingham-America Cup Defence Committee for the International Polo Matches, 1921, was £3,575 8s.

The above, when sold at Messrs. Tattersall's on July 4th and subsequent date, realized £3,345 15s.

Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google

RETURN TO the circulation desk of any
University of California Library
or to the
NORTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY
Bldg. 400, Richmond Field Station
University of California
Richmond, CA 94804-4698

ALL BOOKS MAY BE RECALLED AFTER 7 DAYS
2-month loans may be renewed by calling
(415) 642-6233
1-year loans may be recharged by bringing books
to NRLF
Renewals and recharges may be made 4 days
prior to due date

DUE AS STAMPED BELOW

[redacted]

LIBRARY USE AUG 22 '86

PHOTOCOPY NOV 7 '88

DEC 24 1989

Digitized by Google

YD 12992

RETURN TO → CIRCULATION DEPARTMENT
202 Main Library
642-3403

LOAN PERIOD 1	2	3
4	5	6

LIBRARY USE
This book is due before closing time on the last date stamped below

DUE AS STAMPED BELOW

REC. CIR. JUN 1 6 '80
REC. CIR. '80
NOV 12 1984
12 1983
DEC 1 1983
RET'D DEC 5 1983

FORM NO. DD6A 20m 11/78
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY
BERKELEY, CA 94720

Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google